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THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

by

FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN S. J.

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APUD AEDES UNIVERSITATIS GREGORIANAE
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INTRODUCTION

The recent observance of the fifteen-hundredth anniversary of the Council of Chalcedon has focussed the attention of the theological world once more on the men and the ideas that dominated those vital, formative years of the fifth century, during which the Church crystallized its thinking on Christ. As is indicated by the title of the oustanding result of this renewal of scholarly interest, — the collection: *Das Konzil von Chalkedon, Geschichte und Gegenwart,* edited by Grillmeier and Bacht, — a new and deeper understanding of fifth-century christological development is not merely of historical importance, but has vital implications also for modern Christian thought. The basic movements, the key notions of the schools of theology which clashed in the fifth century, have their counterpart in the varying directions taken by present-day writers and thinkers about Christ.

One indispensable element in a clear understanding of this fifth-century christological development, is a firm grasp of the ideas which characterized the two principal schools of thought which were in conflict, namely, the Alexandrian and the Antiochene. In this respect, the Alexandrian school has by far the more favored position. The works of Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria have, for the most part, been preserved in their entirety, and in the original Greek. They have been the object of close study for many centuries.

The Antiochene school, on the other hand, has not met so kind a fate. Of the writings of Eustathius of Antioch and Diodorus of Tarsus we possess only fragments. The condemnation of Nestorius in 431 involved an effective imperial decree that his works should be sought out and destroyed. A similar sentence was passed on the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. The result is that our knowledge of these leading figures of the Antiochene school has been largely based on fragmen-

tary sources, and on what their theological adversaries have preserved for us of their writings.

If, in the past few decades, some of this obscurity has been dispelled, it is largely due to the discovery of ancient manuscripts containing Syriac translations of several works of Theodore of Mopsuestia. These discoveries have brought the hitherto obscure figure of the Bishop of Mopsuestia into the clear light of day. It has become increasingly evident that he is really a key-figure in the whole development of Antiochene theology, as well as the foremost exponent of Antiochene exegesis. If one cannot fully grasp the development of christology in the fifth century without knowing what the Antiochene school stood for, then there is no need of an apology for a study of the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia. This man has every right to stand as the spokesman of his school.

Of Theodore's personal life we still know very little. He was born about the year 350; he prepared for the priesthood in the company of St. John Chrysostom; he was made Bishop of Mopsuestia in Cilicia about the year 392; he exercised this office for thirty-six fruitful years, and died in communion with the Church in the year 428. Three years later Nestorius was condemned at Ephesus. In 553, one hundred and twenty-five years after his death, Theodore of Mopsuestia was declared « impious and heretical » by the Fifth Ecumenical Council, the Council of the « Three Chapters ». The fascinating, and in many respects, tragic story of the events which led up to this official condemnation, has been well told by Msgr. Devreesse in his *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste.* It is not our intention to re-write this history.

The object of the present study is to present a thorough and objective analysis of Theodore's thought on the unity of Christ, on the basis of all the material that is now available. We believe that in this study, the completeness with which the sources are utilized is of peculiar importance. The problem lies in the fact that we still possess very little of Theodore's strictly dogmatic works on the Incarnation. However, the few fragments which remain of these theological treatises give us some important christological development, which shed considerable light on the teaching in the exegetical and catechetical works. Hence, it seems particularly imperative to consider these fragments, as giving us an insight into Theo-

dore's more profound thought on the Incarnation. Unfortunately, however, the greater part of these dogmatic fragments, and the only ones extant in the original Greek, have been preserved for us by Theodore's avowed enemies. The charge has been made by competent scholars that these extracts can be shown in so many instances to have been mutilated, interpolated and otherwise falsified, that one must renounce any attempt to make use of them in assessing Theodore's genuine thought.

The first half of our present study, therefore, is devoted to an investigation of these charges of falsification which have been levelled against the extracts found in sources hostile to Theodore. We believe that this textual problem must de settled before one can begin the purely doctrinal study of his writings. This rather lengthy, but necessary investigation, shows that while in a few cases, extracts have been so amputated from their context as to be definitely misleading, the sweeping charges of interpolation and alteration do not stand up under more detailed examination. In more than one instance, such charges are found to be based on a mistaken identification of texts. In not a single case where the text of an extract differs from the correct parallel in a friendly Syriac or Latin version, have we found the hypothesis of deliberate and malicious alteration on the part of the compiler to be the more probable explanation of the discrepancy. We find that the rejection of these fragments has been based on an absolute confidence in the literal accuracy of certain ancient translators of Theodore: a confidence which does not seem to be warranted.

In view of the conclusions reached in this first part of our work, we believe we are justified in making use of the dogmatic fragments of Theodore in our presentation of his thinking on the unity of Christ. To be sure, their fragmentary character demands that they be considered in the light of all the other evidence which is now available. Hence, it will be observed that in our doctrinal study, we have drawn our conclusions not from a study of isolated fragments alone, but from as wide a basis as possible in all the extant works of Theodore. In doing so, we have looked for the consistent pattern of thought which runs through all of his writings, whether dogmatic, exegetical of catechetical.

This consistent pattern of thought is the necessary key

to a proper understanding of Theodore. The feature of his writings which seems to be responsible for the wide divergence of recent theological opinion in his regard, is the fact that while at times he speaks like an out-and-out Nestorian, at other times he uses such consecrated formulas of orthodoxy as: « two natures united in one person », and insists that Christ is « one Son », and « one Lord ». Our supposition is that he does not really contradict himself; that somehow his basic understanding of these notions is such as to justify both of these modes of expression. It is this basic understanding of terms, the ideology behind the terminology, which we have attempted to grasp and to present. Whether or not we have succeeded will be for others to decide. At least we hope that this study will shed some new light on a thinker whose importance in the history of Christology is becoming ever more widely recognized and clearly understood.

Before closing this introduction the author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to the Rev. I. Ortiz de Urbina, S. J., Rector of the Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies in Rome, for his truly fraternal charity and scholarly patience in directing this work.

Rome, Easter, 1956.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE QUESTION

I. New interest in Theodore of Mopsuestia

The past twenty-five years have seen a marked revival of interest in the writings and doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The initial impulse for this re-awakening was given in 1932 by Mingana's discovery, and publication with an English translation, of a Syriac text of Theodore's Catechetical Homilies [1]. Here, for the first time, modern scholars possessed the complete text of a work in which the Bishop of Mopsuestia presented the faith of the church to his catechumens. Previously we had known this work, variously referred to as *Liber ad Baptizandos* and *Liber de Fide*, only from isolated fragments, most of them found in the Acts of the Second Council of Constantinople. Now that a full text was available, and of a work which expressly set out to expose the teaching of the church, the question was bound to arise whether this new picture of Theodore's christological thought would correspond to the one which had been current since his condemnation for heresy in 553.

Up to 1932, scholars did not have a great deal on which to base a first-hand judgement of the Mopsuestian's doctrine on the Incarnation. The only complete work available was the *Commentary on the Twelve Minor Prophets* [2], which, while interesting to the student of Antiochene exegesis, had almost nothing to offer of christological import. Of the other exegetical works of Theodore, in particular, of his commentary on Genesis, on the Psalms, on the Gospels, and on the major

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[1] A. Mingana, *Woodbrooke Studies*, W. Heffer, and Sons, Cambridge, Vol. V, *Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Nicene Creed*, 1932; Vol. VI, *Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia in the Lord's Prayer and on the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist*, 1933.

[2] Migne, *P.G.*, 66, 123-632.

Epistles of St. Paul, only fragments were known to exist [3]. With regard to the minor Epistles of St. Paul we were more fortunate; Swete had discovered and published, together with existing Greek fragments, a complete Latin translation of Theodore's commentary on the Epistles from *Galatians* to *Philemon*[4]. The second volume of Swete's edition of the *Commentary on the Minor Epistles* also contained, in an appendix, all the known Greek and Latin fragments of Theodore's strictly dogmatic works: his *De Incarnatione, Contra Apollinarem,* and *Contra Eunomium* [5]. Other fragments of the *De Incarnatione,* preserved in Syriac translations, had been published previously by Lagarde and Sachau [6]. Moreover, a complete Syriac text of Theodore's *Controversy with the Macedonians* on the subject of the divinity of the Holy Spirit, had been published with a French translation by Nau in 1913 [7].

It is true that in these works, available prior to the publication of the catechetical homilies in 1932, there is some material of christological import to be found. In particular, the commentary on the minor Epistles of St. Paul contains many passages illustrative of Theodore's view of Christ. But for the most part, it was the fragments of the *De Incarnatione,* preserved in Greek by Leontius of Byzantium, to which one turned when seeking documentation on Theodore's theology. And since these fragments reflected the traditional view, common in the Church since the general acceptance of the condemnation of 553, there was no great stimulus toward the study of this « Father of Nestorianism ».

As we have pointed out, it was the edition of the cat-

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[3] Migne, *P.G.*, 66, 633-968.

[4] H. B. Swete, *Theodori episcopi Mopsuesteni in epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii,* Cambridge, Vol. I, 1880; Vol. II, 1882.

[5] Swete, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 291-322. Most of these fragments are also to be found in Migne, *P.G.*, 66, 969-1020.

[6] P. Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca,* Leipzig, 1858; pp. 100-108 contain the Syriac text of twenty fragments found in Cod. Brit. Mus. Add. 12156, ff. 83v-86. E. Sachau, *Theodori Mopsuesteni fragmenta syriaca,* Leipzig, 1869. This work contains the Syriac text, with a Latin translation, of the fragments found in Cod. Brit. Mus. Add. 14669, as well as a Latin translation (pp. 63-68) of the Theodorean fragments already published by Lagarde.

[7] F. Nau, *Théodore de Mopsueste, Controverse avec les Macédoniens, Patr. Or.* IX, 1913, pp. 637-667.

echetical homilies in 1932 which provided the initial impulse for a new interest in Theodore. But Mingana's was only the first of a series of publications which in the past twenty-five years have made more and more of Theodore's works available to modern scholarship. In 1933, K. Staab supplemented the previous work of Swete by presenting all that the Greek catenae had to offer of Theodore's commentary on the major Epistles: *Romans, I* and *II Corinthians,* and *Hebrews* [8]. Six years later, R. Devreesse published considerable sections of the commentary on Psalms I-LXXX, utilizing an ancient Latin translation, as well as the Greek fragments found in the catenae [9]. In the following year (1940) appeared the Latin translation by Vosté of the complete Syriac text of Theodore's *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John* [10]. Finally, R. Tonneau published a new French translation of the *Catechetical Homilies,* along with a phototypic reproduction of the Syriac manuscript [11].

Naturally, the availability of this new material has excited the interest of scholars in the doctrine of the Bishop of Mopsuestia. The focus of interest has been, as one might expect, in the question whether these new sources will confirm, or clash with, the traditional view of Theodore's christology. Before beginning our presentation, therefore, of the results of recent studies on Theodore's doctrine, it seems well to indicate what the verdict of the past had been, and how this verdict came to be formed. Thus we shall have a standard by which to judge to what extent modern views mark a departure from the judgement that has been current in the Church for the past fourteen hundred years.

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[8] K. Staab, *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche,* Münster i W., 1933, pp. 113-212.

[9] R. Devreesse, *Le Commentaire de Théodore de Mopsueste sur les Psaumes* (I-LXXX), *Studi e Testi* 93, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., 1939.

[10] J. M. Vosté, O. P., *Theodori Mopsuesti Commentarius in Evangelium Iohannis Apostoli* (Versio), *C.S.C.O.,* Script. Syr. Ser. 4, T. 3, Louvain, 1940.

[11] R. Tonneau, O.P., *Les Homélies Catéchétiques de Théodore de Mopsueste, Studi e Testi* 145, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., 1949.

II. Traditional views on Theodore of Mopsuestia

Theodore, Bishop of Mopsuestia from 392 to 428, died in peace and communion with the Church in the same year in which Nestorius ascended the episcopal chair at Constantinople. Although Theodore was under constant attack on the part of the Apollinarist faction, there is no clear proof that during his lifetime his doctrine met opposition from the side of the orthodox. John of Antioch does mention an occasion on which some expression used by Theodore in a sermon caused such scandal among the faithful that the Bishop later retracted it [12]. This has been taken by Jugie to mean that Theodore had publicly denied to Mary the title « Mother of God » [13]. But neither John of Antioch, nor Facundus, who recounts the event, actually tells us what it was that disturbed Theodore's hearers, and the fact that Nestorius was the first to object to the expression used would seem to argue against Jugie's interpretation. On the other hand, Innocent of Maronia supplies a passage which evidently is intended to be the one to which John of Antioch had referred [14]. Here again, Nestorius is said to have been seriously disturbed by the expressions used. But the fact that the Fifth Council also quoted sections of this same « sermon » as coming from the second book of the *De Incarnatione* [15] casts some doubt on the accuracy of Innocent's report.

In any case, apart from this incident of the sermon which scandalized his hearers, there is no evidence that Theodore's christology, during his lifetime, aroused opposition except on the part of the Apollinarists.

Three years after his death, at the Council of Ephesus, the name of Theodore of Mopsuestia was linked with a symbol introduced by a certain Charisius, although the Actio Charisii,

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[12] Letter of John of Antioch to Nestorius, quoted by Facundus Hermianensis, *Pro defensione trium capitulorum*, X, 2; Migne, *P.L.* 67, 771 b-d.

[13] M. Jugie, A.A., *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium ab ecclesia catholica dissidentium*, Tom. V, Paris, 1935, p. 105, note 1.

[14] E. Schwartz, *A.C.O.* IV, 2, p. 70. The same passage is quoted in the Acts of the Fifth Council as coming « ex libello Armenorum »: *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Coll. V., Mansi IX, 241.

[15] *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Coll. IV, Capitula Theodori, 49-50, Mansi IX, 220.

as it appears in the Acts of the Council, does not mention Theodore's name [16]. This « deformed symbol », as it is called, met conciliar condemnation on the grounds of its doctrine on the Incarnation. Cyril of Alexandria's version of the event was that the symbol was « said by those who introduced it to have been the work of Theodore of Mopsuestia », but that the Fathers of the council preferred to ignore the question of its authorship [17]. Whether or not it really was a composition of Theodore's is difficult to determine for lack of positive evidence. It certainly is not the symbol which Theodore explained to his catechumens in the *Catechetical Homilies*. Cyril took the trouble to refute it in his work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* — a fact which suggests that he then took it to be a genuine work of Theodore's. But Theodoret, in his defense of Theodore against Cyril's attack, remarks apropos of this symbol that he could not find it anywhere in the writings of the Mopsuestian [18]. Whatever the truth of the matter is, it is clear that the Fathers at Ephesus did not wish to introduce the question of the orthodoxy of the late Bishop of Mopsuestia.

The question was raised, however, in the years which followed upon the council. First Rabboula, Bishop of Edessa, then Acacius, Bishop of Melitene, finally Cyril of Alexandria, entered serious charges of heterodoxy against Theodore. It is not to our purpose here to go into a detailed account of the sequence of events in this first crisis concerning the memory of Theodore. The historical study has already been done at length by Devreesse [19] and Richard [20]. What interests us here is the nature of the accusations which they brought to bear on Theodore. In substance, they came to this: In the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia we find the same errors of

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[16] *Collectio Atheniensis* 76-77; Schwartz, *A.C.O.* I, 1, 7, pp. 96-106.

[17] Cyril Alex., Ep. 72 *ad Proclum*, Migne *P.G.*, 77, 345 a; Ep. « Legi litteras » *ad Joannem Antiochenum*, Schwartz, *A.C.O.*, I, 5, 315.

[18] J. Flemming, *Akten der ephesinischen Synode vom Jahre 449*, Berlin, 1917, pp. 105-107.

[19] R. Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste, Studi e Testi* 141, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., 1949, pp. 125-161.

[20] M. Richard, « Acace de Mélitène, Proclus de Constantinople et la Grande Arménie », *Mémorial Louis Petit*, Bucarest, 1948, pp. 393-412. See also his review of Devreesse's *Essai* in *Mél. Sc. Rel.*, VIII (1951), 122-125.

which Nestorius has been found guilty. Therefore Theodore is equally to be condemned, and his writings proscribed.

Rabboula of Edessa went so far as to anathematize Theodore and to order all existing copies of his works confiscated, as we know from the letter of Ibas of Edessa to Maris of Persia [21]. A letter of Rabboula to Cyril of Alexandria, preserved in the Acts of the Fifth Council, gives us the precise charge on which he condemned Theodore: it is none other than that of denying that Mary was the Mother of God [22]. In Rabboula's view it was a providential act of God that Nestorius brought this error out into the public, so that it might be recognized and condemned.

For Acacius, too, there was no distinction between the teaching of Theodore and that of Nestorius. In a letter written to Sahak, Catholikos of Armenia, Acacius warns him against « those who are imbued with the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia and the evil poison of Nestorius » [23].

This association of Theodore and Nestorius under the same condemnation gained the weight of first-rate authority when it was adopted by Cyril of Alexandria, the man who was primarily responsible for the downfall of Nestorius. For who was better qualified than he to say in what consisted the Nestorian heresy, and hence, to judge whether Theodore was equally tainted with it?

There can be no doubt that Cyril's verdict on Theodore has been of prime importance in determining the traditional view of the latter's heterodoxy. We find Cyril's attitude toward Theodore expressed in a number of his letters [24]; typical is his statement in the letter to Acacius: « Pretending to detest the teachings of Nestorius, they applaud them in another way, by admiring the teachings of Theodore, although these are tainted with an equal, or rather much more grievous impiety. For Theodore was not the disciple of Nestorius, but rather the other way around, and both speak as from one

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21 Schwartz, *A.C.O.* II, 1, p. 392.

22 « Iste primus exposuit non esse Dei genetricem secundum veritatem sanctam Mariam, tanquam Deo Verbo non recipiente eam quae secundum nos est genituram ». *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Coll. V, Mansi IX, 247- 248.

23 M. Richard, « Acace de Mélitene etc. », p. 396.

24 *Ep.* 55, Migne, *P.G.*, 77, 317 b; *Ep.* 67, *ibid.* 336 b; *Ep.* 69, 340 a-c; *Ep.* 70, 341 a-c; *Ep.* 71, 343-4.

mouth, emitting one and the same poison of heterodoxy from their hearts » [25]. In this same letter to Acacius, Cyril relates how he has taken certain excerpts from the writings of Theodore, as well as of Diodorus, and has refuted them. This evidently is a reference to his work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* — a work of which only fragments have come down to us, mostly in the Acts of the Fifth Council and in the writings of Severus of Antioch [26]. In these fragments we see clearly that Cyril finds in the writings of Theodore the same division of Christ into two persons, the same reduction of the mystery of the Incarnation to a mere indwelling of God in a man by grace and good pleasure, of which Nestorius had been guilty [27].

Although most of Cyril's work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* has been lost, the mere fact that he was known to have written such a work has certainly had a strong influence on the shaping of the traditional view that Theodore was the « Father of Nestorianism ». One might ask at this point whether Cyril's verdict — being the first-hand judgement of the « Doctor of the Incarnation » on the question of Nestorianism — is not enough to settle any question of Theodore's heterodoxy once and for all. As we shall see, those who would absolve Theodore of heresy solve this problem by questioning not Cyril's judgement on doctrine as such, but rather the validity of the sources on which it was based. We shall have to go into this question at length in a subsequent chapter; for the present it suffices that we know what Cyril's judgement on Theodore was, and how it influenced the attitude taken by this followers.

It was not to be expected, of course, that Cyril's judgement on Theodore should be shared by the adherents of the Antiochene school. In fact, John of Antioch and his Oriental synod reacted so violently to the proposal of Proclus, Bishop of Constantinople, that they anathematize certain extracts known to be derived from Theodore's writings, that Cyril himself had to intervene, fearing lest the hard-won peace of 433 be

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[25] *Ep.* 69 *Ad Acacium*, Migne, *P.G.* 77, 340 a-b.

[26] Ph. Pusey, *S.P.N. Cyrilli Abp. Alexandrini in D. Joannis Evangelium*, Vol. III, Oxford, 1872, pp. 511-537. Also in Migne, *P.G.*, 76, 1437-1452.

[27] Migne, *P.G.*, 76, 1443 c; 1445 b-c.

put in jeopardy [28]. And we have already mentioned how Theodoret of Cyr took up his pen in defense of Diodorus and Theodore, against Cyril's work which had charged them with Nestorianism [29]. Similarly, the extreme measures taken by Rabboula, Bishop of Edessa, met sharp criticism from the pen of Ibas, particularly in his famous letter to Maris of Persia. When Rabboula died, in 435, and Ibas succeeded him to the episcopacy, the official attitude toward Theodore at Edessa changed from severe prohibition to enthusiastic devotion. It was at this period, at the school of Edessa, that many of Theodore's works were translated into Syriac, thus becoming the theological heritage of the so-called Nestorian church of Syria and Persia.

It was in connection with the letter of Ibas of Edessa to Maris of Persia that Theodore's name was introduced into the proceedings of the Council of Chalcedon. In criticizing the rigid measures taken by Rabboula against the writings of Theodore, Ibas had referred to the Bishop of Mopsuestia as a « herald of truth and doctor of the Church » [30]. As this letter had been instrumental in bringing about the condemnation and deposition of Ibas at the « Robber-Synod » of Ephesus of 449, it was also introduced as evidence at Chalcedon, during the process for his rehabilitation. Thus the Fathers of Chalcedon listened to the words of Ibas which both extolled Theodore as a doctor of the Church, and accused Cyril of the heresy of Apollinarism. After this letter had been read, the legate of the Roman See, Paschasinus, declared: « Cognovimus ex sententia reverentissimorum episcoporum Ibam reverentissimum episcopum innoxium demonstratum. Lecta enim ejus epistola, cognovimus eum esse orthodoxum ... » [31]. And following Paschasinus, the other Fathers of the Council gave their votes, favorable to the reinstatement of Ibas in his see [32].

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[28] Cyril Alex. *Ep.* 72 *Ad Proclum*, Migne *P.G.* 77, 344-5.

[29] Only a few fragments of this work of Theodoret remain, mostly preserved in the acts of the « Robber-Synod » of Ephesus, published by J. Flemming (*op. cit.*), Abhandl. der Kön. Gesellschaft zu Göttingen, Philolog.-Hist. Klasse, N.F. Bd. XV, n. 1, Berlin, 1917. Another fragment is found in the *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Coll. V, Mansi IX, 252-254.

[30] Schwartz, *A.C.O.* II, 1, p. 392.

[31] Facundus, *Pro defensione trium capitulorum*, V, 1, Migne *P.L.* 67, 629 b. Schwartz takes these to be the exact words spoken by Paschasinus on this occasion; *A.C.O.* II, 1, p. 398 *ad calc.*

[32] Schwartz, *A.C.O.*, II, 1, 398-401.

Can it be said that this incident at Chalcedon is in any sense a conciliar approbation of the statement of Ibas praising Theodore as a « doctor of the Church », and thus indirectly, an approbation of the doctrine of Theodore? This would seem to be a rather difficult position to maintain, for if the decision to reinstate Ibas is to be interpreted as an approbation of everything said in his letter, one would be forced to conclude that the Fathers of Chalcedon also agreed with the statement that Cyril, in his reaction against Nestorianism, had fallen into the error of Apollinaris. As this latter supposition is manifestly absurd — Cyril was a standard of orthodoxy for Chalcedon, as Galtier has clearly shown [33] — one must conclude that the Council meant to ignore both of these personal judgements passed by Ibas, and simply to accept the orthodoxy of his faith, and the sincerity of his repudiation of Nestorianism. If it were really significant that the Council of Chalcedon « listened to the praise of Theodore without manifesting the least sign of disapproval » [34], it would also have to be significant that it listened to Ibas' attack on Cyril without disapproval. As is clear in the votes of most of the Fathers, the deciding factor in the case of Ibas is that he is now willing to anathematize Nestorius and his teachings, and to subscribe to the Tome of Leo and the decrees of Chalcedon. It is true that Paschasinus declares that the reading of Ibas' letter has shown him to be orthodox. And Maximus of Antioch says much the same, in his vote [35]. But it seems an unwarranted leap to conclude that they thereby meant to give their stamp of approval to the personal judgement he passed either on Cyril or on Theodore.

The only safe conclusion, then, concerning the attitude of the Fathers of Chalcedon towards Theodore of Mopsuestia is that the question of his orthodoxy simply did not come up for discussion. Is that fact in itself significant, in view of the well-known charges made by Cyril in his *Contra Diodorum et Theo-*

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[33] « Saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie et saint Léon le Grand à Chalcédoine », *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Grillmeier-Bacht, Würzburg, Vol. I, 1951, pp. 345-387.

[34] Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 168.

[35] Diepen asserts that Paschasinus is the only one to declare the letter orthodox. But the « brief allusion » of Maximus of Antioch seems no less a declaration of its orthodoxy. See H. M. Diepen, *Les Trois Chapitres au Concile de Chalcédoine*, Oosterhout, 1953, p. 97, and Schwartz, *A.C.O.*, II, 1, 399.

dorum [36]? Or cannot that be explained merely for the reason that the Council had many other more immediate and pressing problems facing it, and preferred to abstain, as councils generally do, from attempting to solve disputes which were not immediately within its agenda?

Recently, however, broad conclusions have been drawn from the silence of Chalcedon regarding Theodore. K. McNamara found the fact that Theodore incurred no dishonour at Chalcedon « significant, as indicating its awareness of his positive contribution to the development of the doctrine enshrined in its canons » ... and « as a witness to the Council's conviction of Theodore's good faith in all that he had written » [37]. With all due respect, we must confess that these conclusions seem to exceed the premises; how can one safely define so precise and positive an attitude on the basis of the Council's silence? With the rampant heresy of Eutyches to stamp out, and the wrongs of the « Robber Synod » to right, the Fathers of Chalcedon may well have felt that they had enough work to do without attempting to settle the controversy between Cyril and Theodoret on the orthodoxy of the late Bishop of Mopsuestia. Without doubt there were many disciples of Cyril present who would have subscribed to the view expressed in the *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum;* it is equally likely that there were those who would have seconded Theodoret's reply to that work. But Theodore of Mopsuestia was not the issue at Chalcedon; one should be slow to draw conclusions from the fact that it did not discuss him. As far as the formation of a traditional view of Theodore is concerned, the most important influence of the Council of Chalcedon seems to be the fact that it indirectly inspired ardent defenders of Theodore's orthodoxy among the sixth-century Western theologians who looked upon the condemnation of the « Three Chapters » as a reversal of Chalcedon. It is clear that the motive for the passionate defense of Theodore's writings by Facundus [38] and Pelagius [39] is not any deep ideological sympa-

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[36] See Devresse, *Essai*, p. 168, « ... il (le concile) semblait ignorer qu'il y eût une attaque de Cyrille d'Alexandrie contre Diodore et Théodore ».

[37] K. McNamara, « Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy », *The Irish Theological Quarterly*, XIX (1952), 255.

[38] Facundus Hermianensis, *Pro defensione trium capitulorum*, Migne, *P.L.* 67, 527-852.

thy with his theological system, but the fear that the authority of Chalcedon would be impaired by his condemnation — a fear based on the fact that the Council seemed to have given its tacit approval to the high praise of Theodore in the letter of Ibas.

As far as the cases of Ibas himself, and Theodoret are concerned, there seem to be some grounds for the fear that decisions made at Chalcedon were being reversed at Constantinople [40]. But in the case of Theodore, it was surely an exaggeration to see a conciliar judgement expressed in the way Ibas' praise of him was heard without comment. As we have seen, the charge of Apollinarism against Cyril in the same letter was equally ignored, and one could hardly conclude to the Council's attitude on Cyril from that fact. It seems most realistic to say that Chalcedon expressed no official attitude on Theodore; that it simply did not discuss the orthodoxy of his writings, but left the question open to the controversy of theologians.

In the century which separated Chalcedon from the Second Council of Constantinople, this controversy over the memory of the Bishop of Mopsuestia, far from dying out, grew steadily in bitterness. If one might adopt the usual political lines of cleavage: on the far right, in their devotion to the writings of the Mopsuestian, were the descendants of the school of Edessa, who moved to Nisibis in 489, and there determined the theology of the Church in the Persian Empire. This Church of Persia, commonly referred to as the Nestorian Church, regarded Cyril of Alexandria as an out-and-out heretic, but canonized Theodore of Mopsuestia as its great doctor, both in theology and in exegesis. A number of the canons of their councils have come down to us, wherein the doctrine of Theodore is prescribed as a rule of faith from which no one may deviate without incurring anathema [41].

At the other end of the scale, we find the monophysites of all the varying shades, for whom Theodore of Mopsuestia ranks

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[39] *Pelagii Diaconi Ecclesiae Romanae In defensione trium capitulorum*, ed. R. Devreesse, *Studi e Testi*, 57, Città del Vaticano, bibl. Ap. Vat., 1932.

[40] Decisions rather disciplinary than dogmatic, and not forming part of the ecumenical decrees, since this part of the council's work did not receive papal confirmation. Thus Diepen, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-103.

[41] J. B. Chabot, *Synodicon Orientale, ou Recueil de Synodes Nestoriens*, Paris, 1902, pp. 400; 459; 476; 561.

with Nestorius as the most impious of heretics. Such, for example, is Severus of Antioch, in whose writings a number of extracts of Theodore have been preserved for us simply because Severus proposed them as examples to prove the rampant Nestorianism of their author. Here, too, we see the influence of Cyril of Alexandria at work, since Severus derives not only his attitude toward Theodore, but also his citations, from Cyril's *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum*. Another sect with monophysitic tendencies, the Acephales, produced a diatribe against Theodore, of which fragments have been preserved by Facundus, who refutes it at length in his defense of the « Three Chapters ».

But there is no greater agreement on the question of Theodore in between these two extreme parties — among those who accept both Ephesus and Chalcedon. The most vociferous proponents of Cyril's attitude on Theodore are those for whom the formula « Unus de Trinitate passus est carne » will become the tessera of orthodoxy, designed to unmask the disguised adherents of « Nestorianism ». For such as John Maxentius [42] and Innocent of Maronia [43] the positive signs of latent Nestorianism are the refusal to accept the dictum « Unus de Trinitate », and partiality for the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Who were these « latent Nestorians » against whom Innocent of Maronia wrote his treatise? It is difficult to say; Devreesse ventures the conjecture that they were the « Acemetes » of Constantinople, whom he calls « staunch defenders of the Council of Chalcedon, and well-known dyophysites » [44]. It may well be that their resistance to such formulas as the « Unus de Trinitate » was founded on their attachment to the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, but there is no certain evidence to prove that this was the case. In fact, one does not find a record of Eastern theologians of this period who actually entered the lists with a defense of the theology of the Mopsuestian. The defendants of his memory all came from the Western Church, and

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[42] *Libellus fidei oblatus legatis apostolicae sedis Constantinopolim*: Schwartz, *A.C.O.* IV, 2, pp. 3-10.

[43] *De his qui unam ex Trinitate vel unam subsistentiam seu personam Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum dubitant confiteri*, Schwartz, *A.C.O.* IV, 2, pp. 68-74.

[44] Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 193. Evidently some of them at least must have gone too far in their dyophysism, for they earned a condemnation by Pope John II as « evident Nestorians ». See Schwartz, *A.C.O.* IV, 2, 210.

were men motivated clearly by zeal for the integrity of the Council of Chalcedon, rather than for the particular brand of theology which Theodore had taught. Precisely who the partisans for Theodore were in the East at this time we do not know. The edicts of Justinian speak darkly of « Nestorians who attempt to renew their heresy through the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia » [45]. As any proponent of Theodore would automatically have been « Nestorian » in Justinian's eyes, this may be taken simply to mean that there were those in the East who favored Theodore's theology and propagated his writings. The *Life of St. Sabas* mentions in passing certain monks from Palestine who championed the cause of Theodore in a controversy at Constantinople with the sect known as the Aposchistes [46]. And the same source mentions a supplication sponsored by Peter, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, against the condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia by Justinian [47]. Other than that, the sixth-century partisans of Theodore in the East remain anonymous.

His enemies, however, are well known. Devreesse has treated in great detail the sequence of events that led to Theodore's condemnation in 553. Of capital importance seems to be Justinian's condemnation of Origen in 543; for in this is seen the motive for the campaign against Theodore's memory conducted by Theodore Askidas, a powerful figure at the court of Justinian. It was this Theodore Askidas, a zealous Origenist, who instigated the imperial campaign against Theodore of Mopsuestia in order to revenge the condemnation of his hero by the equal condemnation of the man who had done the most to discredit Origen's allegorism [48]. Theodore Askidas's successful argument with Justinian is said to have been the proposition that he could reconcile the Monophysites once and for all by correcting their impression that Chalcedon had approved of Ibas' praise of Theodore of Mopsuestia and his blame for Cyril of Alexandria, and that it had approved of the writings of Theodoret against Cyril. Condemn Theodore, condemn the let-

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[45] « *Typos* » of Justinian: Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1039 d. *Ep.* « *Grammata* », Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1043 d.

[46] Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis, Leben des Sabas, Texte u. Untersuchungen*, 49, 2, Leipzig, 1939, p. 176, lines 7-9.

[47] *Ibid.* p. 194, lines 19-27.

[48] Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 205.

ter of Ibas, condemn the writings of Theodoret against Cyril, it was argued, and you will have a united Empire.

Whatever the persuasion might have been, it is certain that Justinian became convinced of the need to condemn these « Three Chapters », and thus became Theodore's most implacable and most powerful enemy. A year after the condemnation of Origen appeared the document of Justinian known as his « Typos »; in this Theodore of Mopsuestia is roundly denounced as a heretic and blasphemer [49].

Richard believes that the condemnation of Origen was the motive of another weighty attack on the memory of the Bishop of Mopsuestia — this time by Leontius the Hermit, or Leontius of Byzantium, the author of the three books *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* [50]. The third of these books [51] is a bitter attack on Theodore, in which Richard sees reproduced, detail for detail, the structure of Justinian's edict against Origen, which had appeared just a year or so before. Richard's proof that Leontius of Byzantium was actually an Origenist seeking revenge does not strike us as powerfully convincing — but the question is too complicated to be gone into here. The main fact is that this Leontius entered the lists with a treatise against Theodore which has preserved for us the only Greek fragments extant of the latter's work *De Incarnatione* [52]. This treatise has been of primary importance in determining the attitude taken toward the christology of Theodore; it not only contributed material toward the process of his condemnation in 553, but has been the major source from which later theologians, until very recently, have drawn their knowledge of his theology. For this reason it will be necessary to speak at greater length of Leontius' work in a subsequent chapter. For our present purpose it suffices to note that he was at one with Cyril and Justinian in their view of Theodore as the « Father of Nestorianism ».

And this was the view which received conciliar approval at Constantinople in 553. As is well known, it was Justinian's theology (neo-chalcedonianism, as it is currently termed) and

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[49] Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1035-1041.

[50] M. Richard, « Léonce de Byzance, était-il origeniste? », *Revue des Etudes Byzantines*, 1947, pp. 31-66.

[51] Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1357-1396.

[52] These fragments are not printed with the rest of Leontius' treatise in Migne *P.G.* 86, but are found among the dogmatic fragments of Theodore in *P.G.* 66, 972-1004.

Justinian's view on the « Three Chapters », which were defined by the subservient council. The anathema pronounced by Justinian in his « Homologia » of 551 appears almost verbatim as the twelfth conciliar canon, which declares not only the writings of Theodore, but also his person, to be impious and heretical [53]. It was this second part against which Pope Vigilius long held out; he willingly censured the extracts presented to him, as teaching Nestorianism; but long refused to anathematize one who had died in the peace and communion of the Church. At last, however, he capitulated, and confirmed the condemnation of the « Three Chapters » in his epistle of 23 February, 554 [54].

We have already mentioned the opposition which Justinian's measures against the « Three Chapters » met on the part of Western theologians, who saw involved a derogation of the authority of the Council of Chalcedon. Facundus, African Bishop of Hermiane, published his *Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum* about the year 547; another outspoken defendant of Theodore was Pelagius, the deacon of Pope Vigilius, who boldly reprimanded Vigilius for what he considered his weakness in signing the confirmatory decree [55]. Both Facundus and Pelagius entered strong pleas for the orthodoxy of Theodore's writings; both charged that there had been falsification of texts and omission of explanatory context in the extracts scrutinized; both expressed doubt as to the authenticity of the work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* attributed to Cyril of Alexandria [56].

And the opposition to the decrees of the Fifth Council did not stop with theological treatises: it developed into open schism on the part of the powerful North-Italian sees of Aquileia and Milan. Pelagius, who as deacon had complained bitterly against Vigilius' acceptance of the decrees, succeeded that unfortunate Pope as the Successor of Peter, and thus found himself in the opposite camp, having to uphold the honor of the Holy See which was now irrevocably committed to uphold the Council. He publicly retracted his defense of the « Three Chapters », and strove mightily to convince his Western brethren

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[53] See Justinian's *Confessio Rectae Fidei*, Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1018, and *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Coll. VIII, Mansi IX, 383-386; also in Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 224-225.

[54] Schwartz, *A.C.O.* IV, 2, pp. 166-168.

[55] *Pelagii Diaconi Ecclesiae Romanae In defensione trium capitulorum*, ed. R. Devreesse, *Studi e Testi*, 57.

[56] Facundus: *P.L.* 67, 729-731; Pelagius, ed. Devreesse, pp. 28-30.

that Constantinople II had in no way abrogated the dogmatic decrees of Chalcedon. However, the impression that Chalcedon had been repudiated at Constantinople took deep root in the West, and it took the succeeding Popes — including Gregory the Great — over half a century to overcome the opposition in Northern Italy. At last, however, papal authority prevailed, and the Second Council of Constantinople, recognized by the Holy See as ecumenical since the day when Vigilius signed its decrees, came to be recognized as such by the whole western Church [57].

With this acceptance of the solemn anathema of the council of 553, the question of Theodore's christological errors appeared to be settled once and for all. He was to go down in the history of theology as the Father of Nestorianism — as one who taught that Christ was one person, and the Divine Word another, and thus denied that Christ was God [58].

As far as can be determined, no dissenting voice to this verdict was heard in the centuries that followed, except from beyond the border of the Empire, in the separated « Nestorian » Church of Persia. One might be tempted to think that the « adoptionist » heresy of the eighth century in Spain grew out of excessive devotion to the writings of the Bishop of Mopsuestia. Certainly there are many points of contact between the two systems of thought [59]. But there is no evidence of any direct influence of one upon the other.

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[57] On the question of the ecumenical character of the decrees of the Fifth Council, see Ch. Moeller, « Le Ve Concile Oecumenique et le magistère ordinaire au VIe siècle », *Rev. Sc. phil. et theol.* XXXV (1951), 413-423. Moeller's thesis is that, since the council was in open schism from the Pope at the time when the conciliar canons were adopted, only those canons are to be considered ecumenical decrees which received explicit confirmation by Pope Vigilius in his letter of 23 February, 554. But in this letter only the canons condemning the « Three Chapters » are mentioned; hence the dogmatic canons have no ecumenical value. Moeller further points out that in their efforts to reduce the Italian schism, the Popes did not demand formal acceptance of the decrees condemning the « Three Chapters ». But there can be no doubt about the fact that Pope Gregory the Great looked upon these decrees as definitive. See his Synodal Letter to the Oriental Patriarchs of February, 591 (Reg. I, 24) — « ... quintum quoque concilium pariter veneror, in quo ... Theodorus ... ad impietatis perfidiam cecidisse convincitur ... ».

[58] *Conc. Const. II*, Coll. VIII, Mansi IX, 383-386. Denz. 224.

[59] Amann describes the doctrine of Elipand as « ... une terminologie, une théologie aussi, où les vieux maîtres d'Antioche, un Diodore de Tarse,

Typical of the attitude toward Theodore of Mopsuestia among the scholastics is the chapter of St. Thomas' *Summa contra Gentiles* entitled: « De errore Theodori Mopsuesteni circa unionem Verbi ad hominem » [60]. In this chapter, St. Thomas makes no distinction between the teaching of Theodore and the heresy of Nestorius; both taught that Christ was a mere man, in whom God the Word dwelt by grace, as in the saints. If this man and the Divine Word are called one « person », this can mean only an affective union, involving for the man a share in the divine names, and even in adoration, but not justifying for Mary the title « Mother of God ».

This view of Theodore as the author of the Nestorian heresy has been a common-place not only for Catholic, but also for Protestant historians of dogma. There is little difference in this regard, for instance, between Harnack's judgement on Theodore, and that of Tixeront; if anything, Harnack's view is the more severe of the two [61].

We can conclude this survey of past attitudes towards Theodore — by past, I mean prior to 1932 — by citing the letter of Pope Pius XI in commemoration of the fifteen-hundredth anniversary of the Council of Ephesus: the Encyclical « Lux Veritatis » of December 25, 1931. The Pope is speaking of the heresy of Nestorianism [62]:

> Totius controversiae, ut omnes norunt, Nestorius auctor fuit; non quod ipse novam ingenio studioque suo pepererit doctrinam, cum potius eam a Theodoro Mopsuesteno episcopo mutuatus sit, eamque fusuis enucleatam novitatisque specie indutam magno cum verborum sententiarumque apparatu, ut erat dicendi copia praestans, efferre omnique nisu evulgare coepit.

Here is clearly reflected the traditional attitude: Theodore of Mopsuestia is the « Nestorian before Nestorius », the true author of the christological heresy condemned at Ephesus.

A year after this encyclical, appeared the first edition of the newly-discovered catechetical homilies, inaugurating a new period in the discussion of Theodore's christology.

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un Théodore de Mopsueste, se seraient reconnus ». « L'adoptionisme espagnol du XIIIe siecle », *Rev. des Sc. Rel.* XVI (1936), 281.

[60] Lib. IV, cap. 34; ed. Marietti, Romae, 1920, pp. 470-476.

[61] A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 5th ed., Tübingen, 1931, II, 340-343; J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*, III (4th ed., Paris, 1919), pp. 14-22.

[62] *A.A.S.* 1931, p. 496.

III. Recent Discussion of Theodore's Christology

In the following pages, it is our intention to present, in summary fashion, the conclusions to which scholars have come in their study of Theodore's christology in the light of the newly-discovered material that has been made available in the past twenty-five years. In this presentation, it is not our purpose to review each article in great detail, nor to express a personal criticism, whether of agreement or disagreement, with the opinions expressed. In the course of our own study of Theodore's christology, it will be necessary to enter into detailed consideration of points raised by these scholars. But in what follows, our aim is simply to indicate, objectively, what has been said about Theodore's christology in the past twenty-five years.

The advantage of this method is that such a survey will indicate on what points there is general agreement, and on what points there is divergency of opinion. This will obviate the need of going over common ground, and point more precisely to the areas wherein further study must be done in order to reach satisfactory conclusions. It will be precisely the scope of this thesis to define wherein lie the unanswered problems on Theodore's christology, and to attempt to reach a solution. Undoubtedly, the question uppermost in the minds of all of these investigators has been whether or not these new sources really betray the Nestorianism of which Theodore has stood convicted these fifteen centuries. Our survey will show that this basic question has not received a unanimous reply. In fact, the wide difference of opinion on this fundamental question is the justification of the present thesis. We have described the history of Theodore's theological reputation in some detail, to show how the early conflict over his orthodoxy finally settled into a uniform view with the acceptance of the decrees of Constantinople. The modern research seems to have returned the problem to where it was in the fifth century; it is as if Cyril and Theodoret were again exchanging their broad-sides. Let us see what the modern followers of Cyril and Theodoret have been saying.

E. Amann was the first to publish a detailed discussion of the christology of the newly-discovered catechetical homilies [63].

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[63] E. Amann, « La doctrine christologique de Théodore de Mopsueste

In contrast with the traditional view of Theodore as one who had « divided Christ » into two persons, Amann notes that in these catecheses it is the unity of Christ which comes to the fore. Of the third Homily, Amann remarks: « Without any exaggeration, one may say that the subject treated is this: the unity of person of the historical Christ in the duality of his natures » [64]. Of the conclusion to the seventh Homily, he remarks that it leaves no doubt as to the thought of Theodore. « Each nature has its distinct operations, but the act of these operations must be attributed to a unique subject » [65]. Amann admits that Theodore's theological explanation of the unity in Christ is not adequate; that his concept of « inhabitation » is deficient; that his idea of the « assumption » by the Word of a true man leaves room for many obscurities. But, he argues, one cannot reproach Theodore for not having anticipated the terminology and the doctrine which Leontius of Byzantium elaborated a century after Ephesus and Chalcedon. He concludes that, with a few slight corrections, these Catecheses could have been pronounced before an audience of Western bishops and doctors without producing in his hearers anything but a great admiration for the piety and learning of their author [66].

A year after these laudatory lines were written, appeared another study of the same Catechetical Homilies — this time from the pen of M. Jugie [67]. One could hardly come to a more contradictory opinion. Jugie writes of this newly-discovered work that it amply confirms what one already knew — namely, that Theodore is the true Father of Nestorianism. He finds in the Homilies clear proof that Theodore really sees in Jesus Christ two distinct personalities; that his attempt to unite them in one « prosopon » is superficial, and leaves two distinct beings: the Word, and Jesus, for whom Theodore's formula is « alius in alio », and not the formula of Catholic orthodoxy:

(à propos d'une publication récente) », *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, XIV (1934), 161-190.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 179, note 1.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[67] M. Jugie, A.A., « Le *Liber ad baptizandos* de Théodore de Mopsueste », *Echoes d'Orient*, XXXIV (1935), 257-271. The same views are found in the chapter which Jugie devoted to the doctrine of Theodore in

« unus et idem » [68]. Jugie concludes: « Le vrai père du Nestorianisme dans ses formules les plus criardes est l'évêque de Mopsueste » [69].

Several years later, when discussing the « Nestorianism » of Theodore's doctrine on the sacraments, W. De Vries had occasion to mention the sharply divergent views expressed by Amann and Jugie on the orthodoxy of the Catechetical Homilies [70]. It is De Vries' opinion that the verdict must be given unreservedly to Jugie, and that Amann's attempt to clear Theodore of the charge of heresy must be considered a failure. De Vries sees the fundamental error of Theodore as nothing less than the denial of the basic fact of Christianity: that God has in truth become Man: that one and same is God and Man in One Person. It is his view that while Theodore wished to remain faithful to the traditional formulae of orthodoxy (One Person, One Son, etc.) his thought is really dominated by a rationalistic tendency which led him to deny the substance of the mystery of the Incarnation [71].

The appearance of the Catechetical Homilies, therefore, brought no uniform solution to the question of Theodore's « Nestorianism ». The publication of the *Commentary on Psalms I-LXXX* by Devreesse in 1939 brought no more unanimous a response. In his analysis of this commentary, Amann displayed the same sympathy for Theodore's basic orthodoxy as he had shown regarding the Homilies [72]. In his view, the reason why people condemned Theodore for Nestorianism is that they made a kind of bogey-man of the expression « homo assumptus » [73]. Thus, he remarks apropos of Theodore's exegesis of Psalm II: « Provided that one excludes all prejudice, and defines clearly what is meant by *homo assumptus*, all these explanations of Theodore can be taken in good part » [74]. Theo-

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his *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium ab ecclesia catholica dissidentium*, Tom. V (Paris, 1935), pp. 90-110.

[68] « Le *Liber ad baptizandos* etc. », p. 259.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[70] W. De Vries, S.J., « Der 'Nestorianismus' Theodors von Mopsuestia in seiner Sakramentenlehre », *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, VII (1941), 91-148.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 92-93.

[72] E. Amann, « Un nouvel ouvrage de Théodore de Mopsueste », *Rev. des Sc. Rel.* XX (1940), 491-528.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 520.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 516.

dore, on occasion, « did not watch carefully enough over his vocabulary; » on another he « used a rather poor figure to express the mystery of the ineffable union ». But Amann is clearly convinced that his basic thought is sound.

The study of the same texts of the *Commentary on Psalms I-LXXX* brought J. M. Vosté to the opposite conclusion [75]. He finds it impossible not to see expressed in them the doctrine of union by mere inhabitation, from which results the divinity of the Man Christ by mere exterior, honorific designation. As Vosté sees it, for Theodore the mystery of the Incarnation supposes no more than a moral union of grace and honor between the « man assumed » and the Word. Thus the Christ is born and dies as mere man; in reality he is no more God than are the faithful, who are temples of the Holy Spirit and adoptive sons of God, having become by grace « divinae consortes naturae » [76].

Vosté's critical view was shared by Diekamp [77], to whom the Christology of the Psalm-commentary showed the tendency to conceive of the divinity and humanity of Christ as two subsistent individualities, as two persons, two Sons. Between the Divine Word and the « man assumed » by Him, Diekamp sees Theodore place not only a distinction of nature, but also a distinction of Person [78].

Diekamp's criticism received a reply from A. Vaccari, who studied the christology of the same *Commentary on the Psalms* [79]. Vaccari admits that Theodore favored expressions which later became the by-words of Nestorianism — scil. « union by inhabitation of the Word in a man », and « the flesh as clothing for the Word ». But he argues that the Nestorian error was to take these concepts in a limitative sense, as though nothing more were required for an adequate idea of the Incarnation. Thus they came to put between the two natures of Christ a merely modal, rather than

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[75] J. M. Vosté, O.P., « Théodore de Mopsueste sur les Psaumes », *Angelicum*, XIX (1942), 179-198.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[77] F. Dickamp, Review of Devreesse's edition of the Commentary of Theodore on Psalms I-LXXX, in *Theologische Revue XL* (1941), 156-159.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[79] A. Vaccari, S.J., « In margine al commento di Teodoro Mopsuesteno ai Salmi », *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, I (*Studi e Testi*, 121), Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., 1946, pp. 175-198.

a substantial union. « Che tale sia il pensiero di Teodoro nel commento ai Salmi non si potrebbe affermare, e sembra piuttosto escluso dall'unità di persona, che da lui vedemmo ripetutamente asserita nella maniera più chiara e categorica » [80].

In the studies which we have so far discussed, the question at issue was the christology of a particular work of Theodore. In 1946, in Volume XV of the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique,* appeared the article « Théodore de Mopsueste » by E. Amann, wherein for the first time we find a synthesis of Theodore's christology, based on all the material which is now available [81]. It is important to notice Amann's method here: he bases his exposition of Theodore's doctrine on the *Catechetical Homilies,* but where occasion calls for it, he refers to the more technical theology of the fragments of the *De Incarnatione* and the *Contra Apollinarem.* He finds no contradiction between these two sources, but rather, for the most part, confirmation of one by the other, even though these fragments have been culled by enemies, who picked out only such passages as stressed the distinction of natures and the autonomy of the humanity of Christ. Amann asks: « Who knows whether these texts may have been framed in a synthesis as powerful as that of the eighth Catechesis, and where there was expressed an equal care to throw into relief the unity of the Person of Jesus, Son of God? » [82].

We have already seen Amann's judgement on the christology of the *Catechetical Homilies* and the *Commentary on the Psalms.* In this complete synthesis, he admits that, in his more technical works, Theodore pushed some of his deductions to an extreme, and came to some disquieting (although perhaps not wholly inexact) conclusions. « Le Christ du *De Incarnatione* ou du *Contra Apollinarem* risquerait parfois de faire figure de 'grand inspiré' plutôt que celle de Fils de Dieu » [83]. Hence, after Theodore, work remained to be done, to conciliate the correct doctrine of the two concrete, complete and operating natures with the affirmation of the

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80 *Ibid.,* p. 183.
81 *D.T.C.,* XV, 1, cols. 235-279.
82 *Ibid.,* col. 266.
83 *Ibid.,* col. 278.

unique Person. Theodore had affirmed this unity vigorously, but had not been so fortunate in finding a satisfactory metaphysical explanation of it. However, in the light of the doctrine of the *Catechetical Homilies,* Amann is satisfied with the basic orthodoxy of Theodore's thought. He concludes: « Le dyophysisme Chalcédonienne a trouvé en lui sa plus claire et sa plus ferme expression » [84].

Two years later appeared the monumental *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* by R. Devreesse [85]. Here, for the second time, we find a synthesis of Theodore's christology [86]. But there are two important differences in the method used. First: Devreesse expresses no personal, theological opinion on the doctrine presented, although one justifiably concludes, from the whole tone of the *Essai,* that he considers Theodore's orthodoxy quite satisfactory [87]. In fact, in Devreesse's synthesis, one finds a series of perfectly orthodox statements, woven into a sound treatise on the Incarnation — but none of these elements in Theodore's language which have « disquieted » Amann, and have been clear proof of heterodoxy for so many other scholars.

Secondly, — and this is in great measure the reason for the first difference — Devreesse simply has not taken into account the doctrine of the fragments which have come down to us through Theodore's enemies: through Cyril, Leontius, Justinian and the Fifth Council. And this despite the fact that in these sources we have the only Greek witness to the *De Incarnatione,* and practically all that we possess of the *Contra Apollinarem.* Devreesse's reason for this omission is clearly presented in another part of his *Essai*: it is because he has concluded that this « hostile tradition » not only gives a one-sided view, but can be shown in so many instances to be deliberately corrupted that it is completely unreliable and merits no consideration from one who wants to know what

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84 *Ibid.,* col. 278.

85 R. Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste, Studi e Testi,* 141, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., 1948.

86 *Ibid.,* pp. 109-118.

87 Thus, on p. 285: « On découvrira dans son système des lacunes ou des exagérations: est-ce une raison valable pour continuer à lui imputer des erreurs qu'il n'a pas soutenues ou paraître lui reprocher la date de sa naissance? ».

Theodore actually taught [88]. In this view, Devreesse is strongly supported by the studies of M. Richard, who declares flatly that historians of dogma should renounce any effort to derive their knowledge of the doctrine of Theodore from the dogmatic fragments found in Migne or Swete [89]. He believes that these fragments are all derived from an early florilegium of Theodorean texts, taken out of context, interpolated and falsified by « those notorious forgers, the Apollinarists » [90]. Hence, in the view of Devreesse and Richard, it is no longer a question of using these fragments with caution; one simply cannot use them at all. As is obvious, this poses a critical problem in the study of Theodore's christology, and we shall have to return to it at greater length in a subsequent chapter. For the present, we shall continue with our review of the studies which have appeared in recent years.

As was to be expected, Devreesse's *Essai* was widely reviewed, and considerable attention was given to his presentation of Theodore's christology. While most of the reviewers were high in their praise of Devreesse's work, a criticism which occurred several times was that his analysis of Theodore's doctrine on Christ was « too brief », or « incomplete » [91]. J. Lebon regretted the fact that Msgr. Devreesse had not applied himself further to show that Theodore's formulas, rightly understood, did not involve that Nestorian division of Christ into two persons of which he had been traditionally charged [92]. J. Daniélou noticed that Devreesse had not mentioned the « dangerous tendencies » in Theodore's concept of Christ, which appeared even in the « reliable » texts [93]. Most of the reviewers accepted Devreesse's thesis that one could no longer utilize the fragments of the « hostile » sources; I. Ortiz de

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88 *Ibid.*, Chap. IX, pp. 243-258.

89 M. Richard, « La tradition des fragments du traité περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως de Théodore de Mopsueste », *Le Muséon*, LVI (1943), pp. 55-75.

90 M. Richard, « Les traités de Cyrille d'Alexandrie contre Diodore et Théodore, et les fragments dogmatiques de Diodore de Tarse », *Mélanges dediés à la mémoire de Félix Grat*, 1, Paris, Pecquer-Grat, 1946, p. 113. See also his article, « Léonce de Byzance, était-il origeniste? », *Revue des Etudes Byzantines*, 1947, p. 43.

91 I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J., in *Orient. Chr. Per.* XV (1949), p. 441; A. Grillmeier, S.J., in *Scholastik*, XXVI (1951), pp. 427-429.

92 *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, XLIV (1949), p. 604.

93 *Rech. Sc. Rel.*, XXXVI (1949), 621-622.

Urbina, however, questioned it, as far as the fragments transmitted by Cyril of Alexandria are concerned [94].

The most severe criticism of Devreesse's presentation of Theodore's christology came from the pen of P. Parente [95]. He admits that the conciliar extracts are unreliable, and that Devreesse rightly judges Theodore's doctrine on the basis of the newly discovered works. But in examining these same texts, Parente finds Theodore so extending the distinction between the two natures in Christ as to see there two subjects of attribution, two sons, two physical hypostases, which he does not succeed in reducing to a real unity [96]. Parente finds Theodore's christology incompatible with the Nicene Creed [97]; he concludes: « Difatti, pur liberati dalle manipolazioni e dalle interpolazioni, il pensiero e il linguaggio di Teodoro risultano anticipatamente nestoriani, in quanto compromettono l'unità ontologica di Cristo ... » [98].

Another criticism of Devreesse's synthesis of Theodore's christology, but on a considerably different basis, came from across the Atlantic. M. Anastos, writing in the *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, found Devreesse altogether too complacent about doctrine which to Anastos seems surely to smack of Nestorianism [99]. The Theodorean doctrine which this critic finds most objectionable — in fact, the one for which he believes him primarily to have been condemned, is the idea that the « homo assumptus » remained mutable: i. e. capable of committing sin, until after the resurrection. Anastos sees here a direct and formal contradiction to the anathema of Nicea against those who hold that the Son of God is mutable or changeable. In his eyes, Theodore's christology is basically heretical, and Justinian was abundantly justified in condemning it.

The first volume of the monumental collection: *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, contains two studies which deal at consid-

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94 *loc. cit.*

95 P. Parente, « Una riabilitazione di Teodoro Mopsuesteno ». *Doctor Communis*, 1950, pp. 3-15.

96 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

98 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

99 M. Anastos, « The immutability of Christ and Justinian's condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia », *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, VI (1951), 125-160. Cf. p. 135.

erable length with the question of Theodore's christology [100]. The two authors have approached the question from two different, but complementary aspects. Grillmeier's intention is to point out the positive contribution which Theodore made to the development of christology, while Camelot emphasizes the dangerous tendencies and weaknesses which he finds in Theodore's doctrine on Christ. As a matter of fact, Grillmeier also dwells at some length on what he conceives as the fundamental deficiency of the Antiochene christology, scil. the failure to realize that the « One Person » in Christ is actually the Person of the Word, and not a « tertium quid » formed by the union of Word and man [101]. But on the positive side, he notes with satisfaction that Theodore energetically rejected the Arian and Apollinarist errors of a Christ without a perfect human soul. As Theodore's valuable contribution to christology, Grillmeier notes his insistence on the complete humanity of Christ; on the human soul, and especially its free, moral activity as something of theological importance; on the redemptive value of Christ's human acts; on the psychology of Jesus; and on the created grace of Christ [102].

On the debit side of the ledger, T. Camelot presents those aspects of Theodore's doctrine which to him reveal the « germ » which grew into Nestorianism. Camelot finds that Theodore's theology « runs the risk of not doing full justice to the unity of the Incarnate Word ». His « unique prosopon » could be taken as merely a « prosopon of union », the result of a union of Word and man by special benevolence [103]. He finds the human « moi » put into such relief that one cannot see how Theodore could hold the metaphysical unity of the Person; the unity of Christ remains in the order of an accidental grace. It is

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[100] *Das Konzil von Chalkedon, Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Grillmeier-Bacht, Vol. 1, Würzburg, 1951: A. Grillmeier, S.J., « Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon », pp. 5-202; T. Camelot, O.P., « De Nestorius à Eutyches. L'opposition de deux christologies », pp. 213-242.

[101] Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 152. Altaner takes exception to Grillmeier's admission of these deficiencies in Theodore's christology; he finds him too much influenced by the traditional distrust of the Antiochene doctor. See his review of Vol. I of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*: « Zur Theologie und Geschichte des Konzils von Chalkedon », *Theologische Revue*, 1953, p. 203.

[102] Grillmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[103] Camelot, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-217.

precisely in this failure to give its true worth to the substantial character of the unity of Christ that Camelot sees in Theodore a « tendency to what will be Nestorianism » [104].

K. McNamara, on the other hand, see in Theodore's christology not merely a « tendency to what will be Nestorianism » —but Nestorianism itself, in all its essential features [105]. In presenting this thesis, McNamara takes a definite stand on the question of the sources which may be used. He rejects the position of Devreesse and Richard on the grounds that the evidence produced to show corruption of texts is not sufficient to cast doubts on the reliability of the extracts as a whole. Hence, while he admits that these dogmatic fragments were chosen deliberately to give a one-sided and unfavorable picture of Theodore's doctrine, he contends that « in the absence of direct evidence against authenticity, it would be foolish to jettison a fragment which offers valuable insight into Theodore's mind, merely because we do not find its ideas fully paralleled in the other works » [106].

Using, therefore, both the newly-published works and the dogmatic fragments preserved by Leontius, McNamara presents a picture of Theodore's christology which indicates the strong points of his system (especially his emphasis on the perfect humanity), but also highlights the basic « Nestorianism » of his thought: scil. the concept of the « homo assumptus » as a physical person, a « totum in se subsistens, et sui juris », distinct from the Person of Word [107]. In a lengthy study of Theodore's idea of the union of Word and man, McNamara comes to the conclusion that Theodore's initial mistake was to take the figure of « inhabitation », as a technically accurate term containing the theological key to the whole problem. From this starting point he could never arrive at any more than an accidental-dynamic union; could never establish an essential difference between the presence of God in the just and the union of Word and man in Christ [108].

A position much similar to that of McNamara is taken by

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104 *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

105 K. McNamara, « Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy », *The Irish Theological Quarterly*, XIX (1952), 254-278; XX (1953), 172-191.

106 *Ibid.*, Part one, pp. 258-259.

107 *Ibid.*, pp. 269 ff.

108 *Ibid.*, Part two, p. 178.

H. M. Diepen O. S. B. in his work on the « Three Chapters » at Chalcedon [109]. Diepen believes that Theodore's opposition to the Apollinarist error led him so to insist on the perfection of the « homo assumptus » as to make this a man subsisting in himself, distinct from the Word; and hence to set up a real duality of subjects, of persons, in Christ [110]. The unity professed by Theodore in one « prosopon » is merely apparent; the term « prosopon » had not lost its primitive sense of « face », « mask », with the derived meanings of « appearance », or « role » [111]. Theodore's basic difficulty was that he could not discover the true concept of the hypostatic union in between the false extremes of an incarnation implying real change in God (Arianism, Apollinarism), and that of a « becoming man » in mere appearance. Rejecting the first of these extremes, he fell into the other [112]. Diepen concludes with the judgement passed by Cyril of Alexandria: « In the writings of Theodore one finds errors even worse than those of Nestorius [113].

Finally, we shall mention the studies of the Protestant scholar, R. V. Sellers, who takes a much more favorable attitude not only to Theodore, but to the doctrine of the Antiochenes as a group, including Nestorius [114]. Sellers apparently sees no appreciable difference between the christology of the various representatives of the school of Antioch; in illustrating a point he will quote from Theodore, Nestorius or Theodoret with equal approval. His attitude is that the Antiochene christology was basically sound; that while the Antiochenes did not express themselves with sufficient clarity, they were in fact « at one with the Alexandrians in proclaiming that Jesus Christ is the divine Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity made man » [115].

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[109] H. M. Diepen, O.S.B., *Les Trois Chapitres au Concile de Chalcédoine, Une étude de la christologie de l'Anatolie ancienne*, Les Editions de Saint Michel, Oosterhout, 1953; chap. I, pp. 20-30. This chapter on Theodore's christology had already appeared in the *Revue Thomiste*, « L'assumptus homo à Chalcédoine », *Rev. Th.* LI (1951), pp. 573-608.

[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

[111] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

[112] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

[113] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[114] R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies*, London, S.P.C.K., 1940; *The Council of Chalcedon, a historical and doctrinal survey*, London, S.P.C.K., 1953.

[115] *The Council of Chalcedon*, p. 170. See also, p. 181: « It seems clear, then, that so far as fundamentals are concerned, there is no dif-

Sellers defends the Antiochenes (including Nestorius) from the charge of dividing Christ into two persons; he sees this accusation as merely a misunderstanding of their care to distinguish the two natures, which remain without change or confusion in Christ. In his view, it was because the Antiochenes not only admitted the free will of the humanity of Christ in theory, but tried to work it out in practice, that they were denounced as « Nestorian » [116].

We have thus concluded our survey of recent literature on our question of the christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia. It is time to count the results: to define the areas of agreement and disagreement, and so to indicate the precise problems we shall have to handle in an attempt to come to some satisfactory solution.

There seems to be general agreement on Theodore's personal intention to conform to the doctrine of the Church as he understood it. There is no clear indication of anything like formal heresy, or obstinacy in error. His insistence on the doctrine of One Person; his care to reject the formula « Two Sons », condemned by Pope Damasus in 382, indicates that he did not consciously will to separate himself from the dogma of the Church.

There is also quite general agreement that Theodore's christological system contained a number of solid and valuable positions; particularly his insistence on the complete humanity, and on the human psychology of Christ. This aspect has been well brought out by Grillmeier, but others acknowledge the truth of his position. Theodore's insistence on the human soul of Christ was a valuable counter-weight not only to the errors of Arius and Apollinaris, but also to the tendency of the Alexandrian theology to overlook the theological significance of the free human acts of the God-Man. Most scholars admit that the

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ference between the Christological teaching of the Antiochenes and that of the Alexandrians, though, when set beside that raised by the latter, the Antiochene doctrinal structure must appear crude and unfinished ». In his review of this work, T. Camelot remarks: « M. Sellers expose exactement les théologies en présence, mais on ne manquera pas de le trouver trop optimiste quand, tout en reconnaissant que la théologie d'Antioche reste très déficiente, « crude and unfinished », il pense qu'elle ne diffère pas essentiellement de celle d'Alexandrie ». *Rev. des Sc. Phil. et Theol.* XXXVIII (1954), p. 336.

116 *Two Ancient Christologies*, p. 201.

Antiochene system, with its stress on the concrete and operating human nature in Christ, had its part in the formulation of the dogma defined at Chalcedon.

But the question that has agitated minds and aroused passions since the time of St. Cyril still seems without a satisfactory answer: namely, was Theodore's concept of the Incarnation basically « Nestorian » or not? Is his « homo assumptus » really a « totum in se subsistens » — a physical person, an ultimate subject of attribution, distinct from the Person of the Word? Is his « One Person » in whom the two natures are united, merely a moral, dynamic unity, or did he grasp, at least sufficiently, the substantial unity of the Son of God? In brief, did Theodore's doctrine conform with the divinely revealed truth of the Gospel and the Nicene Creed, that the Word Himself « was made flesh », « became man », — or did his theological explanation of this mystery really empty it of its essential content?

This, it seems to us, is the basic question that must be asked about Theodore's christology. What method should be used in approaching its solution? A. Grillmeier has laid down several valuable hints as to how such a study must be conducted [117]. He has made the following points:

1. Theodore's orthodoxy is not sufficiently proven merely by his use of formulas later adopted by the Church; one must go deeper into the ideology behind the formula.

2. Until the opposite is proven, one should presuppose his intention to follow the teaching of the Church.

3. The concrete situation of his christology must be considered: how did the christological problem present itself to him, and what means were at his disposal for solving it?

4. Finally, Theodore's doctrine must be measured against the standard of the dogma of Ephesus.

These suggestions of Grillmeier seem to us to be eminently sound and practical. One may be tempted to ask, concerning the last point, whether Theodore can justly be judged on the basis of dogmatic decrees which were laid down only after his death. To this question it seems to us that there is a satisfactory answer. First: this study is not a judicial process, to decide whether Theodore was guilty of formal

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[117] Grillmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 145, note 2.

heresy. It is rather a theological study, to see whether or not his objective teaching, as it has come down to us, conformed with the essential truths of revelation. Now the Fathers of Ephesus defined no new dogma, elaborated no new and binding formula of faith. They merely declared that the teaching of Nestorius on the Incarnation was essentially contrary to the dogma of the Church as already expressed in the Nicene Creed. And they did this precisely in a way that gives us a standard for judging the doctrine of Theodore.

As is well known, the process whereby the Fathers reached their decision was to compare the contradictory doctrine of two letters with the dogma of the Nicene Creed. One of these letters, from the pen of Cyril of Alexandria, contained the substance of his teaching on the Incarnation; the other was a reply to this letter from Nestorius, who contradicted the basic assertions of Cyril. The decision of Ephesus was categorical: Cyril's teaching expresses the dogma of Nicea; Nestorius' is its opposite. Here, then, it seems to us, is a key to the solution. If Ephesus is to be the standard for judging the orthodoxy of Theodore, then it is in the light of the doctrine of these two letters that the judgement must be made. And this we shall attempt to do.

But it is clear that first one must know what Theodore actually taught. This means a close study of all available texts. And here we meet the question of the sources on which one can rely in studying Theodore's doctrine. There are several possible solutions to this problem. The first, and easiest, would be to accept the thesis of Devreesse and Richard, that the « hostile » tradition is hopelessly corrupt, and thus completely ignore the dogmatic fragments presented to us by Cyril, Leontius, Justinian and the Council. There are obvious advantages to this solution. First, it would obviate any need of entering into the complicated problem of the authenticity of the « hostile » texts. Secondly, it would allow one to base his study exclusively on sources whose fidelity to the original is commonly accepted by all. Since many reputable scholars have accepted the findings of Devreesse and Richard, one could safely appeal to this judgement against a possible criticism of incompleteness in the use of the sources.

Another possible solution would be to accept the findings of Devreesse and Richard where they have shown any particular fragment to have been falsified, but to make use of the

other fragments in this tradition without further question. This solution, while apparently reasonable, does not seem to us to do justice to the conclusions which these scholars have reached. They assert categorically that these fragments of Leontius, Cyril and the Fifth Council can be shown in so many instances to be falsified, that one simply cannot rely on any of them. One cannot simply ignore this conclusion; if one will make use of these fragments at all, he must (it seems to us) first reckon with the arguments of Devreesse and Richard against their reliability as a whole.

This leads to the question: are there sufficient reasons for re-opening the question of the reliability of these fragments? It seems that there are. First, Leontius and Justinian have preserved for us our only Greek witness to the dogmatic works of Theodore. If we rule out these sources, we must rely completely on translations. Secondly, some of these fragments are of considerable length, and contain important theological developments. Thirdly, without these fragments we have almost nothing of Theodore's treatise *Contra Apollinarem,* and not a great deal of his *De Incarnatione.* In this case, one would have to base his study to a greater extent on the exegetical works, and on the catecheses, where Theodore would not be expected to develop his theology so fully in its more technical aspects.

Despite these facts, it would probably still be wiser not to re-open the question of using these fragments, if one were completely satisfied that the position taken by Devreesse and Richard had been established beyond all reasonable doubt. However — and this is the deciding factor — we are not convinced that this is the case. In his review of Devreesse's *Essai,* I. Ortiz de Urbina found considerable discrepancy between Devreesse's sweeping conclusion, and the evidence on which it had been based [118]. And our own studies have confirmed our opinion that this question has not yet been finally settled. At least there is enough doubt to justify the re-opening of the question in this thesis.

Our first step, therefore, will be to examine the evidence on which the charge has been made that the fragments of Cyril, Leontius, Justinian and the Council are totally unreliable witnesses to the teaching of Theodore. After this con-

[118] *Or. Chr. Per.* XV (1949), pp. 442-443.

sideration we shall be able to decide whether, or to what extent, these sources can be used.

The second step will be to present, as objectively as possible, a study of Theodore's christology. In doing so we shall follow the suggestions laid down by Grillmeier: first, putting Theodore in his theological milieu, in the background of his adversaries, and his predecessors in the school of Antioch. And secondly, we shall attempt to get behind his terminology, to his basic thought on the Incarnation: to the concept of Christ that will explain his manifold utterances.

Finally, we shall compare this theology with the dogma of Ephesus, in the light of the judgement there passed on the letters of Cyril and Nestorius. Thus we hope to reach some solution to the problem of Theodore's christology; whether he was really, as has been so long believed, the true (if unintentional) « Father of Nestorianism ».

CHAPTER TWO

THE RELIABILITY OF THE FRAGMENTS FOUND IN SOURCES HOSTILE TO THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

I. The Contents of the Hostile Florilegia

Before beginning our study of the evidence on which the charge has been made that the hostile sources are completely unreliable witnesses to the doctrine of Theodore, it seems best to describe these sources, and to indicate what fragments they contain.

Our earliest witness to this hostile tradition is the work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* of Cyril of Alexandria. The work itself has been lost; our only portions of it are those preserved in other sources: mainly in the writings of Severus of Antioch and in the acts of the fifth council [1]. Since we have only the Syriac version of Severus' texts, and the portion of the conciliar acts containing the citations from Cyril has been transmitted only in a Latin translation, there is practically nothing of Cyril's work extant in the original Greek. This fact raises an immediate question: how faithful are these

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[1] For the fragments in the works of Severus of Antioch, consult the excellent indices to the Latin version of his works in the *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, especially: *Liber contra impium Grammaticum* (trad. J. Lebon), *Oratio prima et orationis secundae quae supersunt*, *C.S.C.O.* Vol. 112, Scr. Syr. t. 59 (1938); *Orationis tertiae pars prior*, Vol. 94, Scr. Syr. t. 46 (1929); *Orationis tertiae pars posterior*, Vol. 102, Scr. Syr. t. 51 (1933). The indices to all three volumes are found at the end of vol. 112. Likewise: *Sévère d'Antioche, Le Philalèthe* (trad. R. Hespel), *C.S.C.O.* Vol. 134, Scr. Syr. t. 69 (1952).

The sections quoted by the fifth council are found in Mansi, Vol. IX, 230-240. Also in Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1437-1452. Pusey gives fragments from both sources, but he does not translate the Syriac of Severus: P. Pusey, *S.P.N. Cyrilli Abp. Alexandrini in D. Joannis Evangelium*, Vol. III (Oxford, 1872), pp. 511-537.

translations to the Greek text of Cyril? With regard to Severus of Antioch there is no doubt as to the fidelity with which his citations from the works of Cyril correspond with our Greek texts. And in particular, with regard to the citations from Theodore which he drew from Cyril's work, the cases where we can compare them with the Greek text preserved by Leontius illustrate this fidelity [2]. Likewise, in the case of the extracts found in the acts of the council, we can control the Latin version in a number of cases by comparison with the Greek texts given by Leontius. Here we find a scrupulously literal translation, almost letter-perfect in its correspondence with the Greek [3]. Hence there is no serious difficulty involved in the fact that Severus and the council give us these citations only in translation.

What do these sources actually give us of Theodore? As far as Severus is concerned, while he is an important witness to Cyril's treatise *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum,* he is not so important in the precise respect of the extracts from the works of Theodore quoted by Cyril. As a matter of fact, most of these citations given by Severus are also found in Leontius or the acts of the council; there are only two which we would not otherwise possess [4]. Besides the citations which Severus admittedly drew from the work of Cyril against Theodore, he quotes three others: one is from the symbol attributed to Theodore and condemned at Ephesus; the other two are extremely brief extracts from two different works [5]. All of these fragments are conveniently assembled by Devreesse [6].

In the acts of the fifth session of the Second Council of

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[2] Compare *Contra Grammaticum* II, 15 (Lebon, Vol. 112, p. 105, ll. 1-9) with Leontius' fragment 28 (*P.G.* 66, 992 b-c); *Philalethes* frag. 1 (Hespel p. 128) with Leontius' frag. 4 (*P.G.* 66, 980 b-c); *Philalethes* frag. 4 (Hespel p. 129) with Leontius' frag. 2 (*P.G.* 66, 977 a-b).

[3] Compare Cyril frag. 7 (*P.G.* 86, 1442 a-b) with Leontius' frag. 12 (*P.G.* 66, 984 c); Cyril frag. 8 (*P.G.* 86, 1443 c-1444 a) with Leontius, frag 14 (*P.G.* 66, 985 a-b); Cyril frag. 9 (*P.G.* 86, 1444 d-1445 a) with Leontius' frag. 28 (*P.G.* 66, 992 b-c).

[4] *Contra Grammaticum* III, 29 (Lebon, Vol. 102, p. 69, ll. 11-14); *Philalethes* (Hespel, p. 129, lines 3-12).

[5] *Contra Grammaticum* III, 17 (Lebon, Vol. 94, p. 206) from *Commentary on Hebrews; Contra Gram.* III 26 (Vol. 102, p. 46) from *De Spiritu Sancto ad Patrophilum; Cont. Gram.* III, 29 (Lebon, Vol. 102, p. 71) from Symbol.

[6] *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste,* p. 172-174.

Constantinople we find a series of ten extracts, each with its refutation by Cyril of Alexandria. The first five are described as « Sanctae memoriae Cyrilli ex primo libro eorum quae contra Theodorum scripsit »; the second five as « ex secundo libro Cyrilli ». In each case the extract is attributed to Theodore, but there is no indication of its source in Theodore's works. Twice in the course of his refutations, Cyril introduces other quotations from Theodore; one is expressly said to be derived from the catechetical homilies, and is in fact from that work [7].

All five of the Theodorean extracts said to be « ex secundo libro Cyrilli », appear, at least in part, in other anti-theodorean florilegia. This fact not only confirms the correctness of their ascription to Theodore, but provides us with information not given by Cyril as to their source in the works of Theodore. Four of Cyril's five texts are indicated by Leontius to be from Theodore's *De Incarnatione;* the other is attributed by a Syriac fragment to the *Commentary on Hebrews* [8].

There is, however, a serious problem as to the authorship of the five extracts said by the council to be taken from the first book of Cyril against Theodore. The fact is that three other sources attribute some, or all, of these five texts to Diodorus, rather than to Theodore [9]. And besides this extrinsic authority, there is also internal evidence for the Diodorean

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[7] Mansi, IX, 239-240; *P.G.* 86, 1447 a-b; cf. *Cat. Hom.* III, 6 (ed. Tonneau, p. 61, lines 4-12).

[8] Thus: Cyril's frag. 7 (*P.G.* 86, 1442) is from *De Inc.* X (cf. Leontius Frag. 12: *P.G.* 66, 984 a); Cyril's frag. 8 (1443-4) is from *De Inc.* XII (cf. Leontius 14, 985 a-c); Cyril's frag. 9 is from *De Inc.* XV (cf. Leontius 28, 992 b-c); Cyril's frag. 10 ascribed to the *Com. on Hebrews* by a Syriac fragment edited by De Lagarde (*op. cit.* p. 108) and translated by Sachau (*op. cit.* p. 70); Cyril's fragment 11 is from *De Inc.* XII (cf. Leontius' 17, 985 d).

[9] *Cod. Brit. Mus. Add.* 12156 (a Monophysite florilegium) gives thirty-three extracts of Diodorus (ed. P. Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca,* Leipzig, 1858, pp. 91-100); translation by M. Brière, « Quelques fragments syriaques de Diodore, évêque de Tarse (378-394?) », *Revue de l'Orient chrétien,* 3e série, t. X (XXX), 1946, pp. 231-283. Among these thirty-three extracts of Diodorus are the five found in the « First Book of Cyril against Theodore ». Leontius quotes Cyril's fragments 1, 2 and 5 as from the *Contra Synusiastas* of Diodorus (*P.G.* 86, 1388 a-c). Timothy Aelurus also gives Cyril's frag. 5 to Diodorus: see Schwartz, *Codex Vaticanus gr. 1431, eine antichalkedonische Sammlung aus der Zeit Kaiser Zenos,* (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Philisophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, XXXII, B. 6), München, 1927, n. 211, p. 108.

authorship of these extracts. M. Richard has pointed out the fact that the thought and language of these texts in question coincide much more with that of Diodorus than with that of Theodore [10]. He points out the frequency with which the phrase « the Son of David », or the notion of « sonship of David » occurs in these five texts given by Cyril. This reference to David, which occurs no less than sixteen times in the fragments of Diodorus given by the *Collectio Palatina* and by Severus of Antioch, occurs only three times in the fragments which we possess of Theodore's *Contra Apollinarem* [11]. Yet it occurs no less than nine times in these five fragments given by Cyril.

The arguments for the Diodorean authorship of these fragments given by the council as from the first book of Cyril against Theodore seem rather convincing. If they are not accepted, one would have serious difficulty explaining how all five of them came to be included in the collection of Diodorean extracts of cod. 12156, where they seem to be homogeneous with the other fragments there cited. Moreover, both this monophysite collection, and Leontius, who also ascribes three of Cyril's texts to Diodorus, are usually careful about their sources; when quoting from Theodore they tell us the work, and the book or the section from which they are citing. The case for the Diodorean authorship has recently been accepted by M. Jugie [12]. In our view it is certainly so strong that one could not now use any of these five fragments from the « first book of Cyril » in a discussion of the doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia.

This leaves the question, of course, of how it came about that the council attributed these texts to the first book against Theodore. One might be tempted to think that there was merely some confusion about the books of Cyril's *Contra*

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10 M. Richard, « Les traités, etc. », *Mél. Félix Grat.*, p. 110-111.

11 It seems that this latter figure is too low: the expression « ex semine David » or its equivalent occurs four times in the first fragment of the *Contra Apollinarem*, quoted by the council and Vigilius, and twice in a fragment of this same work quoted by Leontius (*P.G.* 66, 997 c.). However, the precise phrase « Son of David » occurs in three of Cyril's five texts, but nowhere in what remains of Theodore's *Contra Apollinarem* Yet it is characteristic of the fragments of Diodorus given by *cod.* 12156.

12 M. Jugie, A. A., « La doctrine christologique de Diodore de Tarse d'après les fragments de ses oeuvres », *Euntes Docete* (1949), p. 173.

Diodorum et Theodorum. We know that the first of these books was against Diodorus [13]. The book against Diodorus, being the first of the three, could perhaps have been taken, by some error, to be the first book against Theodore. In this case the original error would not have been on Cyril's part, but a fault in the transmission of his text.

However, there is a serious difficulty against this theory. Richard has pointed out the fact that Severus of Antioch quotes two of Cyril's five texts, attributing them neither to Diodorus nor to Theodore, but to Theodoret. On the premise that Severus drew his citations of both Diodorus and Theodore from Cyril's *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum,* and that a confusion is much more likely to have taken place between Theodore and Theodoret than between Diodorus and Theodoret, he concludes that these texts must have been attributed to Theodore in the text of Cyril where Severus found them [14]. While this argument might seem less than conclusive, there is a stronger proof available, not mentioned by Richard. The fact is that on two occasions, Severus quotes Cyril's refutation of the fourth of these fragments, and once he says explicitly that it is from the first book which Cyril wrote against Theodore [15]. Can this be explained on the grounds that in Severus' text of the *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* there was some confusion between the book against Diodorus and the first book against Theodore? It seems not, since Severus certainly had the complete text of this work before him, and refers to all three books, distinguishing the « Book against Diodorus » from the « First and Second Books against Theodore ». We must conclude, therefore, that Cyril himself quoted these five texts — almost certainly of Diodorus — in his first book against Theodore. How can such an error on Cyril's part be explained? Richard' explanation is that Cyril based his two volumes *Contra Theodorum* not on a first-hand study of his works, but on a florilegium of extracts supplied

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[13] The titles and opening sentences of each of the three books are given in *Cod. Paris.* 415; cf. E. Schwartz, *A.C.O.* I, 1, 1, p. xv.

[14] Richard, « Les traités, etc. », *Mél. Félix Grat.,* p. 104.

[15] *Contra Grammaticum* III, 41 (Lebon, Vol. 102, p. 246); *Oratio II ad Nephalium* (Lebon, *C.S.C.O.* Script. Syr. Ser. IV, t. 7, pp. 41-42). See the passage « Stupefactum est coelum » of Cyril, in refutation of the fourth extract given by the council: Mansi IX, 232-233; *P.G.* 86, 1439-40.

to him, and that the mistake was due to the fact that while this florilegium contained texts of both Diodorus and Theodore, Cyril took them all to be from the works of Theodore [16]. This explanation seems to us to be probable. But we shall postpone any discussion of it for the moment, since it involves the question of the common florilegium, to which we must return after a description of the other witnesses to the hostile tradition.

To sum up our treatment of Cyril: his « Second Book against Theodore », quoted by the fifth council, gives us seven extracts (five given formally as such, and two quoted in the course of Cyril's refutation); four of these are from the *De Incarnatione,* one from the *Commentary on Hebrews,* one from the *Catechetical Homilies.* The extracts from the « First Book against Theodore » cannot safely be used in studying Theodore; it seems more likely that they belong to Diodorus.

Another witness to the hostile tradition of extracts from Theodore is found in a Syriac manuscript (*Cod. Brit. Mus. Add.* 12156) which contains a collection of anti-Nestorian and anti-Chalcedonian texts, clearly compiled and edited by Monophysites [17]. The collection has been attributed to Timothy Aelurus († 477); the Syriac text is of the sixth century, prior to 562 [18]. This manuscript was edited, without translation, by De Lagarde [19]; a Latin version of the extracts from Theodore was supplied by Sachau [20]. Most of the extracts from Theodore (twenty-four out of thirty-two) are from his *De Incarnatione*; the indication is given of the section from which they were taken, showing that the compiler had the whole work to draw from, and put down his citations in the order of the sections from which they were taken [21]. There are four

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16 Richard, « Les traités, etc. », p. 112.

17 Brière describes the contents (op. cit. p. 231-2):
fol. 1-62: Documents against the Council of Chalcedon.
fol. 63-80: Patristic texts aginst Nestorius.
fol. 80-83: Blasphemies of Diodorus of Tarsus.
fol. 83-86: Blasphemies of Theodore of Mopsuestia.
fol. 86-89: Blasphemies of Nestorius.

18 E. Sachau, *Theodori Mopsuesteni fragmenta syriaca,* Leipzig, 1869, p. v.

19 P. De Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca,* Leipzig, 1858. The extracts of Theodore are on pp. 100-108.

20 Sachau, *op. cit.,* pp. 63-68.

21 The *De Incarnatione* consisted of fifteen books, but was also di-

cases where an extract of this *ms.* coincides with one of Leontius; a comparison with Leontius' Greek text shows the Syriac to be a reliable translation of the same text. This monophysite collection gives a number of citations of the *De Incarnatione* which we would not otherwise have: particularly from books one to six, and eleven, of which Leontius quotes none.

The third book of the treatise *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* by Leontius of Byzantium is directed against the writings and doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia. To illustrate the errors which he finds in Theodore's teaching, Leontius cites thirty-six extracts from his works. Of these extracts, twenty-nine are from the *De Incarnatione* (some from each of Books VII-XV except Book XI); six from the *Contra Apollinarem* (Books III-IV); and one from the *Commentary on the Psalms* [22]. In citing the *De Incarnatione,* Leontius indicates the book, but not the section, from which the passage is taken; the citations follow the order of the books. In the case of the *Contra Apollinarem,* the passages are indicated as from the third or fourth book, but are not given in that order. These fragments of Leontius are our most important Greek witness to the dogmatic works of Theodore.

The only other Greek source of citations from these dogmatic works is the letter « Grammata » of the emperor-theologian, Justinian [23]. In this « Letter against Theodore of Mopsuestia », Justinian quotes eight sections from Books III-IV of the *Contra Apollinarem,* one from the *De Incarnatione,* Book VIII, and one from the *Commentary on the Psalms.* But there is little here that we would not otherwise possess, since eight of these ten extracts correspond perfectly with citations given also by Leontius. Of the other two, one provides the

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vided into ninety smaller sections, unevenly divided among the books, and numbered consecutively throughout the whole work.

[22] These extracts were part of Leontius' *Contra Nestorianos et Eutichianos,* Book III. When A. Mai originally edited this text, he omitted the citations from Theodore, as he had already printed them elsewhere; the text is in *Spicilegium Romanum,* t. X (Rome, 1844) and the fragments from Theodore were already in *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio,* t. VI (Rome, 1832), pp. 300-312. When Migne reprinted Mai's work, he followed his example in separating the fragments of Theodore from Leontius' text; the latter is in *P.G.* 86, 1267-1396, but the citations from Theodore are among his dogmatic fragments in *P.G.* 66, 972 ff.

[23] Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1041-1096.

Greek text of a citation given in a Latin version by the *Constitutum Vigilii* and the acts of the fifth council [24]; the other is a section of the *Contra Apollinarem* which is not found cited elsewhere [25].

We have just mentioned the *Constitutum Vigilii* and the *Acts of the Second Council of Constantinople*: these are the last link in this chain of the hostile tradition of Theodorean texts [26]. These collections of *capitula* (sixty in the *Constitutum Vigilii*, seventy-one in the *Acta Concilii*) are drawn, without any apparent system, from various works of Theodore. We can restrict our attention to the first fifty-five of Vigilius (fifty-four of the council), since these are the texts wherein the doctrine at issue was Theodore's christology. These two series of *capitula* are practically identical, even as regards the Latin version, which is the only form in which they are found. Where this version can be compared with the Greek of Leontius and Justinian, it is proved to have been a scrupulously careful and literal translation.

These *capitula* illustrative of Theodore's christology are taken from both his exegetical and his dogmatic works. The *Constitutum* gives no indication of the sources, whereas the council specifies the work of Theodore from which they are taken. We shall mention the numerous cases where these *capitula* merely duplicate passages to be found elsewhere, and then we shall indicate what they contain that could shed new light on Theodore's works.

First of all, three *capitula* are derived from Cyril's « First Book against Theodore », giving passages ascribed by Leontius and cod. 12156 to Diodorus [27]. Nine *capitula* reproduce texts already found in Greek in Leontius [28]. Eight texts are from the *Catechetical Homilies* [29], and six are from the *Commentary on St. John's Gospel* [30]; as these works are now available in

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[24] Justinian, *Ep. Adv. Theodorum Mops.* Migne, *P.G.* 86, 1059 a, is clearly the Greek text of the last part of *Cap.* I of Vigilius and the council. Cf. *Vigilii Constitutum de tribus capitulis*, ed. O. Guenther, *C.S.E.L.* vol. XXXV, 1, p. 238, lines 28-36.

[25] Migne, 86, 1071 d - 1073 a.

[26] *Vigilii Constitutum*, ed. Guenther, pp. 230-320. The *capitula* are on pp. 237-285. The conciliar *capitula* are in Mansi, IX, 202-221.

[27] *Vig. Const.* 29, 45, 46; *Conc.* 28, 44, 45.

[28] *Const.* 10, 20, 30, 44, 47-49, 54, 55. *Conc.* 10, 19, 29, 43, 46-48, 53, 54.

[29] *Const.* and *Conc.* 31, 35-38, 41-42; also *Const.* 43.

[30] *Const.* 14, 15, 16, 27, 33, 34. *Conc.* 13, 14, 15, 26, 33, 34.

their integrity, these *capitula* are of no great value in a study of Theodore's doctrine. Three other *capitula* were already preserved in the writings of Innocent of Maronia [31]. In all that makes twenty-nine *capitula* which are found elsewhere, and hence shed no new light on Theodore's doctrine.

Of the remaining twenty-six *capitula,* the most important are those derived from Theodore's dogmatic works. The first twelve extracts of the *Constitutum* and the council contain the greater part of all that remains of the treatise *Contra Apollinarem*; only one of these is given fully by Leontius [32]. Of the *De Incarnatione,* four *capitula* give passages not found elsewhere [33]. The other thirteen *capitula* peculiar to these collections are taken from various exegetical works.

We shall sum up our consideration of these anti-Theodorean florilegia by recalling the elements which provide material of particular doctrinal importance. We would name: 1) the fragments given in Cyril's *Second Book Against Theodore*; 2) the fragments of the *De Incarnatione,* especially from Books I-VI, in *Add.* 12156; 3) the Greek texts from the *De Incarnatione* and the *Contra Apollinarem* given by Leontius; 4) the sections of the *Contra Apollinarem* given by Vigilius and the council. If these texts are reliable, they certainly could not be ignored in a thorough study of Theodore's christology, since they represent a major portion of what remains of his strictly dogmatic works on the Incar-

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31 *Const.* 39, 50, 51. *Conc.* 39, 49, 50. These texts are found among the four extracts of Theodore cited by Innocent of Maronia in his work: *De his qui unam ex Trinitate vel unam subsistentiam seu personam Dominum Nostrum Iesum Christum dubitant confiteri,* ed. Schwartz, *A.C.O.,* IV, 2, pp. 70-72. The second and third of the *capitula* found here are part of a rather long citation which Innocent ascribes to a « sermon of Theodore », although the heading of the conciliar *capitulum* 49 is « ex secundo libro de Incarnatione ». But the council elsewhere quotes the whole of Innocent's passage as a citation from a sermon preached by Theodore at Antioch; the citation was found in the libellus of the Armenians (Mansi IX, 241-242).

32 *Cap.* 10. Portions of *cap.* 1 and 8 are also given by Leontius and Justinian.

33 *Const.* 26 (*Conc.* 25) from *De Inc.* I.
Conc. 30b from *De Inc.* VII.
Const. 18 (*Conc.* 17) from *De Inc.* XIV.
Const. 28 (*Conc.* 27) from *De Inc.* XV — a fairly long passage of which Leontius quotes only the opening sentence.

nation. The question must now be confronted: are they reliable witnesses to the texts which Theodore wrote?

II. The Theory of the Common Florilegium

It will have been noticed, in the foregoing discussion, how frequently it appeared that these citations of Theodore, particularly of his *De Incarnatione,* coincided with one another. M. Richard has studied these coincidences in detail, and drawn from them the conclusion that there must have been a common florilegium, which served as the ultimate source of all these collections [34]. We shall consider the facts on which this conclusion is based.

We know that the *De Incarnatione* was a work of considerable size; it contained fifteen books, ninety sections, and Gennadius describes it as running to fifteen thousand verses [35]. Now it is clear that if several different exceptors, working independently, were to choose passages from the complete text of a work of this magnitude, the number of cases where their passages would coincide would probably not be great. But it is altogether beyond the bounds of probability that such independent exceptors should begin and end their citations at precisely the same point in the text. The occurrence of such perfect coincidence of *incipit* and *explicit* in more than a very small percentage of cases, seems clearly to rule out the possibility of independent culling of the integral text. The only reasonable explanation seems to lie either in the dependence of one collection on the other, or mutual dependence on a common third florilegium.

Richard first studies the coincidences between the citations of the *De Incarnatione* by the council and by Leontius. Here we find that of the twelve conciliar citations from the *De Incarnatione* no less than nine coincide with texts of Leontius [36]; among these nine texts there are six common *incipit*'s and six common *explicit*'s [37]. As Leontius' work is prior to

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[34] Richard, « La tradition etc. », *Le Muséon,* 1943, pp. 55-75.

[35] Gennadii Massiliensis *De Viris Illustribus,* Migne, *P.L.* 58, 1067 b.

[36] *Conc. cap.* 27, 29, 30 a, 43, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54.

[37] Common *incipit*: *Conc. cap.* 27, 43, 46, 47, 48, 54.
Common *explicit*: *Conc. cap.* 29, 43, 47, 48, 53, 54.

553, one might conclude that the council had drawn its texts directly from him. But this is ruled out by the fact that in three cases the conciliar citation is not found in Leontius [38]; in another the council gives a rather long citation of which Leontius quotes only the first sentence (*Conc. cap.* 27). Richard concludes that these coincidences cannot be explained unless Leontius and the anonymous compiler of the conciliar extracts drew from the same collection of fragments — or, if you prefer — from two copies, more or less complete, of the same collection. From this it follows that Leontius must have used a ready-made florilegium, rather than the complete text of the *De Incarnatione*, as the source of his citations — a conclusion which gives the lie to his assertion that he procured the book of Theodore « against the Incarnation », as he sarcastically calls it [39].

The thesis that Leontius and the compilers of the conciliar extracts worked from a common florilegium receives confirmation from a comparison with the texts of the Monophysite collection of cod. *Add.* 12156 [40]. Here Richard points out that of the twenty-four extracts of this collection, four are found in Leontius [41], and two in the council [42]; there are four common *explicit*'s and one common *incipit*. The proportion of coincidences with Leontius is heightened by the fact that half of the citations of *Add.* 12156 come from Books I-IV and XI, of which Leontius quotes none. Thus almost half of the citations from books quoted by both sources are

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[38] *Conc. cap.* 17, 25, 30 b. This figure differs from the one given by Richard, because he also counts *cap.* 26, 49 and 50 as conciliar citations from the *De Incarnatione*, not given by Leontius. However, *Conc. cap.* 26 is certainly a passage from the *Commentary on St. John* (trad. Vosté, p. 38, lines 18-30); and *cap.* 49-50 are of doubtful origin, since they are also found in the « sermon » of Theodore quoted by Innocent of Maronia and the *libellus Armenorum* (cf. *supra*, note 31).

[39] Richard, « La tradition etc. », p. 59. Cf. Leontius, *P.G.* 86, 1384 c; 1385 a.

[40] Ed. P. De Lagarde, *op. cit.*; trad. E. Sachau, *op. cit.*

[41] Lagarde's fragments 11, 13, 14, 16 correspond with Leontius' 2, 3, 4, 6-7. Both collections follow the order of the books; hence the correspondence of order in the fragments is not in itself significant. It can hardly have been by chance that fragments 3 and 13 have a common *explicit*, fragments 4 and 14 a common *incipit*.

[42] Lagarde's fragment 1 corresponds to *conc. cap.* 25; Lagarde's fragment 20 is given by the council in Coll. VI, Mansi, IX, 343 c-d.

common, involving two common *explicit*'s and one common *incipit*. The possibility of one of these collections depending directly on the other, instead of a common florilegium, is ruled out by the fact that both contain a number of texts not found in the other.

Finally, there is a striking correspondence between the texts of Leontius and the passages of Theodore quoted by Cyril of Alexandria in his « Second Book against Theodore ». Here, as Richard has pointed out, of the five texts quoted by Cyril, no less than four are given at least in part, by Leontius, and there are three cases of common *incipit* [43]. Moreover, Severus of Antioch, who got his texts of Theodore from Cyril's *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum*, quotes two other passages which reappear in the collection of Leontius; one has a common *incipit*. These same two texts appear also in *cod. Add.* 12156, again with the common *incipit* [44].

We have seen the evidence to indicate that the Theodorean collections of the council, Leontius, and *cod. Add.* 12156 are all based upon a common florilegium. Can these coincidences between the later collections and Cyril be explained on the grounds that the texts quoted by Cyril in his *Contra Theodorum* constitute the basic florilegium from which the others have been drawn? There is no difficulty against this theory in the fact that Leontius and the others quote texts not given by Cyril — simply because we possess only a part, perhaps a relatively small part, of Cyril's work against Theodore. We do not know how extensive a florilegium the whole work contained.

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[43] Cyril's extracts 7, 8, 9, 11, correspond with Leontius 12, 14, 28, 17.

[44] A passage which Severus explicitly says he found in the second book of Cyril against Theodore (*Contra Grammaticum* III, 15, Lebon, vol. 94, p. 178, lines 30-36) corresponds with Leontius' fragment 4, and also with fragment 14 of *cod. add.* 12156. This is the one with the common *incipit*. Another passage which Severus does not say he found in Cyril, but which he almost certainly did, (*Philalethes*, ed. Hespel, p. 129, lines 13-22) is part of Leontius' fragment 2 (*P.G.* 66, 997 a-b) and also fragment 11 of *cod. add.* 12156. Moreover, two texts of Cyril not given by Leontius are found in the Syriac collection: Cyril fragment 10 (*P.G.* 76, 1445 d) is perfectly identical with the fragment of the *Commentary on Hebrews* given by Lagarde, p. 108 (Sachau, p. 70); Cyril refers in his refutation of this same fragment to a statement of Theodore's which is found in another fragment of the Syriac collection (*P.G.* 76, 1446 b corresponds to Lagarde p. 108, Sachau 68-69: « Ex libro ad baptizandos »).

But Richard would rule out the possibility that Cyril's work is in itself the common florilegium, on the grounds that in this case the later collections could not have indicated the book or section from which the citations are taken, since Cyril did not give this information in his work *Contra Theodorum* [45]. As we have seen, the council and Leontius indicate the book, and *cod. add.* 12156 indicates the section from which the passages are taken. But the passages given by Cyril, at least as they are quoted in the acts of the fifth session of the council, do not specify their source. Is it possible that the original text of Cyril may have contained such references? Richard argues that it is not; his proof is taken from the citations of Cyril's work by Severus.

The works of Severus of Antioch are a valuable source of fragments from many ancient works now lost, and not a little part of their value lies in the fact that Severus is usually very careful to give precise references to the works from which he quotes. However, when he cites Thodore's *De Incarnatione* — which he knew only from Cyril — he never mentions either the book or the section in which the passage is to be found. At most he refers to the book of Cyril's *Contra Theodorum* in which it is refuted. The argument of Richard is that if Cyril had given precise reference, Severus, following his usual practise, would not have failed to give them also.

It seems to us that there is further support for Richard's contention here, in the manner in which the compilers of the conciliar *capitula* cited texts which are also found among the quotations of Theodore in Cyril's work *Contra Theodorum*. There are five conciliar capitula which present texts also found in the portion of Cyril's work quoted in the fifth session of the council. Three of them are found in Cyril's « First book against Theodore »; two in his « Second book ». Now it seems significant that, while in every other case the capitular heading gives a reference to a definite work of Theodore as the source, in two of the three texts which also appear in *Book I Contra Theodorum*, the capitular heading simply refers to the work of Cyril as its source [46]. In the third case there is a variant in the manuscripts of the acts of the council. *Paris lat. 16832* reads: « Eiusdem Theodori contra synusiastas

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[45] Richard, « La tradition etc. », p. 60 ff.
[46] *Conc. cap.* 44-45.

quae et proposuit beatus Cyrillus et refutavit »; *Sangall. 672* reads: « Eiusdem ex libro contra synusiastas vel Apollinaristas quae et proposuit beatus Cyrillus et refutavit » [47]. This reference to a work entitled *Contra Synusiastas* is interesting, in view of the fact that these citations of Cyril's *First Book against Theodore* probably belong to Diodorus, and it was Diodorus who gave this title to his work against the Apollinarists. But in any case, the rather uncertain reference here would not indicate that Cyril's text contained precise data on book or section such as is found in Leontius or the Syriac collection.

Of the two texts of Cyril's *Second Book against Theodore* quoted in the conciliar *capitula*, in neither case does the capitular heading refer to Cyril's work as the source of the citation; rather a reference is given to a precise work of Theodore, and in one case to the number of the book in question [48]. But here we find that if Leontius is correct, both of the references given by the council are incorrect [49]. Could it have been that the compiler of the conciliar extracts, drawing upon Cyril, who gave no reference to the works in question, took a guess as to the source of the citation? At least in one of the cases there is reason to suspect so. *Conc. cap.* 46 (which is also fragment 8 of Cyril's *Second Book against Theodore*) happens to involve a discussion of *Hebrews* 2, 10: « qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat ». The capitular heading ascribes this text to Theodore's commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. If one were surmising a source, the matter treated would obviously have suggested this work. But Leontius says it is from Book XIII of the *De Incarnatione*, and there is no reason to suspect his reference. We would conclude, therefore, that a study of the conciliar capitula, and their manner of citing texts found in the *Contra Theodorum* of Cyril, supports Richard's contention that Cyril's work did not give precise references to the book or section from which

[47] *Conc. cap.* 28. Cf. Guenther's note on Vigilius' *cap.* 29, *C.S.E.L.* XXXV, 1, p. 263 *ad calc.*

[48] *Conc. cap.* 43, 46.

[49] *Conc. cap.* 43 « ex libro duodecimo de Incarnatione » is Leontius frag. 28, which he assigns to *De Inc.* XV. *Conc. cap.* 46 « ex interpretatione Epistolae ad Hebraeos » is Leontius fragment 14, which he assigns to *De Inc.* XII. Apart from these two cases where the conciliar compilers could have taken their texts directly from Cyril's *Contra Theodorum*, the references of the Council and of Leontius coincide.

his citations of Theodore were taken. But since Leontius and the Syriac collection give such references, then the work of Cyril could not itself have been the common florilegium postulated by the frequent coincidences in citation. Then the remarkable coincidence between Cyril and the two later collections can only be explained by assuming that Cyril also drew from this common florilegium. This means that Cyril based his *Contra Theodorum* not on a first-hand study of the integral text, but on a ready-made florilegium.

What of Cyril's explicit statement that he « studied the books of Theodore and Diodorus, picked out some of the chapters, and refuted them? » [50]. Richard replies that this statement simply reflects a certain laxness of conscience, not uncommon among the ancients, in literary questions. Moreover, he argues that between the time Cyril received at Jerusalem the letter from the Antiochene « orthodox », which convinced him of the need of such a work, and the time he wrote to Acacius, announcing its completion, Cyril would not have had sufficient time to study the works of Theodore and Diodorus in their entirety [51]. The speed of composition renders the use of a ready-made florilegium much more probable [52]. There is another indication of the fact that Cyril worked from a ready-made florilegium in the remarkable coincidences between his citations in the *First Book against Theodore*, and the collections of texts of Diodorus of Tarsus given by *cod. add.* 12156 and Leontius. Richard has studied these coincidences in detail; the facts are as follows.

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[50] Cyril, Ep. 69 *ad Acacium*, Migne, *P.G.* 77, 340 c.

[51] The letter from the « orthodox » at Antioch is mentioned in Cyril's Ep. 70 *ad clericos et Lamponem presbyterum* (*P.G.* 77, 341 a). His Ep. 69 *ad Acacium* mentions the work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* as already completed (*ibid.* 340 c-d).

[52] Richard, « La tradition etc. », p. 62. He returns to this argument as to the speed with which the *Contra D. et T.* was written, in other articles on this matter; cf. « Proclus de Constantinople et le théopaschisme », *Rev. Hist. Eccl.* 1942, p. 316; « Les traités, etc. », *Mél. Félix Grat.*, pp. 101-102. It should be observed, with regard to this argument from the speed of composition, that there are really several unknown factors involved: 1) Had Cyril begun a study of Theodore's writings before be received that letter in Jerusalem? 2) How long after returning from Jerusalem did Cyril write Ep. 69 *ad Acacium*? Richard insists that Cyril would not have waited for months to fulfill his duty of politeness to Acacius, after the arrival of the archimandrite Maximus. (cf. *R.H.E.* 1942, p. 316). But is it not possible that Cyril might have delayed this letter until he had

All five of the texts in Cyril's *Book I against Theodore* (quoted in the fifth session of the council) appear among the thirty-three texts of Diodorus in *cod.* 12156; in these five cases there are three common *incipit*'s and three common *explicit*'s [53]. Moreover, Leontius quotes three of Cyril's five texts as from Diodorus; in these three cases there are three common *incipit*'s and one common *explicit* [54]. Here, as in the case of the citations of Theodore, one is forced to conclude that Leontius and *cod.* 12156 depend on a common florilegium; either this florilegium is the work of Cyril itself, or Cyril also drew from this same common source. But Cyril's *First Book against Theodore* could hardly have been the source of the texts given by Leontius and the Syriac collection, since they ascribe these texts to Diodorus. How can this phenomenon be explained? Richard solves the problem as follows: Cyril based his *Books I and II against Theodore* on a florilegium of texts which must have been in two sections, of which the first part really contained texts of Diodorus. However, through some error, Cyril took all of these texts to be Theodore's, refuted the first part in *Book I against Theodore,* and the second part in *Book II.* This two-fold florilegium from Diodorus and Theodore must also have been the common source of the collections of *cod. add.* 12156 and Leontius. The fact that the Syriac collection gives texts of both, in that order, with texts of Diodorus coinciding with those of Cyril's *Book I,* texts of Theodore coinciding with those of Cyril's *Book II,* tends to confirm this theory [55].

It cannot be denied that all the foregoing evidence adds up to a strong argument for the conclusion that Cyril of Alexandria, despite his own statement to the contrary, based his treatise against Theodore not on a first-hand study of his *De Incarnatione,* but on a florilegium prepared for him by others [56]. Moreover, this same florilegium used by Cyril is

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finished the works which he wished to send along with it to Acacius? 3) How long would it have taken Cyril to do what he himself tells us he did: read the books of Diodorus and Theodore on the Incarnation?

[53] Cyril's texts are fragments 27, 22, 23, 17, 31-32 of Diodorus in *Cod. add.* 12156 (ed. De Lagarde, *op. cit.,* pp. 91-100; trad. Brière, *Rev. de l'Orient Chrét.* (1946) pp. 231-283.

[54] Cyril's fragments 1, 2 and 5 are Leontius' texts of Diodorus, 4, 3 and 2 (*P.G.* 86, 1388).

[55] Richard, « Les traités, etc. », p. 112.

[56] It is interesting to note that the sixth-century Nestorian writer Barhadbesabba Arbaia says that Cyril himself compiled a series of ex-

the basis of the whole anti-Theodorean tradition of texts: including the collections of the Syriac manuscript, of Leontius, and the *capitula* of Vigilius and the council. There does not seem to be any other reasonable explanation of the remarkable coincidences in all these sources. The difficulties against the theory that Cyril's work *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* could itself have been the common source of the later collections seem, taken together, to rule out that possibility. Then it, too, must depend on the common source: scil., a two-fold florilegium of Diodorean and Theodorean texts, composed by persons unknown.

What do we know about this florilegium? 1) It must have been originally in Greek, the language of Theodore and Cyril. 2) The compiler must have had the full text of the *De Incarnatione* to work from, since almost every book is represented in one or another of the dependent collections. 3) The compiler must have noted both the number of the book (given by Leontius) and the number of the section (given by *cod.* 12156). 4) Since the florilegium was used by Cyril, it must have been composed within about ten years of Theo-

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tracts from the writings of Theodore and Diodorus, (*Patrologia Orientalis* IX, p. 571). But there are reasons for discounting the value of this late testimony. One is that Barhedbesabba shows some familiarity with the letters of Cyril, and thus could merely be echoing what Cyril himself said to this effect in his letter to Acacius (*P.G.* 77, 340c). But a more serious drawback is that Barhadbesabba seems to make Cyril the author of that collection of extracts which Proclus of Constantinople presented to the Oriental Bishops for their censure. This incident occurred several years before Cyril wrote his *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum*, and there is good reason to believe that Cyril was not the compiler of the series of extracts then in question. At that time Cyril advised Proclus not to insist on the condemnation of these texts by the Oriental Bishops (see Cyril's Ep. 72, *P.G.* 77, 344-5). And in his letter to John of Antioch on this occasion, Cyril gives little credit to this collection of texts and its compilers, speaking of the latter as: « ... aliquos qui se, ut apparet, circa illum (i. e. Theodorum) infense habent et occasionem facientes contrario dogmate quo tenentur, capitula quaedam non ex melioribus intellectu, sicut quidam dixerunt ... exegerunt condemnari ». Cyril says that they are to be ignored: « ... cum maxime neque in promptu est persona quam culpae supponunt, et capitulorum redargutio incerta et qui haec agunt, in incertum currentes et aera verberantes inveniuntur ». (Cyril, Ep. « Legi litteras », Schwartz, *A.C.O.* I, 5, 314). We believe it is safe to conclude that in this instance Barhadbesabba has been drawn by his Nestorian bias to see Cyril of Alexandria as the arch-villain in every step taken against the memory of Theodore of Mopsuestia.

dore's death; that is, by the year 438. 5) A comparison of the later witnesses to this florilegium with the earliest witness (Cyril) shows practically identical texts: hence we can be reasonably sure that the sixth-century collections reproduce faithfully what they found in the fifth-century florilegium.

This much we know. But there are still a number of unanswered questions, among which the most vital are: 1) Who composed the original florilegium? 2) How honestly did they quote Theodore's texts?

III. Authorship of the common florilegium

Richard's answer to the question as to the authors of the original florilegium is that they were « those redoubtable forgers, the Apollinarists » [57]. In view of the many literary frauds of which the Apollinarists stand convicted, a solid proof that they were responsible for this florilegium would in fact constitute a serious a-priori reason for suspecting its reliability. One is entitled to ask: what real historical evidence is there that the Apollinarists did compose this florilegium?

It is true, of course, that the Apollinarists were the lifelong opponents of Diodorus and Theodore, who had both composed treatises directed specifically against the teaching of Apollinaris. And we know that in the preface to his work *Contra Apollinarem*, Theodore himself complained that the Apollinarists had falsified texts of his *De Incarnatione* by interpolating the doctrine of « two sons » [58]. Moreover, we know that on other occasions Cyril of Alexandria fell victim to Apollinarist frauds. But what positive proof is there that

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[57] Richard, « Léonce de Byzance, était-il origeniste? » *Revue des Etudes Byzantines*, 1947, p. 43. See also his article: « L'introduction du mot ' hypostase ' dans la théologie de l'Incarnation », *Mél. Sc. Rel.* (1945), pp. 22-23, where he states, referring to his article of 1943 in *Le Muséon*, « Nous croyons avoir prouvé que les fragments des florilèges dérivent tous d'une collection d'extraits du *de Incarnatione*, déjà utilisée par Cyrille d'Alexandrie lorsqu'en 438 il rédigeait ses traités *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum*, et dont l'origine apollinariste n'est pas douteuse. C'est une raison suffisante pour les suspecter ». Cf. also « Les traités ... », p. 113.

[58] Migne, *P.G.* 66, 1001 d-1004 b.

the Apollinarists were responsible for the florilegium on which Cyril based his *Contra Theodorum*?

As a link between the Apollinarists and Cyril's documentation on Diodorus, Richard points to the « excessively deformed » picture which Cyril paints of the career of Diodorus in his Epistle *XLV Ad Succensum* [59]. Richard is convinced that this « deformed » account of the life of the Bishop of Tarsus is « evidently of Apollinarist origin », and he goes on to state that Cyril could not have found it elsewhere than in the introduction of his florilegium of texts of the *First Book of Diodorus against the Synusiasts* [60]. Hence it must have been the Apollinarists who supplied him with this florilegium.

With all respect, we must confess that this argument seems to presume more than it proves. How can one be sure that Cyril could not have heard this unfavorable account of the career of Diodorus otherwise than by reading it in the introduction to a florilegium of his texts?

In any case, even if one could establish a link between the Apollinarists and this Diodorean florilegium, one would still not have shown that they were responsible for the florilegium with which we are concerned, since there is question here of two distinct florilegia. Richard has shown that this collection of texts from Diodorus' Book I *Contra Synusiastas* — utilized by Cyril in his *Contra Diodorum* — is distinct from the one which he used in composing his two books *Contra Theodorum* [61].

Possibly another link with the Apollinarists may be seen in the origin of our florilegium at Antioch. It will be recalled that while at Jerusalem in 438, Cyril received a long letter from the « orthodox » at Antioch, complaining about the way the Oriental bishops were favoring the doctrines and writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia. It is Richard's view that this letter from Antioch included the florilegium on which Cyril

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[59] Migne, *P.G.* 77, 230 a-b.

[60] « Les traités, etc. », *Mél. Felix Grat.*, p. 113: « L'image excessivement déformé qu'il nous présente de la carrière de l'évêque de Tarse est évidemment d'origine apollinariste et Cyrille ne peut l'avoir trouvée ailleurs que dans l'introduction de son florilège de textes du Ier livre contre les synousiastes ».

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 107-109.

based his two books *Contra Theodorum* [62]. In the supposition that these so-called « orthodox » at Antioch were actually Apollinarists, we have another link between these « forgers », and our florilegium.

But we must observe that our only reference to this letter received by Cyril at Jerusalem makes no mention of any documentation included in it. The origin of the collection at Antioch is rather conjecture than a matter of provable fact. Secondly, one may ask whether the only orthodox opponents of the doctrine of Theodore at Antioch must have been Apollinarists. The peace of 433 involved the definitive rejection of Nestorius and his teaching by the Antiochenes. There are undeniably many points of similarity between the doctrines of Nestorius and those in the writings of Theodore. Nestorius himself claimed that his doctrine was the same as that of the Bishop of Mopsuestia. It seems not at all impossible that orthodox minds at Antioch, troubled by the similarities between Theodore and Nestorius, should have felt constrained to warn Cyril of this new danger.

We would conclude, therefore, that these extrinsic, historical arguments for the Apollinarist origin of our florilegium are a matter more of conjecture than of certain fact. There is, however, the intrinsic argument to consider. It can be expressed thus: the Apollinarists, bitter enemies of Theodore, are known to have perpetrated frauds; Theodore himself accuses them of tampering with his *De Incarnatione*. But the florilegium actually shows evidence of interpolation, falsification, etc. Therefore the Apollinarists must have been responsible for it.

Here we approach the heart of the matter, the question whether our florilegium can really be shown to be a literary fraud, a collection of interpolated and falsified texts. This is really the important question. We have had to deal at length with the alleged Apollinarist origin, since a real historical proof that they composed this florilegium would constitute a strong *a-priori* argument against its reliability. But we believe that there is no solid, extrinsic proof that this is the case. Without prejudice, therefore, we can approach the question of the interpolation and falsification of the texts.

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[62] « La tradition etc. », pp. 61-62.

IV. The Question of Falsification in the Hostile Florilegia

The charge of deliberate falsification made by Richard and Devreesse with regard to the citations in the « hostile » florilegia, is based on a comparison of these texts, where possible, with sources friendly to Theodore. What are these « friendly » sources? We have already mentioned most of them in the opening chapter: they are the recently-discovered translations of Theodore's works which have furnished the impetus for the new interest in his doctrine. In particular: the Syriac texts of his *Catechetical Homilies* and *Commentary on St. John*; the ancient Latin version of his *Commentary on the Psalms*. Besides these complete, or at least continuous texts, there are also some scattered pages of what was evidently a complete Syriac text of the *De Incarnatione*. These pages, comprising eighteen folia, all separate except for two, are found in *Cod. Brit. Mus. Add.* 14669, which was edited, with a Latin translation, by E. Sachau [63]. Facundus also quotes a number of passages from the works of Theodore, in a Latin version, in his treatise: *Pro defensione trium capitulorum concilii chalcedonensis*.

A feature common to all these « friendly » sources is that they are translations from Theodore's original Greek texts. It is on the basis of discrepancies between the Greek texts of Leontius and these Syriac or Latin versions that one will charge deliberate falsification on the part of the unknown compiler of our florilegium. But here it seems to us that a certain caution must be observed, due precisely to the fact that we are dealing with translations. In the first place, a

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[63] E. Sachau, *Theodori Mopsuesteni Fragmenta Syriaca*, Leipzig, 1869, pp. 28-57. Both the edition of the Syriac and the Latin translation leave something to be desired. Richard complains of the way Sachau has arranged the folia, adding to the confusion already present (« La tradition, etc., p. 62). R. Abramowski states that Sachau's translation is a poor one, needing much correction (« Neue Schriften Theodors von Mopsuestia », *Zeitschrift für neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft*, 1934, p. p. 67). And Richard indicated the need of such correction by publishing a new translation of the part of the Syriac text with which he was concerned (« L'Introduction du mot 'hypostase' etc. », *Mél. Sc. Rel.*, 1945, p. 24).

version will generally be to some extent an interpretation of a text: there is always a question as to how perfectly the translator understood the original, how successfully he transferred the idea into a new language. Furthermore, there is the question of care and accuracy; whether the translator felt himself bound to reproduce every phrase, every word of his original. Secondly, there is the question of a deliberate « improvement » of the text. An ancient translator was generally not performing a purely academic exercise; he was rendering a text available to a new community; the purpose was the utility of the work in a new region. There are not lacking historical examples to show that a translator, in these circumstances, might consider it proper, or even his duty, to eliminate from his text such terminology as had become suspect or dangerous with the passing of time and doctrinal development. In particular, in the case of Theodore, it is to be noticed that striking development took place only three years after his death, in the exposure and condemnation of Nestorius. It is not impossible that a position held by Theodore in good faith could, after the public rejection of Nestorianism, have been too reminiscent of the teaching of Nestorius to be left in his text by a cautious translator.

There are, therefore, several elements on the part of a translation which are possible explanations of its discrepancy from the original. On the other hand, if it is the Greek text of Leontius which is to be blamed for the discrepancy, then, if the difference goes beyond the bounds of ordinary textual corruption, there is no alternative but to charge falsification against the excerptor of the text. This might seem to be an obvious solution, in view of the fact that the florilegium was evidently drawn up by enemies of Theodore, out to prove him guilty of heresy.

But here again there are grounds for caution. In the first place, as we have seen, the original compiler of the hostile florilegium must have indicated carefully not only the book, but also the section of the *De Incarnatione* from which the citation was taken. Thus he made possible an easy check on the accuracy of his quotations. This seems like a rather strange procedure for one whose intention is to present falsified texts. Furthermore, the florilegium was drawn up in the original language of the text — making any divergence immediately apparent. Moreover, it was done within ten years

of Theodore's death, while his works were still widely available, with able writers such as Theodoret ready to defend his memory.

In these circumstances, it seems that the compiler of this hostile florilegium must have been an utter fool if he presented a collection of falsified texts to Cyril of Alexandria for refutation. It would have been ridiculously easy for Theodoret to dispose of Cyril's work — all he had to do was to show that Cyril's texts had been corrupted. It may, of course, become evident that the unknown compiler did actually falsify the texts: in this case one can only conclude that he lacked intelligence as well as honesty. But the point of the foregoing observations is to suggest that there are reasons for caution in coming to this conclusion. The mere fact of discrepancy between a hostile citation and the text of a friendly translation, in itself, does not seem to be enough to warrant the serious charge of malicious falsification. The fact that the compiler gave precise references to book and section is rather a presumption in favor of his honesty. One must, therefore, exclude the possibility of an intentional or unintentional departure from the original on the part of the translator, before concluding that the compiler of the florilegium has borne false witness against the Bishop of Mopsuestia.

With these cautions in mind, then, we shall consider the cases where texts of the florilegium can be compared with the Syriac or Latin versions, to see wherein they differ, and to determine, if possible, how this difference is most reasonably to be explained.

But before beginning this comparison of texts, we must consider the question whether the compiler of the hostile florilegium may have been guilty of the more drastic fraud of foisting on Theodore texts which he had not written at all. Richard points out the fact that Theodoret, in his reply to Cyril's *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum*, states that he could not find, in the writings of Theodore, a certain passage attributed to him by Cyril [64]. However, Richard did not mention the fact that the passage alluded to by Theodoret is clearly a section of the « Symbol » introduced at the Council of Ephesus by Charisius [65]. As we have seen, Cyril remarks in a letter

[64] Richard, « La tradition, etc », p. 69.

[65] J. Flemming, *Akten der Ephesinischen Synode vom Jahre 449*, Berlin, 1917, pp. 105-107.

that this symbol was said by those who introduced it to have been the work of Theodore [66]. Hence it is not surprising that he included a refutation of its doctrine in his *Contra Theodorum*. It may, of course, be true that Theodore did not write the symbol in question. But we can understand how Cyril came to include it in his *Contra Theodorum*, without charging fraud to those who prepared his florilegium of texts from Theodore.

Another passage in Cyril's work which may give grounds for a suspicion of such fraud is the following brief and indirect quotation: « Miror vero adversarium scripsisse, quod nunquam conjunctionem ad Deum Verbum meruisset et Jesus, nisi prius immaculatus esset effectus per unctionem » [67]. The reason for suspicion is that, while Cyril gives no reference to the source of his quotation, both the Syriac *cod. add.* 12156, and the *capitula* of Vigilius and the Council, quote a text which is evidently the one to which Cyril refers — and state that it is « ex libro ad baptizandos » [68]. Yet there is no such passage in our Syriac version of the *Catechetical Homilies*. Must one conclude that the compiler of the florilegium has invented this quotation out of whole cloth? Or was there a mistake as to the source of the citation? Or did the Syriac translator omit something from the text? We do not feel that there are adequate grounds here to determine which of these explanations is the most probable.

We must now turn our attention to those texts of the hostile florilegia for which parallels can be found in the Syriac and Latin versions. We shall first examine the cases presented by Richard, and then those presented by Devreesse.

V. Evidence of falsification proposed by M. Richard

Richard bases his argument for the unreliability of the hostile florilegia largely on a comparison of three texts of Leontius and the Council, with their parallels in the Syriac

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66 Vide supra, p. 5.

67 Migne, *P.G.* 76, 1446 b.

68 *Cap.* 39 of both Vigilius (Guenther, pp. 269-270) and the Council (Mansi IX, 218a). The same passage, without reference to the source, and with a slightly different text, is quoted by Innocent of Maronia (*A.C.O.* IV, 2, p. 72).

translation of *Cod. Add.* 14669. We have already mentioned that this ms. consists of eighteen folia, all but two disconnected, preserved at random from what must have been a complete text of the *De Incarnatione*. Sachau describes it as being « in manu Edessena, charact. Estrangel. saec. V », and judges that the translator had an excellent command not only of Greek and Syriac, but also of theology [69]. From the combination of the antiquity and this competence, he suggests that it is the work of Ibas or his companions Pruba, Koumi, and Ma'nae in the school of Edessa.

Richard goes one step beyond Sachau and attributes this translation definitely to Koumi, on the strength of a statement by the eighth-century Nestorian Joseph Hazzaya. As Richard sees in the name Koumi a solid guarantee of the accuracy and fidelity of this Syriac version, we must consider briefly the facts on which this attribution has been based [70]. Our information on Joseph Hazzaya comes from an article by Addai Scher, who gives the following quotation from Hazzaya's work: *Questions and Replies* [71]:

> En effet les copistes, mais surtout ceux qui traduisent des livres d'une langue à une autre, interpolent souvent les livres divins, et le plus célèbre interpolateur est cet écrivain, qui traduisit le livre de Mar Denys. Son compagnon Komai, lui aussi, de son côté, interpola les écrits du Bienheureux Interprète, en les traduisant du grec en syriaque. Dans le livre de l'Incarnation, et dans celui de la Foi, partout où l'Interprète avait écrit qu'il y a dans le Christ deux hypostases, Komai, un des partisans de l'Empereur Justinian, a écrit une hypostase.

After giving this quotation, Scher goes on to point out serious historical weaknesses in Hazzaya's claim that Koumi interpolated the text which he translated. The most obvious, of course, is his description of Koumi as a partisan of Justinian. Besides the chronological difficulty, it is doubtful that Justinian would have allowed the works of Theodore to be translated. Moreover, he points out that the Rabban Narsai,

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[69] Sachau, *op. cit.*, pp. iv-v.

[70] Richard, « La tradition, etc. », p. 69: « Le nom de Koumi nous garantit en réalité le sérieux de la version syriaque ».

[71] Addai Scher, « Joseph Hazzaya, Ecrivain syriaque du VIIIe siècle », *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, III (1910), pp. 60-61.

from whom Hazzaya says his report is derived, lived a good century and a half after Koumi. On the other hand, Scher accepts the statement of Hazzaya that Koumi translated the text of the *De Incarnatione* wherein the doctrine of « one hypostasis » is found, and he concludes that this must be the same translation of which his library at Seert contained the complete text in manuscript. For it, too, showed the doctrine of « one hypostasis » [72].

Richard, following the lead of Addai Scher, likewise accepts the testimony of Joseph Hazzaya that Koumi was the translator of the text of Theodore which showed « one hypostasis », but denies the same Hazzaya's accusation that this was an interpolation on Koumi's part [73]. The reason for such an accusation is seen in the extreme Nestorianism of Hazzaya, who held firmly to the official doctrine of his sect (two hypostases, one person), and could not believe that his great authority, Theodore of Mopsuestia, had actually taught « one hypostasis ».

There are some interesting details here which neither Scher nor Richard seems to have fully considered. In the first place, Joseph Hazzaya says that Koumi « interpolated the doctrine of one hypostasis » not only in the *De Incarnatione*, but also in the *De Fide*, which is the same work known as the *Liber ad Baptizandos*, or the *Catechetical Homilies*. Now our Syriac text of the *Catechetical Homilies* nowhere teaches the union of two natures in one hypostasis (*qnoma*), but, where it speaks of the union, it always describes it as in one person (*parsopa* — from the Greek πρόσωπον) [74]. Is it possible that Hazzaya's charge of interpolation could be due to the fact that the translator of his text of the *Catechetical Homilies* had rendered the Greek πρόσωπον by *qnoma*? In this case, he would have made Theodore speak of « one hypostasis », wherever there was question of the union of the two natures. And since for Hazzaya, as for the Nestorian church of his period, nature and hypostasis were equivalent, it is understandable that he could have described this as an interpolation

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72 Unfortunately this *ms.* was lost, it seems irreparably, before any transcript of it was made.

73 Richard, « La tradition, etc. », pp. 67-69.

74 By « our text » of the *Cat. Hom.* I mean the text published in phototypic reproduction by Tonneau, *Studi e Testi* 145.

of the doctrine of « one hypostasis », where Theodore had spoken of two hypostases [75].

So far this is mere conjecture. Is there any evidence that this was actually the case? We believe that there is: in the form of the quotations from a Syriac text of these same *Catechetical Homilies* given by the eighth-century Nestorian, Theodore bar Koni. This author quotes three passages from the *Catechetical Homilies* where there is question of the union of the two natures [76]. In two of these cases, our Syriac text uses the expression « in one *parsopa* », indicating that the Greek had shown πρόσωπον [77]. In the other case, our Syriac text says simply that the Scriptures sometimes predicate as « of one only », what is true of the two natures in Christ [78]. Now in each of these three cases, Theodore bar Koni's Syriac text of the *Catechetical Homilies* spoke of « one *qnoma* », or « one hypostasis »; twice because it translated πρόσωπον by *qnoma*, and once because it inserted *qnoma* where, at least if our Syriac text is correct, there was no equivalent word in the Greek [79]. On the evidence of these three cases one may conclude that Theodore bar Koni had a text of the *Catechetical Homilies* wherein the translator had made Theodore speak of « one hypostasis », wherever he taught the union of the two natures. This sounds significantly like Hazzaya's charge that Koumi, in translating the *De Fide*, had interpolated the doctrine of one hypostasis where Theodore had spoken of two hypostases.

But Joseph Hazzaya said that this « interpolator » had translated not only the *De Fide*, but also the *De Incarnatione*. Is there any trace of a Syriac text of the *De Incarnatione* wherein Theodore's doctrine of union in one person was consistently translated as union in one *qnoma*? Here we recall that Addai Scher possessed in his library a complete Syriac text of the *De Incarnatione*. In the article wherein he de-

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[75] Since the time of Babaeus Magnus (ca. 600), the official formula of the Nestorian Church was « two natures, two hypostases, one prosopon ». See Jugie, *Theol. Dogm. Christ. Or.* V, p. 179 ff.

[76] Theodore bar Koni, *Liber Scholiorum*, ed. Addai Scher, *C.S.C.O.* Script. Syr. Ser. II, t. 66 (1922), p. 189, line 21 - p. 190, line 12.

[77] *Cat. Hom.* III, 10 (*trad.* Tonneau, p. 65, lines 27-28); *Cat. Hom.* VI, 3 (*trad.* Tonneau, p. 135, line 19).

[78] *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 10 (*trad.* Tonneau, p. 201, line 5).

[79] See Tonneau's footnotes to the three passages mentioned above.

scribes this codex, he makes the following illuminating remark [80]:

> J'ai dit que cette version du Livre de Théodore est la même que celle qui a été faite par Koumi, parce que la version de celui-ci, selon le témoignage de Joseph Hazzaya, disait qu'il y a en Jésus-Christ une hypostase. Or notre manuscrit aussi, partout où il parle de l'union, dit qu'il y a dans le Christ une seule hypostase (qnoma).

How it seems hardly possible that the original Greek text of the *De Incarnatione*, « everywhere where it speaks of the union », should have showed *one hypostasis*. In this case one must claim that in each case where Leontius' Greek fragments speak of union in one person, the text has been changed from *hypostasis* to *prosopon* [81]. Perhaps one would be willing to make that claim. But there is also the testimony of Facundus, who quotes four texts of the *De Incarnatione* where Theodore speaks of the union of the two natures in Christ. In each case it is union in one *persona* [82]. And there is a parallel Greek text to show that *persona* is Facundus' version of *prosopon* [83]. Finally, in the Syriac *cod. add.* 14669, where in two instances we find Theodore speaking of union in « one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis* » in eight other instances where mention of the union occurs, it is simply union in one *prosopon* [84].

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80 Addai Scher, « Joseph Hazzaya, etc. », p. 63.

81 The texts of Leontius show union in one *prosopon* in the following places: (*P.G.* 66) 976 b 14; 981: a 7; b 8-9; b 12; c 5; 985 b 14.

82 Facundus, *Pro defensione trium capitulorum*, Migne *P.L.* 67, 587 b 3-4; 748 b; 751 d 10-11; 753 c 15 - d 1.

83 *P.L.* 67, 741 c-d, where Facundus quotes Theodore's exegesis of Psalm 44, has a parallel in the Greek text edited by Devreesse: *Le commentaire de Theod. de Mop. sur les Psaumes*, p. 289-290. Where Facundus has *persona*, the Greek has *prosopon*. Here, as elsewhere in the exegetical works, Theodore speaks of the union of the two natures in one *prosopon*; the formula « in one hypostasis » does not occur.

84 E. Sachau, *Theodori Mopsuesteni Fragmenta Syriaca*, gives the Syriac text of *Cod. Add. 14669*. In this text, the doublet « one prosopon and one hypostasis », referring to the union of the two natures in Christ, occurs on p. 70, line 12, and on p. 71, line 6. But the expression, « union in one prosopon » or « unity of prosopon », occurs eight times: p. 70, lines 1 and 9; p. 71, line 2; p. 73, line 8; p. 77, lines 11, and 17-18; p. 83, lines 7 and 11.

How can one explain the fact that whereas all our other sources of the *De Incarnatione*, both friendly and hostile, speak repeatedly, almost exclusively, of union in one *prosopon*, Addai Scher's text used « one *qnoma* » *wherever* Theodore spoke of the union? Have we not the same phenomenon here which we saw in the case of Theodore bar Koni's text of the *Catechetical Homilies*: where the translator rendered « one *prosopon* » by « one *qnoma* », and thus made Theodore consistently teach a union in one hypostasis?

If this conclusion is correct, then we have Syriac translations of both the *De Fide* and the *De Incarnatione* wherein Theodore was rendered in such a way as to make him consistently speak of a union of the two natures in one hypostasis. Now if we recall the statement of Joseph Hazzaya: scil. that Koumi, in translating both the *De Fide* and the *De Incarnatione*, wrote « one hypostasis » wherever Theodore had written that there are two hypostases in Christ, it does not seem unwarranted to conclude that the two texts in question are in fact the version which Hazzaya attributed to Koumi. And his charge of interpolation will be explained simply by the fact that Koumi consistently rendered Theodore's union in one *prosopon* as union in one *qnoma*.

Addai Scher, therefore, seems justified in concluding that his manuscript of the *De Incarnatione*, which consistently showed union of the two natures in one *qnoma*, must have been Koumi's translation. But Richard also would claim Koumi as the translator of the version found in *Cod. Add. 14669*, assuming evidently that he had here a portion of the same text. The fact, however, is that the version of *Cod. Add. 14669* does not consistently teach union in one hypostasis wherever it speaks of the union, as Scher told us his manuscript did. As we have seen, *Cod. Add. 14669* speaks of the union of the two natures in one *prosopon* at least eight times; in two other cases it uses the doublet: « one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis* ». One is forced to conclude that *Cod. Add. 14669* is not the same version as that possessed by Addai Scher. Koumi cannot then be the translator of both of these texts: if Joseph Hazzaya's testimony is accepted, it will appear that Koumi was the translator of Scher's text, but not of that in *Cod. Add. 14669*. Yet, as we have seen, on the strength of Hazzaya's statement, Richard proposed that the name Koumi as translator guaranteed the fidelity of the ver-

sion found in *Cod. Add. 14669*. It may well be that this is an accurate and faithful version, but there is reason to doubt the peremptory value of an appeal to the name Koumi to prove it. The fidelity and accuracy of this Syriac version will have to judged on its own merits, rather than by the alleged guarantee which the name Koumi has been said to impart to it.

With this preliminary question out of the way, it is time to come to the main question, scil. to what extent do the texts of Leontius differ from their parallels in *Cod. Add. 14669*, and how can this discrepancy be most reasonably explained? The first case to be considered concerns two fragments of Leontius which have a parallel in *fol.* 10 of the Syriac manuscript. Richard has provided a Greek re-translation of the Syriac, thus allowing a convenient comparison of the two versions. We present the sections which show the discrepancies [85]:

Leontius	*Richard's version of cod. 14669.*
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὰς φύσεις διακρίνωμεν, τελείαν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου φαμέν, καὶ τέλειον τὸ πρόσωπον (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπρόσωπον ἔστιν ὑπόστασιν εἰπεῖν)· τελείαν δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ὁμοίως· ὅταν μέντοι ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν ἀπίδωμεν, ἓν πρόσωπον τότε φαμέν. ... ὥστε κἀνταῦθα ὅταν μὲν τὰς φύσεις διακρίνειν πειρώμεθα, τέλειον τὸ πρόσωπον φαμὲν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τέλειον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς θεότητος. ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀποβλέψωμεν, τότε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πρόσωπον ἄμφω τὰς φύσεις κηρύττομεν ...	ὅταν γὰρ τὰς φύσεις διακρίνωμεν, νοοῦμεν τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἐν ὑποστάσει ἰδίᾳ, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν <ἐν ὑποστάσει ἰδίᾳ·> ὅταν μέντοι ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν ἀπίδωμεν, ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασίν φαμεν. ... καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὅταν τὰς φύσεις διακρίνειν πειρώμεθα, τέλειον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει φαμὲν, τέλειόν τε τὸν θεὸν <ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει> φαμὲν. ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀποβλέπειν πειρώμεθα, ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν ἄμφω τὰς φύσεις κηρύττομεν ...

To explain the differences between these texts, Richard justly remarks that one cannot invoke mere accidents of trans-

[85] Leontius, *P.G.* 66, 981 a-c; *Cod. Add. 14669*, ed. Sachau, (text), pp. 70, line 11 - p. 71, line 7. Richard' Greek version: *Le Muséon*, 1943, p. 66. The phrases in brackets do not appear either in the Syriac or in Richard's Greek version. They should be disregarded for the present; the reason for inserting them will become clear in the further discussion of the text.

lation or transmission. « If one of these two texts represents the original thought of Theodore, as there is good reason for thinking it does, the other has been intentionally modified by a theologian well aware of what he was doing » [86]. The question is: Who modified the original?

Richard unhesitatingly accepts the Syriac manuscript as a faithful version of the original text, and charges the compiler of Leontius' florilegium with deliberate falsification. His principal argument in favor of the Syriac version is the one which we have already considered: scil. the testimony of Joseph Hazzaya concerning the translation of the *De Incarnatione* by Koumi. We have indicated that there are serious reasons for doubting the cogency of this appeal to the name Koumi to guarantee the version of *Cod. 14669*. On the other hand, Richard offers two arguments against the reliability of the text of Leontius. One is based on the alleged Apollinarist origin of his florilegium [87]. We have already examined the evidence for the attribution of this florilegium to Apollinarists: the conclusion to which we came was that it seemed to be more a matter of conjecture than a provable fact [88]. We have also seen that the compiler of the florilegium carefully noted the book and the section from which his citations were taken, thus making possible an easy check of his fidelity. This does not seem a likely procedure of one whose intention is to present a collection of forged or falsified texts. The extrinsic reasons, therefore, offered by Richard both in favor of *Cod. 14669* and against Leontius, do not seem to us to carry a great deal of weight.

His second reason for rejecting the text of Leontius is an intrinsic one, based on the content of the parenthesis which does not appear in the Syriac, and hence which Richard takes to be an interpolation in the Greek extract. We shall quote Richard's remarks in this regard [89]:

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[86] Richard, « La tradition, etc », p. 66.

[87] « L'introduction du mot 'hypostase' etc. », *Mél. Sc. Rel.*, 1945, p. 23, where he says of the text of Leontius: « Malgré l'abondance de ses témoins, nous avons plusieurs bonnes raisons de nous défier de ce texte. D'abord il appartient à la branche de la tradition qui nous vient des Apollinaristes ».

[88] *Vide supra*, pp. 52-54.

[89] « L'introduction du mot, etc. »., p. 23.

> Ensuite la parenthèse même, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπρόσωπον ἔστιν ὑπόστασιν εἰπεῖν, unique argument de l'opinion que nous discutons, est au moins étrange dans ce contexte. Pour qu'elle ait quelque sens il faudrait que l'équation ὑπόστασις=φύσις ait été familière aux lecteurs du *De Incarnatione,* d'autant plus que le dogme des trois hypostases divines leur avait appris à distinguer ces concepts. Or ceci, on serait bien en peine de le prouver!

A glance at the Greek text of Leontius, quoted above, will show that Richard is quite right in saying that this parenthesis makes no sense unless one realizes that the term ὑπόστασιν in the parenthesis is taken as a synonym for φύσιν in the phrase which precedes. Richard believes it would be difficult to prove that this equation was familiar to the readers of the *De Incarnatione,* especially since the trinitarian formula had taught them to distinguish these terms. But surely Richard does not deny that at the close of the fourth century the trinitarian sense of *hypostasis* was still a long way from reaching its uniform application in the field of christology. However, it does not seems to us so practical to dispute about what the readers of the *De Incarnatione* might have thought: the more immediate question is whether Theodore of Mopsuestia could have written this parenthesis, making *hypostasis* synonymous with *physis.* It seems to us that this question can be solved from a study of Theodore's use of these two terms. In fact, P. Galtier has recently made such a study, and has come to a conclusion quite different from the position held by Richard. We quote the conclusion reached by Galtier [90]:

> Pas plus pour Théodore que pour ses contemporains, il (le mot ὑπόστασις) n'est un pur synonyme de πρόσωπον.. Au contraire; il n'y aurait pas seulement anachronisme, ce serait une erreur et une injustice, de l'entendre au sens actuel de notre mot « personne ». Chez lui, le mot ὑπόστασις s'identifierait plutôt avec celui de φύσις : dans toute nature complète, il voit une ὑπόστασις et, par là, son langage ressemble à celui de saint Cyrille.

In support of Galtier's position we can also note a few more texts not discussed in his study of the question. In the

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[90] P. Galtier, S.J.: « L'*unio secundum hypostasim* chez Saint Cyrille », *Gregorianum* 33 (1952), p. 382.

Commentary on St. John there is a Greek fragment which clearly indicates that Theodore could use *hypostasis* and *physis* as practically synonymous, even with reference to a Divine Person [91].

εἰπὼν τὸ ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον περὶ τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ, καλῶς ἐπήγαγε τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, ὥστε δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ ἐρχόμενον πρὸς τὴν διὰ σαρκὸς εἶπε φανέρωσιν. τῇ γὰρ ὑποστάσει, φησί, καὶ τῇ φύσει ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ πρὸ τούτου.

It is noteworthy that Facundus translates this phrase by « substantia et natura », showing that even in the sixth century one could still understand the use of *hypostasis* in its primary sense of *substance* [92]. Another instance where Theodore clearly made *hypostasis* synonymous with *physis* is found in a Greek fragment of the *Commentary on Hebrews* [93].

οἱ πιστεύσαντες καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος μετειληφότες μέτοχοι τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ χριστοῦ γεγόναμεν, ὥσπερ τινὰ φυσικὴν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν κοινωνίαν δεξάμενοι.

Finally, there is a passage in the *Catechetical Homilies* where the two terms are again practically synonymous, signifying the subsistent reality of the Holy Spirit, as opposed to the created gift of his grace [94]. Theodore is explaining *John* vii, 38-39:

> Manifestement ici il indique qu'il parle du don de l'Esprit. Ce n'est pas, en effet, de l'hypostase ou de la nature de l'Esprit-Saint dont il disait qu'elle n'était pas parce que Jesus n'avait encore été glorifié; car il est de (toute) éternité, avant toute la création. Mais il parlait du don de l'Esprit-Saint, (don) qui, après l'Ascension de Notre-Seigneur au ciel, fut répandu et vu sur les apôtres bienheureux et sur ceux qui étaient avec eux.

From these additional texts, as well as those produced by Galtier, it seems certain that Theodore could well have used ὑπόστασιν as a synonym for τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγους. In this case the objection of Richard against the genuinity of

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91 Devreesse, *Fragments grecs sur s. Jean*, in the appendix to his *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, p. 314, lines 13-19.

92 *Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum*, *P.L.* 67, 746 d. It is also quoted by Devreesse, *loc. cit.*

93 Staab, *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche*, p. 205, lines 6-10.

94 *Cat. Hom.* X, 9 (Tonneau, p. 259).

the parenthesis in the text of Leontius appears to be without solid foundation.

We have now considered all the arguments offered by Richard to prove that the Syriac version is genuine, and that the text of Leontius represents a deliberate falsification of Theodore's work. We do not believe that these arguments prove his case. We must now consider the arguments for the opposite view, which have been proposed by Dom Diepen to prove that it is the Syriac text which has suffered the mutilation and interpolation. Speaking of the Syriac version, Diepen observes [95]:

> ... comme preuve que le texte de la traduction a été mutilé, ses cicatrices sont toujours là qui l'attestent: avant même de prendre connaissance du renseignement précis de Joseph Hazzaya, nous avions été frappé des traces évidentes d'un remaniement. Aux passages critiques, la phrase est embarrassée, et elle ne retrouve son harmonie que lorsqu'on lui restitue la dualité hypostatique qu'elle devait exprimer à l'origine. On verra en outre que le mot d'hypostase y est constamment rapproché de celui de nature, en sorte que l'équivalence de l'hypostase avec la personne qu'on y lit aussi, semble bien être une interpolation.

By removing what he considers to be interpolation, and adding what he thinks has been dropped, Diepen arrives at a text which he finds confirmed by the Greek of Leontius. When giving the Greek re-translation of *Cod. 14669* above, we have indicated these conjectures of Diepen. He would supply the phrases in brackets (as having been intentionally omitted), and would delete the phrase: καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν each time that it occurs [96].

As Diepen gives two different reasons for his conjectures: one to prove the mutilations, and another to prove the interpolations, we shall consider each case separately. His first argument to show that the words « in hypostasi sua » have been omitted is that without them « la phrase est embarrassée ».

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[95] H. M. Diepen, O.S.B., *Les trois chapitres au concile de Chalcédoine*, p. 28. Or see his article, « L'*Assumptus Homo* à Chalcédoine », *Revue Thomiste* LI (1951), pp. 586-589, where the same matter had previously been published.

[96] *Vide supra*, p. 64.

Now it must be admitted that a judgement of this kind depends to some extent on subjective elements. Hence we feel entitled to observe that in our opinion, while in the first instance the sentence does seem to lack a necessary final complement, in the second case the repetition of the word τέλειον with the particle τε seems to sustain the thought well enough without a repetition of the phrase ἐν ὑποστάσει ἰδία. We feel that in the second case, this phrase could well be understood without having to be explicitly repeated.

But the more important point in Diepen's position is that the phrase « in hypostasi sua » has been omitted once each time it appeared twice, with the intention of making Theodore teach a consistent doctrine of one hypostasis — whether the natures be considered as distinct or in union. That this is Diepen's mind here is evident from his remarks with reference to Richard's French translation of the same text [97]:

> Deux ans plus tard, M. Richard a donné une traduction française du même fragment syriaque (*Mélanges de Science religieuse*, art. cit. p. 24). L'auteur semble alors avoir changé d'avis car il introduit, lui-aussi, les deux hypostases que le contexte exige mais que la critique externe ne l'y saurait decouvrir. Il n'avertit pourtant pas son lecteur en vertu de quel principe critique il lui propose: ' Car lorsque nous distinguons les natures, nous concevons la nature divine dans sa propre hypostase et la nature humaine <dans sa propre hypostase> '. Et comme rien n'est supprimé dans le texte de Koumi, M. Richard est obligé de prêter à Théodore l'opinion que ' le Christ aurait deux hypostases si l'on considère ses natures l'une après l'autre; mais qu'il n'en aurait qu'une seule si l'on considère l'union ' (p. 25). Nous croyons que ni le texte de Koumi (une hypostase), ni celui de Théodore (deux hypostases) ne présentait cette contradiction.

In this last sentence, by « the text of Koumi » Diepen clearly refers to the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669*, whereas by « that of Theodore » he means his own conjectural reconstruction of that text. Hence it is clearly Diepen's theory that « Koumi » (i. e. the translator of *Cod. 14669*) has omitted the phrase « in hypostasi sua » once each time it occured twice, with the intention of making Theodore teach a consistent doctrine of one hypostasis both « before » and « after » the union.

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[97] Diepen, *op. cit.*, p. 29, note 1.

The basic defect in Diepen's theory here is that the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669*, even without the duplication of the phrase « in hypostasi sua », still clearly and explicitly teaches that each nature, considered as distinct or « before the union », is in its own *hypostasis*. An examination of the Syriac text shows that the first time this thought is presented, it is the *divine nature* which is explicitly said to be « in hypostasi sua »; but the second time it is *the man* who is explicitly « in hypostasi sua ». Hence each nature, considered separately, is expressly said to be in its own *hypostasis*. The « hypostatic duality » is still there, even without the duplication of the phrase in each case. If the intention of the one who supposedly omitted this phrase was to make Theodore teach a consistent doctrine of one hypostasis, he certainly committed a strange blunder in leaving the doctrine of two hypostases right in the text.

It seems to us, therefore, that the omission of the phrase « in hypostasi sua » probably does not have the doctrinal significance which Diepen sees in it. We have already remarked that in the second case where Diepen would supply the phrase, it seems to us that the structure of the sentence makes it easily enough understood without having to be expressed. What of the first case, where the sentence does seem to be « embarrassed », lacking its final complement? We have seen that Diepen's case for deliberate omission on doctrinal grounds is not supported by the evidence of the text. We should consider then, whether this omission could have been unintentional, due merely to an oversight on the part of a copyist. Is there any evidence that this was the case?

As a matter of fact, there is: in a Syriac quotation of this same passage of the *De Incarnatione*, given by Theodore bar Koni. We present his text, along with Richard's French version of the passage in *Cod. 14669* [98].

Richard's version of cod. 14669	*Theodore bar Koni*
Il est donc évident de toutes manières que le mot mélange	

[98] Richard's French version is found in *Mél. Sc. Rel.* 1945, p. 24. Theodore bar Koni's text is found in his *Liber Scholiorum* (ed. A. Scher, *op. cit.*), p. 190, lines 13-25. The Latin translation is had by the courtesy of I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J.

(κράσις), ne convient pas et est mal adapté, mais, puisque les natures demeurent indissolublement, qu'il y a union. En effet, les natures assemblées par celle-ci ont réalisé une seule personne selon l'union. Et selon ce que le Seigneur a dit de l'homme et de la femme: « Ils ne sont plus deux, mais une seule chair », (Mt. 19, 6) ainsi nous pouvons dire nous aussi que <le Verbe et l'homme assumé> ne sont plus deux mais une <personne> (ἕν) les natures restant évidemment distinctes. De même que là le nombre des deux n'empêche pas de dire qu'ils sont une seule chair — dans quel sens on les dit <une seule chair> c'est bien évident, — ainsi ici l'union de la personne n'est pas détruite par la différence des natures. Car lorsque nous distinguons les natures nous concevons la nature divine dans sa propre hypostase et la nature humaine <dans sa propre hypostase>. Mais lorsque nous considérons la conjonction, nous disons une personne et une hypostase. En effet, lorsque nous divisons la nature de l'homme nous disons qu'autre est la nature de l'âme et autre celle du corps, sachant que chacune a hypostase et nature et croyant que l'âme séparée du corps demeure dans sa propre nature et hypostase et que pour tous deux il y a nature et hypostase (car c'est ainsi que nous avons appris de l'apôtre <à parler de> l'homme intérieur et de l'homme extérieur (II Cor. 4, 16) et que nous nommons ce qui les distin-

Si consideramus naturas, tunc cognoscimus naturam divinam in sua hypostasi et naturam humanam in sua hypostasi. Si autem attendimus ad conjunctionem, tunc unam personam et unam hypostasim dicimus. Ut enim quando distinguimus naturam hominis, dicimus diversam esse naturam corporis, et diversam animae, cum unicuique ex eis dicamus esse et naturam et hypostasim.

gue de ce qui est commun, par l'addition des mots « extérieur » et « intérieur », afin de ne pas les nommer de la simple appellation <d'homme>); mais lorsqu'ils se réunissent en un nous disons qu'ils sont une hypostase et une personne et nous nommons l'un et l'autre d'un seul <nom>.

Ut autem adjungimus in unum, unam hypostasim et unam personam dicimus eas, et ambo in unum nominamus.

De la même façon là aussi nous disons qu'il y a la nature divine et la nature humaine, et que, les natures étant ainsi conçues, une est la personne de l'union. Et par suite, lorsque nous cherchons à distinguer les natures nous disons que l'homme est parfait dans sa propre hypostase et parfait le Dieu. Mais lorsque nous voulons considérer l'union, nous proclamons que les deux natures sont une seule personne et une hypostase, reconnaissant qu'en raison de son union à la divinité la chair reçoit un honneur au dessus de la création et que la divinité accomplit tout en elle.

Hoc modo dicimus etiam hic, naturam divinam et naturam humanam, et licet cognoscimus naturas, unum prosopon unitatis est. Et in hoc, quando naturas conamur distinguere, dicimus unum prosopon et unam hypostasim ambabus naturis.

It will be recalled that Diepen chided Richard for supplying the missing phrase « dans son propre hypostase » in his French translation, « without informing his reader in virtue of what critical principle » he did so. While Richard does not say so, it may well be that his justification for this insertion was the fact that the phrase appears in the text as cited by Theodore bar Koni. There is no doubt, therefore, that this phrase does belong in the Syriac text, at least in the first of the two instances where Diepen detected its lack.

On the other hand, the text of Theodore bar Koni seems to warrant the definitive rejection of Diepen's theory that this omission in *Cod. 14669* had been a deliberate mutilation on doctrinal grounds. In his theory, the whole point of the omission was to avoid a contradiction with the doctrine of

union in one hypostasis which the translator wished to interpolate into the text. Yet the text as cited by Theodore bar Koni is identical with that of *Cod. 14669* in showing the « interpolation ». From this fact, as well as from what we have seen previously, is seems safe to conclude that the omission of the phrase « in hypostasi sua » in *Cod. 14669* was a mere accident, of no particular doctrinal significance.

What of Diepen's second charge against the Syriac translation: scil. that the phrase « and one hypostasis » is an interpolation? We have observed that these two questions are quite distinct. The omission of the phrase « in hypostasi sua » is probably due merely to a fault in the transmission of the Syriac text. But the addition of the phrase « and one hypostasis » is a new factor altogether, which deserves careful consideration. The presence of this phrase in the Syriac text: — its absence in the Greek text of Leontius — cannot be accidental; one or the other of these witnesses has modified the original text.

Now there is a very important point to be considered here which neither Richard nor Diepen has treated in their arguments for the reliability of one or the other of these versions. It is the question whether *Cod. 14669* and Theodore bar Koni give us two independent translations of this passage of the *De Incarnatione*. An affirmative answer to this question would indicate that they must both be derived from an original Greek text quite different from that given by Leontius. This would rule out the possibility that it was the Syriac translator who modified the original, and would cast serious suspicion on the text given by Leontius.

What indications are there that they might be independent translations? There is the fact that Theodore bar Koni's text gives the phrase « in hypostasi sua » which is missing in *Cod. 14669*. But we have seen that this was more likely an accidental omission in the transmission of the text. Secondly, we notice that in bar Koni's text the personal pronoun « we » is consistently omitted. Equivalently, wherever *Cod. 14669* says « dicimus nos », bar Koni says simply « dicimus ». But at the same time it is to be noticed that Theodore bar Koni writes in the eighth century, while *Cod. 14669* dates from the fifth. The development of a living language over such a period might well explain such a difference in a quotation. Finally, in one or two cases there is a slight discre-

pancy in the order of the words. At the same time, however, we observe that the citation of Theodore bar Koni is not a very careful one; he has twice abridged his text, and in the second case he evidently did not realize that he was confusing the thought by the omission of the intervening passage. It seems not at all improbable, therefore, that the slight discrepancies between the fifth-century translation and its eighth-century citation can be explained by the ordinary accidents of transmission.

On the other hand, there is positive evidence that these two Syriac texts are actually the version of one and the same translator. In the first place, apart from the details mentioned above, the two Syriac texts show a word-for-word identity, not only in the choice of words, but even in the order in which they occur. And secondly, we believe that there is definitive proof that only one translator is involved, on the basis of a comparison of a sentence which occurs in both Syriac texts, with the corresponding Greek of Leontius. We present the three texts involved [99]:

Leontius	*Cod. 14669*	*Theodore bar Koni*
διακεκριμέναι γὰρ αἱ φύσεις, ἓν δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον τῇ ἑνώσει ἀποτελούμενον.	καὶ νοουμένων τῶν φύσεων, ἓν τὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως πρόσωπον.	licet cognoscimus naturas, unum prosopon unitatis est.

It is obvious that the two Syriac texts here are identical, and that they show two distinct discrepancies from the Greek of Leontius. Now the identity of the two Syriac texts can be explained in one of two ways: either they are two independent, but accurate versions of the genuine Greek text, or they are the identical, but rather free, translation of the Greek given here by Leontius. If the first alternative is accepted, one must conclude that the Greek text given by Leontius has suffered alteration and interpolation. On the other hand, if the text of Leontius is genuine in this particular sentence, one must conclude that *Cod. 14669* and Theodore bar Koni give

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[99] To see the context, see the citations given above, p. 64 and pp. 70-72, The sentence of Leontius is in *P.G.* 66, 981 b 13 - c 1.

us the work of one and the same translator, who was somewhat free in his adherence to the original.

The question to be decided, therefore, is whether the text of this sentence, as given by Leontius, can reasonably be said to have suffered alteration and interpolation. In what would this alteration have consisted? If the Syriac texts are independent, accurate versions of the original, then someone must have changed the word « recognized » to « distinguished », and substituted the phrase, « the person *effected* by the union », for the phrase, « the person *of* the union ». One could not otherwise explain the *identical* discrepancy from Leontius in two *independent* Syriac versions.

However, there are very serious difficulties against the theory of alteration and interpolation in this particular sentence of Leontius. In the first place, it seems unreasonable that an interpolator would have gone to the trouble of altering the word διακεκριμέναι here, and yet have left it in the text, in the same connection, only a few sentences previously. In the preceding paragraph, while developing the same thought, the text of Leontius shows an identical use of the word as applied to the two natures [100]: ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶ δύο πρόσωπα, ἀλλ' ἕν, δηλονότι τῶν φύσεων διακεκριμένων.

In this case, the wording of Leontius is confirmed by the Syriac of *Cod. 14669*, where Richard translates: « ... les natures restant évidemment distinctes ». There is no reason to suppose that a hostile interpolator would have changed the wording of the second sentence, simply to make it correspond more exactly with what Theodore himself had said just previously. Hence we have ample confirmation for the reading of Leontius in the sentence with which we are concerned. The coincidence of the two Syriac versions in rendering « distinguished » by a word meaning merely « known » or « recognized », suggests an identical but slightly inaccurate translation.

What of the second variant, where the Syriac texts agree in speaking of « the proposon *of* the union », where the text of Leontius has « the prosopon *effected by* the union »? If we ask which of these two phrases is more in conformity with what Theodore says elsewhere, the verdict falls definitely in

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100 *P.G.* 66, 981 a 12-13.

favor of Leontius. For, if the phrase « effected by the union » is an interpolation, then someone has gone to the trouble of interpolating something which Theodore himself had said just a few sentences previously (*P.G.* 66, 981 a 7-8): ... αἱ φύσεις ἓν πρόσωπον κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀπετέλεσαν. That this previous text is genuine is certain from the parallel in the Syriac, where Richard translates: « ... les natures ...ont réalisé une seule personne selon l'union ». Moreover, the expression, « one person effected by the union », must have occurred frequently in the *De Incarnatione*, judging by the fact that it appears twice in the few fragments of this work preserved by Facundus (*P.L.* 67, 587 b): « ... adunari dicimus utrasque naturas, et unam juxta adunationem effectam esse personam »; also (753 c-d): « Utrumque juste Filius vocatur, una exstante persona, quam adunatio naturarum effecit ».

In the sentence with which we are concerned, then, the text given by Leontius is thoroughly Theodorean. Far from being an interpolation, it has every guarantee of being the genuine expression used by Theodore. On the other hand, the Syriac version presents an expression: « the prosopon *of* the union », which appears nowhere else in all that we possess of the writings of Theodore. He frequently speaks of the « union of the person », the « unique prosopon », and, as we have seen, the « one person effected by the union ». But one will look in vain for an example of the phrase: « the person of the union ». The conclusion seems justified that it is the text of Leontius that presents the original words of Theodore in this place. If the text of Leontius is rejected, and the Syriac accepted as accurate versions of the genuine text, then one is forced to the absurd conclusion that someone has twice altered Theodore's text only to bring it into more perfect accord with his customary manner of expression. We must conclude that the reading of Leontius is the genuine one, and that the identical discrepancy in the two Syriac texts must be due to the identity of their translator, who is thus shown to have been somewhat free in his adherence to the original.

Is there any other evidence in this same passage which would confirm the idea that this Syriac translation is not one to be relied on for literal accuracy? We believe that there

is, in the comparison of the first two sentences of Leontius' fragment VI with the corresponding section of the Syriac.

Leontius (P. G. 66, 981 a 4-9)

πανταχόθεν ἄρα δῆλον, ὡς περιττὸν μὲν τὸ τῆς κράσεως καὶ ἀπραπὲς καὶ ἀφαρμάζον, ἑκάστης τῶν φύσεων ἀδιαλύτως ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μεινάσης. πρόδηλον δὲ ὡς τὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἐφαρμάζον. διὰ γὰρ ταύτης συναχθεῖσαι αἱ φύσεις, ἓν πρόσωπον κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀπετέλεσαν.

Richard's version of Cod. 14669

Il est donc évident de toutes manières que le mot mélange ne convient pas et est mal adapté, mais, puisque les natures demeurent indissolublement, qu'il y a union. En effet, les natures assemblées par celle-ci ont réalisé une seule personne selon l'union.

It will be observed that the Greek of Leontius presents a perfect antithesis, neatly expressing the logical relations between the thoughts involved. « The word 'mixture' is unsuitable, because the natures remain indissolubly what they are; the word 'union' is suitable, because, brought together by this, the natures have effected one person according to the union ». There is no reason whatever to suspect the genuinity of the Greek here; it is a perfect expression of Theodore's thought. Yet if we compare the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669*, one can only say that it is a very imperfect translation, since it has not only neglected the neat antithesis of the Greek, but has even missed the causal connection between the thoughts. The Syriac translator seems to have missed the fact that the permanence of the two natures is precisely the *reason* why « mixture » is unsuitable; whereas the realization of one person is precisely the *reason* why « union » is the correct term to use. His translation is close enough to show beyond doubt that it was Leontius' Greek which he tried to render into Syriac. The result shows that his version is not always as rigorously accurate as one might wish. This example, then, would confirm the evidence that freedom or inaccuracy would be the logical solution to the question why the Syriac version does not correspond to Leontius in the other sentence with which we have been concerned. And since two different translators would hardly have been guilty of exactly the same inaccuracies, it seems quite certain that Theodore bar Koni has quoted his passage from a copy of the very same version of the *De Incarnatione* as that contained in *Cod. 14669*.

It will be recalled that the investigation presented in the past few pages was instituted for the purpose of determining whether the phrase « and one hypostasis », suspected of being an interpolation by Diepen, had the guarantee of appearing in two independent Syriac versions of the *De Incarnatione.* Having come to a reasonably certain answer to that question, we can now go ahead with a discussion of the reasons advanced by Diepen to show the interpolation. But before going on, we should remark that our proof of the identity of the two Syriac versions has also shown that this translation was not a particularly accurate one. Its divergencies from the Greek of Leontius in these cases where the latter has a solid guarantee of authenticity give positive proof of a certain freedom, a certain inaccuracy in the Syriac rendering of the original Greek. We shall see further proof of this point as our study goes on.

Dom Diepen's argument to show that the phrase indicating the union of the two natures « in one hypostasis » is an interpolation, is that for Theodore, *hypostasis* is a synonym for *physis.* And since Theodore would certainly not have spoken of union in one *physis,* neither would he have admitted union in one *hypostasis.* Furthermore, Diepen asks, why would Cyril's formula, « unio secundum hypostasim » have caused such emotion at Antioch if the bishops of this patriarchate could have found the same expression in the works of their great doctor, Theodore of Mopsuestia?

Now it is true, as Diepen is aware, that Theodore does occasionally use the term *hypostasis* in the sense of 'person', when he is referring to one, or all three, of the Divine Persons of the Trinity. But as Galtier has shown, and we have proved with additional examples, the term *hypostasis* for Theodore does retain, even when he is referring to a Divine Person, much of its primitive sense of « substantial reality », wherein it is very close to the term, *physis.* And apart from the strictly Trinitarian application of the word *hypostasis,* we cannot find an instance where it is clearly a synonym for *prosopon.* This linking of *hypostasis* with *proposon,* then, in the Syriac version, is something unusual in Theodore's terminology.

Still more unusual is the notion that the union of the two natures in Christ results in one *hypostasis.* As we have

seen, Theodore frequently speaks of the one *prosopon* as being *effected* by the union of the two natures. From the Syriac version one would have to conclude that he also conceived of the one *hypostasis* as being effected by the union. But, as we have seen, the basic and primary sense of *hypostasis* for Theodore is always that of a real, substantial being. Obviously he conceives of the two natures in Christ as such real, substantial beings. What, then, would be the real, substantial being which is *effected* by the union of these two natures? One cannot say that the same difficulty would apply to his union in one *prosopon*, for this term is much more elastic, and does not necessarily have that note of substantiality proper to *hypostasis*.

A further reason to suspect the Syriac version here is the fact that all our other sources of the *De Incarnatione*, both hostile and friendly, speak exclusively of union in one *prosopon*. We have had occasion to remark this fact before, as our reason for believing that the *consistent* use of the formula, « union of the two natures in one hypostasis », as found in the lost manuscript described by Addai Scher, was due simply to the consistent rendering of *prosopon* by *qnoma*. We know that this is the reason why Theodore bar Koni found the doctrine of one *hypostasis* in his Syriac version of the *Catechetical Homilies*. Here we should note that in this same place, Theodore bar Koni proposed three other texts to show that the Bishop of Mopsuestia had spoken of one hypostasis. But a comparison of these texts with their extant parallels shows clearly that in none of these three cases was it really a question of the union of the two natures, humanity and divinity, in one hypostasis [102]. We cannot agree with Devreesse when he says that in these half-dozen passages cited by bar Koni, « ... Théodore de Mopsueste affirme à côté des deux natures — ou plutôt les unissant — l'unique hypostase » [103].

We believe it is safe to say that there is no sound reason for believing that the missing portions of the *De Incarnatione*

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[102] Compare the texts given by Theodore bar Koni (*op. cit.*, pp. 188-189) with the parallel texts in Staab (*Pauluskommentare*, p. 201, lines 33-36; p. 205, lines 6-10) and in Vosté, (*Theod. Mops. Comm. in Ev. S. Jo.*, versio, p. 84, lines 25-31).

[103] *Essai*, p. 276, note 6.

would show a different formula of the union in Christ from that which we find in the fragments of this work preserved in Latin and Greek. And to support the evidence of these fragments, we have all the testimony of the exegetical and catechetical works. Theodore does not hesitate to present his theology in these works; while he does not go so deeply into its rational explanation, he certainly presents his basic theological formulae time and time again. In all these works we find numerous instances of union in one *prosopon*, but not a single case to indicate that Theodore conceived of the union of the two natures in Christ as resulting in one *hypostasis*.

We may say, therefore, that it is a question of choosing between the text of Leontius, which shows « union in one prosopon », (something extremely common in Theodore's writings), and the Syriac translation, which shows « union in one prosopon *and one hypostasis* », (something for which we have no parallel in all the extant writings of Theodore). We are reminded that in another sentence in this same passage, when the Syriac translator clearly departed from the genuine text: « the person *effected by* the union », he used an expression, « the person *of* the union », which has no parallel in Theodore's extant writings. Considering the evidence which we have already seen to show that this Syriac translator did not feel himself bound to a rigorously literal adherence to his text, we believe there is serious reason to suspect that in this case, too, he has departed from the original words of Theodore.

What could have been his motive for making this change? Here we can present only conjecture: but perhaps it has some likelikood. It is very probable that this translation was made in the school of Edessa, about the middle of the fifth century. Now we know that Ibas, head of this school and Bishop of Edessa, was rehabilitated by the Council of Chalcedon only when he subscribed to the condemnation of Nestorius, and signed the dogmatic decrees of the Council. There is good reason to believe that Ibas was quite sincere in both of these commitments.

At this precise time, therefore, even at Edessa, anything that was too reminiscent of the formulae of Nestorius would have been considered better not said. Let us suppose, then, that the Syriac translator found in his text of Theodore what Leontius presents: scil. the idea that each nature, considered

distinct in itself, could be said to be, or to have, a *proposon*. The similarity of this to Nestorius' formula of the two *prosopa* combining in the *prosopon of union*, might well have struck the translator as unfortunate. What would be simpler than to render the phrase in such a way as to say that each nature has its own *hypostasis*, rather than its *prosopon*? Let us suppose this slight alteration has been made. What then? He would have *had* to drop the parenthesis: (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπρόσωπον ἔστιν ὑπόστασιν εἰπεῖν), since it would no longer have made any sense in his version. Why, then, would he add: « one person *and* one hypostasis? Because the sequence of the thought demanded that what was twofold when the natures were considered distinct, was but one when they were united. It should be noticed that the whole development springs from the example of man and wife, who are *no longer* two, but one flesh. So also, says Theodore, in Christ there are *no longer* two persons, but one. Just as « no longer », in the case of man and wife, indicates that there was a time when they were not one flesh, but two, so also, « no longer », applied by Theodore to Christ, indicates that there is a point (a moment of reason, rather than of time, in this case), prior to which there are two *prosopa*, whereas in the union there is but one. The apparent contradiction (two prosopa as distinct, one prosopon in union) is really demanded by the sequence of thought, and justifies the strong adversative (μέντοι) employed [104]. Having changed the two *prosopa* to two

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[104] It will be observed that our interpretation of this passage differs from that of Diepen, who will not admit that Theodore taught the « contradiction » of saying that what was two-fold as distinct, is but one in the union. He believes that the original text must have read: « two *hypostases* as distinct, but one *prosopon* in the union ». In accordance with this theory he admits that Leontius has tampered with his text to the extent of changing the two *hypostases* before the union to two *prosopa*. But he excuses this supposed alteration as: « an interpretation, rather than a falsification; an adaptation to the vocabulary of his epoch » (p. 29). But if the original text read as Diepen proposes it, and Leontius really changed it as Diepen supposes that he did, we would find it hard to share Diepen's complacency for Leontius. Actually, it is most unlikely that Leontius did more than copy his text from a florilegium prepared long before « his epoch », since this same text appears in the Syriac collection of *Cod. 12156*, just as Leontius presents it. If his text does not reproduce the original, it is not Leontius who is responsible, but the

hypostases as distinct, the translator could only preserve the sequence by adding that they became one *hypostasis* in the union.

The foregoing, we repeat, is mere conjecture as to *why* and *how* the alteration could have taken place in the Syriac version. We do not see in it any grave improbability. On the other hand, its greater or lesser probability does not seriously affect the textual proofs which we already advanced to show that the formula of Leontius: union in one prosopon, is more likely to have been what Theodore wrote. Finally, on the other hand, we should note the strongly Chalcedonian ring of the formula in the Syriac version: « one prosopon and one hypostasis ». If Theodore's text had actually contained this striking anticipation of the formula of Chalcedon, it is strange that Facundus of Hermiane, who was so keen to produce evidence of Theodore's orthodoxy, would not have noticed it and made capital of it. Furthermore, as we have already remarked, Ibas of Edessa was present at Chalcedon and accepted its dogmatic decrees. If this Syriac version came from his circle, shortly after the middle of the fifth century, it is not surprising that this formula may have found its way into Theodore's text in the course of translation.

We do not believe that the evidence is sufficient to prove with certainty that in this instance, the discrepancy between the Greek of Leontius and the Syriac version is due to a departure of the translator from his original text. It is quite certain that in other cases, this is the correct explanation. We believe that there is ample reason for saying that here, too, it is a probable, or even the more probable explanation. In any case, it is surely rash to brand the Greek text of Leontius as a forgery on the basis of a variant in the Syriac translation. The next text to be considered will give added proof that this is true.

There are only two passages where we can compare the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669* with the Greek of Leontius. We

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fifth-century compiler who prepared the florilegium used by Cyril of Alexandria. In this case there could be no question of an innocent « adaptation to the vocabulary of his epoch ». But, as we have seen, there is good reason to believe that the text of Leontius does correspond to the original work of Theodore. The contradiction seen by Diepen is not one that is present « sub eodem respectu ».

shall now consider the second of these passages, where Richard has also seen evidence of malicious interpolation in the hostile florilegium. In his translation of the Syriac text, Sachau notes a variant from the text of Leontius, and he translates a bit of the Syriac into Greek to provide an accurate comparison. For the rest, the version evidently corresponds with Leontius' Greek. We present the two texts, putting the variant sections into parallel columns [105]:

Greek of Leontius, where Syriac corresponds:

ὁς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι. - δεδικαιῶσθαι ἐν πνεύματι λέγων αὐτόν, εἴτε ὡς πρὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος μετὰ τῆς προσηκούσης ἀκριβείας τόν νόμον φυλάξαντα, εἴτε ὡς καὶ μετ'ἐκεῖνο

Leontius continues:

τὴν τῆς χάριτος πολιτείαν τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ μετὰ πολλῆς πληροῦντα τῆς ἀκριβείας.

Syriac version continues:

τῇ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος χάριτος πολιτείᾳ καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀκριβείᾳ πεπληρωμένον.

M. Richard evidently accepts the Syriac as an accurate version of the original text, and takes the phrase τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ in the text of Leontius to be an interpolation, for he remarks [106]:

> Cette fois encore le texte syriaque nous donne une variante, — déjà signalée par Sachau, — dont la portée théologique est évidente: l'expression si choquante τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ, n'y figure pas.

But it is to be noted that the difference between these two texts cannot be explained by the simple interpolation of the phrase: τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ. For, while we do not find the word, συνεργείᾳ in the Syriac, we do find τοῦ πνεύματος although in a different construction, forming an element in the phrase: τῇ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος χάριτος πολιτείᾳ. In the supposition, (evidently accepted by Richard), that this latter represents the original text, then whoever interpolated the text of Leontius must not only have added the word συνεργείᾳ but completely reworded the sentence, putting the words τῇ τῆς χάριτος πολιτείᾳ into a new construction without τοῦ

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105 Leontius' fragment XXI, *P.G.* 66, 988 c. Syriac *Cod. Add.* 14669, fol. 17 b; Sachau (trad.), p. 53.

106 Richard, « La tradition, etc. », p. 66.

πνεύματος, which he needed to form his « choquante » phrase τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ. It is impossible, therefore, to maintain that the phrase in Leontius: τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ is an interpolation, without at the same time holding that the whole construction: τὴν τῆς χάριτος πολιτείαν πληροῦντα is an invention of the interpolator, while the Syriac version: τῇ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος χάριτος πολιτείᾳ πεπληρωμένον reproduces the original, authentic text.

Richard does not seem to have considered the possibility that the Syriac might simply be a garbled version of the Greek as given by Leontius. The fact that the Syriac shows practically all the words, but in different grammatical construction, should have at least suggested this possibility. It seems to us that the key question to ask is this: which expression: τὴν τῆς χάριτος πολιτείαν ... πληροῦντα or τῇ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος χάριτος πολιτείᾳ ... πεπληρωμένον, is Theodore more likely to have written? Fortunately we have another text of Leontius, (one whose authenticity there is no reason to suspect), which gives us a satisfactory answer to this question. In fragment II, from the seventh book of the *De Incarnatione*, where Theodore is discussing the life of virtue practised by the *homo assumptus*, we read the following passage [107]:

> ... καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου συνέργειαν δεχόμενος, ἄτρεπτος λοιπὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς διετηρεῖτο. ... καὶ μετήει μὲν σὺν εὐμαρείᾳ πλείστῃ ἐπ'ἀκριβεστάτην ἀρετὴν, ἔι τε τὸν νόμον φυλάττων πρὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, ἐί τε τὴν ἐν τῇ χάριτι μετιὼν πολιτείαν μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα.

One need only compare this passage with the Greek of Leontius quoted previously to see that there is a perfect parallel both in thought and expression. In each case, the life of the *homo assumptus* is divided into two stages: before his baptism he keeps the Law; but after baptism he fulfills the « regime of charity ». The phrase: τὴν τῆς χάριτος πολιτείαν... πληροῦντα which Richard must hold to be an interpolation in fragment XXI, is found to correspond, both in thought and expression, with a passage whose genuinity one cannot reasonably doubt. The exact correspondence between these two expressions of the same idea must surely stamp Leontius' fragment XXI as the original writing of Theodore.

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[107] *P.G.* 66, 977 b.

Now if we go back to Sachau's Greek rendition of the variant portion in the Syriac, it is obvious that the translator of *Cod. 14669* has made nonsense of a perfectly clear sentence in the Greek. He has completely missed the point of the antithesis between Christ keeping the Law before his baptism, and fulfilling the « regime of charity » after it. We see that the word πνεύματος appears in the Syriac version where it clearly does not belong: scil. interfering with the phrase, the « regime of charity ». There is no reason to doubt, therefore, that the whole phrase: τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργείᾳ belongs in the original text. The lack of the word corresponding to συνεργείᾳ in such an inaccurate translation as the Syriac is found to be, is no argument against its belonging in the Greek. Moreover, the thought expressed by this phrase fits perfectly into the context, which is an explanation of Christ's « justification in the Spirit ».

What of Richard's assertion that this is a « choquante » phrase? We would reply: 1) « Choquante » or not, it is found in a text which has a solid guarantee of genuinity. And 2) The idea that the *homo assumptus* was assisted in the practise of virtue by the Holy Spirit is found elsewhere in the writings of Theodore: *a*) at least implicitly, but clearly enough to be certain, in works of whose authenticity there is no question [108];

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[108] E. g. *Comm. in I Tim.*, 3, 16 (Swete, II, 136-137): « ... iustificatus in Spiritu: evidens hoc quoniam ad deitatem nequaquam potest pertinere; humanae vero naturae evidenter potest aptari, qui et Spiritus inhabitationem in baptismate accepit, quando et in specie columbae insuper illum venit. Sed a Spiritu in solitudinem ductus est, ut contra diabolum in agone decertaret, et in Spiritu Dei eiciebat daemones, sicut ipse in evangeliis dicit; et ad plenum omnia illa quae secundum inhabitantem in se Spiritum gratiae pro nostra expediebat salute. Primitiae quidem nostrae salutis erant illa quae secundum Christum celebrantur; unde et Spiritus ad perfectionem omnium suscepit bonorum inhabitationem Dei Verbum, eo quod et nobis participatione Spiritus omnium bonorum causa adquiritur sive in praesenti saeculo sive in futuro ». On the sinlessness of Christ as an effect of the grace of the Holy Spirit, see *Cat. Hom.* V, 19 (Tonneau, p. 127): (Le Verbe) ... « ne prit pas seulement un corps, mais tout l'homme, composé d'un corps et d'une âme immortelle et raisonnable. Il l'assuma pour notre salut, et par lui il opéra le salut pour notre vie. Et cet (homme) fut justifié et sans tache par la vertu de l'Esprit-Saint, — comme dit le bienheureux Paul: *il fut justifié par l'Esprit* (*I Tim.* III, 16); et encore: *qui dans l'Esprit éternel s'est offert lui-même sans tache à Dieu* (*Hebr.* IX, 14), — et, ayant reçu la mort selon la loi des hommes, il ressuscita d'entre les morts, parce qu'il

b) explicitly, and repeatedly, in the fragments of the hostile sources, and in such a way that if one excludes this idea, he must claim not only interpolation, but the invention of some of these fragments out of whole cloth [109]. The conclusion seems certain that in this text where the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669* can be compared with the Greek of Leontius, far from showing the text of Leontius to have been interpolated, it betrays itself as an inaccurate translation. Not only is Richard's charge of interpolation seen to be unjustified, but a striking proof is given that one must be very hesitant to brand a Greek text as falsified on the basis of a discrepancy

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était sans péché, par la vertu de l'Esprit-Saint ... ». See also *Cat. Hom.* VII, 13 (Tonneau, p. 181): « ... étant absolument sans tache par la vertu de l'Esprit-Saint, il reçut sur soi mort et passion, mais mort ignominieuse par la croix, afin de nous donner à nous de jouir des biens à venir ... ». For the idea of the assistance of the Holy Spirit needed by the *homo assumptus* to live a life of perfect virtue see *Comm. in S. Jo.* XVI, 14 (Vosté, p. 212, lines 17-20): « Christus in carne, cum in eius natura non esset ut uniretur Deo Verbo, necessario indiguit mediatione doni Spiritus; et accepta omni gratia perfecta quae fuit ei pro unctione, duxit in integritate multa vitam, prout natura humana non potest ».

[109] *Cod. Add. 12156*, frag. 3 gives the same text found in Vig. Cap. 28, discussing the way in which the indwelling divinity aided the *homo assumptus* to overcome the natural passions of his soul. But the Syriac fragment continues: « Et in hac re etiam gratia Spiritus Sancti adjuvabat ad hunc effectum, ut Beatus quoque Apostolus dixit: 'vere grande est arcanum timoris Dei, qui revelatus est in carne et justificatus in Spiritu'; quoniam nos quoque auxilium Spiritus accepturi eramus ad perfectionem justitiae.» (Trad. Sachau, *op. cit.*, p. 64). The same idea is found explicitly in two other fragments of this Syriac collection (Frag. 4, Sachau, p. 64, and frag. 7, Sachau, p. 65). Similarly, in a citation from Theodore by Severus of Antioch, we find the following description of the effects of the Holy Spirit in Christ: « Lorsque Jésus fut baptisé, il sortit aussitôt de l'eau. Et voici que pour lui le ciel s'ouvrit, et il vit l'Esprit de Dieu descendre du ciel et venir sur lui. Ceci, en effet, appliqué à la divinité, n'est pas exact, puisque l'Esprit-Saint est venu sur lui à la façon d'un don ... et aussi en lui conférant, par son appui, ce qui (lui) manquait dans les luttes (à mener) contre le Calumniateur et dans toutes les autres (circonstances). *Philalethes*, ed. Hespel, trad. p. 129. And finally, if this idea of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, helping the *homo assumptus* in his life of perfect virtue, is not genuine to Theodore, one must postulate that *Cap.* 6 and 7 of the Council and the *Const. Vigilii* are inventions out of whole cloth. Theodore is here intent on proving that the *homo assumptus* had a rational soul (against the Apollinarists) precisely from this need of the help of the Holy Spirit. Cf. Mansi, IX, 205-206, or *Const. Vig.*, ed. Guenther, pp. 242-243.

in the Syriac version. The Syriac translation does not merit the unqualified trust which has been put in it.

We have now seen the two passages where the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669* can be compared directly with the Greek of the hostile florilegium. We shall now consider a third instance produced by Richard, where this Syriac text offers a parallel, not directly with a Greek text, but with a Latin translation of such a text, found in the Acts of the Fifth Council [110]. Comparing the two versions, Richard observes [111]:

> Cette fois-ci les textes sous-jacents aux deux versions étaient voisins et ne se séparaient bien franchement qu'avec la phrase finale, qui n'est d'ailleurs pas des plus claires dans la version du concile.

Later in the course of the same article, Richard observes that this same conciliar fragment is also found in the Syriac florilegium of *Cod. 12156*; as an indication of the dependence of the two on a common source he notes that the final phrase in *Cod. 12156* corresponds better with the reading of the conciliar fragment than with the Syriac of *Cod. 14669* [112]. This is the extent of Richard's discussion of this case. He takes the discrepancy between the Latin of the conciliar fragment and the Syriac of *Cod. 14669* as due to a difference between the two underlying Greek texts. Hence he sees here a confirmation of his theory that the Greek fragments of the hostile florilegium presented an altered version of the *De Incarnatione*.

Now we believe the following observations are in order. From the correspondence between the Latin of the conciliar fragment and the Syriac of *Cod. 12156*, it is safe to conclude that the conciliar Latin is an accurate version of the Greek fragment on which both versions were based. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that wherever we can compare

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110 Conciliar fragment: « Ad haec itaque », *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Coll. VI, Mansi IX, 343 c-d; also in Migne, *P.G.* 66, 983-4 d. The passage in *Cod. 14669* is in *fol.* 13, Sachau, (trad.) p. 48..

111 « La tradition, etc. », p. 67. The final phrase in the conciliar fragment reads: « certa constituta unitate, ex qua indivise ab universa creatura honor impletur ». Sachau translates the Syriac thus: « quum nota sit unio ambarum (naturarum), quae (unio) a tota creatione adorationem accipit ».

112 *Op. cit.*, p. 73. The Syriac fragment of *Cod. 12156* is found in Lagarde, *op. cit.*, p. 106, lines 9-14.

the Latin version of the Acts of the Fifth Council with a Greek parallel, it is found to be a painstakingly accurate traslation.

Equivalently, therefore, we can say that when the Syriac of *Cod. 14669* shows a discrepancy from the Conciliar Latin, it is also at variance with the Greek text as it was quoted in the Council. Now the question is: how is this discrepancy between the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669* and the Greek fragment to be explained? Richard unhesitatingly assumes that the Syriac accurately reproduces its Greek original, and that hence there must have been two Greek recensions of this passage, of which the one translated by *Cod. 14669* is genuine, while that of the Council had been altered.

We believe that the evidence produced in the preceding pages shows that no such elaborate explanation is necessary to explain why the Syriac of *Cod. 14669* shows a minor discrepancy from the Greek text. We have seen three cases, in the very limited area where control is possible, where this Syriac version falls short of being an accurate rendition of an undoubtedly genuine Greek parallel. Here again, there is no reason to suspect the genuinity of the Greek. Richard's only complaint against the Latin text is that it is not very clear. We suggest that if the phrase « ex qua », is rendered: « by reason of which », (referring to « unitate »), it makes tolerably good sense. But there is no doctrinal issue involved that would justify a suspicion of falsification. The Syriac version differs rather in its grammatical construction than in the idea which it expresses.

We believe that in the light of the foregoing evidence from other passages, inaccuracy in the Syriac version is the only reasonable explanation of this slight discrepancy from the text as it was read at the Fifth Council. Rather than indicating falsification in the hostile florilegium, this variant is rather another indication that one must be very careful when charging deliberate falsification in the Greek texts on the basis of a discrepancy in the Syriac version.

After discussing these three instances where fragments of the hostile tradition can be compared with the Syriac of *Cod. 14669*, Richard adds a complement to his study by remarking a discrepancy which he has observed between a text quoted by Cyril, and its parallel in the Syriac version of the *Catechetical Homilies*. Setting this brief extract of Cyril in its

background in the complete text, Richard points out that in the context both preceding and following the extract, Theodore speaks of the « unique prosopon » of whom the Scriptures predicate terms applying to both natures. This « neat use of the scissors » indicates to Richard that it was not the intention of the extractor to present a fair and complete picture of Theodore's doctrine. And in this criticism he is no doubt justified. However, one should not conclude from this example that the compiler of the florilegium used by Cyril really intended to conceal the fact that Theodore taught the doctrine of union in one prosopon. A number of the extracts of this florilegium are precisely passages where Theodore expounds this doctrine. Hence, while this passage alone would give an unfair idea of Theodore's teaching, the florilegium as a whole would have supplied the notion of « one prosopon » which was in the context here.

These remarks should not be understood as implying that we hold the hostile florilegium to be a complete and impartial presentation of Theodore's doctrine. There is no question but that the compiler was out to find evidence of heterodoxy, and was interested only in what could support this view. We shall see cases in the conciliar *capitula* where the lack of context is definitely damaging to Theodore. But at the same time, we believe that there are many cases where these extracts present important theological developments, and shed light on Theodore's way of thinking which we would lack without them. The lack of context will dictate that these extracts be used with caution, and in the light of all the other information now available. But we do not think it sufficient reason for closing our eyes to the evidence they have to offer, one-sided though it be.

On the other hand, solid proof of deliberate interpolation and falsification in the texts of this florilegium would constitute grave reason for not using them at all. This is the question with which we are now concerned, for besides complaining of the lack of context in Cyril's citation, Richard finds, on the basis of comparison with the Syriac translation, evidence that the compiler has also given to his text « le petit

coup de pouce nécessaire pour le transformer en témoin à charge »[113]. We present the two texts in question[114]:

Citation of Cyril

Hoc vero non ex nobis ipsis invenimus testimonium, sed ex divina edocti sumus Scriptura, quoniam et beatus Paulus ita dicit: « Ex quibus Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus, » non quod ex Judaeis et secundum carnem est, qui super omnia Deus est; sed hoc quidem ad significandam humanam naturam dixit, quam ab Israelitico genere esse sciebat, illud autem ad ostendendam divinam naturam, quam supra omnia et omnibus dominantem sciebat.

Text of Syriac version

Or ce ne fut pas d'eux mêmes qu'ils utilisèrent ces termes, mais de l'enseignement des Livres Saints, car le bienheureux Paul dit: *C'est d'eux (les Juifs) qu' est issu le Christ selon la chair, Dieu au-dessus de tout.* Ce n'est pas que celui-là, qui est (issu) de la maison de David selon la chair, soit naturellement Dieu, mais il dit *selon la chair* pour indiquer la nature humaine assumée; tandis que *Dieu au-dessus de tout,* c'est pour enseigner la nature divine plus élevée que tout, qui est le Seigneur.

Evidently Richard's « petit coup de pouce » is the omission of the word « naturaliter » and the slight rearrangement of the sentence where it occurs in the Syriac version. He does not consider the possibility that the Syriac translator might be responsible for the discrepancy. Our experience with the version of *Cod. 14669* has given us reason for a more cautious approach to this question.

We would first note that this use of the word, « naturaliter » occurs in the Syriac version each of the three times when this exegesis of *Romans* IX, 5 is presented[115]. One of these other two texts appears among the conciliar *capitula*; the same discrepancy is present as is found in Cyril's citation. We present these two texts[116]:

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[113] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[114] The text quoted by Cyril is found in *Acta Conc. Const. II,* Coll. V, Mansi IX, 239-240. Also in Migne, *P.G.* 76, 1447 a-b. The Syriac parallel is in *Cat. Hom.* III, 6 (Tonneau, p. 61, lines 4-12).

[115] The other two texts are: *Cat. Hom.* VI, 4 (Tonneau, pp. 137-139) and VIII, 10 (p. 201).

[116] *Cat. Hom.* VI, 4 (Tonneau, pp. 137-139); *Capitulum* XXXI of both Vigilius and the Council; *Const. Vig.* (ed. Guenther, p. 265); *Acta Conc. Const. II,* Mansi IX, p. 216.

Conc. (*and Const. Vig.*) *31*	*Syriac version*
Sed Christus quidem secundum carnem adsumptam servi formam, eum autem, qui eam adsumpsit, super omnia nominans deum, intulit tamen hoc secundum coniunctionem, ut per significationem nominum naturarum manifestam divisionem faciat. Nemo igitur neque eum, qui secundum carnem ex Iudaeis est, dicat deum, nec iterum deum, qui est super omnia, secundum carnem ex Iudaeis.	... mais (comme) *Christ en la chair,* il reconnaissait la forme d'homme qu'il prit, et celui qui assuma cette forme il le nommait *Dieu au-dessus de tout.* Or il dit ces deux choses à la fois pour indiquer la distinction des natures. Car il n'y a personne qui (parlant) de « *ce qui est né d'entre les Juifs selon la chair* » reconnaisse que naturellement il soit Dieu, ni que « *Dieu au-dessus de tout* » soit naturellement (issu) des Juifs.

From this coincidence it is clear that the presence of « naturaliter » in the Syriac, its absence in the extracts, cannot be due to accident. Either the compiler of the extracts deliberately omitted the word in both cases, or the Syriac translator supplied it each time he rendered Theodore's exegesis of *Romans* IX, 5. We do not believe that either of these explanations can be excluded *a priori.* It is true that just as Richard interprets the variant in Cyril's citation as a deliberate falsification on the part of the compiler, so also R. Devreesse explains the discrepancy in the conciliar *capitulum* as the result of interpolation and willful omission [117]. Both of these scholars accept the Syriac version without question as an authentic and accurate witness to the original text of Theodore.

Have they forgotten that any translation may, to a greater or lesser extent, be an interpretation of the original text, and that it may, on occasion, reflect rather the translator's way of putting a thought than that of the author? Have they failed to take into account the question of how strictly the Syriac translator felt himself bound to reproduce literally every phrase, every last word of his Greek prototype? It seems to us that these are vital questions if one is going to base a charge of falsification or interpolation on the testimony of a Syriac translation.

Have we any means of controlling the literal accuracy

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[117] R. Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste,* pp. 249-250.

of this Syriac version of the *Catechetical Homilies*? Unfortunately, we have no Greek witnesses to this work. However, we do possess nine fragments, preserved in the Latin version of the Acts of the Fifth Council and in the *Constitutum Vigilii*. Now, as we have remarked previously, there are numerous cases where this Latin version of the conciliar extracts can be compared with the Greek texts as preserved by Leontius and Justinian. It would really be difficult to contrive a more slavishly literal and painstakingly accurate rendition of a Greek text into Latin than the one provided by the unknown translator of these extracts. Hence we can rest assured that every phrase, every last word in these Latin *capitula* had its counterpart in the Greek as it was quoted in the sessions of the council.

No doubt the objection will be raised: « But we do not know how these Greek texts read at the council would compare with the authentic texts of Theodore. Hence they could not be used to control the accuracy of the Syriac version ».

Here it seems to us that we must remain within the boundaries of reasonable probability. Let us suppose, for the moment, that the compiler of these extracts may have altered his texts where he saw an opportunity to slip in a bit of Nestorianism, or to suppress an orthodox expression. What about the portions of his text where there was nothing of particular doctrinal significance involved? In compiling extracts in Greek, from a Greek text, is there any probability that the extractor would have recast the structure of sentences, added or omitted phrases, where there was nothing to be gained from the change? Would not such a procedure have unnecessarily increased the risk that his intentional alterations would be detected?

It seems absurd, therefore, seriously to doubt that at least in the « doctrinally indifferent » passages, the Greek texts read at the council corresponded with the original work as Theodore wrote it. But we have seen that the Latin version of the conciliar extracts is a faithful mirror of these texts. Therefore we do possess, in the doctrinally indifferent portions of these nine extracts, a limited, but significant control of the accuracy with which the Syriac translator of the *Catechetical Homilies* worked.

Let us examine the first of the two pairs of texts which we have quoted above (p. 90). The parallel arrangement will

facilitate the comparison. We notice that the Latin has « ex Iudaeis », where the Syriac paraphrases, « de la maison de David ». But since this discrepancy occurs in the sentence where the doctrinal alteration of the extract has been suspected, we shall ignore it. On the other hand, there is no reason to suspect the later phrase, « quam ab Israelitico genere esse sciebat », which is altogether lacking in the Syriac version [118]. In fact, it will be noticed that the Greek here presents a typically balanced construction: « humanam naturam, quam ab Israelitico genere esse sciebat — divinam naturam, quam supra omnia et omnibus dominantem sciebat ». Notice what the second member of the balance has been reduced to in the Syriac: « qui est le Seigneur ». It can hardly be claimed that these discrepancies are the result of interpolation and alteration in the Greek extract. Is it not absurd to say that the compiler would have interfered with his Greek text merely to impart to it the balanced construction which is lacking in the Syriac version? The evidence points to a certain inaccuracy in the Syriac translation — a certain freedom of the translator in reproducing his text. This freedom can, as we see, account for the omission of a whole phrase, for the recasting of a balanced construction.

Now let us examine the second pair of texts quoted above (p. 91). Here again we find « naturellement » in the Syriac where it is lacking in the conciliar version; Devreesse sees this lack as the result of a deliberate omission. He also sees an interpolation in the Latin phrase: « secundum coniunctionem », where the Syriae has *ak hda,* which Devreesse renders « ambo simul », while Tonneau says: « deux ... à la fois ». Devreesse labels the Latin phrase an interpolation: « ... quoique encore explicable, bien que non authentique » [119]. But it is really difficult to see what the compiler could have intended to gain by such an « interpolation ». On the other hand, the charge of interpolation on such grounds supposes that the Syriac version is painstakingly accurate and literal. We have already seen some indications that this is not a well-

[118] It is certain that this phrase is not an addition either of the one who drew up the citations from the work of Cyril to be read at the Council, or of the one who translated the *Acta* into Latin, since it also appears in the Syriac version of this same fragment as quoted by Severus of Antioch in his *Philalethes*: ed. Hespel, *C.S.C.O.*, p. 130.

[119] *Essai*, p. 250.

founded supposition. Does the present text offer any further indications in the same direction?

It will be noticed that the Latin version contains the phrase « per significationem nominum », which is completely lacking in the Syriac. Is this phrase an interpolation in the extract? Or is it merely another inaccuracy in the Syriac version? We believe that the latter is certainly the case, since if the phrase is an interpolation, someone has gone to the trouble of inserting a perfectly genuine expression of Theodore into his text, simply to make him say more clearly here what he has said elsewhere in a similar connection. The phrase itself is a bit cryptic here, and perhaps its full significance would not be immediately apparent unless one were familiar with Theodore's terminology. His idea is that when two disparate terms such as « Unigenitus Patris » and « Primogenitus creaturarum »; or « Ex Iudaeis secundum carnem », and « Deus super omnia », are said « ambo simul », or « secundum coniunctionem », of the unique *prosopon*, then the very *meaning of these terms* (as implying divinity or humanity) indicates the distinction of natures in Christ, whereas their simultaneous predication indicates the unity of person. This thought is clearly expressed for example in *Cat. Hom.* III, 6, where, explaining the words of his creed: « Filius unicus, primogenitus omnium creaturarum », Theodore says [120]:

> En deux mots, ils nous apprirent les deux natures; *par la distinction des noms,* ils nous enseignèrent la distinction des natures. Ceux qui de l'unique personne du Fils dirent ces deux choses, nous apprirent la conjonction exacte des deux natures.

And a similar development involving the idea that the « meaning of the terms indicates the distinction of natures », is found in a passage of Theodore's commentary on *Psalm XLIV*, quoted by Facundus of Hermianae [121]:

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120 *Trad.* Tonneau, p. 61, lines 1-4. (Italics mine).

121 Migne, *P.L.* 67, 741 d. (Italics mine). This same passage is preserved in Greek, edited by Devreesse in: *Le Commentaire de Theodore de Mopsueste sur les Psaumes (I-LXXX), Studi e Testi 93,* pp. 289-290. Corresponding to the phrase in the version of Facundus: « in eo quod diversarum intelligentiarum declarativas voces emisit », Devreesse's Greek reads: τῷ διαφόρῳ τῶν νοημάτων ἐμφαντικὰς ἀφεῖναι φωνάς. But the word διαφόρῳ seems impossible here, since the article τῷ modifies the infinitive, which would not also be modified by an adjective. Vaccari has

> Sed quia haec Deo Patri non conveniant: *propterea unxit te Deus tuus,* claret de reliquo quod haec de Christo dicantur. In quo mirabiliter et naturas divisit, et personae unitatem demonstravit: et *naturas quidem divisit in eo, quod diversarum intelligentiarum declarativas voces emisit;* multum enim differt ab invicem, « Sedes tua, Deus, in saeculum saeculi », et « Propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus ». Unitatem vero ostendit personae, ea quae diversa sunt colligens in unitatem personae.

In both of these texts one will observe the idea of the *meaning of the terms* as indicating the distinction of the natures in Christ. Now if we return to the text of *Conciliar Cap. 31,* (above, p. 91), we see that it is the very same idea which has been more succinctly expressed in the phrase: *per significationem nominum.* If we examine the corresponding Syriac, we will see that it is definitely incomplete: in fact it does not make very good sense, because it is precisely the « meaning of the terms » which will manifest the distinction of the natures, and this phrase has been lost. There is only one possible explanation for this discrepancy between the conciliar extract and the Syriac version: and that is a certain inaccurancy, a certain freedom of the Syriac translator in rendering his text. We see in this case that this inaccuracy can account for the loss of a phrase which definitely belongs in the text, and is even needed to make the thought complete.

We have now seen two of the nine *capitula* by which the accuracy of the Syriac version of the *Catechetical Homilies* can be controlled. In these two cases we have seen undeniable evidence that the Syriae translator departed from the wording of his text, omitted whole phrases of the original. We could continue with the other seven texts, but it will be more convenient to study them in detail in the next chapter, when we treat the conciliar *capitula* as a whole. For the present we can anticipate the results of this further examination by stating that the indications already had will be

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noticed this difficulty, and has proposed διαφόρους, to agree with the word φωνάς. (*Misc. Giovanni Mercati I, Studi e Testi 121,* p. 178, note 1). But the Latin version of Facundus suggests that διαφόρων is the correct form, agreeing with νοημάτων. This would easily explain the reading of the manuscript as edited by Devreesse: either by the change of the final *nu* into an *iota,* or by attraction to the case of the article preceding.

confirmed by the remaining seven texts. In cases where there is no reason to suspect the conciliar text, or even good reason to prove it genuine, the Syriac will be found to be inexact. The comparison of the doctrinally indifferent portions of these texts shows beyond reasonable doubt that one cannot presume that this Syriac version is a meticulously faithful rendition of the original text. It is undoubtedly a good translation, and reliable enough on the whole to be depended on for Theodore's doctrine. But it is another matter altogether to presume that it is so literally accurate that a slight deviation from the Greek text of the council is enough to brand the latter as an interpolation. We have seen a number of cases where such an explanation would certainly be false.

What shall we say then of these two instances where the Syriac text shows the word: « naturaliter », lacking in the conciliar texts? By virtue of what principle can one determine that whereas elsewhere the Syriac may have been a bit free with the original, here it must be a literally accurate rendition? It seems to us that this is precisely what must be proved by one who will charge the compiler of the extracts with malicious alteration. We have remarked before that only two explanations are possible: either the compiler omitted « naturaliter » in each of these *capitula*, or the Syriac translator supplied it each time he translated this identical exegesis of *Romans* IX, 5. Now this latter explanation does not seem at all unlikely, when we remember that the translator was undoubtedly a theologian of some competence, who could well have allowed his own preference in terminology to influence the way he rendered Theodore's Greek into Syriac. We have seen proof that he did not feel himself bound to a slavishly literal reproduction of his text. And the fact that one person translated the whole work would account for the uniformity in rendition.

On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that these two conciliar extracts were compiled by two different persons. The first one appeared in Cyril's work *Contra Theodorum*, and is quoted by the Fifth Council only as part of its citation from that work. Hence the extract must have been made prior to the year 438. The second extract appears among the *capitula* of Vigilius and the Council, along with seven other passages from the *Catechetical Homilies*. Now there is nothing to prove that these eight conciliar extracts

from the *Cat. Hom.* were also part of the florilegium used by Cyril in composing his *Contra Theodorum*. As a matter of fact, the indications are rather that they were not part of that early florilegium. While the one citation of Cyril from the *Cat. Hom.* turns up again in the writings of Severus of Antioch, there is no trace of any one of these eight conciliar *capitula* in any of the hostile sources prior to the *Constitutum Vigilii*. This strongly suggests that this collection of eight texts from the *Cat. Hom.* was drawn up only in the course of preparations for the condemnation of the Three Chapters, more than a century after the work of Cyril.

Now it is extremely unlikely that two different « interpolators » would have altered these two texts in exactly the same way, and in doing so have produced remarkably similar results. The comparison is enlightening; the following are the sentences where each of these extracts is said to have suffered alteration:

Cyril's citation (*above, p. 90*)	*Conc. Cap. 31* (*above, p. 91*)
Non quod ex Judaeis et secundum carnem est, qui super omnia Deus est ...	Nemo igitur neque eum, qui secundum carnem ex Iudaeis est, dicat deum nec iterum deum, qui est super omnia, secundum carnem ex Iudaeis.

One is almost forced to conclude that the same hand wrote both of these texts. But if the persons who extracted them from their context lived a century apart, one can only conclude that the same hand which gave them their uniform stamp was none other than that of Theodore himself. It is impossible to say that the one who compiled the conciliar *capitula* also « doctored » the text of Cyril before it was read at the council, because we have the text quoted by Severus of Antioch to prove that Cyril was cited correctly at Constantinople.

There is no great difficulty, therefore, in saying that the one person who translated all of the *Cat. Hom.* is responsible for the appearance of the word « naturaliter », in the three cases where Theodore gives an almost identical exegesis of *Roman* IX, 5. It would be but a slight change in the text, and is easily explained as due to the translator's tendency to let his own mode of expression influence his rendition.

We have already seen indications that he did not feel himself bound to a rigorously literal translation.

We would conclude, therefore, that the discrepancy between the citations of Cyril and the Council on the one hand, and the Syriac version on the other, is more probably due to a slight departure of the translator from his text, rather than to malicious alteration in the extracts. To say the least, this is certainly the more charitable explanation. We believe is also has the best chance of being the true one.

We have now discussed all the cases wherein M. Richard found evidence of falsification in the hostile florilegium. The conclusion seems justified that Richard's case for rejecting the evidence of these florilegia has not stood the test of more detailed investigation. His absolute confidence in the Syriac version as proof of dishonesty in the anti-Theodorean texts is seen to be unfounded. He has presumed too much on the literal accuracy of these translations. They are no doubt reasonably good versions; it is a great boon to our knowledge of Theodore that they were made and preserved. But they are not found to be so literally accurate that any deviation from them brands a hostile citation as maliciously falsified. In the following chapter we shall see that Msgr. R. Devreesse has made the same unwarranted assumption part of the basis for his criticism of the evidence against Theodore presented to Pope Vigilius and the fifth general council.

CHAPTER THREE

EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION OFFERED BY MSGR. R. DEVREESSE

I. The controversy with J. M. Vosté O. P.

In the preceding chapter, we have studied the four cases where M. Richard found evidence of falsification in the anti-Theodorean tradition, on the basis of a comparison with Syriac translations. The conclusion to which Richard came at the end of his article was that « it is high time that historians of dogma give up the attempt to derive the doctrine of Theodore from the dogmatic fragments such as they are found in Migne or Swete » [1]. In other words, the anti-Theodorean tradition should be completely ignored in a study of Theodore's christology.

We have presented our reasons for believing that the proofs offered by Richard do not justify so sweeping a conclusion. But Richard, in the article which we have had under consideration, appealed for confirmation of his view to the investigations which R. Devreesse had made along similar lines. In further proof that the hostile texts had been falsified, Richard cites the evidence which had already been offered by Devreesse to show that « every time a verification is possible with another branch of the tradition, one ascertains that the florilegia present a text that is more or less altered » [2]. Devreesse had presented this evidence in an article which appeared in 1930, in reply to a previous article of J. M. Vosté, O. P. [3]. It will shed some light on the question to resume the contents of the two articles in question.

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1 « La tradition, etc. », p. 74.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

3 R. Devreesse, « Par quelles voies nous sont parvenus les commentaires de Théodore de Mopsueste? », *Revue Biblique*, XXXIX (1930), 362-

The position taken by Vosté was that the Syriac sources in general confirm the accusations of the Fifth Council against Theodore of Mopsuestia, in regard both to his christology, and to his scriptural canon and exegesis. These Syriac sources utilized by Vosté were of two sorts. The first was the Syriac version of the *Commentary on St. John*, whose text had already been edited by Chabot, but whose translation had not yet appeared. Here we are dealing with what presents itself as the work of Theodore himself. The other sources used by Vosté were rather Nestorian commentaries on the Scriptures, for whose authors the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia were a major source of inspiration. The principal among these is Isho'dad of Merw († ca. 850), whom Vosté calls a « faithful abbreviator of Theodore » [4]. Another source is the Nestorian collection called the « Gannat Bussame », or « Garden of delights », which Vosté describes as a commentary on the scriptural lessons of the Nestorian lectionary, composed for the most part of citations from ancient commentators, among whom Theodore of Mopsuestia has the lion's share. Both of these sources constantly refer to Theodore as « The Interpreter », or the exegete *par excellence*, and hence, even when they do not expressly quote him, they can be expected to reflect his views.

From a comparison of these Syriac sources with the allegations made by Leontius and the Fifth Council, Vosté concluded [5]:

> Les sources syriaques — le commentaire susmentionné sur saint Jean et les commentaires d'Iso'dad sur l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament — confirment de tout point les acerbes reproches de Léonce de Byzance contre Théodore et les allégations compromettantes du II[e] Concile de Constantinople.

Now it would take us too far afield to discuss in detail the points raised here by Vosté on strictly scriptural questions of canon and exegesis. In general we can notice that Vosté finds in the writings of Isho'dad of Merw ample confirmation of the

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377; in reply to: J. M. Vosté, O.P., « L'oeuvre exégétique de Théodore de Mopsueste au II[e] Concile de Constantipole », *Revue Biblique*, XXXVIII (1929), 382-395; 542-554.

[4] Vosté, *art. cit.*, p. 383.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 383-384.

conciliar charges that Theodore arbitrarily excluded certain books from the canon of Sacred Scripture, and that he radically limited the extent to which the Psalms could be understood as messianic. Vosté sees Theodore's errors here as springing from a tendency to over-confidence in his personal judgement, as contrasted with the traditions of the Church [6].

In the field of christology with which we are directly concerned, Vosté notes the confirmation of the conciliar citations from the *Commentary on St. John*, by the parallel texts found in the Syriac version of that work. Vosté does not remark any differences which would suggest that the conciliar texts had been deliberately falsified. Several times he suggests that the Syriac can serve to clarify the Latin version of the Council, which he finds obscure or imperfect. In other cases the conciliar extract supplies lacunae in the Syriac version, due in one case to a fault of haplography, in another more probably to a deliberate omission by the translator [7]

But in general Vosté is satisfied with the correspondence between the conciliar citations and the Syriac version. He concludes: [8]

> Le II[e] Concile de Constantinople, en citant Théodore de Mopsueste, puise ses informations aux meilleures sources, aux oeuvres mêmes de l'Interprète, dont nous retrouvons le texte identique dans deux versions indépendantes, représentant des traditions aussi éloignées l'une de l'autre que celle des Syriens Orientaux et celle de l'Eglise Romaine. Pour l'histoire des premiers Conciles, et des hérésies en particulier, la constatation n'est pas sans importance.

In the following year, in the same review, appeared the article of R. Devreesse, in which he explicitly took issue with Vosté on this question of the reliability of the conciliar citations from the works of Theodore. At this time, Devreesse suspected not only the conciliar fragments, but also the Syriac translations, of having been tendentiously manipulated. Of the former, he insisted that one could accept only after rigorous control, what the enemies of Theodore provide us of his writings. And of the Syriac versions he observed that since they were the exclusive property of the separated Nestorian

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 553-554.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 388, notes 1 and 2.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 553.

Church, there was nothing to prevent the Nestorians from rehandling, or even distorting them at their will. Hence, he concludes, the Syriac translations, whether it is a question of complete works, or of fragments, are suspect [9].

Instead of these conciliar citations, and Syriac versions, on which Vosté would rely, Devreesse proposed that the truly reliable sources for Theodore's writings were: first, the citations given by Facundus of Hermiane in his *Defense of the Three Chapters;* and, second, the fragments preserved in the exegetical *catenae.* Confident that the reliability of these sources was beyond question, Devreesse then proceeded to examine five cases where he saw an opportunity to test the fidelity of the conciliar or Syriac texts by a comparison of parallel passages. The conclusion which he reached was that the comparison showed clear evidence of the dishonesty of those who prepared the conciliar extracts. It is interesting to see how the evidence offered to prove this point in 1930 has stood the test of further investigation.

The first instance cited by Devreesse concerned *Conc. Cap.* 62, which he compared with a fragment found in the catena of *Cod. Barb. gr. 569* [10]. The first part of the conciliar citation corresponds with the Greek fragment, but the second part is quite different. Devreesse concluded [11]:

> Cette seconde partie de la citation a été plus que forcée, on peut dire dénaturée, faussée dans la seconde partie de l'extrait présenté au concile.

However, when Devreesse wrote his *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* in 1948, he tacitly acknowledged that his former judgement had been too hasty, since he now printed *Cap.* 62 in parallel with not one, but two fragments of the Greek *catenae;* besides that of *Barberi* which confirms the first part of the conciliar citation, there is also a fragment of *Catena Nicephori* which vindicates the last part [12]. There is still a

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9 Devreesse, *art. cit.*, pp. 364-365.

10 Mansi IX, 223 (there is no corresponding *capitulum* in the *Constitutum Vigilii*); Greek fragment from *Cod. Barb. gr. 569*, fol. 79.

11 *Art. cit.*, p. 367.

12 *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, p. 23, note 4 (continued on p. 24). There is no reference here to the charge of falsification which he had made in 1930.

section in the middle of *Cap. 62* with no parallel in the Greek *catenae*. But this lack has more recently been supplied in the form of a parallel in a Syriac version of the *Commentary on Genesis*. In 1953, R. Tonneau published for the first time the contents of five folia of what must have been a complete text of this commentary, in Syriac translation [13]. It just happens that in the fifth folium we find the section quoted in *Conc. Cap. 62* [14]. The Syriac not only corresponds with both the conciliar extract and the Greek fragments, but also shows the middle section of *Cap. 62*, for which the *catenae* offer no parallel. Hence the authenticity of *Conc. Cap. 62* has been completely vindicated by the subsequent discoveries of the writings of Theodore.

The second instance discussed by Devreesse in 1930 concerned two adjoining *capitula* (*Conc.* 51-52; *Vig.* 52-53) from the *Commentary on St. Matthew*. Devreesse juxtaposed these two fragments with a passage of Theodore preserved in Latin by Facundus in his *Pro defensione trium capitulorum* [15]. Actually, *Cap. Vig. 53* corresponds with the version of Facundus, but *Vig. 52* is quite different from the lines of Facundus with which Devreesse compares it. From this he concludes that Facundus has demonstrated the dishonesty of the enemies of Theodore. However, Devreesse himself subsequently discovered a Greek fragment which is clearly the original of the passage cited by Facundus [16]. And the remarkable fact is that this Greek fragment, which happens to go one sentence beyond the passage of Facundus, gives, in that one sentence, what is clearly the correct parallel for *Vig. 52*. Ortiz de Urbina has pointed out this fact, which escaped the notice of Devreesse even

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[13] R. M. Tonneau, O.P., « Théodore de Mopsueste, Interprétation (du Livre) de la Genèse (*Vat. Syr.* 120, ff. I-V) », *Le Muséon* LXVI (1953), 45-64. Syriac text, pp. 47-57; translation: 57-64.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 63. Tonneau does not seems to have noticed the parallel in the conciliar extract.

[15] Migne, *P.L.* 67, 596 b.

[16] A passage of *Cod. Vindob.* 154 (ed. Klostermann-Benz, *Zur Uberlieferung der Matthäusklarung des Origenes*, Texte und Untersuchungen, XLVII, 2; 1931, p. 19) which is quoted by Devreesse in his *Essai*, p. 36, note 8. This discovery was originally published by Devreesse in the note: « Pro Theodoro », *Revue Biblique*, 1932, pp. 261-263. Neither he nor Richard, who hailed this discovery as another vindication of Facundus and proof of the unreliability of the conciliar fragments (« La tradition », etc., p. 69, note 51), noticed that the final section of the Greek actually confirmed the text of *Vig. 52*.

in 1948, when he wrote his *Essai*, since he there again compares *Vig.* 52 with a section of Facundus to which it simply does not correspond [17]. The texts are as follows:

Vig. Cap. 52 (Guenther, pp. 278-9)	*Cod. Vindob. 154* (Dev. *Essai*, p. 36, note 8)
Bene intulit: namque ego homo sum, ut dicat 'nihil mirandum, si hoc potes, cum sis homo accipiens a deo: quoniam et ego, cum hoc sim, accipio oboedientes semel habens iubendi potestatem propter datoris indulgentiam'.	καλῶς ἐπήγαγε τὸ Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπός εἰμι, ἀντὶ τοῦ Οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δύνῃ, ἄνθρωπος ὤν, λαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπεὶ κἀγὼ τοῦτο ὢν λαμβάνω ὑπηκόους ὑπερέχων τῷ (Kl. ἅπερ ἔχων τοῦ cod.) κελεύειν ὡς βούλομαι.

It will be observed that the Latin tends to support the *ms.* reading against the proposed emendation, since the phrase: « semel habens iubendi », would be a literal rendition of the Greek: ἅπερ ἔχων τοῦ κελεύειν. As this phrase occurs almost at the end of the Greek fragment, the difficulty may well be explained by the loss of the few final words which would be the equivalent of « potestatem propter datoris indulgentiam ». We agree, therefore, with Ortiz de Urbina, who considers *Vig. 52* proved authentic on the basis of its « almost complete identity » with the Greek fragment. *Vig. 53*, which was previously confirmed by the Latin of Facundus, is also substantiated by the parallel passage in the Greek. As far as the text of these two extracts is concerned, then, there is no question but that they present the exact words of Theodore. The charge of textual falsification has been shown to be unjustified.

There is another question, however, as to the intention which the compiler of these two extracts had in cutting them from their context and arranging them as we find them in the collection of *capitula*. The Greek fragment of *Cod. Vindob.* 154 shows us that *Vig. 53* actually preceded *Vig. 52* in the original text, and that in cutting this passage into two separate extracts, both extremely brief, the compiler deliberately omitted the intervening sentence which would have consid-

[17] *Essai*, pp. 253-254. Ortiz de Urbina made the necessary correction in his review of the Essai: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XV (1949), p. 442.

erably clarified Theodore's real meaning. The following will illustrate how the compiler worked; the section in parentheses is what he avoided in making his citations. We supply the context from the citation of Facundus and from the Greek fragment, to which references have been given above.

> (Prudentia enim erat, secundum rationem quae ei videbatur, talia credere de Christo. Homo enim et ego; sed tamen quorum accepi potestatem, horum sum dominus: quae mihi videntur, ea fiunt a meis subjectis.)
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> *Vig. 53*: Quapropter nec incongruum est, et te accepta ista a Deo potestate, verbo solo iubentem abigere passiones. Nec enim tamquam filio dei et ante universam creaturam existenti et creatori eorum quae sunt, accessit centurio.
>
> (Haec enim neque discipulorum erat tunc scire ante crucem, sicut in reliquis ostendemus, Domino adjuvante, subtilius, sed tamquam hominem per virtutem adeptum a Deo majorem quam est hominis potestatem. Unde ei dicit: Nam et ego homo sum. Quia enim dixit ei: *Dic verbo*, — hoc enim solius Dei esse videbatur —)
>
> *Vig. 52*: bene intulit: namque ego homo sum, ut dicat 'nihil mirandum, si hoc potes, cum sis homo accipiens a deo: quoniam et ego, cum hoc sim, accipio oboedientes semel habens iubendi potestatem propter datoris indulgentiam'.

Now there can be little doubt about the intentions of the one who thus neatly avoided quoting a sentence which would clearly have shown that Theodore did not personally share the imperfect faith of the centurion. It seems obvious that the compiler wished to give the impression that Theodore himself looked on Christ in the same way that the centurion did. The omitted section would have demonstrated that he did not. Such a citation is certainly indefensible, and betrays the dishonesty of the one guilty of making it. Do we know who is responsible for this fraud? One may suppose that it was the compiler of the conciliar extracts, but there is more likelihood that it was rather the « Acephales » who originally prepared this misleading citation. We know that it was their work against Theodore which Facundus set out to refute when, in 547 or 548, he wrote his *Defense of the Three Chapters* [18]. Now the reason why Facundus made his long citation from the *Commentary on St. Matthew* was

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[18] Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 201. Cf. Facundus, *P.L.* 67, 558-559.

precisely to convict the « Acephales » of their dishonesty in so citing Theodore as to make it seem he shared the imperfect faith of the centurion. And Facundus actually cites the passage which the Acephales quoted to prove their charge [19]. Here we find exactly the same mutilated citation from the *Commentary on St. Matthew*: the same sentences given in the same inverted order as they are found in Vig. 53 and 52. The only difference is that as Facundus quotes from the work of the Acephales, it is given as all one extract, whereas in the conciliar *capitula* it is divided into two. But exactly the same amount of text is quoted, the same intervening section omitted, the same inversion of the order of the original text is found. We may safely conclude that whoever prepared the conciliar *capitula* borrowed this citation from the work previously done by the Acephales. In this case, it must be granted that they were drawing upon a secondary, and definitely unreliable, source.

One should note that Vigilius was not as completely deceived by this dishonest citation as may have been hoped. In his criticism of these two *capitula*, the Pontiff observes that it is the mind of the centurion, and not that of the author, which is here expressed [20]. However, he does not approve of the exegesis which makes so imperfect the faith of the centurion, seeing that Christ praised it so highly; and he further remarks that from the other *capitula* it is clear enough that for the author himself, Christ is the Son of God, not by unity of subsistence, but by grace, and hence is a mere man « who has accepted power through the munificence of the one giving it ». But it cannot be denied that Vigilius would have had to revise his criticism if he could have seen the sentence which the compilers had deliberately omitted. In what follows we shall see other examples where the lack of context was definitely damaging to Theodore. These instances must be seriously considered by one who would defend the judicial process by which Theodore was condemned for heresy in 553. But we shall reserve discussion of this question to a later moment: for the present we must continue our study of the evidence of textual falsification adduced by R. Devreesse.

We have seen so far that the first two cases in which

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19 *P.L.* 67, 595 c - 596 a.

20 *Vigilii Constitutum*, ed. Guenther (*C.S.E.L.* XXXV, 1), p. 279.

he saw proof of textual falsification have not been substantiated; in each case he compared the conciliar citation with a passage to which it actually did not correspond; and the discovery of the correct parallels has vindicated the verbal accuracy of the citations. In his third instance the very same thing has happened. In 1930, Devreesse compared Vig. 35 with a passage of Theodore's *Commentary on Romans* quoted by Facundus, and labelled the conciliar *capitulum* a « corrupted resumé » of the latter passage [21]. However, the heading of the conciliar citation had attributed this fragment to the *Liber ad baptizandos,* and the publication of the *Catechetical Homilies* a few years later provided the proof that *Vig. 35* was actually taken from that work, and was a faithful rendition of the text [22]. In his *Essai,* Devreesse acknowledges the correct parallel, but now asks why the conciliar compiler did not choose to cite the « luminous and explicit » passage from the *Commentary on Romans,* rather than the other « cut from its context » [23]. Here we must remark that the context in question would not have materially changed the meaning of the citation; its lack does not necessarily indicate any intention to distort Theodore's doctrine. As to why they quoted the passage from the *Catechetical Homilies* rather than the one from the *Commentary on Romans*: — surely there are many possible reasons for that, besides the one which Devreesse thinks is alone acceptable: scil, « because the collectors of 553 knew what they were doing ». The fact that we now possess both passages does not prove that the collectors were acquainted with both, and explicitly chose between them.

The next instance of falsification adduced by Devreesse in 1930 concerned two brief citations from the *Commentary on St. John, Cap. Vig.* and *Conc.* 33-34. Both of these citations have a parallel in the Syriac version of this commentary; the first is also attested by a fragment from a Greek *catena.* The following will show how the Latin of the council compares with the Greek fragment [24]:

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21 *Revue Biblique,* 1930, p. 369.

22 *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 16 (Tonneau, pp. 209-211).

23 *Essai,* p. 251, note 2.

24 *Vig. Cap.* 33 (Guenther, p. 266); Greek fragment 16 (Devreesse, Appendix to *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste,* p. 318).

Cap. 33 (Guenther, p. 266)	*Greek frag. 16* (Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 318)
Rabbi, tu es filius dei, tu es rex Israel: hoc est 'tu es ille, qui de longe praedicatus es Christus'; haec enim scilicet de Christo sperabant sicut domestico constituto praeter omnes deo.	'Ραββί, σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, σὺ εἶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῦ 'Ισραήλ. Ταῦτα δηλονότι περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ προσεδόκων ὡς οἰκειωμένου παρὰ πάντας θεῷ.

Now, on the basis of this Greek text, Devreesse made two charges against the conciliar *capitula*. The first was against the translation of οἰκειωμένου by « domestico constituto ». In his *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, Devreesse repeats this complaint, asserting that: « le terme 'domestique', ajoute quelque chose de servile que ne comporte pas le grec »[25]. Evidently he would prefer that the Latin translator had used « familiaris » instead of « domesticus ». But it seems clear that Devreesse has mistakenly limited the Latin « domesticus » to the servile connotation of its modern counterpart, « domestique ». The proof that in sixth-century Latin this word had the same wide range of meaning as that of its Greek parallel: οἰκεῖος, and hence could be understood as a synonym for « familiaris », is found right in the comment of Vigilius on this text. He paraphrases the *capitulum* as follows[26]:

> ... Adhibentur verba Nathanahel dicentis domino: *tu es filius dei, tu es rex Israel* et infertur dictum esse Christo tamquam domestico dei, ut non ipse Christus sit deus sed plus quam alii homines sit domesticus deo, et adicitur, quia sicut alii sancti homines filii dei dicuntur, homines tamen sunt, sic et Christus per familiaritatem, quam ad deum habet, a Nathanahele, cum quo loquebatur, deus sit nominatus.

If, therefore, the « translators of 553 » had the sinister intention which Devreesse attributes to them, it must have been Vigilius whom they intended to deceive by rendering οἰκειωμένου as « domestico constituto ». But Vigilius shows that he understood the term « domesticus » in exactly the same sense in which Theodore had used οἰκεῖος. Rather than

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[25] *Essai*, p. 250.
[26] Guenther, p. 267.

seeing any sinister intention here, it is much more probably a simple matter of a strictly literal translation. We have seen previously that comparison with the Greek of Leontius shows the Latin version of the *capitula* to be almost slavishly literal. Here we can add that in the instances where we can compare this Latin version with the fragments of the Greek *catenae*, the same fact is observed [27]. It would be completely in keeping with the character of this translation to render οἰκεῖος by « domesticus »; οἰκειωμένου by « domestico constituto ». In the sixth century, these words had not only the same derivation and root-meaning, but also the same breadth of connotation, no longer present in the modern counterpart: « domestique » [28]. The complaint, then, against the use of the term « domesticus », instead of « familiaris », is seen to be unfounded.

Devreesse's second charge in 1930 was a more serious one: scil. that the whole of *Cap. 34* was an interpolation. Despite the fact that the text of this capitulum was attested by the Syriac version, Devreesse rejected it on the grounds that it did not appear in the Greek fragment on this passage. He presumed that in this case the Greek catenist must have given a continuous passage from the original text; hence the Syriac version also must have been based on an interpolated text of the commentary. Richard chided Devreesse for this lack of confidence in the Syriac version of the Commentary [29]. One might also with good reason have questioned the supposition that the Greek catenist, who was obviously making only a selection of texts, must have here cited a continuous passage, rather than several sentences, omitting what had intervened.

In any case, in his *Essai* Devreesse has quietly let this charge of interpolation drop, evidently because he now has come to have great confidence in the accuracy of the Syriac version. And since the Latin text corresponds with the

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27 Compare *Conc. cap.* 62 with the fragments of the *catena* on Genesis (*Essai*, p. 23, note 4); also *Conc. cap. 51-52* with the fragment of *Cod. Vindob. 154* (*Essai*, p. 36, note 8).

28 It may be noted in passing that even in modern usage, the English word « domesticity » does not have the servile or menial significance of the French word: « domesticité ».

29 « La tradition, etc. », p. 69, note 51.

Syriac, his only charge against Cap. 34 now is the note of « domesticité » which the translator has introduced into the Latin version. While there is no Greek text corresponding to this *capitulum*, there can be little doubt that the original text showed forms of οἰκεῖος where the Latin has « domesticus ». And since for Vigilius, « domesticus » is a synonym for « familiaris », there is really no foundation for a suspicion that the translation was intended to be misleading.

One cannot say the same, however, about the way these two extracts have been taken from their context. Strangely enough, Devreesse did not seem to realize the strong argument he could have drawn from a consideration of the context in this case. J. L. McKenzie has taken the trouble to re-print a considerable portion of Vosté's rendition of the Syriac text of the *Commentary on St. John*, in order to put these *capitula* in their proper setting [30]. He points out the fact that Theodore is interpreting the mind of Nathanael, when, on his first meeting with Christ, he called Him « Son of God ». In keeping with his usual interpretation, Theodore insists that at this time Nathanael could not have understood the mystery of the divine nature in Christ, and hence for him the title « son of God » at this time meant only « one especially familiar to God ». As McKenzie points out, this exegesis is perfectly sound, and would be shared by most modern Scripture scholars.

But when we consider only the two conciliar extracts, we see that what Theodore presented as the mind of Nathanael, could very well be understood as representing the mind of Theodore himself. In order to give this misleading impression, the compilers have omitted the sentence which came between *Cap. 33* and *34*, and also the section which comes immediately after *34*. The following will illustrate how the compilers worked on this text; the sections in parentheses show what they avoided in making their citation [31].

> (Unde et Nathanael, ipsis operibus convictus, dixit ei:)
> *Cap. 33*: /Rabbi, tu es filius dei, tu es rex Israel: hoc

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[30] J. L. McKenzie, S.J., « The commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on John I, 46-51 », *Theological Studies* XIV (1953), 73-84.

[31] *Vig. cap. 33-34* (Guenther, pp. 266-267); the context is supplied from Vosté's translation of the Syriac (p. 37) and from the Greek fragment (*Essai*, p. 318).

est 'tu es ille, qui de longe praedicatus es Christus'; haec enim scilicet de Christo sperabant sicut domestico constituto praeter omnes deo,/

(sicut rege Israel, quamvis obscurius et carnaliter de eo cogitarent. Nec enim quomodo esset Filius Dei Iudaeos tunc erat possibile scire, nec quomodo rex Israel.)

Cap. 34: /Certus quidem et ipse erat filium dei non secundum deitatis dicens nativitatem sed secundum quod domesticus deo erat, per quod filii dei per virtutem domestici deo constituti homines interim vocabantur./

(Nec enim possibile erat Nathanael statim hoc scire, quod post longum tempus ipsos apostolos tandem cognovisse videmus: quae autem ad ipsum fuerant a Domino dicta, sufficere non poterant ad demonstrandam alteram naturam).

As McKenzie has pointed out, the omitted context makes it perfectly clear that Theodore treated Nathanael's concept of Christ at this time as inadequate. There can be little doubt but that the intention of the compiler was to foist the imperfect theology of Nathanael, on his first meeting with Christ, on to Theodore himself. Vigilius' criticism of these *capitula* shows that he is aware that it is Nathanael's view of Christ which is presented; but his condemnation of the *capitula* shows that he did not realize what the context would have told him: scil. that Theodore realized that this view of Christ was carnal and inadequate. The cutting of the context has definitely given rise to an unjust condemnation in this case.

There is a striking similarity of the technique used here, to that used in *Cap. 52* and *53;* a comparison is enlightening. In each case, a passage is involved where Theodore is presenting an interpretation of the mind of a contemporary of Christ: in the one case, it is the centurion; in the other it is Nathanael. In both cases, the original passage has been broken into two miserably short fragments, by the omission of the intervening sentence — in each case a sentence that would have indicated that Theodore himself did not share the defective view of Christ which he describes. In both cases there can be little doubt about the dishonest intentions of the compilers. We have seen proof that the ones responsible for the first of these cases: the episode of the centurion, were the Acephales, authors of the work refuted by Facundus. It seems quite probable, in view of the obvious

similarity of technique, that the fragments concerning Nathanael were also found in their work. This, then, would be another instance where the compilers of the conciliar extracts depended on a secondary, and unreliable source. As we have remarked before, this creates a problem as regards the justice of the process by which Theodore was condemned for heresy. We shall return to this point later on. For the present, we wish to conclude our study of the evidence of falsification of texts which was offered by Devreesse in 1930.

In the four preceding cases, we have seen that further discoveries and investigations have nullified every one of the charges of interpolation or textual falsification advanced by Devreesse. The fifth and last case there presented concerned a passage of Theodore's commentary on Psalm 8, quoted by Leontius. Devreesse compared the Greek text given by Leontius with an ancient Latin version of this commentary. This Latin version dates from the fifth century; it was preserved in an eighth-century manuscript. It differs in a significant point from the text given by Leontius, as is seen in the following section [32]:

Ancient Latin version	*Text of Leontius*
Manifestum ergo est quod aliam divinae scripturae nos doceant Dei Verbi esse substantiam et aliam hominis suscepti naturam, multamque inter utrasque esse distinctionem: nam alia memor est, alia memoria digna censetur, ...	πῶς οὐ πρόδηλον ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἡ θεία γραφὴ διδάσκει σαφῶς εἶναι τὸν θεὸν λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον; πολλήν τε αὐτῶν οὖσαν δείκνυσιν ἡμῖν τὴν διαφοράν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μνημονεύει, ὁ δὲ καὶ ταύτης ἀξιούμενος μακαρίζεται ...

On the basis of this discrepancy between the Greek text of Leontius and the ancient Latin version, Devreesse made the charge in 1930, and repeats it in his *Essai*, that Leontius has deliberately substituted the distinction: *heteron-heteron*, where Theodore had spoken quite correctly of a distinction of *natures* or *substances* in Christ. He does not seem to admit that there are two possible explanations which deserve con-

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[32] The two texts are printed in parallel columns by Devreesse in his edition of the *Commentary on the Psalms* (*Studi e Testi* 93), pp. 46-47. The text of Leontius is also found in Migne, *P.G.* 66, 1004 b-d.

sideration: just as Leontius could have maliciously made Theodore sound more like Nestorius, so also the Latin translator could have benignly made Theodore sound less like Nestorius. While Vaccari sides with Devreesse in adopting the former explanation [33], Jugie takes a stand for the latter as more probable. Of the fragment in question he observes [34]:

> Authenticitatem hujus fragmenti a Leontio Byzantino laudati nulla adest specialis ratio in dubium vocandi. Congruit enim cum multis aliis ejusdem Theodori locis ... Verum nostro judicio, mutatione tenetur non Leontius, sed latinus interpretator, cujus aures catholicae verba Theodori haeresim redolentia tolerare non potuerunt; unde stylo catholico omnia lectori proposuit.

And in this view he is followed by K. McNamara, who observes that the formula of the text of Leontius is more consistent with Theodore's usual practise of using concrete, masculine, personal forms when referring to the humanity and divinity of Christ [35].

It seems to us that the key question here is whether there is any other evidence to show that Theodore did actually use the masculine « heteros » when distinguishing the Word and the *homo assumptus*. The fact is that there are several clear instances of such use. For example, in Theodore's exegesis of *Heb.* II, 9-10, where fortunately the original Greek text has been preserved, we find the *homo assumptus* and the Word referred to respectively as αὐτὸν and ἕτερον : (Staab, p. 204, lines 24-25)

> ... ὥστε φαίνεσθαι ἐντεῦθεν αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς τιμῆς μετέχοντα διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον συνάφειαν.

And a few lines further on, they are distinguished as τούτου and ἐκείνου : (p. 205, lines 1-2)

> ... ὥστε φαίνεσθαι καὶ τούτου τὴν φύσιν κἀκείνου τὴν χάριν.

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[33] R. Vaccari, S. J., « In margine al commento di Teodoro Mopsuesteno ai Salmi », *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, I (*Studi e Testi* 121), pp. 179-180.

[34] M. Jugie, A.A., *Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium*, V, (Paris, 1935), p. 102, note 1.

[35] K. McNamara, « Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy », *The Irish Theological Quarterly*, XIX (1952), p. 272.

An instance of the use of the formula ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος referring to the Word and the *homo assumptus* is found in a section of the *De Incarnatione* preserved in the Syriac *cod. 14669*. We have seen that this Syriac text does not give a perfect version of the original; on the other hand, we have no reason to suspect its accuracy in this case. We quote the Latin version of Sachau [36]:

> Ii autem accedunt et dicunt nobis (placet nobis verbis eorum adversus eos uti): « Resuscitans est aut is qui resuscitari debet? resuscitans eum, qui solubilis est, aut solutionem excipiens? » Quae autem inter se contraria sunt neque congruunt. Solubilis enim eget resuscitatore suo, ille autem extra passionem est et potestate eum, qui solvitur, resuscitat. Dixerunt ergo nobis: quid erga hanc quaestionem dicere decet? — Facile autem respondemus dicentes: satis cognitionis de hac re ex Sacris Scripturis est. Alius enim est, qui solvitur, alius qui resuscitat. Et ille est templum, quod solutionem excipit; ille autem, qui id resuscitat, Deus Verbum est, qui promittit se resuscitaturum esse templum eius dissolutum.

Another section of this same codex shows that such use of the disjunction: alius et alius, did not go unobserved by Theodore's opponents [37]:

> Hi enim multas quaestiones nobis afferunt ad refutationem veritatis — et tum dicunt: si dicimus 'duo perfecti', necesse est dicere 'duo filii'; tum autem: « Non decet dicere 'alius et alius' », et iterum « decet dicere 'Deus Verbum crucifixus est, is qui est Christus, neque alius quidam' ». Contra has quaestiones ut decet respondimus.

From these texts it may be concluded that the formula of the text of Leontius would not have been something unusual in Theodore's terminology. It is rather typical, as McNamara remarks, of his use of concrete, masculine forms, when speaking of the Word and the *homo assumptus*.

And in particular, in this very passage where the formula occurs, one would rather expect the concrete masculine forms, than the abstractions of the Latin. It will be noticed that the masculine form: *heteron-heteron*, is required for the subsequent series of disjunctions between « he who visited, he

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[36] *Cod. Add. 14669*, fol. 9 b; *trad.* Sachau, p. 51.
[37] *Cod. Add. 14669*, fol. 11 b; *trad.* Sachau, p. 50.

who received the visitation », etc. This series of disjunctions, as between the Word and the *homo assumptus,* sounds perfectly natural to Theodore's usual style. On the other hand, the Latin version must follow its « aliam naturam, aliam substantiam », with the awkward series: « *alia* memor est, *alia* memoria digna censetur », etc. which sounds definitely unlike Theodore. It must be realized that the whole development here is based on Theodore's interpretation of Psalm 8: « Quid est homo, quod memor es eius, aut filius hominis, quod visitas eum? » As Theodore takes it, the *homo,* or *filius hominis* here, is none other than Jesus, the *homo assumptus;* the one who is mindful of him, and visits him, is the *Word.* This exegesis leads naturally to a distinction between « *Hic* qui visitat, et *Ille* qui visitatur », etc. We find a similar development of Psalm 8 in a passage quoted by Cyril of Alexandria: here again the difference between the two « natures » is expressed in the concrete masculine forms as the difference between « hic et ille » [38]:

> Videtis enim, hominum sceleratissimi, quanta naturarum est differentia, quod hic quidem stupefactus est, quia et memor esse hominis dignatur, et visitare eum, caeterorumque participem facere, quorum eum participem fecit: ille vero e contrario miratur, quod tantorum particeps esse supra suam naturam meruit: et hic quidem tanquam beneficium dans mirificatur, et magna praestans, et supra naturam ejus qui consequitur beneficium: ille vero tanquam beneficium consequens, et majora, quam est, ab eo suscipiens.

Here one may perhaps object that the text of Cyril had also been altered. But in this case, we possess the reply of Theodoret of Cyr, which shows clearly that he accepted the reading of Cyril's citation as genuine. Cyril had objected to this distinction of the two « natures » as between « hic et ille », saying [39]:

> Flectitur igitur omne genu coelestium et terrestrium et inferorum ei qui crucem sustinuit: quem puris et solis humanitatis mensuris injiciens adversarius, memoriam et visitationem meruisse dicit a Deo Verbo, cum certe oportet scire et sapere, quod non alter Deus Verbum erat praeter ipsum

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[38] Cyril, *Contra Theodorum,* Lib. II, frag. 7 (*P.G.* 76, 1442 c-d).
[39] *Ibid.,* col. 1443 c-d.

> Filius separatim et per partem, qui ex semine David, sicut dicit, homo: sed erat ipse ex Deo Patre Deus Verbum, factus secundum nos, homo videlicet, et non alium quemdam magis quam seipsum visitatione et memoria dignans.

In his reply to this, Theodoret of Cyr quotes the text of Theodore just as Cyril had given it, showing that he had no objection on the score of textual corruption. On the other hand, he argues for the correctness of Theodore's expression, against that of Cyril [40]:

> Tu dicis: « Sed erat ipsum ex Deo Patre Verbum, factus certe secundum hominem, et non alium quemdam, sed seipsum visitatione et memoria dignans ». Quid his verbis magis ridiculum? Cuius enim Deus Verbum visitationis indigeret? ... Merito igitur Theodorus dixit, eum qui accepit visitare, assumptum esse. Ita autem et propheta docens, dominum quidem eum qui visitavit, vocat; hominem vero eum qui visitationem meruit.

From the foregoing evidence, we would conclude that there is good reason for accepting the text of Leontius, with its reading: ἕτερον ... ἕτερον, and the following series of disjunctions between « hic et ille ». This is T.' s usual style of referring to the Word and the *homo assumptus*.

Vaccari, however, has argued against the reading of Leontius' text: *heteron-heteron*, on the grounds that it would contradict what Theodore has said previously in the exegesis of this same psalm. He refers to the fact that the Latin version shows Theodore as saying [41]:

> Unus atque idem et Deus Verbum, cui principia psalmi constant, et homo his, quae inseruimus, dictis esse signatur, cuius memor est et quem visitat et quem minuit *paulo minus ab angelis*, quem honore coronat et gloria et quem constituit super opera manuum suarum.

Now there is no question about the fact that for Theodore, the Word and the *homo assumptus* were united in one *prosopon*, and hence could be described as « persona idem ipse ».

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[40] Mansi IX, 254.

[41] Vaccari, *op. cit.*, p. 179. Cf. Devreesse, *Le Commentaire de Théodore de Mopsueste sur les Psaumes*, p. 45, line 10 ff.

Facundus quotes a passage from the *De Incarnatione* where this doctrine is very clearly presented [42]:

> Quando naturas quisque discernit, alterum et alterum necessario invenit; et huic rei neque ipsos puto repugnare, quia alterum Deus Verbum natura, alterum autem quod assumptum est, quidquid illud sit, concedatur: hoc interim item persona idem ipse invenitur, nequaquam confusis naturis, sed propter adunationem quae facta est assumpti ad assumentem.

From this passage we can be quite sure that when Theodore said: « Unus atque idem et Deus Verbum ... et homo », he meant: « Unus atque idem persona ». On the other hand, where Leontius shows him saying « heteron-heteron », it is manifestly a question of the distinction of the « natures ». There is therefore no contradiction involved, since the two are said *sub alio et alio respectu.*

One may object that in this case, Theodore would not have used the simple terms: *heteron-heteron,* of the Word and the *homo assumptus,* but would have qualified them, as we see him doing in the passage quoted by Facundus, scil. « alterum et alterum, sed alterum natura », etc. But there is good evidence to show that Theodore was not always so careful to specify in what sense he would speak of the Word and the *homo assumptus* as « alterum et alterum ». We have already seen an instance of this in the passage quoted from the *De Incarnatione* in *Cod. 14669.* And the context of the passage quoted above from Facundus shows that Theodore was open to criticism on precisely this point. Having cited this passage where Theodore very carefully notes that when he says « alterum et alterum », he means « naturā », non « personā », Facundus goes on to insist that this clear teaching must be used to clarify the more obscure passages where Theodore distinguishes the Word and the *homo assumptus* as « alterum et alterum ». The passage is worth quoting [43]:

> Sed nunquid post hanc manifestam nobis ab eo regulam constitutam, et non semel aut iterum, sed saepius conculcatam, ubicumque dictorum suorum invenitur de Christo lo-

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[42] Facundus, *Pro defensione trium capitulorum,* IX, 3 (*P.L.* 67, 747 c - 748 a).

[43] *Ibid.,* col. 749 c - 750 a.

> quens alterum ab altero secernere, et assumentem ita distinguere ab assumpto, ut et hoc et illud idem non esse confirmet, pro divisione unius personae dictum, et non potius pro diversitate duarum naturarum debemus accipere, cum dicat quia persona idem ipse est assumens atque assumptus, et hoc ipsum repetat, et vario dicendi modo commendet?

It is clear from this line of defense adopted by Facundus that Theodore was not always so careful to add the necessary qualification: « naturā », when he distinguished the Word and the homo assumptus as « alterum et alterum ». In fact the admission is rather obviously implied that one *will* find Theodore distinguishing them without such qualification. Now if we return to the passage on Psalm 8, as quoted by Leontius, we will find exactly the sort of expression which Facundus has in mind as needing to be interpreted in the light of the more explicit passage he has quoted. There should be no doubt, then, but that Theodore could have written, and probably did write, what Leontius presents to us. On the other hand, the use of the unqualified distinction: *heteron-heteron,* would very understandably have disturbed the Latin translator, who could have remedied the difficulty quite easily in the course of his translation. We are inclined to agree, therefore, with Jugie in his view that it is rather the scruple of the translator than the malice of a Greek compiler that is responsible for the discrepancy between the two versions. At least there is enough reason for this opinion to render quite uncertain the charge of falsification in the hostile florilegia, drawn from this case.

We have now considered all five of the instances of such falsification proposed by Devreesse in 1930. We have seen that in the first four cases, his charges have been definitively nullified by subsequent discoveries. In this last case there is good reason to suspect that it is the ancient Latin version, rather than the Greek citation, which will explain the textual difference.

On the other hand, in considering these five cases, we have seen two flagrant examples, not of verbal corruption, but of dishonesty in citation by reason of the damaging lack of context. The intention to give a misleading citation is too obvious to be denied, in the episodes of Nathanael and the centurion.

We must keep these two results of our investigation in mind, then, as we proceed to a study of Devreesse's treatment of the conciliar *capitula* in his *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*. The first result will suggest that one must be very cautious when charging deliberate falsification against the conciliar texts on the basis of a parallel in another source. It must be very certain that one is comparing the extract with the text which actually does correspond. And secondly, one should consider, where a translation is involved, whether it is not the translator who is responsible for the discrepancy between the two texts.

The second result will suggest that one must be careful to check the context, where possible, to see whether the brevity of the conciliar citation is due to a deliberate intention to avoid a context that would qualify or modify the content of the citation. It will be important to see how frequently such cases occur in the conciliar capitula, and whether they would suffice to render suspect all this literature of anti-Theodorean extracts.

II. The extracts condemned by Pope Vigilius and the second Council of Constantinople

The major portion of Devreesse's *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* is devoted to an historical study of the process by which this Bishop, who had died in communion with the orthodox Church of the fifth century, came to be condemned as a heretic by this same Church in the sixth century. An important element in this historical study is the examination of the extracts which served as the documentary basis for his condemnation. Devreesse devotes Chapter IX to a detailed study of these extracts, establishing their relationship with other anti-Theodorean collections, and comparing them, where possible, with parallel texts from independent sources. After this study, he comes to the following conclusion [44]:

> ... avant de prendre congé de cette littérature d'extraits, n'oublions pas de retenir que son origine est douteuse, ou plus exactement, frauduleuse; que ces fragments, là où nous avons pû les comparer avec le texte d'où ils étaient arrachés et

[44] *Essai*, pp. 254-255.

> avec leur authentiques parallèles, nous les avons trouvés à chaque fois mutilés, tronqués, coupés de leur contexte ou détournés de leur sens, arrangés et remaniés, soumis à la même torture que les documents grâce à quoi Justinien, suivi par l'assemblée de mai 553, voulait démontrer que la tradition n'avait jamais cessé d'être anti-théodorienne.

Now it is obvious that such a conclusion cannot fail to reflect upon the justice of the conciliar action by which Theodore was condemned for heresy. And, in fact, Devreesse points out this logical sequence in the following words [45]:

> Ce n'est pas sans une certaine mélancolie, mêlée à une pointe d'amertume, que nous en prenons congé. Car, il ne faut pas d'oublier, c'est à ces pièces, fausses ou douteuses, que se rattache, de droit comme de fait, la condamnation de l'oeuvre et de la personne de Théodore, au début de l'été 553.

As we have previously announced, it is our intention in the following pages to re-examine the evidence of falsification which Devreesse has found in the conciliar extracts. It is clear that an investigation such as we propose into the reliability of these conciliar *capitula* would be a necessary part of a thorough study of the justice of the conciliar process by which Theodore was condemned. But such a thorough study would involve many other historical factors and much other evidence which would be altogether beyond the scope of this thesis. Such a study would perhaps better be done after the publication of a new critical edition of the *Acta* of this council, expected in the near future. We would be gratified if our present thesis made some contribution towards such an eventual re-examination of the evidence. But our present question is a different one: we ask to what extent we can use these conciliar texts in our study of Theodore's christology. If the charges of Devreesse are found to be substantiated, one would have to renounce completely any attempt to make use of these *capitula*. It is because we believe that this question has not yet been definitively settled that we are devoting this chapter to it.

Having made this preliminary statement of our intentions, we shall now proceed to a re-examination of the evidence produced by Devreesse in Chapter IX of his *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*. Most of the reviewers of the *Essai* were satis-

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

fied that Devreesse had amply proved his case against the honesty of the compilers of these extracts. But I. Ortiz de Urbina, S. J. took serious exception to Devreesse's categorical denunciation of the extracts as « false or dubious ». Studying these same fifty-five extracts found both in the fourth session of the Council and in the *Constitutum Vigilii*, Ortiz de Urbina concludes that of the twenty-nine texts for which he finds a certain parallel, no less than twenty-two are thereby proved certainly authentic, while in only five cases does he see evidence of unfriendly manipulation. He adds: « This state of affairs in no way authorizes one to say *en bloc* that these texts are ' false or dubious ' » [46]. Since he made this statement in the course of a brief review of Devreesse's book, he did not present all the evidence on which he based his judgment. What we propose to do is to examine the texts concerning which these two scholars have come to so contrasting conclusions, in the hope that thus some further light may be shed on the subject.

First of all, to lessen somewhat the apparently irreconcilable contradiction between the two statements, we should note that Devreesse himself, when discussing the individual texts, seems to allow a textual confirmation of eight of the extracts, although he notes in most of these cases that the lack of context is damaging. Secondly, of the twenty-two texts which Ortiz de Urbina considers proved authentic by comparison with certain parallels, there are nine (Vig. 26, 28, 29, 44-49) which he has compared with texts found in other anti-Theodorean collections, as that of Leontius, Cyril or the Monophysite collection of *Cod. Add. 12156*. In Devreesse's opinion, these are not independent witnesses, but are simply other elements in the anti-Theodorean tradition. Richard's studies warrant at least a strong suspicion that this is the case. We have discussed this question of the « common florilegium » in the preceding chapter, and found additional evidence to support Richard's view. Hence it seems safer to count these nine texts among those for which no certainly independent parallel has been found.

With these preliminary concessions made, we now can sum up the remaining differences of opinion. In the fifty-five extracts, Devreesse sees a certain parallel in nineteen cases; of

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[46] *Orient. Chr. Per.* XV (1949), p. 443.

these he admits three as substantially identical with the parallel (Vig. 15, 16, 25); five are textually sound, but are unintelligible or misleading due to the lack of context (Vig. 12, 35, 38, 41, 53); eleven show textual corruption (20, 22, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 42, 43, 52). Ortiz de Urbina, on the other hand, sees an independent parallel in twenty cases (if we do not count the nine which were mentioned above); of these, no less than thirteen are claimed as genuine (13-17, 25, 33-36, 41, 52, 53); two more have insignificant variants which do not affect the sense (42, 43); and only five (20, 22, 27, 30, 31) are admitted as apparently corrupted. There is still enough contradiction here to warrant further study. The only satisfactory way to handle it seems to be to present the evidence in each case where they have reached a different verdict. At the same time, the writer will present his personal evaluation of the evidence, which, let it be said, in general confirms the opinion of Ortiz de Urbina against that of Devreesse. In brief, we shall demonstrate: 1) that there are twenty-one capitula for which an independent parallel can be found; 2) that of these twenty-one fragments, no less than seventeen are shown to be substantially correct as to the text, although a serious lack of context must be admitted in a number of cases; 3) that in the other four cases, which show substantial textual variants from the parallel, the grounds for asserting that these differences must be due to a deliberate corruption of the text by the anti-Theodorean compilers, are not as unquestionable as has been thought. Before going into the evidence, we should first mention that, while the extracts are practically identical as they are found in both the acts of the council and the *Constitutum Vigilii* [47], confusion may result from the fact that the numbering is not uniform in both sources. It is preferable to follow Ortiz de Urbina in referring to the texts as found in the *Constitutum*, since this has received a critical edition which is generally available [48].

The first twelve extracts are from Theodore's treatise *Contra Apollinarem*. There are no independent parallels to any of these texts, and Devreesse dismisses them with the remark that as they are presented, they do not seem to him to cor-

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47 For the acts of the council, see Mansi IX, 203-221.

48 O. Günther, *Collectio Avellana* (*C.S.E.L.* XXXV, 1, 230-320). The extracts are on pp. 237-285.

respond to the authentic thought of Theodore [49]. Ortiz de Urbina comments, quite justly, that this is not a sufficient reason for rejecting their authenticity [50]. One might add the observation that these extracts are all drawn from a polemic, theological treatise. We have no complete text of any comparable work of Theodore. To say that they do not seem to correspond with the thought found in his purely exegetical and catechetical works is not to exclude the possibility that they are genuine. Hence they should rightly be numbered among the texts for which we simply have no independent parallel. It is this very fact which renders them important in a doctrinal study of Theodore, since these twelve extracts are our most important witness to the most mature of Theodore's dogmatic works. Whether they may safely be used will depend on the solidity of the proofs advanced to show falsification in the rest of these extracts.

Of Vig. 13, Devreesse says that he has not found it elsewhere. Ortiz de Urbina, on the other hand, numbers it among those proved authentic by comparison with other certain texts, but he does not indicate where the other text in this case is to be found. The writer must confess that he has been able to find no parallel to *cap.* 13.

With regard to Vig. 14, Devreesse makes the following remarks [51]:

> Le fragment *Hoc quidem* correspond exactement à la version syriaque (trad. Vosté, p. 251, 6-7), et l'explication qu'il fournit de Jean XX, 17b n'a rien qui nous puisse scandaliser quand on s'est mis au point de vue de Théodore. On se demandera seulement si les quelques lignes de l'épitomé grec conservées à cet endroit n'ont pas préservé une ou deux phrases du début, perdues ou négligées par le latin officiel et la tradition syriaque.

To clarify this comment, we should observe that by the « Greek epitome », Devreesse refers to the *catena Vallicellana,*

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[49] *Essai,* p. 247. He discusses the extracts, in numerical order, on pp. 246-254.

[50] *Or. Chr. Per.* 1949, p. 442, where all of his remarks concerning individual *capitula* will be found.

[51] *Essai,* p. 247. The lines of the Greek epitome to which he refers are found in the Appendix to his *Essai*: p. 416, 23-26. We have quoted this below: p. 129.

found in a manuscript which he designates as E. This *catena* presents several unusual characteristics, the most important of which is that while its citations from Theodore's commentary on *John* I to VIII coincide with those from the other *catenae,* as well as with the Syriac version of the Commentary, from the beginning of *John IX* it presents an epitome, rather than strictly textual citations. The result is that from this point on it is no longer a verbal witness to the Greek text of Theodore's Commentary, but rather a digest or condensation of passages of that text. It is generally possible to identify the passage which is thus condensed; in his edition of the Greek fragments of Theodore's *Commentary on St. John,* Devreesse has indicated the place in Vosté's translation of the Syriac version to which the fragments of E seem most closely to correspond. Occasionally they can also be compared with textual citations found in other Greek *catenae.* Summing up the comparisions thereby established, Devreesse says of this epitome E [52]:

> Un résumé du texte grec sous-jacent à la version syriaque, tel est le premier fait constaté et telle est la meilleure définition qui convienne à E dans la plus grande partie de son travail — ou de sa copie — à partir du chapitre IX.

It seems to us that this peculiar character of the witness of E to Theodore's *Commentary on St. John,* IX-XXI, makes imperative another comparative study which we have not seen thus far published. It is the study of the mentality which the unknown epitomizer had in making his résumé of Theodore's text. It is inevitable that when one digests a longer work, the result can reflect not only the mind of the original author, but also that of the editor. When we compare the epitome of E with the longer passages in the Syriac version or the other Greek catenae, we do in fact find clear evidence of the mentality of the epitomizer: it is none other than a tendency to avoid the more characteristic expressions of Antiochene christology, or even to transform them into something much closer to language that Cyril of Alexandria would have used. It would be an unduly long excursus to present a thorough discussion of all these texts here. We shall limit ourselves to a few characteristic examples, and give references to other places where the reader can find the same thing to be true.

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[52] *Essai,* p. 301.

In the following examples we suppose that the Syriac version presents a reasonably faithful translation of the original text of Theodore, even though it may differ considerably from the Greek text of E. Our reasons for doing so are the following. First, wherever we can compare this Syriac version of the *Commentary of St. John* with the Greek *catenae* which actually cite the original text, (except for several sections in Chapter I, and for the last part following the commentary on *John* XX, 23), we find that the Syriac translator has been quite faithful to the Greek text [53]. There are a few minor discrepancies, but nothing to suggest that the Syriac translator deliberately altered the doctrine of the original. On the other hand, the author of the Greek epitome E, beginning with the commentary on John IX, has made no pretense to follow the text of the original. Therefore, where the terminology or even the thought of this epitome differs from the Syriac translation, we feel justified in concluding that the difference has been introduced by the editor of E, since the very character of such an epitome renders the chance of such modification much more likely. Furthermore, as we shall see, where the terminology differs, it is the Syriac version which is consistent with Theodore's usual style of expression, whereas the Greek epitome introduces something quite foreign to the strictly Antiochene christology.

As examples of such discrepancies in christology, we present the following texts for comparison. In the first text, it

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[53] The last part of our Syriac text, following the comment on John 20: 23 (after Vosté, p. 255, line 29 in the translation), seems definitely to be the work of another, who has used Theodore as a source, rather than a strict translation of Theodore's commentary. The case of chapter one is more puzzling. The considerable differences between the Greek text and the Syriac version here have led Devreesse to propose the hypothesis of two different editions of the work (*Essai*, p. 302). A comparison of the differing sections gives us the definite impression that the Greek represents the original text of Theodore. Where the Syriac differs, it lacks the logical development of thought found in the Greek. Compare, for instance, Vosté, p. 10, 18-27 with the Greek: Devreesse, p. 308, 4 - 309, 6. Also Vosté, p. 11, 14-27 with Dev. p. 309, 28 - 310, 18. Moreover, the Syriac text omits a section of the Greek text (Dev. 309, 12-19), which has every chance of being authentic. We are inclined to believe that the Syriac version is definitely inferior to the Greek text in this first chapter. But elsewhere it shows quite close correspondence to the texts of the Greek *catenae*, allowing for the omission of a casual phrase here and there.

will be noticed that the Syriac version uses the typically Theodorean and Antiochene expression: « natura assumpta », throughout. The epitomizer consistently avoided this terminology in favor of expressions that could have come from the pen of Cyril of Alexandria:

Vosté: p. 148, 35 — p. 149, 19

Hic vero mirandum nobis est propter haereticos illos, qui nolunt concedere Dominum nostrum assumpsisse animam, cum tamen Dominus noster supra et infra diserte loquatur de anima sua. Sed circa hoc obiciunt nobis, etiam de Deo dictam esse animam. Atque non intellegunt oculos et manus, pedes ceteraque membra dicta esse de Deo, quin tamen propterea negemus et illa a Domino nostro fuisse assumpta. Hic igitur dum aliquid simile dicitur, intellegimus verba ista dici de natura a Deo Verbo assumpta; supra autem, operationem tantum et voluntatem innuunt. Ita « anima mea » hic dicitur de natura; supra autem significat voluntatem Dei erga factum, eo quod ex voluntate animae nostrae solemus accipere aliquid sive bonum sive malum, quia eius naturae est cogitatio rationalis.

Nobis etiam obiciunt beatum Simonem dixisse: *Animam meam pro te ponam.* Hoc autem puto nobis potius tamquam argumentum servire. Nam sicut ille, homo ex anima et corpore compositus, dicebat: *Animam meam ponam,* ita etiam Dominus noster. Non enim divina natura loquebatur de anima, sed humana, sicut et Petrus promittebat se daturum esse animam

Devreesse: p. 353, 21 - 354, 12

ὅμως λεκτέον ὅτι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου καὶ ψυχὴν εἶχεν, οὐ τὴς ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα σημαινούσης. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ εἰρῆσθαι καὶ περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας εἰρῆσθαι λέγομεν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ θεοῦ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο λέγομεν μήτε πόδας μήτε χεῖρας ἔχειν Ἰησοῦν τὸν Χριστόν. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον λέγηται, τὴν ἑνωθεῖσαν σάρκα ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν τῷ θεῷ λόγῳ νοοῦμεν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐνεργειάν τινα καὶ διάθεσιν μόνον.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ λέγει ὁ Πέτρος - Ἄρτι τὴν ψυχήν μου ὑπὲρ σοῦ θήσω· ὅπερ καὶ ὁ Κύριος εἶπεν, οὐδὲν ἐκ τούτου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος τοῦτο εἶπεν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκ θεότητος ὢν καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος εἷς καὶ οὐ δύο, ὡς ἰδίαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μέρος ἴδιον τιθέναι λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ὢν ἄνθρωπος, εἰ καὶ θεὸς ἦν τῇ φύσει σάρκα ἀναλαβὼν καὶ ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν.

suam; quia evidens est animam esse partem hominis.

There can be no question but that the Syriac version here is consistent with all our other information on Theodore's terminology. The editor of E, on the other hand, has introduced a completely different christological language with a strongly Alexandrian coloring. We would especially point out the substitution of the formula: « flesh having a soul », for the Antiochene « assumed human nature ». We leave it to the reader to examine the parallel phrases in detail. We believe there can be no doubt about the fact that the editor of E has modified the christology of the original text.

Another example of the avoidance of typically Theodorean terminology by the editor of E is seen in the following text:

Vosté, p. 174, 4-10

... atque nullus homo par erat ad aggrediendum tyrannum illum. Pro omnibus ergo hominibus simul veni, tam pro iis qui antea fuerunt, quam pro iis qui futuri sunt. Non in virtute mea confido, sed per auxilium naturae me inhabitantis spero istud a me esse adimplendum.

Iudicatus est mundus a me, id est, per me contra Satanam.

Devreesse, p. 375, 21-25

πρὸς οὖν τοῦτον οὐδεὶς ἦν ἱκανὸς πολεμῆσαι, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων τῶν πάλαι καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ εἰς αὖθις ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὁ Χριστὸς ὡς θεὸς καὶ πάντα δυνάμενος ποιεῖν.

κρίνεται οὖν ὁ κόσμος ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ δι'ἐμοῦ.

We shall quote one more example, content for the rest with giving references to similar cases. The text involved is *John* XVII, 1: « Pater, clarifica Filium tuum ».

Vosté, p. 220, 2-13

Dixit ergo: Sicut dedisti ei tantum honorem, ut et universalem dominationem accipiat, — quamvis enim hanc de facto postea receperit; attamen quantum ad honorem iam pertinebat ei utpote electo a Deo; — sicut ergo, inquit, dedisti mihi istud, ita glorifica me; id est modo convenienti honori, cuius di-

Devreesse, 403, 29 - 404, 1

Δι'οὗ μέλλω δοξάζεσθαι ὡς θεὸς ἀνερχόμενος ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ καθεζόμενος ἐκ δεξιῶν σου, φησὶν οὖν ὅτι 'Αξίως με δόξασον, ὦ πάτερ, ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τοῦ πάθους, τῆς ἐμῆς ὑπεροχῆς. Δεῖξον ὅτι υἱός σού εἰμι φύσει καὶ ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ ὤν, δι'ὅν με δοξάζεις, ἵνα πάντες τοῦτο γνῶσιν ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἄξιος τοῦτο πάσχω οὔτε ἄκων, ἀλλ'ἵνα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος

gnum me fecisti, manifesta me in conspectu omnium tempore passionis, ut omnes per ea, quae in cruce adventura sunt, cognoscant magnitudinem honoris mei, atque noverint me non meruisse passionem, sed propter multiplicem utilitatem aliorum sponte mea me mori. Hoc igitur: clarifica (me), non significat « da mihi gloriam », sed: manifesta gloriam meam, quae mihi data est a te.

γένωμαι ἀγαθῶν μεγίστων. τὸ γὰρ δόξασον οὐ τοῦτο σημαίνει, ὅτι δός μοι δόξαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν προσοῦσάν μοι δόξαν ταύτην δεῖξον.

In this last example the editor of E has introduced a use of the communication of idioms which is not only lacking in the Syriac, but is definitely foreign to Theodore's christology. Theodore would not not have said that « he who is crucified » is the « Son of God by nature ». In the Syriac text it is the *homo assumptus* who is crucified and glorified (cf. Vosté, p. 219, 21-25); in the epitome of E it is the natural Son of God.

One who wishes to see further examples of this « Alexandrizing » of Theodore's christology by the editor of E may consult the texts listed in the footnote [54]. We believe they will amply substantiate the view that whereas the Syriac text is distinctly Theodorean, the Greek epitome introduces christological thought and formulae that are foreign to the whole Antiochene tradition. There is, therefore, an important conclusion to be drawn from this excursus: it is that the Greek fragments of E, subsequent to the commentary on *John* IX, 1, cannot be depended on in a study of Theodore's christology. We believe it would lead to absurd conclusions to attempt to incorporate the language of this epitome into a systematic pres-

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[54] Compare: Dev. 372, 25-28 with Vosté, 171, 10-12;
— also: — 375, 23-34 174, 5-36;
379, 24-32 182, 16-33;
390, 20 ff. 193, 21 ff.;
403, 12-15 217, 4-35;
403, 29 ff. 220, 5-11;
406, 7-14 225, 36 - 226, 22;
406, 20-23 227, 12-17;
407, 12-15 229, 11-17.

entation of Theodore's thought or expression. For Theodore's *Commentary on St. John,* we must rely chiefly on the Syriac version, supplemented where possible by the Greek *catenae* which follow the text of the original. These two witnesses are substantially in agreement, but the epitome of E « cantat extra chorum ».

With this in mind, we shall now return to the starting-point of this discussion, scil. the remarks which Devreesse made about Vig. 14. It will be recalled that he suggested that the conciliar extract, as well as the Syriac text, might have omitted a bit of text supplied by the Greek epitome. The inference is that the text of E would have shown Theodore's christology in a more favorable light. No doubt it would have. But the reason is clearly that the editor of E has simply condensed the passage of Vig. 14, and in doing so has « improved » the Antiochene christology involved. In this case the conciliar text and the Syriac version, being independent witnesses, leave no doubt as to what the original text was. The following will show how the editor of E has condensed it:

Vig. Cap. 14

Hoc quidem, quod est *ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum et deum meum et deum vestrum,* nemo sic demens est, ut alii cuidam convenire diceret nisi templo dei verbi, adsumpto pro nostra salute homini, qui et mortuus est et resurrexit et ascensurus esset in caelos et patrem sibi ascribit cum discipulis deum, et ipse gratia adoptionem meritus, et deum suum appellat, quia cum ceteris hominibus similiter, ut esset, accepit. Unde propter communitatem quidem naturae *patrem meum et patrem vestrum* dicit et *deum meum et deum vestrum;* divisit autem iterum suam personam ab ipsis praecipuum gratiae significans, propter quam ad deum verbum coniunctione in loco veri filii ab omnibus honoratur hominibus.

Devreesse, p. 416, 23-26

ὡς ἄνθρωπος μέν φησι θεόν μου καὶ θεὸν ὑμῶν - διὰ τὴν σάρκα καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὐσίας κοινόν, διαιρεῖ δὲ ὡς φύσει θεὸς ὤν, τὸ διάφορον σημαίνων τοῦ ποιητοῦ παρὰ τὸ ποίημα.

In this case, the authenticity of the conciliar text is absolutely certain from its perfect correspondence with the independent witness of the Syriac version of the same passage: translated by Vosté, p. 251, 6-17. There can be no doubt that the Greek text here is merely another example of the way the author of E has « improved » the Antiochene christology while making his digest of the text. The suggestion of Devreesse that both the conciliar compiler and the Syriac translator may have omitted what is given by E, postulates an extraordinary coincidence in two completely independent sources. It also fails to take into account the true character of this epitome: scil. that of a free résumé, strongly colored by an approach to christology quite different from that of the original author. On the other hand, the remarkably close correspondence between the Latin version of the council and the Syriac version indicates that both translators adhered very closely to the original Greek. It also proves the fidelity of the conciliar compiler to the authentic work of Theodore in this case.

The next two *capitula* are also drawn from Theodore's *Commentary on St. John*. Of these extracts, Devreesse remarks that they are found nearly equivalently in the Syriac (« se lisent à peu près équivalemment dans le syriaque »). We believe that there is reason to add more precise details as to this « equivalence » of the two texts.

It will be recalled that the last part of the Syriac text of this commentary (Vosté, p. 255, 29 ff.) is no longer a simple translation of the work of Theodore, but is the work of another author who has evidently used Theodore's text for his inspiration. In this section, the citations of the Greek *catenae* which ordinarily follow the text word-for-word, do not correspond with the Syriac. However, the epitome E shows enough correspondence with the general exegesis of the Syriac to indicate that the unknown author of this part of the Syriac text followed the thought of Theodore's commentary quite closely.

Now, of the two *capitula* 15 and 16, one is taken from the part of the commentary prior to the break in the Syriac version; the second is from the part subsequent to this break. A comparison of the *capitula* with their respective parallels in the Syriac text shows exactly what one would expect to find. Vig. 15, which corresponds to Vosté, p. 254, 29 - 255, 4 (hence still the translation of Theodore's work), gives definitely the

same text represented by the Syriac version. In fact the *capitulum* remedies a textual defect in the Syriac codex, evidently caused by a fault of haplography [55]. Another slight difference between the two version is probably due to an intentional omission on the part of the Syriac translator [56]. Otherwise the exact correspondence of the two independent versions proves them both faithful to the authentic Greek text.

On the other hand, Vig. 16 is taken from the last part of Theodore's commentary (on *John* XX, 28), where our Syriac text no longer presents a direct translation of Theodore's work, but a re-handling of his material. Here we cannot expect to find an exact parallel between the conciliar citation and the Syriac text. Nor in fact, do we. We present the two texts for comparison:

Vig. 16

Dicit ad Thomam: *infer digitum tuum huc et vide manus meas et porrige manum tuam et mitte in latus meum et noli esse incredulus sed fidelis.* ' Quoniam ', dicit, ' non credis et tactum solum sufficere tibi ad credendum putas (haec enim dicens non me latuisti), tange manu et cape experimentum et disce credere et non diffidere '. Thomas quidem cum sic credidisset, *dominus meus et deus meus* dicit, non ipsum dominum et deum dicens (non enim resurrectionis scientia docebat et

Vosté, 256, 27-35

Et palpavit (Thomas) accurate et compertam habens veritatem factorum, confessus est culpam suam, dicens: *Dominus meus et Deus meus.* Quid? Cum Thomas antea nec crederet Salvatorem a mortuis resurrexisse, nunc vocat Dominum et Deum? Non est verosimile. Ecce enim Thomas, discipulus dubitans, non ipsum (quem tetigit) Dominum vocat et Deum, — non enim resurrectionis scientia eum docebat Deum esse eum qui resurrexit; — sed quasi pro miraculo facto Deum collaudabat,

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55 See Vosté, p. 255, note 1, where he says that the lacuna is supplied « e graeco ». But the term « graeco » here is a simplification of the exact state of affairs; it is the conciliar Latin version of the Greek text to which Vosté actually refers. The simplification indicates that Vosté was aware how accurately this conciliar Latin version of the capitula does translate the Greek. Wherever they can be compared, this fact is verified. With regard to the fault of haplography in the Syriac *ms.*, see *Rev. Biblique*, 1929, p. 388, note 2.

56 *Rev. Bibl.* 1929, p. 388, note 1: « ' Valde stulte ', c'est bien dans le style de Théodore. Le traducteur syriaque a omis cette expression, sans doute parce que l'opinion, rejetée par l'Interprète, n'est pas tellement « stulta », c'est même l'opinion traditionnelle, et c'est le sens obvie des mots ».

deum esse eum qui resurrexit), sed quasi pro miraculo facto deum conlaudabat.

stupefactus propter miracula quae vidit.

Comparing these two texts, Vosté notes that the Conciliar extract follows the quotation of the scriptural text with a paraphrase quite in the style of Theodore, whereas the Syriac text breaks abruptly into an objection against the possibility that Thomas is here addressing Christ as God [57]. On the other hand, in the last part, the two citations coincide quite closely. The correspondence of the conciliar capitula with the Syriac translation in other parts of the commentary justifies the assumption that here, too, it represents the original text. The fact that the Syriac text presents the same general thought, and even a part of the text, is in accordance with the character of this text as a re-handling of this part of Theodore's commentary. And to that extent, it confirms the authenticity of the conciliar citation.

There is no fragment from this passage in the regular Greek *catenae*. The epitome E, consistently with what we have seen already, digests this passage in such a way as to depart radically from the original thought, which, as we have seen, is established with certainty by the agreement of the independent conciliar and Syriac texts. The following will show how E has « improved » the christology of this text in condensing it:

Vig. 16

'Quoniam', dicit, 'non credis et tactum solum sufficere tibi ad credendum putas (haec enim dicens non me latuisti), tange manu et cape experimentum et disce credere et non diffidere'. Thomas quidem cum sic credidisset, *dominus meus et deus meus* dicit, non ipsum dominum et deum dicens (non enim resurrectionis scientia docebat et deum esse eum qui resurrexit), sed quasi pro miraculo facto deum conlaudabat.

Devreesse, p. 417, 19-24

Δείκνυσιν ὅτι οἶδε πάντα ὡς θεὸς τὰ παρ'αὐτῶν λεγόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα εἶπε πρὸς τὸν Θωμᾶν. Ὅμως, φησίν, ἐπειδὴ μόνῃ τῇ ἁφῇ πιστεύεις, ἅψαι τῇ χειρὶ καὶ μάθε πιστεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπιστεῖν.

Τὸν ἀναστάντα καὶ ψηλαφηθέντα ὁ Θωμᾶς καλεῖ κύριον καὶ θεόν.

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[57] *Rev. Biblique* 1929, p. 389.

We have taken the trouble of copying Vig. 16 here once more to indicate the definite parallel between the paraphrase of *John* XX, 27 in the conciliar citation, and the second sentence of the Greek epitome. It will be recalled that this paraphrase of verse 27 had been lacking in the Syriac text. The distinct similarity between the words of Vig. 16 and the Greek epitome at this point confirms the fact that it is the conciliar text which represents the original commentary of Theodore. But the contradiction in thought presented by the third sentence of the Greek epitome can only be explained as due to the different mentality of the unknown epitomizer. The agreement of Cap. 16 and the Syriac at this point establishes the genuine exegesis of Theodore. The discrepancy of the Greek is another indication of the fact that this epitome E cannot be relied on where it is a question of Theodore's christology.

We conclude this examination of Vig. 15 and 16 with the observation that the remark of Devreesse: « Ils se lisent à peu près équivalemment dans le syriaque », leaves something further to be said. The fact seems to be that in both of these cases, the conciliar *capitula* offer our best witness to the original text of Theodore's commentary. In the first case, the Syriac version has suffered lacunae which need to be supplied by the conciliar text. In the second, the Syriac offers only a second-hand witness to what Theodore said, whereas the Greek epitome does not even adhere to the thought of the original exegesis.

The following *capitulum*, Vig. 17, is a passage from Theodore's commentary on the *Acts of the Apostles*. Ortiz de Urbina numbers it among those which have been proved authentic by other sources. Devreesse seems to dismiss it as though there were no parallel to be found, but in a foot-note he refers to another page in his *Essai* (39, note 1), where he mentioned the fact that Vosté had seen a parallel to this text in a commentary on the *Acts* by the ninth-century exegete Isho'dad of Merw [58]. That Devreesse does not put much faith in the reliability of such a parallel is obvious, both from his previous treatment of Vosté's suggestions along this line [59], and from

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[58] J. M. Vosté, O.P., « Le Gannat Bussame », *Rev. Bibl.*, XXXVII (1928), 398-399.

[59] Devresse, *art. cit.*, *Rev. Bibl.* 1930, pp. 362-377.

the objections which he raises on this occasion. But the fact remains that Vosté has found, in the writings of an exegete whom he calls « a faithful abbreviator of Theodore » [60], a Syriac text which substantially confirms the Latin text of Vigilius. In fact the correspondence is so exact that Vosté describes the Syriac as « a translation which corresponds word for word with the Latin text » [61]. In view of this striking parallel, there can hardly be any doubt that the passage of Isho'dad and the conciliar extract both represent the genuine text of Theodore. One cannot imagine that the Nestorian exegete would have drawn upon an anti-Theodorean florilegium for an isolated passage of his commentary on the *Acts*. Devreesse, however, objects that the treatment of *I Cor.* 10: 2 given in the parallel extracts does not correspond to what remains of Theodore's commentary on *I Corinthians* at this point. It is difficult to see what sort of correspondence Devreesse expects to find between an application of a text in the course of explaining another passage, and the formal exegesis of the text itself. Surely one cannot expect a rigid consistency of treatment. A contradiction in thought would be another matter, but no such contradiction is apparent, at least to the present writer. The main idea in the commentary on *I Cor.* 10: 2 (Staab, p. 185) is the relationship of « type » and « reality » between Moses and Christ, between the « typical » baptism in the sea unto Moses and the « true » baptism of Christ the Saviour. This is by no means in contradiction with what is said in the conciliar citation.

We believe, therefore, that the objection of Devreesse is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the evidence of two parallel and independent texts. The almost word-for-word correspondence between citations from such completely disparate sources can only be explained by their dependence on a genuine text of Theodore. At least the major portion of *cap.* 17, which is substantiated by the text of Isho'dad, should be admitted as proven authentic.

Devreesse dismisses Vig. 18 and 19 with the remark: « tout parallèle fait défaut ». As far as a strict textual parallel is concerned, his remark is quite correct. But it should be noted that the *content* of Vig. 19 has a very close parallel

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60 Vosté, *art. cit.*, *Rev. Bibl.* 1929, p. 383.
61 « Le Gannat Bussame », p. 398.

in Theodore's treatment of the baptism of Jesus in *Catechetical Homily* XIV, 24 (Tonneau, pp. 451-453). This latter source shows that Vig. 19 presents the genuine thought of Theodore on Luke III, 22, and hence, to that extent, confirms the authenticity of the extract, which is presented as Theodore's commentary on that text.

Vig. 20 is the conciliar Latin version of the citation of Leontius from Theodore's commentary on Psalm VIII. Comparison of the conciliar Latin with Leontius's Greek shows how accurately the unknown translator of these capitula worked. We have already discussed Devreesse's charge of falsification against this text, based on the different reading in the ancient Latin version of Theodore's *Commentary on the Psalms* [62]. It will be recalled that there is good reason to say with Jugie that the discrepancy is due rather to a scruple of the Latin translator than to a malicious alteration on the part of the Greek compiler. We may add at this point that our study of the Greek epitome E has shown that this would not have been the only case where an ancient editor decided to improve the christology of an exegetic text of Theodore. The example of the Greek epitome shows that one could admire Theodore's scriptural exegesis without approving of his christology. It seems likely that the variant in the ancient Latin version of the Commentary on the Psalms had its origin in a similar attitude.

Vig. 22 is another case in which Devreesse has seen clear proof of malicious alteration in the conciliar text: « One will observe that it gives an unfaithful and intentionally misleading citation of a passage which has been preserved in its integrity » [63]. In proof of this contention he refers to his edition of the *Commentary on the Psalms*, where he prints *cap.* 22 in juxtaposition with a passage of the commentary on Psalm XV [64]. The passages show considerable differences, which Devreesse expresses as follows [65]:

> Théodore regarde le passage comme une prophétie, directement rapportée au Christ dans la mort et insiste sur son application première; les textes de 553 faussent teneur littérale et pensée de l'auteur pour insérer un sens accommodatice, refusé par lui.

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62 See above pp. 112-118.

63 *Essai*, p. 248.

64 *Le Commentaire ... sur les Psaumes*, pp. 99-100.

65 *Essai*, p. 248, note 3.

Now it is clear that Devreesse's whole case here rests on the assumption that Vig. 22 really is a falsified version of the passage of the *Commentary on the Psalms* with which he has compared it. His reason for so assuming seems to be that both passages deal with the use of Psalm XV, 10 by St. Peter in his Pentecost address (Acts, II, 27). As a matter of fact, the capitular heading in the acts of the council indicates that this extract was taken from « the beginning of Theodore's commentary on the twelve prophets », a phrase which Günther, following Mai, interprets to mean a lost introduction to that commentary, the rest of which has been preserved in the original Greek [66]. Now, while we do not find the text of *cap.* 22 in this work, it is remarkable that in at least two different places in the course of commenting on one of the prophets, Theodore introduces the use of Ps. 15: 10 by St. Peter, as an example of what he calls « hyperbolic » prophecy. And a still more remarkable fact is that when these two texts are compared with *cap.* 22, they show an identity of thought and expression which can hardly be explained except by allowing the genuinity of the conciliar extract. The texts are as follows:

Comm. in Joel. II (P. G. 66, 232 b-c)	*Vig. 22* (Günther, p. 256)	*Comm. in Zach. IX* (P. G. 66, 557 a-b)
οὕτως ὁ μακάριος λέγει Δαυὶδ περὶ τοῦ λαοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐγκατελείφθη ἡ ψυχὴ αὐὰοῦ εἰς ᾅδην, οὐδὲ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτοῦ εἶδε διαφθοράν. ὅπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων νοεῖσθαι δυνατὸν, μεταφορικῶς δὲ ἤτοι ὑπερβολικῶς λέγει, ὅτι ἐξήρθη κινδύνου ἢ διαφθορᾶς. ἡ δὲ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλήθεια τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Δεσπότου δείκνυται Χριστοῦ... διόπερ ἐχρήσατο τῇ φωνῇ καὶ	Tale est et, quod non derelicta est anima eius in inferno, nec caro eius vidit corruptionem; nam propheta quidem supra modum ipsum ponit circa populum, providentiam dicens, volens dicere, quoniam inextemptabiles eos ab omnibus conservavit malis. Quoniam autem hoc verum et ex ipsis rebus eventum	τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ, οὐκ ἐγκατελείφθη ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ εἰς ᾅδου, ουδὲ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτοῦ εἶδε διαφθοράν, ὅπερ ὑπερβολικῶς εἰρημένον παρὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Δαυὶδ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαοῦ τῶν Ἰσραηλιτῶν, ἐπ'αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας ὦπται γεγονὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ Δεσπότου Χριστοῦ. Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ δικαίως ὁ μακάριος ἐχρήσατο Πέτρος ...

[66] *CSEL*, XXXV, 1, p. 256, note. Cf. Mai, in *cap.* 4 of his preface to his edition of this text: *Script. Vet. Nov. Coll.* VI, p. xiv; the passage is also in Migne: *P.G.* 66, 113-114.

ὁ μακάριος Πέτρος, ὡς ἂν τότε μὲν κατά τινα αἰτίαν μεταφορικῶς εἰρημένη, νῦν δὲ ἀληθῆ τὴν ἔκβασιν ἐπ'αὐτῶν λαβοῦσα τῶν πραγμάτων.

accepit in domino Christo, sequentissime de eo loquens beatus Petrus utitur voce ostendens, quoniam quod de populo supra modum dictum est ex quadam ratione utente voce propheta, hoc verum eventum in ipsis rebus accepit nunc in domino Christo.

It will be observed that all three passages begin with an expression which indicates that what follows is an illustration of some general principle. From the context of the two passages from the commentary on the prophets, we see that in each case Theodore has introduced this example to illustrate his theory of « hyperbolic » prophecy. What would be more likely than that in an introduction to the commentary, the author had discussed the principles of his exegesis, and had once again used this example? In any case, it must be admitted that cap. 22 contains nothing that is not exactly consonant with Theodore's exegesis of this passage as it is found in the very work to which the conciliar text is attributed.

Devreesse, however, has found a contradiction between cap. 22 and the passage from the *Commentary on the Psalms* with which he compared it. One can only say that if this « contradiction » proves cap. 22 to be a forgery, it would also prove the same thing of the two passages which we have quoted from the *Commentary on the Twelve Prophets*. The difference of treatment can only be explained by the development of Theodore's theories of prophecy in the interval between the writing of the commentary on the psalms and the writing of that on the prophets. There can be no reflection on the authenticity of cap. 22. The parallels found in the two Greek texts show beyond doubt that this extract, far from falsifying the thought of Theodore, is a faithful mirror of his exegesis of Psalm 15: 10 where it occurs in the *Commentary on the Twelve Prophets*.

Moreover, this identical treatment of Psalm 15: 10 as an example of « hyperbolic » prophecy in the course of the com-

mentary, lends considerable weight to the opinion of Mai and Günther that when the capitular heading ascribes *cap.* 22 to « the beginning of the commentary on the twelve prophets », it actually alludes to an introduction to that work which has been lost. As the text has come down to us, there is no general introduction to the commentary as a whole; it begins almost immediately with the exegesis of Osea, prefacing it only with a brief historical note, such as is found at the beginning of each of the twelve books.

The very first sentence of this introduction, however, is significant; these are the opening words of the commentary as it has come down to us [67]:

> εἰς ἔλεγχον τῶν ἀβασανίστως ἐπιβάλλειν ταῖς προφητικαῖς ἐπιχειρούντων φωναῖς, καὶ μὴν καὶ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τῶν ἐξῆς, ἀρξώμεθα τῆς τῶν προφητικῶν σαφηνείας, θεοῦ διδόντος, ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὡσηὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι, ὃν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι τῷ χρόνῳ συμβέβηκε τῶν λοιπῶν προφητῶν.

The Latin « temere » by which ἀβασανίστως is translated in Migne is really much too generic a term; the Greek means « without questioning, without investigation ». In the opening sentence, then, Theodore announces that his work is directed against those who have attempted to explain the writings of the prophets without having made the necessary investigation of their subject. Who are these unscientific exegetes? Not another word is said of them in the preface to Osea. Theodore launches immediately into his description of the historical background of the prophecy of Osea.

Now it seems very strange that Theodore should be content with so brief an allusion to the principal adversaries and errors against which he directs his work. He seems to suppose that his readers know perfectly well the sort of exegetes whom he has in mind. This supposition practically demands that they have already read a general preface to the commentary, in which Theodore has set forth his own principles of exegesis, in contrast to the unscientific methods of his predecessors.

With this likelihood in mind, let us now turn to Vig. cap. 21 and 22. The conciliar heading states that both of these extracts are « ex principio commenti quod in duodecim

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[67] *P.G.* 66, 124 a.

prophetas scripsit »[68]. We have already quoted Vig. 22; the following text is Vig. 21:

> Sed non volentes ista considerare voces omnes trahere ad dominum temptant Christum, ut et quae de populo factae sunt, simili modo intellegerent et risum praestarent Iudaeis, quando ex scriptorum sequentia nihil ad dominum Christum pertinentes ostendunt voces.

One cannot fail to see that the matter treated here is none other than the error of an exegesis which neglects to study the whole content of a prophecy, and especially its historical background. Christian exegetes thus have made themselves look ridiculous in the eyes of Hebrew scholars who can prove from the context (ex scriptorum sequentia) that certain passages refer to the people of Israel, rather than to the Messias. The general principle is enunciated in Vig. 21. The following *capitulum* gives an example of the correct way of understanding such prophecies. It is an example which Theodore evidently found particularly appropriate in explaining one of the general principles of his own exegesis: scil. that of « hyperbolic » prophecy.

These two *capitula,* then, contain exactly the sort of material which the first sentence of the preface to Osea would suppose had already been treated in a general introduction. We believe there is no further reason to doubt that both 21 and 22 are authentic passages from the lost introduction to the *Commentary on the Twelve Prophets.* We have already seen that Devreesse's charge of falsification against Vig. 22 is completely unfounded. Of 21 he had remarked that whereas the conciliar inscription had attributed it to the « beginning of the commentary on the twelve prophets », the passage was not to be found in the work cited. The inference is rather obvious that the extract is probably a forgery. Our study has shown that there is every reason to believe that the council is quite accurate in its inscription, and that each of these *capitula* gives us a fragment of a part of Theodore's work which has otherwise been lost.

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[68] This is the heading to Conc. Cap. 20 (Mansi, IX, 211). The heading to Cap. 21 of the council (which is 22 of Vigilius) reads: « Et post alia infert: » which regularly means that the citation is taken from the same work as the previous one.

The three following *capitula* are taken from the *Commentary on the Psalms*. The third of these (Vig. 25), is a section of the commentary on Psalm 68, which has also been preserved in a Greek *catena*. Comparison shows the conciliar Latin to be, as usual, a very accurate translation of the corresponding Greek text [69].

The other two *capitula* (Vig. 23-24), are taken from the commentary on Psalm 21. The ancient Latin Version of this commentary, edited by Devreesse, is rather fragmentary on this psalm, and lacks the commentary on the verses with which Vig. 23-24 are concerned. Hence Devreesse remarks that what remains of the passages cited in these *capitula* — « ne permet pas d'établir un parallèle assez étroit pour décider comment ils ont été traités » [70].

As far as a textual parallel is concerned, this statement of Devreesse is literally true. However, we believe there is no reason to justify the distrust with which it is expressed. The fact is that practically every idea contained in these two *capitula* has some authentic parallel in Theodore's writings. Since the subject-matter is rather exegetical than christological, we shall not go into a detailed treatment here. But the very passages preserved in the Latin version of the commentary on this same psalm show a definite coherence with what we find in the *capitula*. Moreover, Vosté has shown that the commentary of the Nestorian exegete, Isho'dad of Merw, on this same psalm, follows closely the content of the conciliar texts [71]. And we know that Isho'dad looked upon Theodore of Mopsuestia as the Interpreter *par excellence*. There is no serious reason, then, to cast doubt on the authenticity of these two capitula. They should be used, rather, to fill the gaps in the ancient Latin version of the commentary on Psalm 21 [72].

The next *capitulum* to be studied is Vig. 27, a passage from the *Commentary on St. John*. This is the last of the extracts from that commentary to be seen; we have already

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69 Compare Vig. 25 (Günther, p. 259), with Devreesse's edition of the commentary on the psalms: pp. 454-455.

70 *Essai*, p. 248.

71 *Rev. Bibl.* 1929, pp. 550-553.

72 In his edition of the commentary, Devreesse has not deemed the conciliar fragments worthy of a place in the text, but has relegated them to a footnote in small type.

discussed the others (Vig. 14, 15, 16, 33, and 34) [73]. It will be recalled that of the others for which we possess the Syriac translation, all are indicated to have been faithful to the original text. However, we noted that in the case of 33 and 34, the deliberate omission of context gave a seriously misleading citation. It will also be recalled that there is reason to believe that this misleading citation was taken by the conciliar compilers from the work of the Acephales, against whom Facundus wrote in defense of Theodore.

Now, while Vig. 14, 15, and 16, which are faithful to the original text, and provide adequate context, are all taken from the same section toward the end of the commentary, Vig. 27 is taken from the same early section from which cap. 33 and 34 has been drawn. In fact, it presupposes the very same context: scil. the interpretation of the mind of Nathanael, when, on his first meeting with Jesus, he called Him « Son of God ». It is not unlikely, then, that the same source which had provided cap. 33 and 34, also provided cap. 27. In any case, the same injustice has been done to Theodore here, since the lack of context is here again definitely damaging to Theodore.

As we have seen previously, Theodore's interpretation of the mind of Nathanael is that he addressed Christ as « Son of God » in the same sense in which the saints of the Old Law had merited that title: scil. as familiar friends of God. Cap. 27 is concerned with Our Lord's reply to Nathanael: « Quia dixi tibi: Vidi te sub ficu, credis; maius his videbis. Amen, amen dico vobis, videbitis caelum apertum et angelos Dei ascendentes et descendentes supra Filium hominis » [74]. The gist of Theodore's interpretation is that Christ has accommodated himself perfectly to the imperfect knowledge of his interlocutor. Nathanael has understood Christ to be a « familiar friend of God », on the basis of his knowledge of things distant. As Theodore points out, this gift in itself would not suffice to indicate the divinity, since prophets had possessed the same sort of clairvoyance. Our Lord, then, in his reply, speaks of « something greater » than the gift of prophecy: Nathanael will see the Angels ascending and descending on the Son of Man. Is this an allusion to the divinity? Theodore emphatically re-

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[73] Above, pp. 123-133; and pp. 107-112.

[74] *John*, 1: 50-51. Cf. Vosté, pp. 37-38.

jects the idea; the ascent and descent of ministering angels is something « quod semper fit in utilitatem totius generis humani ». If Christ has wished to allude to his divinity, he would have revealed himself rather as the creator of the angels. Hence, the « something greater » is only another, more striking proof for Nathanael of what he already believes: that Christ is a « familiar friend of God ». As Theodore understands this passage, Christ has adapted himself wonderfully to the limited understanding of Nathanael in his first contact with the Master.

With this context in mind, we now present the text of Vig. 27, in parallel with Vosté's version of the Syriac of this passage.

Vig. 27

Matthaeus quidem evangelista post temptationes dicit quod accedentes angeli ministrabant ei, scilicet cum eo constituti et cooperantes et omnibus circa eum deo ministrantes, quod iam per certamina ad diabolum ostensus est clarior. Sed et quod passuro ei aderant angeli, ex evangeliis discimus, et, cum resurrexit, in monumento visi sunt.

Per omnia enim ista monstrabatur dignitas Christi, quod inseparate ei angeli aderant et omnibus circa eum ministrabant: sicut enim a peccantibus separantur, sic et per meritum honoratis subveniunt. Propter quod bene dominus ait, quod ' maius videbitis, quod et caelum aperietur omnibus per me, et omnes angeli semper mecum erunt, nunc quidem ascendentes, nunc vero descendentes sicut ad domesticum dei et amicum '.

Vosté, p. 38, 18-30

Matthaeus enim evangelista post tentationes dixit: *accesserunt angeli et ministrabant ei;* manifeste cum eo erant servientes ei in omnibus quae a Deo erga eum fiebant, ita ut in certamine cum diabolo victor evaderet. Sed et quod passuro ei aderant angeli, ex evangelio discimus; et postquam resurrexit, prope monumentum visi sunt; similiter cum ascendisset in caelum, adstiterunt iuxta apostolos. Per quae omnia Christi dignitas monstrabatur, quod sine intermissione ei angeli aderant, in omnibus, quae circa eum contingebant, ministrantes.

Quapropter recte dicit, maiora istis illos esse visuros;

angeli nempe semper ei praesto forent ascendentes et descendentes, seu diligentissime ministrantes in iis quae apud eum contingunt.

Now it is clear that by itself, this isolated passage given in cap. 27 would give a misleading interpretation of Theodore's

exegesis. Without the rest of the context, one could not know that Theodore understood Christ to be accommodating Himself to the mind of Nathanael, and that he introduced this « ministry of angels » as merely another proof — a greater one, to be sure — of what Nathanael had already declared Him to be: a « familiar friend of God ». Without the context, one would conclude that this in fact is all that Theodore understood Christ to be. Whereas in the following lines of the text, we see that Theodore realized Him to be much more: that these marvels attended the human nature « propter divinam naturam inhabitantem ». It cannot be denied, therefore, that the lack of context has rendered *Cap.* 27 definitely misleading, and has given rise to an unjust sentence on the part of Vigilius in this case.

There is another question to be considered, however, regarding the textual differences between *cap.* 27 and the Syriac version. From a study of the parallel texts, one will see that there are several discrepancies. Devreesse has labeled the last phrase of the *capitulum*: « une interpolation finale — qu'on ne trouve pas dans la tradition syriaque — dont on voit immédiatement la portée. And in a note: « Qu'on veuille noter cette appellation de ' domesticus '; on la retrouvera dans les fragments 33 et 34 » [75]. McKenzie supports the view of Devreesse here, saying [76]:

> It ought to be self-evident that « domesticum dei et amicum » is an intrusion here, and it is so conceded by Ortiz de Urbina and Sullivan. But it is no harmless intrusion, no innocent paraphrase; it gives the passage a turn which it could not have in the Syriac context, and it is quoted as a basis of the condemnation.

Now for the sake of the record, we must confess that we do not understand on what grounds McKenzie has said that « Sullivan concedes the phrase ' domesticum dei et amicum ' to be an intrusion ». What can « intrusion » mean in this context except « interpolation »? May I be pardoned for quoting myself? In the article to which McKenzie refers, I wrote:

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[75] *Essai*, p. 248; also p. 249, note 1.

[76] J. L. McKenzie, S.J., « The commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on John 1: 46-51 », *Theological Studies*, XIV (1953), p. 82.

> Hence, while the phrase « sicut ad domesticum dei et amicum » has no equivalent in the Syriac version, the grounds for describing it as an interpolation introducing a thought foreign to Theodore, are something less than conclusive [77].

While this statement may be ambiguous by itself, the rest of the paragraph would have Shown that I had questioned both that it was an interpolation and that it introduced a thought foreign to Theodore.

This minor point aside, let us consider the question whether this phrase can actually be shown to have been interpolated into the conciliar text. It seems to us that there are three arguments involved in the case for interpolation. The first is that the phrase does not appear in the Syriac version. Taken in itself, is this a sufficient proof that the divergency in the conciliar extract must be due to interpolation? The supposition of such a proof is either that the Syriac translator has never omitted a single phrase of his original text, or that, while he may have omitted others, he could not have omitted this particular one. The first supposition, besides postulating a degree of sustained accuracy beyond the usual limits of human perfection, contradicts the evidence supplied by a careful comparison of the Syriac version with the texts of the Greek *catenae*. While the Syriac is usually quite close to the Greek, there are still a number of ploces where the translator seems to have slightly abbreviated his text, dropping a phrase or even a longer part of a sentence [78]. There is no reason to suspect the catenist of « padding » the text; the consistent tendency of the

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[77] « Some reactions to Devreesse's new study of Theodore of Mopsuestia », *Theological Studies*, XII (1951), p. 194.

[78] Compare the following loci in Vosté's version of the Syriac, with the Greek fragments edited by Devreesse:

Vosté:	p.	3, 6	with	Devreesse:	p.	305, 4
		3, 13				305, 10
		36, 27				318, 19
		36, 32				319, 4
		70, 3				324, 9-11
		110, 19				331, 13-14
		117, 27				333, 3
		125, 38				335, 9-10
		132, 14				338, 12-13
		191, 22-23				389, 3-4
		194, 18				391, 11-12
		201, 22				395, 27.

catenists was clearly to select, and thus to shorten, rather than to lengthen their text [79]. A translator, on the other hand, would be remarkable if he did not miss a phrase now and then. The evidence of the Greek texts, therefore, indicates that the Syriac translator did occasionally drop a phrase in the course of his translation. Is there any principle in virtue of which one can determine that whereas he may have omitted phrases elsewhere, he could not have omitted the one in this particular case?

McKenzie makes much of the fact that this phrase, which does not occur in the Syriac version, is precisely the one picked out by Vigilius for explicit denunciation. The fact that Vigilius found the phrase particularly offensive to orthodox ears would not, it seems to me, lessen the chances that it had been omitted by the Syriac translator.

The main argument proposed by McKenzie to show that the phrase: « sicut ad domesticum dei et amicum » is an interpolation, is that « it gives the passage a turn which it could not have in the Syriac context ». He believes that from the context, « it ought to be self-evident that ' domesticum dei et amicum ' is an intrusion here » [80]. Frankly, we do not see this « self-evident turn ». The first thing to be established is the precise meaning of the phrase: « domesticum dei et amicum ». We have previously shown from the Greek fragment of Vig. 33, that this word « domesticus » in the Latin version of the *capitula* is merely the literal rendition of the Greek οἰκεῖος. We have further demonstrated from the comment of Vigilius on *cap.* 33-34, that the relationship which it expressed for him was nothing else than « familiaritas ». We believe, therefore, that the phrase in question, both in the original Greek and in sixth-century Latin, had exactly the meaning of our English phrase: « as to a familiar friend of God ».

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[79] In this connection we cannot help remarking that McKenzie does not seem to have sufficiently taken into account the fact that the Greek text of the *Commentary on St. John* published by Devreesse, is nothing more or less than isolated sections collected by ancient editors of *catenae*. The selective character of the *catenae* accounts for the statistics which he presents as to the relative length of the treatment of certain verses in the Greek and in the Syriac version. Cf. *Theol. Studies*, 1953, p. 79, text, and note 7.

[80] McKenzie, *art. cit.*, p. 82.

Now the question is, does this phrase: « as to a familiar friend of God », give the passage a new turn which it could not have had in the Syriac? Does it not rather correspond perfectly with the whole sense of the context: scil. the idea that Nathanael looked upon Christ at this time as a « son of God » merely in the sense of a « familiar friend », and that Christ wonderfully accommodated himself to this imperfect understanding? Theodore insists that while the marvel of the ministry of the angels is indeed a greater marvel than clairvoyance, still it is not something that would indicate the divinity, for it is a thing « quod semper fit in utilitatem totius generis humani ». It is a favor which God denies to sinners, but grants to honor his saints for their merits. In alluding to this favor which other « sons of God » have shared, Christ shows that he realizes in what sense Nathanael has called Him a « son of God ». And so, accommodating himself to Nathanael's view, Christ does not reveal himself as the creator of the angels, but merely alludes to their ministry to Him as a greater proof of what Nathanael already believes Him to be: a familiar friend of God.

We believe the foregoing interpretation to present the mind of Theodore on this text. If we have forced the meaning or distorted the thought we confess frankly that we do not see where we have done so. Yet our interpretation includes both of the phrases which according to McKenzie would give the passage a turn which it could not have in the context. Besides objecting to the phrase « sicut ad domesticum dei et amicum », McKenzie has contended that another clause in the conciliar citation: « sicut a peccantibus separantur, sic et per meritum honoratis subveniunt », must be an interpolation. He says of this clause (which does not appear in the Syriac) that it « throws the emphasis in the opposite direction » to the context, and that « one must annihilate the context in order to preserve the text of the *Constitutum* » [81]. We have incorporated this clause into our interpretation of the context. We do not see that in any way it disturbs the progress of the thought.

We believe, therefore, that there is no sound reason to suspect interpolation in the text of the capitulum, even though it shows these phrases not found in the Syriac. It may be noted that in this very same passage there is a third phrase in the

[81] *Art. cit.*, p. 82.

conciliar text which has no parallel in the Syriac version, scil. « quod et caelum aperietur omnibus per me ». It seems absurd to say that the compiler of the extract would have gone to the trouble of interpolating so innocuous a phrase. Yet if it is not interpolated, one must confess that here the Syriac translator has omitted something from his original text. We have shown that the other two phrases also fit perfectly into the context. There is no great difficulty about admitting that they, too, have been dropped by the translator.

This very doubtful charge of interpolation aside, what about the good faith of those who compiled the extracts presented to the council and Vigilius? We have seen that these two passages from the commentary on the episode of Nathanael, as well as another from that on the episode of the centurion, suffer from a damaging lack of context. In each case, Theodore is interpreting the mind of a contemporary of Christ; without the context one would be led to conclude that Theodore himself shares in their limited and defective theology. We have also seen evidence that these three similar passages were probably drawn from the work of the Acephales, refuted by Facundus.

We believe it would be rash to apply to these three capitula the adage: « ab uno disce omnes », and hence to reject the conciliar extracts en bloc. In the first place, the nature of the matter treated renders these particular *capitula* uniquely susceptible to misleading citation: precisely since Theodore is interpreting the mind of another. In practically all the other *capitula* he is obviously proposing his own doctrine. Secondly, it is fairly certain that the most important citations of this conciliar collection: scil. the dogmatic fragments, were not compiled by the Acephales, but existed in a florilegium which long antedated their work against Theodore. Moreover, in the dogmatic fragments the lack of context may leave the picture of Theodore's doctrine incomplete, but by their length and by the nature of the subject-matter, they can hardly be completely misleading. That is, unless someone has deliberately interpolated into them a doctrine foreign to that of the author. It is in view of this last point that we have been attempting to determine just how valid are the sweeping charges of interpolation and falsification which have been leveled against these hostile fragments. We believe we have shown

that there is not so solid a foundation for them as been believed.

We shall continue with our study of the evidence of falsification advanced by Devreesse. In his *Essay* he charges the compilers of Vig. 30 and 31 with deliberate interpolation and corruption of Theodore's text. Vig. 30 is a literal version of fragment 6 of Leontius; Devreesse refers his readers to the proofs given by Richard that this fragment has been « intentionally corrupted, cut from what follows it, truncated, by a theologian well aware of what he was doing » [82]. We have already discussed Richard' proof of corruption; it will be recalled that his case is based on a discrepancy in the Syriac version of *Cod. Add. 14669*. We shall simply refer back to our previous treatment of this matter [83]. As far as the charge of « truncation » is concerned, we do not believe it is wholly justified. Cap. 30 presents a complete thought; it does not need what follows it in the Syriac version in order to make it intelligible. It is true that the following fragment of Leontius (7), does suppose what precedes it, and to that extent limps a bit [84]. But that would not justify the word « truncation » of Vig. 30, which is Leontius' fragment 6.

Vig. 31 is the passage from the *Catechetical Homilies* which we have already discussed in connection with a similar citation from the *Cat. Hom.* given by Cyril of Alexandria [85]. We have seen that the case for corruption of the text here too is very doubtful, if not definitely excluded by the century which separates the two compilers, who would presumably have made exactly the same alteration in the two texts. Moreover, the charge of corruption is based on the accuracy of the Syriac version, and we have shown incontrovertible evidence that the translator of the *Cat. Hom.* cannot be relied on for a perfectly faithful rendition of the original text.

We have likewise already discussed Devreesse's remarks concerning Vig. 33, 34, and 35 [86].

The next extract, Vig. 36, is taken from the *Catechetical*

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[82] *Essai*, p. 249. Cf. Richard, « La tradition, etc. », *Le Muséon*, 1943, pp. 63-66.

[83] See above, pp. 64-82.

[84] *P.G.* 66, 981, b-c.

[85] See above, pp. 90-98.

[86] See above, pp. 107-112.

Homilies, where Theodore is addressing the newly-baptized. The texts are as follows:

Vig. 36 (Günther, p. 268)	*Syriac version* (Tonneau, p. 455, 11-15)
Renatus alter factus est pro altero, non iam pars Adam mutabilis et peccatis circumfusi, sed Christi, qui omnino inculpabilis per resurrectionem factus est.	Tu es né et devenu complètement autre; tu n'es plus dès lors partie de (cet) Adam, qui est changeant, — parce que accablé de péchés et malheureux, — mais (tu es partie) du Christ, qui fut absolument exempt (de l'atteinte) du péché par la résurrection,

The Syriac version continues: (lines 15-18)

> n'en ayant même fait aucun depuis le commencement, parce qu'il convenait que cela aussi fût aussi en lui à titre primordial; mais par la résurrection, c'est complètement qu'il reçoit la nature immuable.

Comparing the Latin extract with the Syriac text, Devreesse remarks: « ... with what care has it not been amputated from its immediate context and modified to the extent of altering it, [87]. It is clear that Devreesse's charge of « alteration » must be based on the difference between the reading: « inculpabilis per resurrectionem factus est », of the conciliar extract, and the Syriac parallel, which Devreesse himself translates: « sine peccato fuit per resurrectionem ». Now it should be remembered that the Latin extract and the Syriac text are both versions of an original Greek text. The difference between these two translations could be explained on the hypothesis that the Greek originally showed something like: ἀναμάρτητος διὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐγένετο. It was undoubtedly this or a similar passage which Justinian had in mind when he accused Theodore of teaching [88]:

> τὸν χριστὸν ... μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἄτρεπτον ταῖς ἐννοίαις, καὶ ἀναμάρτητον παντελῶς γενόμενον.

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[87] *Essai*, p. 252.

[88] *Confessio rectae fidei*, P.G. 86, 1017 b.

If, therefore, the original Greek read: ἀναμάρτητος διὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐγένετο, the verb could have been rendered either « factus est », or « fuit ». But the context in the present case indicates that the author really meant « factus est ». For it is clear that in this passage Theodore is expressing his personal doctrine on the sinlessness of Christ. The lines which follow upon the extract in the Syriac text (quoted above), show that he taught that while Christ, before the resurrection, was indeed without sin, yet with the resurrection he *received* an « immutability » which seems close to the idea of absolute impeccability. That Theodore actually did hold *impeccantia* in Christ during his mortal life, and *impeccabilitas* only after the resurrection, is attested by Amann [89]. Hence, the phrase: « per resurrectionem », lacks its full significance unless the verb expresses the notion of « becoming », which would parallel the phrase at the end of the passage: « by the resurrection he *received* immutability ». We conclude that the context proves the Latin extract to be literally faithful to the original meaning of the text when it reads « factus est », instead of « fuit ». This conclusion is in complete accord with what we know *aliunde*: scil. that the Latin version of these extracts is painstakingly accurate. The incorrect « fuit » of the Syriac is another example of the fact that this version cannot be relied on for meticulous accuracy.

The difference, likewise present, between « inculpabilis » and « sine peccato » is also explained by an original reading like ἀναμάρτητος. It is true that we would rather expect « impeccabilis ». But we should not be too quick to judge a sixth-century translator for not using the term with which our theology makes us more familiar. « Inculpabilis », after all, is the equivalent of ἀναμάρτητος in its more common meaning. It is only from the context that one could understand the precise sense in which the word was to be taken. And this leads one to the observation that the way in which this extract has been cut from its context does cast suspicion on the intentions of the compiler. From the following lines it would have been clear that Theodore did at least teach the actual sinlessness of Christ during his lifetime. Without this clarification the words: « inculpabilis per resurrectionem factus est » are susceptible of a sinister connotation which they

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[89] E. Amann, art. « Théodore de Mopsueste », *DTC* XV, 1, 262-263.

did not originally possess. However, there is no indication in any of the works against Theodore that anyone accused him of teaching that Christ was actually guilty of sin during his mortal lifetime. What they objected to was rather Theodore's admission that Christ was capable of sin. And this is what Theodore actually taught. Hence the lack of context is not so serious as might be imagined. Vigilius draws the inference that Christ must have been « culpabilis » before the resurrection, but there is little doubt that he uses the term in its primary sense: « capable of fault ». If he thought that this extract implied the enormity of teaching that Christ had committed actual sin, he surely would made his denunciation more explicit. And there is no evidence that even Theodore's bitter enemies accused him of quite so open a contradiction of Christ's own words: « Who shall convict me of sin? ».

Of *Cap.* 37, Devreesse remarks only that it offers some resemblances to phrases scattered through Homilies VII and VIII. However, we have found a passage in Homily V, 5, which shows a striking similarity to the extract of Vigilius. Theodore is speaking of the relations between the Word and the Temple — i. e., the « homo assumptus ». The close parallel between the Latin and the literal translation which Tonneau gives of the Syriac text seems to justify the conclusion that we have found the source of *Cap.* 37, and the conciliar text is thereby confirmed.

Vig. cap. 37 (Günther, p. 268)	*Cat. Hom. V, 5* (Tonneau, p. 107, 9-17)
Ut multam quidem eius faceret diligentiam, omnia autem illius propria faceret et toleraret per omnes eo ducto passiones, per quas eum secundum suam virtutem perfectum fecit, nec a mortuo secundum suae naturae legem recedens sed sua praesentia et operatione et gratia liberans quidem eum de morte et malis, quae inde sunt, resuscitans autem eum de mortuis et ad meliorem finem perducens.	Et tout ce qui (appartient) à la nature de l'homme il le prit sur soi: étant éprouvé en toutes ses facultés, il le perfectionna de sa puissance; — au point que, même quand il reçut la mort selon la loi de sa nature, il ne s'en éloigna pas; mais étant avec lui, par l'opération de la grâce, il l'arracha à la mort et à la corruption du tombeau, le ressuscita d'entre les morts et lui accorda cet honneur sublime qu'il lui avait promis avant de subir la mort, quand il disait:

Détruisez ce temple et en trois jours je le redresserai; ce qu'il accomplit.

Devreesse acknowledges the confirmation of Vig. 38 by a passage of Homily VIII (« il recouvre à peu près un développement de l'homélie VIII »), but he quotes Vosté to the effect that « the extract is poorly rendered and the last part of it is practically unintelligible » [90]. Devreesse did not give the precise place in Homily VIII to which he referred, but a comparison with a section of VIII, 9 will show that the parallel is indeed quite certain [91].

Vig. cap. 38
(Günther, p. 269)

Deinde ostendens cuius gratia passus est diminutionem, infert: *quatenus citra deum pro omnibus gustaret mortem,* quia, divina natura ita volente, separata illa ipse per se pro omnium utilitate gustavit mortem; et ostendens, quod deitas separata quidem erat illo, qui passus est, secundum mortis experimentum, quia nec possibile erat illam mortis experimentum accipere, non tamen illo, qui passus est, afuerat secundum diligentiam.

Cat. Hom. VIII, 9
(Tonneau, p. 199, 6-12)

Et, afin de nous enseigner, pourquoi il supporta d'être abaissé pour un peu de temps, il dit: *En dehors de Dieu, pour tous il goûta la mort,* parce que la nature divine voulut ceci: que pour le profit de tous, il goûtât la mort. Et, afin d'indiquer que la divinité est distincte de celui qui patissait dans l'épreuve de la mort, — puisqu'elle ne pouvait pas goûter l'épreuve de la mort, — sans s'éloigner de lui par sa providence, mais étant toute proche, elle opérait ce qui est nécessaire et convient à la nature de celui qu'elle avait assumé.

With all due reverence to the late Fr. Vosté, one must question his assertion: « Ultima verba citati textus Concilii nullum prae se ferunt sensum ». Keeping in mind Theodore's exegesis of his peculiar reading of the text of Heb. 2: 9 (χωρὶς θεοῦ — « citra Deum ») one may rather say that the anti-

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[90] *Essai,* p. 252, note 1; the reference is given to Vosté, « Theodori Mopsuesteni ' Liber ad baptizandos ' », *Or. Chr. Per.* IX (1943), pp. 216-217.

[91] In citing the text of cap. 38 from Günther's edition, we have changed the punctuation of the first two lines to fit the sense, which is more apparent in the light of the Syriac version.

thesis which is brought out in the Latin extract: « separata quidem ... secundum mortis experimentum; non tamen afuerat ... secundum diligentiam », in fact brings out Theodore's thought even more clearly than the Syriac version [92]. Perhaps the misleading element is the word « diligentiam »; for us moderns the word suggests a specialized meaning: « diligence », but in the context it surely has its primary meaning, based on « diligo ». The Word remained with the crucified *homo assumptus* « according to his loving disposition »: κατὰ διάθεσιν was, I suspect, the original Greek. For Theodore, διάθεσις meant precisely a disposition of love towards one, at least in a number of passages [93]. As far as the complaint that the Latin extract is « poorly rendered » is concerned, it should be noted that wherever this version can be compared with the Greek text, it is found to be an extremely literal translation. We believe that keeping this fact in mind, and working back to the Greek construction, will solve most of the difficulties.

Vig. cap. 41-43 are also from the *Cat. Hom.* Of cap. 41, Vosté and Devreesse have good reason to complain that the fragment has been cut too short, as it is not even a full sentence. However, the word « incomprehensible » seems a bit strong to describe this extract; even without the context it is really not impossible to understand what Theodore had in mind. Devreesse links Vig. 42 and 43 together with the severe judgement that they are « unfaithful quotations » of their respective texts. Perhaps he has not taken into sufficient account the fact that he is comparing two independent translations of an original Greek text into two languages as widely different as Latin and Syriac. He complains, at any rate, that cap. 42 « does not correspond word for word with the Syriac ». Yet both Vosté and Ortiz de Urbina, who also read the Syriac, assert that the verbal differences do not seriously affect the sense [94]. A comparison of the Latin with Tonneau's

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[92] Cf. Theodore's exegesis of *Heb.* 2: 9, in what remains of his commentary on that epistle: Staab, pp. 204-205.

[93] See the following examples from the Greek *catenae* on St. John: in the appendix to Devreesse's *Essai*, p. 357, 24; 384, 1; 384, 12-14; 396, 23.

[94] Vosté, *art. cit. Or. Chr. Per.* 1943, p. 218: « differentias ... revera leves quoad sensum ». Ortiz de Urbina, *art. cit. O.C.P.* 1949, p. 442: « le insignificanti varianti non incidono sul senso ».

very careful French translation of the Syriac supports this view [95].

But in the case of cap. 43, while Ortiz de Urbina again does not admit differences which affect the sense of the passage, Vosté supports Devreesse's charge of « unfaithful quotation » to the extent that he sees « two doctrinal differences » between the Latin and the Syriac [96]. He indicates these differences by insertions in the text of cap. 43:

> (Syriace. Et bene post illa dixit beatus Paulus): *Deo autem gratias, qui nobis dedit victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum,* istorum causam fuisse nobis dicens Deum, qui contra omnes adversarios nobis dedit victoriam, sive mortis, sive peccati, sive cuiuscumque hinc nascendi mali, qui Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum pro nobis hominem sumens (Syr. hominem induit), et ipsum per resurrectionem de mortuis ad meliorem transtulit finem (Syr. transtulit ad vitam novam), et in dextera sua sedere fecit, et nobis (Syr. *addit*: per gratiam suam) ad eum donavit communionem.

Now surely Vosté did not see a doctrinal difference between « hominem sumens » and « hominem induit », as these phrases are undoubtedly used by Theodore as synonymous throughout his writings. The difference between « ad meliorem finem » — clearly referring to the life after death — and « ad novam vitam », does not suggest any important doctrinal implications. The omission of the phrase « per gratiam suam » seems more serious, but it must be admitted that in the context it would be easily understood that the communion given to men with Christ in the fruits of the resurrection would be a gift of grace. Hence we would concur with Ortiz de Urbina, who sees here only « insignificant variants which do not affect the sense ».

We conclude, therefore, that the basis on which Devreesse has charged these two *capitula* with being « unfaithful quotations », is reduced to the fact that between the Latin version of the council and the Syriac version of the *Cat. Hom.*, there are these minor variants which really do not seriously affect the sense. How are these variants between the two versions

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[95] Tonneau, p. 127, 18 - 129, 1.

[96] Vosté, *O.C.P.* 1943, p. 219. Cf. Tonneau, p. 129, 23 - 131, 3.

actually to be explained? In the preceding chapter we have discussed the possibility of using these conciliar extracts from the *Cat. Hom.* as a control of the accuracy of our Syriac version of that work. The key to such use is the fact that the Latin version of the council is consistently found to have been a painstakingly literal version of the Greek text of the *Acta*. We concluded that at least in those passages which are « doctrinally indifferent », we would be justified in taking the Latin *capitula* as a careful, word for word rendition of the authentic text. How, then, will we explain doctrinally insignificant variants between this literal version of the Greek, and the Syriac translation? It seems absurd to charge the compiler with deliberate alteration of the Greek citation in such cases. The logical solution is a slight inaccuracy in the Syriac version. In support of this conclusion there are a couple of examples right in the extracts which we have been discussing. In Vig. 37, where the Latin version reads: « per omnes eo ducto passiones, per quas eum secundum suam virtutem perfectum fecit », Tonneau translates the Syriac: « étant éprouvé en toutes ses facultés, il le perfectionna de sa puissance ». The clear reminiscence, in the conciliar version, of Heb. 2. 10 — τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῶν διὰ παθημάτων τελειῶσαι, which Theodore elsewhere likewise applies to the perfecting of the homo assumptus by the Word, makes it extremely likely that this version gives us the wording of the original text [97]. Again, in Vig. 41, where the Latin version says: « solvens mortis *dolores* », Tonneau renders the Syriac (p. 107): « il a rompu les *liens* de la mort ». Knowing Theodore's preference for scriptural expressions, we feel sure that « solvens mortis dolores » is the correct text, based on Acts. 2: 24 « quem Deus suscitavit, solutis *doloribus inferni* ». Similarly, in Vig. 42, where the conciliar version says: « Christum iustificatum et immaculatum factum virtute spiritus sancti », Tonneau renders the Syriac (p. 127): « Et cet (homme) fut justifié et sans tache par le vertu de l'Esprit-Saint ». And a little later, the Latin: « utpote autem impeccabilem virtute sancti spiritus factum », is rendered in the Syriac: « parce qu'il était sans péché, par la vertu de l'Esprit-Saint ». The fact that the verse being explained here is I Tim. 3. 16 (ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι) shows

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[97] Cf. *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 7 (Tonneau, p. 197). Also: *Contra Apollinarem* IV, *P.G.*, 66, 1000 d.

that the passive verbal forms of the Latin: *justificatum,* immaculatum *factum,* impeccabilem *factum,* are demanded by the context. The Syriac version preserves only one verbal form: justifié, but lets the other two drop into the simple form: « il *fut* ... sans tache; il *était* sans péché ».

The foregoing are rather small points, but they illustrate the fact that where the conciliar Latin and Syriac differ, the correct explanation is rather inaccuracy in the latter than « unfaithful quotation » in the former. We have seen that Devreesse has based part of his indictment of the compilers of these *capitula* on the assumption that this Syriac version is so literally accurate that the slightest deviation from it brands the conciliar quotation as unfaithful. There is reason to believe that this assumption is not well founded.

The only other *capitula* for which parallels are found are Vig. 52 and 53 — the episode of the centurion. We have already seen that while these *capitula* are misleading due to the omission of necessary context, the charge of textual forgery based on the parallel text in Facundus has been proved false by a citation from the original Greek text. We shall merely refer to our previous treatment of these *capitula* [98].

We have now considered all the evidence offered by Richard and Devreesse to prove the thesis that the fragments of Theodore's works preserved in the hostile florilegia are so generally corrupted that they should be ignored in a study of his christology. We believe we have shown that this thesis is substantiated only to the extent that in a relatively small number of cases, the conciliar extract is so cut from its context as to give a misleading citation. On the other hand, in not a single case does the alleged forgery, interpolation, or textual alteration remain as the only possible, or indeed, as the more probable explanation of textual variants between the hostile fragments, and independent versions of Theodore's works. It should be noticed that there is not a single case where the text of a hostile fragment differs from a reliable Greek citation of the same passage. The case for textual alteration rests entirely on the witness of translations: in particular, Syriac translations. It presumes that these translations are so literally faithful to the original Greek that variations from them would prove a hostile citation to have been maliciously

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[98] See above, pp. 103-106.

altered. In the course of our study, we have seen evidence that the Syriac versions do not merit such absolute confidence. The control which we have been able to establish, on the basis of the unquestionably authentic parts of the hostile citations, shows that none of these Syriac versions is literally accurate enough to serve the purpose to which Richard and Devreesse have wished to put them. They are all reasonably good translations, to be sure. But even the version of the *Commentary on St. John,* the most careful of the three, shows the omission of a number of phrases found in Greek *catenae.* The version of the *Catechetical Homilies* seems less careful; we have shown that in at least one case it omitted a phrase definitely important for the sense of the passage. And the version of the *De Incarnatione* of *Cod. Add. 14669* is seen to have been quite inaccurate, judging from the number of departures from the original text which we have found in the limited area where control is possible.

Another fact that has come to light in the course of this study is that the Greek epitome E of the *Commentary on St. John* is wholly unreliable as a witness to Theodore's christology. It is a significant example of the fact that an ancient editor could admire the exegesis of the great Antiochene, without approving of his Antiochene christology. It is also an example of the fact that ancient editors did not hesitate to « improve » the orthodoxy of a text when they felt the need. We have seen indications that the early Latin version of the Commentary on the Psalms has probably suffered a similar « improvement » in the passage where it differs from the Greek citation of Leontius.

We conclude this chapter with the belief that this study has yielded at least some positive results. In particular, we believe that it has established the legitimacy, if not the necessity, of considering the evidence of the hostile florilegia in a thorough study of Theodore's christology. Admittedly, this evidence is one-sided. The compilers of these extracts were interested only in what could demonstrate the weaknesses in Theodore's theology, and in some cases they were not above malicious cutting of context to make the picture seem darker than it really was. One might argue that for the council of 553 to have condemned Theodore on such evidence alone was unjust. But, as we have remarked before, we are not here attempting to solve the difficult historical question of the justice

or injustice of the imperial and conciliar action which brought about Theodore's condemnation [99]. We do not take upon ourselves the onerous position of a « defender of the council: » our scope is theological, not apologetic. Our contention is, that for the purposes of a thorough study of Theodore's christology, given the friendly material now available, we can safely use these hostile fragments, as long as we are careful to see them in the light of all the other evidence. Their importance lies in the fact that they comprise a major portion of all that remains of Theodore's strictly dogmatic works. They will shed considerable light on the more technical aspects of his theology, and also on those aspects which most disturbed such theologians as Cyril of Alexandria. On the basis of the conclusions reached in these preliminary chapters, we shall make use of these dogmatic fragments in the following study of Theodore's christology.

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99 With reference to this question of the condemnation of Theodore by the fifth ecumenical council, Fr. McKenzie has made the following remarks: (art. cit. *Theological Studies*, 1953, p. 83):

« Some theologians seem alarmed at the thought that Msgr. Devreesse is attempting to reverse a general council. If they had read his book carefully, or had gone through the *Constitutum Vigilii*, they would know that no such danger is imminent. Vigilius carefully and explicitly abstains from condemnation of the person of Theodore; and he abstains, with equal caution, from accepting the attribution of the extracts to Theodore. The extracts are condemned in the form in which they were presented ».

But one who had read Msgr. Devreesse's book carefully, would also know that on p. 242 of his *Essai*, he accepts the authenticity of the documents which prove that Vigilius eventually gave in to the pressure of Justitian, renounced the stand which he had taken in his *Constitutum* of May 14, 553, and confirmed the conciliar decrees whereby Theodore was condemned in person as a heretic. One of these documents (*Epistula adversus tria capitula*, dated 23 Feb., 554), appears in the one volume pertaining to the Fifth Council which has so far been published in the *A.C.O.* (IV, 2, pp. 138-168). It would be difficult to explain the attitude of Pelagius and the succeeding Popes, if they had looked on the *Constitutum* of May 14, 553, as the final decree of Vigilius and the Holy See in this matter. In any case, Msgr. Devreesse did not so look upon it, when he wrote p. 242 of his *Essai*.

CHAPTER FOUR

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA'S THEOLOGICAL MILIEU

I. The Arian problem and Athanasius' reply

A. Grillmeier has pointed out the fact that for a proper understanding of Theodore's christology, one must first ask how the christological problem presented itself to him, and what means were at his disposal for solving it. Concretely, one may say that this is much the same as asking what problems of christology were posed by the doctrines of his principal adversaries, and what elements of their solution had been found by his predecessors. It will be the purpose of this chapter to respond to these questions.

But it should be noted at the outset that we are limiting the scope of this thesis not only to Theodore's christology, but to a particular problem of that christology. It will be recalled that in the first chapter, after a survey of recent discussions on Theodore, we concluded that there was quite general agreement on a number of points of his christological teaching [1]. Chief among these was his insistence on the complete humanity, on the human psychology of Christ, and on the theological significance of his free human acts. We noted that most scholars admitted the valuable contribution which the Antiochene theology, with its stress on the concrete and operating human nature, had made toward the formulation of the dogma defined at Chalcedon.

But at the same time, we observed that there was still a sharp division of opinion on the question whether Theodore's concept of the unity of Christ was basically « Nestorian » or not. We noted that there still seemed to be no definitive answer to the question whether the « one person » in whom his two natures are united, is merely a moral, dynamic unity,

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[1] See above, p. 15.

or whether he did grasp, at least sufficiently, the substantial unity of the Son of God made Man.

The christological problem, then, which we intend to investigate, is precisely this question of the unity of Christ. Consequently, in our study of the theological milieu, we shall be asking how this problem of unity entered into the doctrine of Theodore's principal adversaries, and how it appeared in the solutions which his immediate predecessors had offered to the doctrine of these same adversaries.

How, then, is this « problem of unity » to be formulated? We believe there is good reason for putting it in the form of this question: what is the attitude taken by Theodore's adversaries and his predecessors, with regard to that principle of unity whereby the Divine Word is taken to be the ultimate subject of predication for all the attributes and operations of Christ? The objection may be raised that this is an « Alexandrian » principle, and that it should not be introduced as the basis for a discussion of Antiochene christology. To this we reply that none the less, it was precisely the use of this Alexandrian principle by Theodore's adversaries, and the attitudes taken toward it both by his predecessors and himself, which seem to us to have basically determined the Antiochene position regarding the unity of Christ. For this reason, therefore, the respective attitudes taken toward this « Alexandrian » principle, whether they be positive or negative, seem to us to be of paramount importance in the study of this christological problem of unity.

We have spoken of Theodore's adversaries and immediate predecessors. By « adversaries » we mean the Arians and the Apollinarists. It is true that occasionally Theodore speaks of other christological heresies, such as docetism [2], and the doctrine of Paul of Samosata [3]. However, these are but passing references to heresies long since condemned. The vital problems besetting Theodore were those posed by Arianism and Apollinarism, and his opposition to these heresies to a large extent determined the emphasis and even the substantial direction taken by his christology.

By his predecessors, we refer to those Antiochene theo-

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[2] *Cat. Hom.* V, 8 (Tonneau, p. 111).

[3] *Cat. Hom.* XIII, 8 (Tonneau, p. 381); also *contra Apollinarem III*, as quoted by Facundus: *P.L.* 67, 585 b.

logians who had preceded him in the struggle against Arians and Apollinarists: namely, Eustathius of Antioch and Diodorus of Tarsus. Of Theodore's familiarity with the doctrine of Diodorus there can be no question. With regard to Eustathius the relation is not so clear, but it does seem clear that Eustathius played a large part in determining the Antiochene position in the face of Arianism. Basic points of similarity between his doctrine and that of Theodore seem to justify the view that, directly or indirectly, his work contributed to the theological formation of the priest of Antioch who later became Bishop of Mopsuestia.

We begin our study by asking what role was played in the Arian heresy by the principle whereby the Divine Word is the ultimate subject of predication for all the attributes and operations of Christ. The answer is that they took this principle as something admitted by all, and made of it the basis of one of their dialectical attacks on the divinity of the Word. We find their argument along this line developed at length in Athanasius' *Third Oration against the Arians*. The greater part of this oration is concerned precisely with the Arian argument that the Word could not be divine, since in the Gospels we see Him affected by such human limitations as fear, ignorance, suffering, and the like [4]. The supposition of such an argument is clearly the principle whereby the Word is the subject of predication even for the human attributes of Christ. We find this dialectic summed up in the following words of the Arian Eudoxius of Constantinople [5]:

> Let them (the Nicenes) answer and tell us how he who is subject to suffering and death can be consubstantial with the God Who is above these things, Who is beyond suffering and death.

It seems perfectly clear that such a form of argument against the divinity of the Word presupposes that the Word is the subject of predication for the human attributes of Christ. But from the form which their argument takes, it is equally clear that in accepting this principle, they have given it an interpretation which is basically false. For their further

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[4] *Oratio III contra Arianos* 26-58 (*P.G.* 26, 377-445).

[5] Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche*, Breslau, 1897, p. 262.

supposition is, that whatever can be predicated of the Word, is necessarily predicated κατὰ φύσιν. From this it follows that these human limitations which are attributed to the Word, must affect him physically, in his own nature as Word — and hence that nature cannot be truly divine.

There were two possible ways of meeting this argument against the divinity of the Word. In order to indicate these possibilities more clearly, we may state the Arian argument in the form of a syllogism:

> Maj. The Word is the subject even of the human operations and sufferings of Christ.
>
> Min. But whatever is predicated of the Word, must be predicated of him κατά φύσιν.
>
> Ergo: The nature of the Word is limited and affected by the human operations and sufferings of Christ.

In replying to this reasoning, one solution would be to detect and expose the fallacy in the minor premise, by distinguishing between what is proper to the Word by his divine nature, and what belongs to him by the appropriation of human nature in the Incarnation. This was the solution of Athanasius. By virtue of this distinction in the minor, he could maintain the major premise in all its vigor. But if one did not detect the fallacy in the minor, the only other recourse would be to deny the major premise. This, we believe, was the solution which Eustathius of Antioch adopted in the pressure of the Arian controversy. It is our intention, furthermore, to illustrate this point from the extant fragments of Eustathius. But before continuing this discussion, it seems well to say a few words about the alternative solution to the problem posed by Arianism: namely, the solution of Athanasius. Thus we shall have a valuable basis of comparison, and perhaps gain an insight into the further differences which will separate Alexandrian from Antiochene.

We have already noted that, by a distinction of the minor premise of the Arian argument, Athanasius was able to maintain their major premise in all its vigor. In other words, the Arian argument in no sense caused Athanasius to abandon the principle that the Word is the ultimate subject of predication for even the human operations of Christ. Not only does he insist, throughout his reply to the Arians, on the propriety of attributing these human predicates to the Word,

but he explicitly makes this the touch-stone of orthodox teaching on the incarnation. For Athanasius, it is the necessary consequence of the mysterious fact that the Word has become man [6]. The difference between Christ and the prophets is precisely the fact that though the Word was with them, yet when they were born, the Word was not born, nor when they suffered, did the Word suffer [7]. Furthermore, if the sufferings could not be predicated of the Word, they would be predicated of another, and that other would be the one who had died for us on the cross [8]. The reality of the incarnation, of the divine redemption, depend for Athanasius directly on the truth that the Word is the unique subject of all predication in Christ.

The question still remained, however, as to how these human operations and sufferings could properly be predicated of the Word, and still not compromise his divinity. As we have seen, Athanasius' solution here was a distinction, between what is true of the Word according to his own nature, and what is true of him by reason of that « flesh » which he had « made his own » in the incarnation. The first element in this distinction is a firm denial that the human limitations, although they are predicated of the Word, actually affect Him in His divine nature. « The Word bore the weaknesses of the flesh, but was in no way injured by them » [9]. They do not affect the « impassibility of the divine nature » [10]. Although the human limitations are predicated of the Word, they remain the natural, physical properties of the flesh; they do not belong to the Word κατὰ φύσιν [11]. In predicating them, therefore, of the Word, one does well to follow the example set by St. Peter, when he spoke of « Christ who suffered for us according to the flesh ». (I Pet. 4: 1). It is truly the Word who suffered for us, but not according to his divine nature: rather, according to the flesh [12]. Similarly, it is not the Word, *qua* Word, who is ignorant or suffers needs, but these things are characteristic of human nature, they are due to his humanity [13].

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6 *Contra Arianos III*, 30-32 (*P.G.* 26, 388-392).
7 *Ibid.*, 30-31.
8 *Ibid.*, 32 (392 b-c).
9 *Ibid.*, 31 (389 b).
10 *Ibid.*, 34 (396 a, c.).
11 *Ibid.*, 34 (396 c).
12 *Ibid.*, 34 (396 a-c).
13 *Ibid.*, 39 (405 c); 41 (409 b-c); 43 (413 a-b), etc.

But the question remained to be solved: how could these human operations and passions be properly predicated of the Word, and still not affect Him physically? In other words, how did Athanasius reply to the contention of the Arians that the unity of subject implied a physical bond, whereby the Word must be physically affected by these human limitations which are predicated of Him? The solution of Athanasius was to propose the relation of « appropriation », whereby the Divine Word has so « made human flesh his own » that the attributes and operations of this human nature belong to the Word and to no one else. It is true that by nature, the sufferings belong only to the body; but, adds Athanasius, by the incarnation, this body belongs to the Word. If the body belonged to another, we would predicate its sufferings of another; but since it belongs uniquely to the Word, then we must predicate even its sufferings and limitations of the Word. Otherwise we could not say: « The Word has become Man » [14].

While Athanasius does not explicitly formulate this theory in terms of a special relation of the humanity to the Person of the Word, still in fact this is the substance of his reply. He retains a lucid distinction between what belongs to the humanity by nature, and what belongs to the Word by nature. But over and above this, he sees a special relation which binds the sacred humanity to the Word, and is similar to that by which each man can call his body and its operations « his own ». This relation in no sense affects the Word physically, in his nature as Word; but it does justify predicating the human operations and sufferings of Him as their ultimate subject. The Word suffers, not in His own nature as God, but in virtue of the flesh which he has « made his own ». Here we have the basic lines upon which Cyril of Alexandria, following Athanasius, further developed his theology of the Incarnate Word.

We believe, therefore, that with this theory of appropriation, Athanasius found an effective reply to the argument which the Arians had drawn against the divinity of the Word from the predication to Him of human attributes. It is to be noted that by virtue of this distinction, Athanasius was able to retain in its full vigor that principle of unity whereby

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[14] *Ibid.*, 30-34 (388-397).

the Divine Word is the ultimate subject of all predication in Christ.

II. Eustathius of Antioch

We have already remarked that if one did not see the lines upon which such a distinction could be drawn, the only other solution would be to deny the Arians' major: scil. to deny that the human attributes and sufferings could properly be predicated of the Divine Word. This, as we have said, seems to be the solution which Eustathius of Antioch adopted in the pressure of the Arian controversy. The reason for believing that he adopted this position only in the course of his reply to the Arian argument against the divinity of the Word, is the fact that we find quite a different attitude expressed in certain fragments which appear to date from the period prior to the outbreak of Arianism.

As is clear, the attitude of a theologian concerning the principle that the Divine Word is the ultimate subject of all predication in Christ, can be manifested in one of several ways: either by his explicit acceptance or rejection of the propriety of such predication, or by his practical use of the communication of idioms. When we come to examine the remains of the writings of Eustathius on this question, there seems to be a good reason for distinguishing two phases of his literary activity. For if we divide his extant fragments into those from works which are clearly directed against Arianism, and those which show no trace of this anti-Arian polemic, we find that only in the latter group occurs such a use of the communication of idioms as we see in the following examples. « Iohannes autem ipsum Verbum corpus factum, quod est principium imaginis et sigilli, manibus suis complexus deduxit in aquas » [15]. « Deigenetricem » (frag. 68). « (Iudaei) ... manifeste deprehensi sunt qui Verbum Deum occidissent et cruci affixissent » [16]. « When did (God) dwell with men, except when he was begotten, with them, from the virgin, and played like a child, with them; grew up with them, ate with them, drank with them, and the rest? » [17].

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[15] M. Spanneut, *Recherches sur les écrits d'Eustathe d'Antioche*, Lille, Facultés Catholiques, 1948, p. 114.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

[17] *Ibid.*, frag. 88, p. 130.

It may seem strange to find such striking examples of the use of communication of idioms on Antiochene soil. But one has only to read the letters of Bishop Ignatius of Antioch to find that such language is by no means alien to the pre-Nicene christology of Antioch. In these letters we find such bold expressions as: « in the blood of God » (Eph. 1: 1); « Our God, Jesus Christ, was conceived by Mary » (Eph. 18: 2); « when God appeared in human form » (Eph. 19: 3); « Let me be an imitator of the passion of my God » (Rom. 6: 3); « through the suffering of God » (Polycarp 7: 1).

It would seem to be this same tradition which is reflected in the fragments which we have quoted from Eustathius of Antioch. We noted that such examples of the communication of idioms are to be found exclusively in those writings which show no trace of the Arian controversy. On the other hand, as we shall see, the anti-Arian treatises show quite a different attitude. Can it be that these fragments which we have quoted are not authentic? Spanneut, who has edited these fragments after careful research of the sources, declares for their authenticity, and explains the doctrinal difference on the grounds that they date from the earlier period, before the Arian controversy had forced Eustathius to adopt a different language [18]. This solution seems to us quite plausible. It is on this basis that we have declared that Eustathius adopted a new attitude toward the communication of idioms in the course of his anti-Arian controversies.

However, this question is of secondary importance. The essential fact is that in the certainly genuine fragments from the works against Arius, Eustathius shows clearly that his solution of the Arian argument is to deny that the human limitations and sufferings can be predicated of the Word. In these anti-Arian fragments we find no trace of a distinction between what is true of the Word by his own nature, and what can be predicated of Him by reason of the Incarnation. Rather, there seems to be an admission that whatever is predicated of the Word, must necessarily be true of him *as* Word. But once this premise of the Arians had been accepted, there was no way to avoid their conclusion as to the nature of the Word, except to deny that one could predicate any but strictly divine attributes of Him. To safeguard the

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 85.

transcendence of the Word, one had to deny that He was the subject of predication for the human operations and sufferings of Christ.

There are four, logically connected steps in this solution to the Arian argument against the divinity of the Word: 1) to admit that whatever is predicated of the Word, must be true of Him in His own nature *qua* Word; 2) hence to deny that the human operations of Christ can properly be predicated of the Word; 3) to establish another subject of attribution for these human predicates; 4) to conceive and speak of this other subject of attribution as of another person, distinct from the Person of the Word. In the anti-Arian fragments of Eustathius we find clear indications of each of these four steps.

There are numerous fragments wherein Eustathius insists that human attributes cannot be predicated of the Word. No distinction is suggested between what can be predicated of Him as subject, by reason of the Incarnation, and what is proper to the divinity as such. Rather, it is assumed that whatever is said of the Word, must be said of the divine nature. This is the assumption of Eustathius when he denies the attribution of human predicates to the Word in the following fragments: 18, 24, 26, 27, 28, 37, 41, 46, 47, 48.

From this denial follows the setting up of another subject of attribution for the human attributes. For Eustathius, this other subject is « the man », composed of body and soul (frag. 41, 47); the man born of the Virgin (frag. 23); the man who rose from the dead (frag. 24); the Man Jesus who suffered and was crucified (fr. 25); the « man of Christ » (frag. 33, 39, 53).

The denial of human predicates to the Word, and the setting up of « the man Jesus » as the subject of these human attributes, necessarily excludes an identity between the Word and the Man. Instead of an identity, Eustathius conceived of a sort of juxtaposition of Word and man, each being the ultimate subject of his own attributes and operations. Thus, for example, we find the concept of « indwelling » or « dwelling together » most commonly used to describe the relation of the Word and the man. The man is the temple, the tent, in which the Word dwelt (frag. 19, 31). The Word built this temple for himself (fr. 20, 35). But just as the Word dwells in the man, so also the man is said to dwell with the Word

(fr. 29). The Word was with the man even in his mother's womb, since, although the Word was not begotten of Mary, still he « entered » her womb, and « passed through » it (fr. 30, 18). Even when the body was crucified, the Spirit (the Word) dwelt within it (fr. 30). But it was the temple which suffered (fr. 31).

Besides the concept of dwelling, as in a temple, Eustathius represents the juxtaposition of Word and man by the concepts of « wearing » and « bearing ». Thus the man is a garment which the Word has put on (fr. 41, 63). Similarly, the Word is said to « bear » the man (fr. 20, 21, 23). But on the other hand, the man is also said to bear God: « homo deum ferens » (fr. 43); « hominem deiferum » (fr. 42, 59).

The setting up of « the man Jesus » as the ultimate subject of all human predicates, and the consequent distinction of Word and Man as two subjects, dwelling within or beside each other, leads by an easy step to the use of terms which are proper to two distinct persons. Thus, for example, the proper name « Jesus » is applied to « the man who suffered, the one who extended his hands upon the cross », where this man is distinguished from the Word. It is the man, Jesus, and not the Word, whom St. Paul called the « Lord of glory » (fr. 25, 27). The Word and the man are distinguished as « alter et alter » (fr. 48). Similarly, the Word speaks of the man « as one person speaks of another person ». (fr. 50). And the prophet, addressing God, speaks of « the man » as « another Lord », evidently as distinct from the Word (fr. 52).

Thus we find, in the writings of Eustathius of Antioch, two distinct attitudes regarding the principle whereby all the attributes of Christ, even the human birth, suffering and death, may be predicated of the Word. In the pre-Arian writings, we found striking use of the communication of idioms. But in the writings against Arius we find a new attitude: one which follows, step by step, from a failure to detect the fallacy in the Arian premise that whatever is predicated of the Word must be done so according to his nature *as* Word. From this acceptance of the Arian premise, on the part of one who will not accept their conclusion as to the nature of the Word, follows the refusal to predicate human operations of the Word, the setting up of « the man » as the ultimate subject of such predicates, and the inevitable tendency to see this subject as a distinct person in Christ.

We conclude that it was Eustathius who took the first basic step toward what is called Antiochene christology, under the pressure of the Arian attack on the divinity of the Word. One cannot help but wonder what a different course this current in theology might have taken if Eustathius had known and adopted Athanasius' distinction between what is proper to the Word *qua* Word, and what is properly predicated of the Word by reason of the human nature that He has « made his own » in becoming man. Did Eustathius know this distinction and deliberately reject it? There is nothing to indicate that this was the case. It seems rather that he saw no way to reply to Arius' attack on the divinity of the Word except to deny that the Word is the subject for human predicates. This, we believe, is the point which divides the stream of christology into Alexandrian and Antiochene.

III. Apollinarism

It would be impossible to understand fully the writings of Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, without knowing the teaching of Apollinaris and his disciples, who were their most bitter adversaries. On the other hand, it seems equally impossible to comprehend what Apollinaris was trying to say, except in the light of his opposition to what he found objectionable in the Antiochene position. We have already seen how the Antiochene distinction between the Word and the man inevitably expressed itself in terms which would suggest two distinct persons, since each is a distinct subject of attribution. Now it seems clear that it was such a doctrine as this: scil. which seemed to divide Christ into two persons, the Word and the Man, which Apollinaris meant to refute and exclude by his own teaching on the incarnation. One might sum up this opposition between the two systems by saying that against the Antiochene tendency to conceive of the Word and the man Jesus as two distinct entities, existing in conjunction, Apollinaris insisted that the man Jesus *is* the Word incarnate: that they are not two, but exactly one and the same.

As is to be expected of one who opposed the Antiochene distinction between the Word and the man Jesus, Apollinaris insisted that there could be but one subject of attribution in

Christ, and that this subject is the Word incarnate. On at least two occasions, Apollinaris speaks explicitly of Christ as « one subject » [19]. More frequently he makes practical application of such a concept, by predicating human birth, suffering and death of the Divine Word. Thus he confesses « the passion of the Lord according to the flesh » [20]. More explicitly he declares: « The Virgin, begetting the flesh, begot the Word, and was Mother of God; the Jews, crucifying the body, crucified God » [21]. He compares with Jews those « heretics who are scandalized by a God who is born and is crucified » [22]. But at the same time, Apollinaris is careful to point out that these attributes are predicated of the Word incarnate only « according to the flesh ». The divinity as such is not affected by them in any way [23].

If we ask Apollinaris how it can be that birth, suffering and death are rightly predicated of the Word, even though they are strictly true only of the flesh, his answer is clear: it is because the Word has become man. The essential point in Apollinaris' doctrine is that after the incarnation there are not two: the Word and the man; but that there is but one, since the Word Himself has *become man.* «God incarnate » and the « Heavenly Man » are exactly one and the same being. It is in Apollinaris' further explanation of how the Divine Word and human flesh constitute one and the same being: how, in other words, the Word *becomes man,* that he commits the grievous error which vitiates his whole doctrine.

This error was based on a neo-platonist concept of man, whereby man is defined as a « mind in flesh » or as a « spirit joined to flesh » [24]. The significant thing about this definition is that man, *in recto, is* the mind or spirit; that this spirit be a man, all that is required is that it have, or be joined with, a human body. In this concept of man, the relation

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[19] Apollinaris, *Ad Julianum,* frag. 150 in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule, Texte und Untersuchungen I,* Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1904, p. 247. Cf. also frag. 151, p. 248.

[20] ἡ κατὰ μέρος πίστις, Lietzmann, p. 178, line 4.

[21] *De fide et incarnatione,* (Lietz., p. 198, 23-25).

[22] Frag. 52 (Lietz., p. 216).

[23] *Ad Jovianum* (Lietz., pp. 251-253).

[24] Frag. 69 (L. p. 220); frag. 72 (L. p. 221); *Anacephalaeosis* 16 (L. p. 244, line 3).

of body to spirit is that of an instrument to the principal agent. The spirit is the active principle, the « mover », the source of life and vitality; the body is moved, guided, directed by the spirit and receives from it its life and activity [25]. At the same time, union with the body, and the direction of its activities, does not impair the incorporeal nature of the spirit: it remains essentially untouched and unchanged by the passions and alterations of the lower faculties [26].

It is such a concept of man which Apollinaris presupposed in his explanation of the incarnation. Since man is a « mind in flesh », or a « spirit joined with flesh », and since the Divine Word is in Himself already a perfect Mind, a perfect Spirit, all that was required for the Word to become a perfect Man was that He become « in flesh », or « joined to flesh » [27]. Being Himself the Spirit, the word became a perfect man, a « spirit having flesh », merely by establishing between Himself and a human body those relations which normally exist between spirit and flesh in man [28]. The Divine Spirit therefore became the lifegiving principle of the flesh which was formed in Mary's womb [29]. The Word assumed the role of « hegemonikon » or « kinetikon » with regard to this human flesh; as man is composed of these two elements, the « mover » and the « moved », so also the Word and the flesh constitute a perfect man [30].

Apollinaris, therefore, has conceived of Christ as a Divine Mind, united to human flesh as its lifegiving and directive principle. This union of divine mover and human instrument results in « one living being » (ἓν ζῶον), in whom the Word Himself is the dynamic source of all life and activity [31]. The human activities and operations, therefore, belong to the Word not only as to an ultimate subject of attribution, but as to their vital and physical principle. In this union of Divine Mind and human flesh there is but one ἐνέργεια and one φύσις [32]. The reason, therefore, for attributing all the activ-

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25 *De unione* (Lietz. p. 204, lines 7-9).
26 Frag. 134-135 (Lietz. p. 239-240).
27 Frag. 69-72 (Lietz. 220-221).
28 *Anacephalaeosis* 16 (Lietz. p. 244); *Tomus synodalis* (p. 262-3).
29 *De Unione* 12 (Lietz. p. 190, lines 17-19).
30 Frag. 107 (p. 232); *De Unione* (p. 204).
31 Frag. 85 (p. 225); frag. 107 (p. 232).
32 Frag. 10 (p. 207); frag. 107 (p. 232); frag. 117 (p. 235-236).

ities of Christ ultimately to the Word is that in this one ἐνέργεια, the Word is the moving principle, the dynamic source.

There is no need here to discuss in detail the grievous errors which are involved in this system, nor the arguments whereby they were refuted. The point most significant for our present study is that it was such a basically false and untenable concept of the unity of subject in Christ, such a gross misinterpretation of the principle whereby the Word is the ultimate subject of all predication, which presented itself to Diodorus and Theodore as the practical alternative to their own christology. Arianism and Apollinarism, the two systems against which the Antiochenes set themselves in opposition, both championed the unity of subject in Christ. But they did so on such false premises as to compromise both the transcendence of the Word and the perfection of the humanity of Christ. In rejecting these errors, there was danger that Diodorus would at the same time sacrifice that unity of subject which Arianism had presupposed for its argument, and which Apollinaris had expressly set out to defend. It will be important, therefore, to see what effect these two heresies will have on the development of Antiochene christology. We shall try to determine to what extent Diodorus and Theodore were able to distinguish between the valid principle, and the misguided application and interpretation of the principle by Arius and Apollinaris. We shall have to see how they refute these heresies, and whether, in doing so, they also exclude that principle whereby the Divine Word is the ultimate subject, the unique Person, in Christ.

IV. Diodorus of Tarsus

A. *The texts.*

For all practical purposes, a study of the christology of Diodorus of Tarsus must be based on a number of dogmatic fragments which have come down to us almost exclusively through the hands of his adversaries [33]. None of these

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[33] Of his extensive exegetical works, the only reliable texts are those fragments of his *Commentary on Romans* edited by Staab: *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche*, pp. 83-112. The fragments found

fragments can be compared with an independent source, as a check on the accuracy of the citation. Naturally, this poses a problem as to the reliability of this information on the christology of Diodorus. Since we wish to examine this christology, we feel constrained to say something first about this question of the reliability of our sources.

But besides the obvious reason, there is a special reason for discussing this question in our thesis. It is that the reliability of the fragments of Diodorus is closely linked with that of the fragments of Theodore of Mopsuestia. There is a good chance, therefore, that the study which we have made of the Theodorean fragments in the earlier part of this thesis may shed new light on the question of the reliability of the fragments of Diodorus. And conversely, our present study should complete our picture of this hostile florilegium from which our dogmatic texts of Theodore have been largely derived.

With the exception of one fragment cited by Eutherius of Tyana [34], all the known dogmatic extracts of Diodorus come to us through those same hostile sources which we have studied at length in treating of Theodore: namely, the treatise *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* of Cyril; the florilegium

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in Migne *P.G.* 33 need drastic re-editing, particularly since Mariès proved, forty years ago, that the greater part of them (scil. the commentary on Ps. 51-74) really belongs to Didymus of Alexandria. See his article: « Un commentaire de Didyme publié sous le nom de Diodore », *Rech Sc. Rel.* 1914, pp. 73-78. On the other hand, the claim of Mariès to have discovered the genuine commentary of Diodorus on the Psalms, has not been accepted by such authorities as Jugie (*Echos d'Orient,* 1934, 190-193) and Devreesse (*Dict. Bibl. Suppl.* I, col. 1130). In any case, this commentary remains still unedited. Mariès claims that it would show Diodorus to have been much more « orthodox » than the dogmatic fragments indicate. However, the serious doubts that have been cast on its authorship seem to justify grave reserve in this regard.

[34] Quoted in his Epistle to Alexander of Hierapolis, edited by Schwartz, *A.C.O.* I, p. 216. It should be observed that all of these dogmatic fragments have recently been collected and edited by R. Abramowski, « Der theologische Nachlass des Diodor von Tarsus », *Zeitschrift für Neut. Wiss.* 42 (1949), 19-69. Most of these fragments have been preserved in Syriac texts, of which Abramowski gives a German version. We prefer to cite the French and Latin versions of Brière and Lebon, which are also perhaps more generally accessible. If one wishes to consult the version of Abramowski, it will not be difficult to find the parallel text. Hence we excuse ourselves from the need to duplicate our references.

of Timothy Aelurus; the monophysite collection of *Cod. 12156;* the writings of Severus of Antioch and Leontius of Byzantium; and the *Collectio Palatina.* As in the case of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the close correspondence between these various sources indicates that the later authors depended directly or indirectly on collections of extracts which go back to the time when Cyril wrote his books against Diodorus and Theodore, that is, about the year 438. But there is a difference here which deserves consideration: it is that whereas all our fragments of Theodore's work *De Incarnatione* seem to be derived from one original florilegium, in the case of Diodorus there are two distinct sources to be reckoned with. M. Richard has pointed out the evidence for such a distinction of sources [35]. It seems worth-while to review his findings, as they are pertinent to the question of the reliability of these fragments.

In our second chapter, in discussing the question of the « common florilegium » of Theodorean texts, we have already shown that there is considerable evidence in support of Richard's opinion that Cyril of Alexandria's *Books I and II contra Theodorum* were based on a collection of extracts prepared for him by others; that this collection consisted of two parts, of which he based *Book I against Theodore* on the first, and *Book II* on the second; that while Cyril mistakenly took all these extracts to be from Theodore, the first part actually contained texts from Diodorus of Tarsus [36]. Richard, therefore, seems to have good reason for proposing that the first part of this common florilegium: the part on which Cyril based his *Book I against Theodore,* is actually an early florilegium of texts of Diodorus. From this florilegium have come the following fragments:

1) The five extracts quoted by the Fifth Council from Cyril's *First Book against Theodore* [37]. Severus of Antioch, who derived his documentation on both Theodore and Diodorus from the work of Cyril, quotes two of these texts; in the codices they are ascribed to Theodoret, but this is undoubtedly

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35 M. Richard, « Les traités de Cyrille d'Alexandrie contre Diodore et les fragments dogmatiques de Diodore de Tarse », *Mélanges Felix Grat I,* pp. 107-112.

36 See above, pp. 49-50.

37 *Act Conc. Const. II,* Sessio V, Mansi IX, 230-233; also found in P.G. 76, 1437-1440.

a copyist's error for Theodore. Severus explicitly attributes the refutation of one of these extracts to Cyril's *First Book against Theodore* [38].

2. Four texts cited by Timothy Aelurus, and definitely ascribed by him to Diodorus of Tarsus. One of these coincides perfectly with fragment 5 of Cyril, as quoted by the Council [39].

3. Thirty-three texts of Diodorus given in the Monophysite collection of *Cod. Brit. Mus. Add. 12156.* This Syriac collection is our most extensive witness to the original florilegium; it contains (at least in part) all five of the texts given by the Council from Cyril's *First Book against Theodore,* and all four of the texts cited by Timothy Aelurus [40]. The coincidence with the texts of Cyril is striking; not only are all five texts at least partly common, but there are no less than three common *incipit's* and three common *explicit's* [41]. And the coincidence with the texts of Timothy Aelurus is even more exact.

4. Finally, three of the five texts of Diodorus cited by Leontius belong in this same series, being common to both Cyril's *First Book against Theodore,* and to *Cod. 12156* [42]. In these three texts, Leontius has two *incipit's* common with Cyril, and one *explicit.*

The coincidences linking all these collections point definitely to a common source. This common source cannot be the work of Cyril, since it seems certain that Cyril took these texts to belong to Theodore, whereas our other sources all

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[38] See above, p. 39.

[39] E. Schwartz, *Cod. Vat. gr. 1431, eine antichalkedonische Sammlung aus der Zeit Kaiser Zenos,* Abhandl. Bay. Akad. Wiss., philos. philol. und hist. Klasse XXXII, b. 6, München, 1927, pp. 108-9, n. 210, 211, 233, 234.

[40] Edited by P. de Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca,* Leipzig, 1858, pp. 91-100. These have been re-edited recently with a French version by M. Brière, *Revue de l'Orient chrétien,* 1946, pp. 231-283. The corresponding texts are as follows: as quoted by the Fifth Council, Cyril's fragment 1 — Brière frag. 17; Cy. 2 — Br. 22; Cy. 3 — Br. 23; Cy. 4 — Br. 17; Cy. 5 — Br. 31-32. Similarly, as numbered by Schwartz, Timothy Aelurus' fragment 210 — Briere 1; Tim. 211 — Br. 31-32; Tim. 233 — Br. 30; Tim. 234 — Br. 7.

[41] Common *incipit*: Cyril 1, 3, 5. Common *explicit*: Cyril 2, 4, 5.

[42] Leontius gives five extracts of Diodorus (*P.G.* 86, 1385 d - 1388 d). Of these, the correspondences are as follows: Leontius 2 — Cyril 5 and Brière 31-32; Leont. 3 — Cy. 2 and Br. 22; Leont. 4 — Cy. 1 and Br. 27.

ascribe them to Diodorus. Hence one cannot explain the coincidences unless Cyril, too, drew upon the common florilegium. The evidence points strongly to the conclusion that this series of Diodorean texts stems from the first part of the florilegium on which Cyril based his *Books I and II against Theodore*. Other copies of this florilegium, such as those used by Timothy Aelurus and the compiler of Cod. 12156, must have distinguished more clearly between the first part, which belonged to Diodorus, and the second, which belonged to Theodore [43].

What of the reliability of this florilegium? Without question, it was drawn up by those hostile to both Diodorus and Theodore. Richard asserts flatly that the compilers were Apollinarists; we have seen no clear proof of this claim. What about the possible falsification of these texts of Diodorus? There are no independent parallels by which any of them can be controlled. Their reliability, therefore, may be presumed to be as good as that of the Theodorean extracts which formed the second part of the florilegium. As we have seen, Richard believed that he had proven several instances of falsification in the extracts of Theodore, on the basis of comparison with a Syriac version. Hence he expressed a suspicion that the texts of Diodorus might have received similar treatment [44].

However, as a result of the investigation presented in an earlier chapter of this thesis, we feel authorized to say that Richard's charges against the Theodorean texts have not been substantiated. Rather, we believe we have shown that these hostile extracts are much more reliable than either Richard or Devreesse has taken them to be. In view of our conclusion regarding Theodore, then, we feel justified in mitigating the suspicions levelled against this hostile witness to Diodorus, as well. It should be recalled that this florilegium, dating from

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[43] The confusion of these texts in the work of Cyril remains a puzzle. A possible explanation might be that as the texts of the second part were drawn from the *De Incarnatione* of Theodore, so those of the first part may have been drawn from the *De Incarnatione* of Diodorus. Thus the identity of the titles may have led to their being transcribed as all from the work of Theodore. In fact, Timothy Aelurus explicitly names the *De Incarnatione* of Diodorus as the source of two of his fragments (233-234). Richard does not seem to have taken this fact into consideration, but speaks of « Second book against the Synousiasts » as the work from which these extracts were drawn.

[44] *Op. cit., Mél. Felix Grat*, pp. 113-114.

prior to 438, was drawn up a a time when the works of Diodorus and Theodore were still widely available in the original Greek, and had such able champions to defend them as Theodoret of Cyr. It would have shown singular lack of judgement to present Cyril with texts which could be demonstrated at once to have been falsified. To be sure, the work of Cyril suffered from the serious defect of the confusion of Diodorean texts for Theodorean in the *First Book against Theodore*. But this seems more likely to have been a mistake than a deliberate fraud. Other copies of the florilegium evidently made clear the distinction between the two authors involved.

It will be recalled that Richard has distinguished two distinct sources of our texts of Diodorus, which have given rise to two distinct series of extracts. The series which we have so far considered includes the texts of Cyril's *First Book against Theodore*. The second series includes the texts which Cyril quoted in his *Book against Diodorus*. Our knowledge of this book is drawn mainly from Severus of Antioch, who not only quotes numerous passages from Cyril's refutation of Diodorus, but also cites nine extracts of Diodorus which Cyril had presented in his work [45]. In quoting these extracts of Diodorus, Severus states explicitly that he has drawn them from the book which Cyril wrote against Diodorus.

Now the remarkable fact, pointed out by Richard, is that while the collection of Diodorean texts in Cod. 12156 includes all five of the extracts in Cyril's *First Book against Theodore*, it does not contain a single one of these nine texts from the *Book against Diodorus*. Neither does the collection of Timothy Aelurus show any of these nine texts. The inference is clear that the *Book against Diodorus* represents a source distinct from this other common florilegium. This inference is confirmed by the witness of the Diodorean texts of the *Collectio Palatina*. This collection presents six texts as belonging to Diodorus; of these, the fourth may be a text of Paul of Sa-

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[45] *Contra Grammaticum* (Vers. Lat.) Lebon, *C.S.C.O.*, vol. 112 (1938, vol. 94 (1929), vol. 102 (1933); Orat. II, 7 (vol. 112, p. 70); Orat. II, 21 (vol. 112, p. 142); Orat. III, 15 (vol. 94, p. 178); Orat. III, 23 (vol. 102, p. 9); III, 25 (p. 30); III, 25 (p. 33-34); III, 26 (p. 45); III, 33 (p. 111). *Philalethes* (Vers. Gall.) Hespel, *C.S.C.O.* vol. 134 (1952), pp. 125-126. Some of these citations are repeated by Severus elsewhere, but there is no need to multiply the references.

mosata, and hence can be discounted [46]. But of the remaining five, while none are common with the sources of our first series, two are common with texts quoted by Severus as from Cyril's *Contra Diodorum* [47]. Here, then, is another witness to the independence of this second series from the first. Finally, of the two texts given by Leontius which are *not* found in the first series, one is common to the *Collectio Palatina*, and one is found among those quoted by Severus from Cyril's *Contra Diodorum* [48].

From the above evidence, Richard concludes that there were two distinct florilegia prepared for Cyril; the one on which he based his two books *Contra Theodorum*, and that on which he based his *Contra Diodorum*. Furthermore, he does not hesitate to ascribe the compilation of this latter florilegium to Apollinarists, on the basis of the « excessively deformed » picture which Cyril portrays of the early career of Diodorus in a letter to Succensus [49]. As we have seen, Richard believes that Cyril could not have read so black an account of Diodorus except in the preface to a florilegium of texts prepared for him by Apollinarists [50].

We have previously remarked that his assumption seems to go well beyond the limits of the known facts. How can one be sure that Cyril could not have heard an unfavorable account of Diodorus except by reading it in the hypothetical preface to the florilegium on which he based his *Contra Diodorum*? And now that we have studied this second series of Diodorean texts, we would ask how Richard can be sure that the *Contra Diodorum* was actually based on a florilegium prepared for Cyril by others, and not on his own study of a work of Diodorus? The fact that the two books *Contra Theodorum* were based on such a florilegium is not a peremptory ar-

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[46] E. Schwartz, *A.C.O.* I, 5, pp. 177-179. The fourth is attributed to Paul of Samosata by Leontius: *P.G.* 86, 1392 b.

[47] *Coll. Pal.* n. 1 corresponds (with a slight omission) to Severus, *Philalethes*, pp. 125-126. And *Coll. Pal.* n. 6 corresponds in part with Severus, *Cont. Gram.* III, 25 (vol. 102, p. 30). In these two cases there are two common *explicit's* and one common *incipit*.

[48] Leontius fragment 1 corresponds with the fragment of *Coll. Pal.* 5; Leontius 5 corresponds with Severus, *Cont. Gram.* III, 33 (vol. 102, p. 111). In these two cases there are two common *incipit's* and one common *explicit*.

[49] Epistle 45, *P.G.* 77, 230 a-b.

[50] Op. cit., *Mél. Felix Grat.*, p. 113.

gument to prove that the same must have been true of the *Contra Diodorum*. In the former case, the common florilegium is postulated by the fact that the later sources could not have depended on the work of Cyril. But in the latter case, there does not seem to be any insurmountable difficulty against the supposition that the *Contra Diodorum* itself is the source of the later citations. It is certain that all of the citations of Severus are taken directly from the work of Cyril. It does not seem improbable that the citations of the *Collectio Palatina* may also have been drawn, directly or indirectly, from the *Contra Diodorum*.

If this is the case, then there is no need to assume that Cyril based his *Contra Diodorum* on a florilegium prepared for him by others, since his own collection of citations can be the source of the later citations. In this case, he could have drawn his citations directly from the *Contra Synousiastas* of Diodorus.

It may be argued that the citations of Leontius present a difficulty against this theory, since of the five extracts which he presents as from the first book of Diodorus *Contra Synousiastas,* the first and fifth belong to the second series of texts (*Contra Diodorum, Collectio Palatina*), while the second, third and fourth belong to the first series (*First Book against Theodore, Cod. 12156*). But the same difficulty holds against the theory of Richard, that these two series of Diodorean texts are based on two distinct florilegia, based on two different books of Diodorus. No matter which theory is defended, one must grant that somehow Leontius had access to a source in which both series wree represented, and where all the citations were labelled: « ex primo libro contra Synousiastas ». What this *fons conflatus* was, it is impossible to say. But it does not seem impossible that his first and fifth citations could have come originally from the *Contra Diodorum* of Cyril.

We conclude, therefore, that Richard does not seem to be on such solid ground when he takes for granted that the *Contra Diodorum* of Cyril was based on an Apollinarist florilegium. The existence of such a prepared florilegium is not postulated by the known facts. It seems equally probable that the citations which we owe to the *Contra Diodorum* were taken by Cyril himself from the text of Diodorus' *Contra Synousiastas.*

What conclusions are to be drawn as to the reliability

of these Diodorean extracts? While they are clearly drawn up by those unfriendly to Diodorus, we have seen that the reasons on which Richard based his distrust of these sources are not as weighty as might at first seem. In particular, the argument from the alleged Apollinarist florilegium as the source of the texts in the *Contra Diodorum*, and the argument *a pari* drawn from the charges of falsification in the texts of Theodore of Mopsuestia, have been found to be less solidly established than Richard had believed them to be.

On the other hand, two other recent studies of Diodorus have offered reasons for accepting the genuinity of these extracts. M. Jugie has pointed to the fact that these extracts present just that sort of « Nestorian » christology which several independent sources indicate had already aroused opposition at the time of Diodorus [51]. Jugie mentions the explicit rejection of such « division » of Christ, found in the *Tomus ad Antiochenos* and in the first letter of Gregory Nazianzen to Cledonius. These documents do not mention Diodorus by name, but prove that such doctrines as the extracts contain were being taught, and were arousing suspicion, at this time. Furthermore. Nestorius himself claimed to teach the same doctrine as Diodorus, and the Church of Persia later canonized Diodorus, along with Theodore and Nestorius, as one of its great Doctors. Jugie presents these facts in confirmation of the authenticity of these extracts, which show Diodorus to have taught a doctrine substantially similar to that of Theodore and Nestorius.

Grillmeier, in turn, sees a confirmation of the fidelity of this hostile tradition in the fact that the extracts show Diodorus to have adhered to the terminology of a « Word-flesh » christology. Forgers, who presumably would have intended to make Diodorus sound like Nestorius, would undoubtedly have made him speak the language of the « Word-man » christology of the later Antiochenes [52].

It should be observed that both Jugie and Grillmeier, even though they accept Richard's thesis as to the Apollinarist origin of the florilegium on which the *Contra Diodorum* is said to have been based, and also his charge of falsification

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[51] M. Jugie, « La doctrine christologique de Diodore de Tarse d'après les fragments de ses oeuvres », *Euntes Docete* II (1949), pp. 187-190.

[52] *Op. cit., Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, I, p. 144, note 47.

in the extracts of Theodore of Mopsuestia, still do not hesitate to base their studies of Diodorus' christology on the fragments in these hostile sources. They both accept these fragments as substantially genuine, offering, as we have seen, internal arguments in confirmation of this genuinity.

We feel all the more justified, then, in following their example, since we have shown that the suspicions of Richard do not have as solid a foundation as previously appeared. With this conclusion we terminate our study of the texts of Diodorus, and turn to the more important issue: the christology which is therein contained.

B. *Diodorus' Christology*

As we have seen, the greater part of our dogmatic fragments of Diodorus are contained in the Syriac collection of *Cod. 12156*. Although this text was edited nearly one hundred years ago, as far as is known its contents were not utilized in any study of Diodorus' teaching except that of the Russian Fetisov [53]. It was not until Brière published his French version of the Syriac fragments in 1946, that they came to be generally utilized in studies of Diodorus' christology. Since they contribute much new information, it may be said that the notices on Diodorus in the standard dictionaries and histories of dogma need to be brought up to date in this respect. For this reason, we shall confine our attention to two studies which have appeared within the past few years, and have thus been able to make use of this new material.

We shall first mention the pages which Grillmeier devotes to Diodorus in his long study of the background of the Council of Chalcedon [54]. In these pages, Grillmeier does not pretend to make an exhaustive study of the christology of Diodorus, but restricts himself to the investigation of a particular aspect: scil. the question whether this is a christology of « Word-flesh » or « Word-man ». In this study, Grillmeier brings out two significant facts: 1) that despite his vigorous opposition to the teaching of Apollinaris, we find in the extant fragments no explicit reference to the soul of Christ; 2) that on the contrary, we find a number of instances where Diodorus refers

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[53] Fetisov, Nicolas: *Diodorus of Tarsus. Research essay of ecclesiastical history on his life and his activity*, Kiev, 1915.

[54] *Op. cit., Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, I, pp. 134-144.

to the humanity of Christ as « the flesh » or « the body », and even attributes to the flesh or body such qualities as knowledge and despair. From these facts, Grillmeier concludes that Diodorus, despite his « Antiochene » tendency to divide Christ, still adhered to the « Word-flesh » christology. Hence, Grillmeier sharply distinguishes the teaching of Diodorus from that of Theodore, whom he proposes as the foremost exponent of the « Word-man » christology [55].

Now it seems to us that while there is much in what Grillmeier says here, still it is necessary to make some further precisions, lest his conclusions prove misleading. From the absence of references to the human soul, and the use of the « Word-flesh » terminology, Grillmeier seems quite justified in concluding that Diodorus' quarrel with Apollinarism did not center on the question of the soul of Christ. In this respect, Diodorus certainly differs from Theodore, who made an important issue of this question of the human mind and will of Christ.

But it would be another matter to conclude that Diodorus really conceived of Christ as a union of Word and flesh, whereas Theodore conceived of Him as a union of Word and man. If this were the case, then Theodore would have made a radical departure from the teaching of Diodorus, and precisely on the question of unity, since it is obviously more difficult to maintain a union between the Word and a man than between the Word and flesh. Our study of the « theological milieu » demands that we ask whether Theodore did not find in the teaching of Diodorus a precedent for his distinction between the Word and the « homo assumptus ».

The first point to be observed is that while we do not find in the extant fragments any explicit reference to the human soul, we do find several instances where Diodorus insists that the Word assumed a « perfect man ». For example, in the first fragment quoted by Leontius, the word « perfect » is put in the position of emphasis [56]: τέλειον τὸν ἐκ Δαβὶδ ἀνείλεφεν ὑιὸς Θεοῦ ὑιὸν Δαβίδ. We find a similar

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[55] *Ibid.*, p. 138: « Was ihn (Diodor) aber von Theodor von Mopsuestia unterscheidet, ist das christologische Schema, innerhalb dessen er seine Theologie der Unterscheidung oder auch Trennung aufbaut. Bei Diodor ist es das Schema « Logos-Sarx », so seltsam dies auch klingen mag, bei Theodor dagegen das Schema « Logos-Mensch ».

[56] *P.G.* 86, 1385 d.

emphasis put on the perfection of the human nature in the following phrase: « Perfecta forma Dei Verbi, perfecta forma servi, quem assumpsit » [57]. Moreover, there is a fragment whose whole intent is to insist on the perfection of this « man » [58]:

> Prophetam suscitabit vobis Dominus Deus de fratribus vestris sicut me. Numquid aliquid deerat Moysi prophetae? Nonne homo perfectus erat? Igitur neque huic homini nazareno deerat quidquam, τῷ ex semine David, sed Deus perfectus ex Deo perfecto assumpsit hominem perfectum.

It should be noted that in these passages we not only find the humanity referred to as a « perfect man », but we also find the substance of Theodore's characteristic expression: « homo assumptus ». This leads to the question whether there is after all so great a difference between Diodorus' concept of the humanity, and Theodore's.

Grillmeier has, it is true, produced a number of instances where Diodorus refers to the humanity of Christ as « the flesh » or « the body ». It would, however, be misleading to conclude that this was Diodorus' consistent, or even more ordinary way of speaking of Christ's humanity. Grillmeier has referred to about ten instances where Diodorus uses the distinction between the Word and the flesh or body. There are not more than two or three additional instances to be found in the extant fragments. In all, then, one can find no more than about a dozen examples of such terminology. What Grillmeier's study does not bring out is that in a great many more than a dozen cases, Diodorus refers to the humanity with such typically « Antiochene » expressions as « the man », the « son of David », « the one born of Mary », and the like. Going through the dogmatic fragments, we find at least eighteen instances where Diodorus refers to the humanity of Christ as « the man ». We find fourteen cases where he speaks of this man as the « son of David », or such equivalents as « he who is of the seed of David », etc. We find no less than twenty-one examples where Diodorus distinguishes between the Word and the « son of Mary », or such equivalents as « he who was born of Mary », etc. In all, therefore, there

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57 Severus Ant., *Cont. Gram. Orat. III*, 23 (Lebon, vol. 102, p. 9).
58 *Ibid.*, 26, p. 45.

are more than four times as many instances of such « Word-man » terminology than there are of the « Word-flesh » terminology to which Grillmeier had referred. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the former is Diodorus' more ordinary, more consistent way of conceiving and speaking of the humanity of Christ. When we find him explicitly asserting that the Word « assumed a perfect man », and when we find him, four times out of five, referring to the humanity as « the man », the « son of David », or the « son of Mary », it is difficult to believe that Diodorus really conceived Christ as a union of Word and flesh, rather than as a union of the Word and a man.

How then can one explain the instances of « Word-flesh » terminology to which Grillmeier refers? It does not seem unwarranted to say that such instances show that Diodorus' language was in a state of transition from the traditional « Word-flesh » to the strictly Antiochene « Word-man » formulae. But at the same time it seems clear that the Antiochene terminology had already gained the overwhelming ascendancy in his writings. And it should be noted that even this occasional use of the distinction between the Word and « the flesh » does not mean that Diodorus still thought of the humanity as mere flesh. This metonymy whereby « flesh » stands for the complete man was certainly well enough established and of common enough usage for Diodorus to have slipped into such an expression without for a moment intending to compromise his position that the Word had assumed a « perfect man ». On the other hand, his more consistent expressions: « the man », the « son of Mary », etc., seem clearly to presuppose that the one whom the Word assumed was not mere flesh, but rather a complete and individual man.

We believe, therefore, that there is danger of being misled by Grillmeier's description of the theology of Diodorus as « Word-flesh », and by his sharp distinction between Diodorus and Theodore, whose theology is that of « Word-man ». If this distinction is meant to bring out only the fact that Diodorus does not give the human soul an important place in his theology, while Theodore does, then it seems quite justified. But it should not be taken to mean that for Diodorus, Christ was a union of Word and flesh, while for Theodore He is a union of the Word and a man. On the contrary, it is clear

that for Diodorus, too, Christ is a union of the Word and a man, of the Word and the son of David. Theodore's problem of uniting the Word and the *homo assumptus* is not something new: it is the direct heritage of Diodorus' distinction between the Word and the « perfect man whom He assumed », between the « Son of God », and the « son of Mary ». We conclude, therefore, that one must accept with caution Grillmeier's picture of the christology of Diodorus, when he describes it as a christology of « Word-flesh », and contrasts it so sharply with the « Word-man » christology of the later Antiochenes. Diodorus' concept of Christ, and his language in referring to the humanity, strikes us as being much closer to that of Theodore of Mopsuestia than Grillmeier's study could lead one to believe.

We stated that we would consider two studies of Diodorus which have appeared since the Syriac fragments were made generally available. The second of these is an article on the christology of Diodorus by M. Jugie [59]. Making use of all the extant dogmatic fragments, Jugie presents a comprehensive study of their christological content, and comes to the conclusion that they contain « the principal affirmations which constitute what is called nestorianism » [60]. Jugie finds in these extracts of Diodorus an « erroneous concept of the unity of Christ », and the lack of a clear view of the difference between nature and person. Jugie understands Diodorus' principal error to have been the assumption that where there are two natures, there are really two persons, two concrete subjects, two autonomous centers of attribution. The root of his problem of unity, then, would have been his insistence on the presence of two natures in Christ.

We believe that Jugie's analysis of the christology of Diodorus is basically correct. However, we also believe that there is justification for another study of this same christology in the present thesis. Admittedly, we shall cover much the same ground as that covered by Jugie, and come to conclusions that will be quite similar. However, we shall approach our subject from a somewhat different point of view, and venture to say that this may shed some new light on the subject.

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[59] M. Jugie, « La doctrine christologique de Diodore de Tarse d'après les fragments de ses oeuvres », *Euntes Docete*, II (1949), 171-191.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

The point which we wish to examine more carefully is the precise manner in which Diodorus replied to the error of Apollinaris regarding the unity of Christ. It will be recalled that we have been examining this problem of unity in the light of the principle whereby the Word is taken to be the subject of all predicates in Christ. We have seen that Apollinaris accepted this principle, but in doing so gave it a false interpretation, since he made the Word out to be not only the subject, but the vital, dynamic principle of the human operations of Christ. What we wish to discover is precisely how Diodorus reacted to this error, and how it affected his own teaching on the unity of Christ. The answer to this question cannot fail to have an important bearing on our question as to the way in which the problem of unity was presented to Theodore of Mopsuestia, and the elements of its solution which were to be found in the teaching of his immediate predecessor in the school of Antioch.

The Apollinarists had no trouble in using or explaining that « communication of idioms » which was a characteristic of the scriptural teaching on Christ. Unfortunately, however, their explanation of this communication of idioms involved a composition between Word and flesh which could not fail to compromise the transcendence of the Divine Word. Fulfilling the functions of the soul in a human composite, and thus being reduced to a part in a complete nature, the Word could not escape the consequent imperfections which such a composition implied.

The first question which we would ask, then, is whether Diodorus realized this basic error of Apollinarism, and explicitly rejected it. The first point is clear: Diodorus was *aware* of the fact that the Apollinarists taught a composition of Word and flesh after the pattern of the composition of soul and body in man. We see this in two fragments where Diodorus is explicitly expounding the Apollinarist doctrine: the doctrine which he sets out to refute [61]. The second

[61] Brière, frag. 2 (p. 260): « ... (de reconnaître) donc le même, et non pas un autre et un autre, mais un seul (*qui est*) *composé*, ... un seul Fils parfait dans le deux; le corps et Dieu le Verbe ... ». Frag. 26 (p. 269): « ... Dieu le Verbe *a pris le corps à David et il a été composé pour (faire) un seul fils* et pour (faire) une seule hypostase; Dieu le Verbe n'est pas appelé justement Fils de Dieu, ni le corps non plus; et le corps est la semence de David, et il n'est pas Fils de Dieu; mais les deux sont un seul fils, soit (fils) de David, soit (Fils) de Dieu ».

question is this: do we find Diodorus pointing out the error of such a theory? Here again the answer is affirmative. Thus, for example, we find Diodorus indignantly rejecting the « injury to the Word of putting Him in composition with a body » [62]. The idea of a « mixture » of Word and flesh is scored repeatedly in another fragment [63]. Similarly, the relationship of soul and body, to express the union of Word and man, is rejected on the grounds that it does not recognize the pre-eminent position of the Word [64]. Likewise, Diodorus declares blasphemous the Apollinarist assertion that Word and flesh constitute « unam substantiam » [65]. This last charge made by Diodorus is evidently by no means a minor count in his indictment, since he entitles his work against the Apollinarists: « Contra Synousiastas », thus showing that this mixture or confusion of divine and human natures was a cardinal point which he wished to refute.

Diodorus, then, was on perfectly solid ground when he rejected the Apollinarist conception of the unity of Christ, and their interpretation of the principle whereby the Word is the subject of even the human attributes. The danger was, however, that in rejecting the Apollinarist abuse of these concepts, Diodorus would throw out not only their false interpretation, but also the true principle which Apollinaris had been trying, though unsuccessfully, to explain and defend. In other words, there was an element of truth in the system

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62 Frag. 5 of Cyril's *Book I against Theodore*, *P.G.* 76, 1440 b. Cf. Leontius' frag. 2 (*P.G.* 86, 1388 a-b).

63 Brière frag. 20 (p. 267): « Si un est le mélange, ainsi que la nature, de Dieu le Verbe et du corps, comment celui qui blasphème contre le Christ a-t-il un pardon que n'a pas celui qui blasphème contre l'Esprit-saint? ... Et blasphémer contre Dieu le Verbe qui a été mélangé avec le corps est sans danger ... ».

64 Severus Ant. *Cont. Gram.* III, 25 (Lebon, vol. 102, pp. 33-34): « Atqui, quomodo unam adorationem defertis? Numquid sicut animae et corpori regum? Anima enim per se solam non regnat, neque corpus per se solum regnat: sed Deus Verbum ante carnem est rex. Itaque, non sicut animae et corpori, ita Deo Verbo et carni ».

65 *Ibid.*, p. 30. Cf. *Coll. Pal.* frag. 6 (*A.C.O.* I, 5, p. 179): « His confessis rebus, unam offer venerationem; non nocebit adoratio una, si res fueris ante confessus. [Tu] unam dicis venerationem; sed per unam venerationem introducis blasphemiam, ut si una est adoratio, sit et una substantia ». The citation of Severus (taken from Cyril's *Contra Diodorum*) shows that there is no need of the textual insertion proposed by Schwartz in the text of the *Coll. Pal.*

of Apollinaris: a recognition of the fact that the Word had truly been born, according to the flesh, of the Virgin Mary, and that Jesus of Nazareth was not another person distinct from the eternal Son of God. Apollinaris' explanation of this unity is unacceptable; but there is good reason for admitting that this was what he was trying to defend. We can see this quite clearly in Diodorus' presentation of the Apollinarist doctrine, as, for instance, in fragments 2 and 26 of Brière. We have already seen that in both of these fragments we find the Apollinarist concept of a Christ who is a composite of Word and flesh. But on the other hand, if one prescind from this aspect of the doctrine therein presented, one will find that what the Apollinarists are trying to defend is the identity of the Son of God and the son of man; and what they are trying to exclude is a division of Christ into two persons, of whom one is the natural Son of God, while the other, the son of David, is a son of God only by grace [66].

There was real danger, then, that in rejecting the Apollinarist position *en bloc*, without distinguishing between the truth and the falsehood of it, Diodorus would exclude not only their excesses, but also the legitimate communication of idioms, and the unity of the Incarnate Word on which such communication of idioms is based. When Diodorus dismisses the whole content of fragment 26 as so much « novelty », he betrays a lack of discernment which reveals that his own concept of Christ may leave something to be desired.

There is reason to believe that the danger of which we speak is actually verified: that Diodorus has in fact rejected not only the errors of the Apollinarists, but also the unity of person which they were trying, in their own mistaken fashion, to defend. We believe that Diodorus has failed to recognize the difference between the legitimate predication of human attributes to the incarnate Word as their ultimate subject, and their attribution to the Word by virtue of an Apollinarist composition with human flesh. The failure to make such a distinction, coupled with a lofty concept of the divinity of the Word, excludes all predication of human attributes to the Word. But the inevitable consequence of such an exclusion is nothing less than a denial of the reality

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[66] Brière, pp. 260, 269.

of the incarnation. For if no human attribute can be predicated of the Word as its subject, then one cannot say that the Word has been born of the Virgin Mary according to the flesh, or that the Word has become man.

There are a number of passages in our extant fragments which testify that this is in fact the stand which Diodorus took in his effort to safeguard the transcendence of the Word. He refuses to allow that the Word may be thought of as the son of Mary, or that one may speak of « two nativities of the Word: one in eternity, and one in time ». Rather, it was the temple built by the Word which was born of Mary [67]. A similar denial of the « second generation » of the Word is found in a Syriac fragment [68]. And there are several other fragments where we find Diodorus denying the divine maternity of Mary [69]. It is obvious from these passages that Diodorus could not accept the title « Mother of God » in its true significance. In fact, our only fragment from a source friendly to Diodorus reveals the inadequate sense in which he was willing to admit the term [70]. Here it is clear that Mary is not really « Mother of the Divine Person of the Word », but rather is mother of a man who is conjoined to the Word, and who is « Deus fortis » by reason of this conjunction.

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[67] Cyril, frag. 2 (*P.G.* 76, 1438 d): « Duas nativitates Deus Verbum non sustinuit, unam quidem ante saecula, alteram autem in ultimis temporibus; sed ex Patre quidem natura genitus est, templum vero quod ex Maria natum est, ex ipso utero sibi fabricavit ».

[68] Brière, frag. 28 (pag. 270): « Dieu le Verbe n'a pas subi deux naissances, et le corps non plus, et ils n'ont pas eu deux pères; mais c'est une seule fois que l'unique (Fils) de Dieu est né du Père avant les siècles ».

[69] Brière, frag. 11 (p. 263): « Avant les siècles, en effet, Dieu le Verbe est né du Père, le seul (est né) du seul; et la forme de serviteur, l'enfant de la sainte Vierge, dans les derniers temps, est l'homme (conçu) de l'Esprit-saint ». Frag. 12: « Paul, en effet, ne demanda pas non plus que Dieu le Verbe, lorsqu'il se fait chair et qu'il est formé, soit le petit enfant (né) de Marie. Mais il dit que l'homme qui est né de Marie a été envoyé pour notre salut; car ce n'est pas pour qu'il naisse que Dieu a envoyé son propre Fils; mais, celui qui est né, il l'a envoyé pour le salut. Pour Paul, il est question de celui qui est né de Marie ».

[70] Eutherius of Tyana, Ep. ad Alex. Hierapolis (*A.C.O.* I, 4, p. 216): « Verumtamen dicatur propter unitionem Maria dei genetrix; deus enim fortis est semen Abrahae propter unitionem ad deum verbum. Fatenda vero et hominis genetrix. Si enim propter naturam hominis genetrix est Maria (dei genetrix est), non tamquam naturae sit partus, sed quia id quod est a David, homo natura, deo verbo coniunctus est ». (The phrase in parenthesis is supplied by the editor, Schwartz).

Mary is mother of a deified man, but not of the Word incarnate.

As we have remarked, the refusal to admit that human attributes can be predicated of the Word is equivalent to a denial that the Word has truly become man. And we find Diodorus explicitly making this denial [71]. It is clear that Diodorus denies that the Word has become man only because he cannot allow any change or diminution of his divine nature. The difficulty, however, is that, due to his failure to see how the Divine Word can be a real subject of predication for human attributes without suffering change, he has reduced the incarnation to the mere indwelling of God in a man. Thus, for example, he says that when we read such texts as: « The Son of Man has descended from heaven », we know well that God the Word has been called « Man », because he has dwelt in the Son of Man. Similarly, when we read: « God has not spared His own Son », we understand that this is the man born from Mary, who has obtained the appellation of « son » [72].

Another indication of Diodorus' failure to see how the human predicates can be applied to the Word without invoking a composition of Word and flesh, is his consistent refusal to admit that the Word can be called the « Son of David » [73]. A natural corollary of this is his refusal to allow divine attributes to be predicated of the « Son of David ». Evidently the Apollinarists had made free use of the communication of idioms in this manner. But as far as Diodorus is concerned, the « Son of David » can mean only the « man born of Mary », and Diodorus simply does not see that it is a Divine Person who can rightly be called « Son of Mary ». Hence, in his eyes, to speak of the « Son of David » as the creator of the

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71 Cyril, frag. 3 (*P.G.* 76, 1438 d - 1439 a): « Cum vero de salutari dispensatione ratio movetur, et Deus vocetur homo, non quod hoc factus est, sed quod hoc assumpsit ... ».

72 Brière, frag. 15 (p. 264).

73 Cyril, frag. 5 (*P.G.* 76, 1440 b): « Neque ipse Deus Verbum vult seipsum Filium David esse, sed Dominum: corpus vero vocari filium David, non solum non invidit, sed etiam propter hoc pervenit ». Cf. Brière, frag. 6 (p. 261): « Dieu le Verbe a diverses désignations, et tu ne nommes pas Dieu le Verbe par ce qui appartient au corps. En effet, tu ne dis Dieu le Verbe ni corps — car il n'est pas limité —ni fils de David — parce que Notre-Seigneur ne demande pas non plus pour lui-même que celui qui est né du Père avant les siècles soit dit fils de David ».

universe, as existing before David, etc., is not only blasphemous, but is sheer nonsense [74].

From the preceding examples, it is clear that Diodorus' failure to distinguish between what was erroneous in Apollinarism, and that aspect of the truth which their system contained, led him to reject even the legitimate communication of idioms [75]. As far as Diodorus could see, this communication of idioms was a mere « abuse of language », a way of speaking καταχρηστικῶς [76]. It does not seem unwarranted to say that this rejection of the communication of idioms stems from an intention to safeguard the divinity of the Word, coupled with Diodorus' failure to distinguish between the principle of the unique subject, and the Apollinarist misinterpretation of this principle.

Despite the orthodox intentions which are certainly present throughout, the consequences of this method of safeguarding the divinity of the Word were seriously detrimental to the unity of Christ. For it was the inevitable result of the refusal to allow human attributes to be predicated of the Word, that another ultimate subject had to be found for these human predicates. Here, we believe, is the primary reason why Diodorus most frequently refers to the humanity of Christ with such terms as « the man », the « son of Mary », or « the son of David ». It is because he has made this humanity an ultimate subject of predication, and it is only natural to conceive of an ultimate subject of predication as a complete person. From the rigid distinction which Dio-

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[74] Brière, frag. 4 (p. 261): « Pour moi, je les ai entendus dire que celui qui a été conçu en Marie et est né d'elle est aussi le créateur de l'univers. ... Et je sais, d'une part, que leur opinion est faible et facile à réfuter: ... Si celui qui (est) de Marie, en effet, est vraiment homme, comment est-il avant les cieux et la terre? ... Comment l'auteur de David et le createur de l'univers est-il fils de David, s'il faut croire ceux qui sont sans intelligence parce qu'ils ont aveuglé la vue de leurs esprits? ». Cf. also Brière frag. 5; *Coll. Pal.* frag. 3 (*A.C.O.* I, 5, p. 178); Severus, *Cont. Gram.* II, 7 (Lebon, vol. 112, p. 70).

[75] There is reason to believe that Diodorus may have come to this negative attitude toward the communication of idioms only during the controversy against Apollinarism. It does not appear in what remains of his *Commentary on Romans*, which shows no trace of his anti-Apollinarist polemic. It is to be noted that Diodorus began his controversy with Apollinaris rather late in his career: on this see M. Richard, *Mél. Sc. Rel.* 1945, pp. 12-13.

[76] Leontius' frag. 4 (*P.G.* 86, 1388 c).

dorus makes between the « Son of God » and « the one born of Mary », it is clear that he no longer sees Christ as one Person, but rather as two, who are somehow in conjunction. If we inquire into the manner in which these two « sons » are united, we find the typically Antiochene formulae of « assumption » and « indwelling ». We have already seen passages where Diodorus speaks of the Word as « assuming a perfect man » [77]. The concept of « indwelling » is more common, especially in the use of the idea of a « temple » which the Word built for Himself, and in which He dwelt. But it should he noted that it is not merely a question of « the temple of his body » (John 2: 21). Rather, it is the « Son of David, who becomes the temple of the God the Word » [78]. It is « the man who was born of Mary » who is the temple which was destroyed by the Jews, and raised up on account of Him Who dwelt in it [79]. The relation between God the Word and the son of Mary is one of union by inhabitation. The Word is « hidden » within the one who appears outwardly, the man [80]. Moreover, the Word « has been called man, because He has dwelt in the son of Man » [81].

Evidently the difficulty occurred to Diodorus, or was proposed to him, that this concept of indwelling did not sufficiently distinguish Christ from the prophets in whom God has also dwelt. His reply is significant: as far as our extant fragments go, the principal difference which he saw between the indwelling of God in the prophets and the indwelling of the Word in the son of Mary was a matter of duration and degree. Thus, he says [82]:

> Non sic, inquit, in eo qui est ex semine David, sicut in prophetis habitavit Deus Verbum. Illi enim particulari quadam et modificata quantitate sancti spiritus gratia fruebantur, hic autem in his quibus interdum erant illi, iugiter permanebat et gloria verbi ac sapientia replebatur.

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77 See above, p. 183.
78 Brière, frag. 3 (p. 260).
79 Brière, frag. 15 (p. 264).
80 Brière, frag. 14 (p. 264).
81 Brière, frag. 15 (p. 264).
82 *Coll. Pal.*, frag. 6 (*A.C.O.* I, 5, p. 179).

And a similar development is found in a passage originally quoted by Cyril in his *Contra Diodorum* [83]. Another indication of the inadequacy of this concept of « inhabitation » is found in the argument which Diodorus used to exclude a « mixture » of Divine Spirit and human flesh in Christ [84]:

> La puissance de Dieu a couvert Marie de son ombre, quand elle s'est formé un temple, sans se mélanger à (son) corps. En effet, l'Esprit saint aussi a rempli Jean-Baptiste, alors qu'il était encore au cours de la conception; et Jean-Baptiste n'a pas fait partie de nature de celui-là.

It hardly seems that Diodorus would have used such an argument if he saw an essential, and not merely an accidental difference between the inhabitation of the Word in Christ and that of the Holy Spirit in John the Baptist.

There is no need to stress the fact that this idea of the indwelling of the Word in the man as in his temple will be a characteristic of « Antiochene » christology. Moreover, while Diodorus does not use the precise phrase: « homo assumptus », we have seen that he has anticipated Theodore of Mopsuestia in this also, in the equivalent form: « Verbum assumpsit hominem perfectum ». But the formula which is most characteristic of Diodorus is the expression: « the son of Mary », or its various equivalents, such as « the one born of Mary », the « son of David », and the like. It is such a distinction between the Son of God and the son of Mary which epitomizes the fact that Diodorus has made the humanity of Christ into an ultimate subject of attribution, distinct from the Word. The humanity has become « another Son » [85]:

> Alter intellegendus procul dubio praeter eum et subsistens proprie filius ac seorsim; non enim verbum semet ipsum sapientia replebat et gloria, sed alteri potius haec quae sunt insignia, conferebat.

The doctrine of « two sons » is the inevitable consequence of a consistent distinction between the Son of God and the « son of David ».

The implications of this distinction naturally did not

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83 Severus, *Cont. Gram.* III, 15 (Lebon, vol. 94, p. 178).
84 Brière, frag. 20 (p. 267).
85 *Coll. Pal.* frag. 6 (*A.C.O.* I, 5, p. 179).

escape the Apollinarists, and several times we find Diodorus defending himself against their attacks on his doctrine of « two sons ». But the very solution which he offers to their objection shows how deeply this distinction was ingrained in his thinking. His reply in fact, is simply to deny that he teaches either two Sons of David or two natural Sons of God [86]. The last part of this reply suggests the further answer which he gives elsewhere: there are not two natural Sons of God, but rather, there is one Son by nature, another son by grace [87]:

> Nous ne disons donc pas deux (fils) d'un seul Père; mais (nous disons) que Dieu le Verbe est un seul Fils de Dieu par nature, et que celui qui (est) de Marie est par nature (fils) de David et par grâce (Fils) de Dieu. Accordons encore ceci: Les deux sont un seul fils, et laissons en parole ce qui est impossible.

The last sentence here shows clearly how far Diodorus is from a satisfactory reply to the objection against his doctrine of « two sons ». Having divided Christ into the Son of God and the son of David, he does not see how they can be one Son except in some manner of speaking which cannot correspond to the reality.

Another reply to the objection against his « two sons » is found in the following fragment [88]:

> Ce n'est pas nous qui disons deux fils, nous qui disons que c'est par grâce que celui qui (est) de Marie a reçu l'appellation de fils: mais ce sont ceux qui disent (que) celui-ci aussi (est) Fils par nature, et non pas par grâce.

Here again the reply betrays the weakness of Diodorus' concept of the unity of Christ. For Diodorus, « he who is born of Mary » is clearly a person distinct from the Word;

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[86] Leontius, frag. 1 (*P.G.* 86, 1385 d - 1388 a): « The perfect Son of God, born before the ages, assumed the perfect son of David, born of David. You will say to me: 'Then you preach two sons?'. I do not say two sons of David, for I did not say that God the Word is the son of David. But neither do I say two natural Sons of God. For I do not say that there are two (born) from the nature of God, when I say that God the Word, born before the ages, dwelt in him who is of the seed of David ».

[87] Brière, frag. 30 (p. 271).

[88] Brière, frag. 33 (p. 272).

for in his eyes, those who teach that « he who is born of Mary » is the natural Son of God, are teaching that there are two natural Sons of God. He himself, however, believes that he avoids this conclusion by insisting that « he who is born of Mary » is a son of God by grace [89]:

> Gratia Filius, qui ex Maria est homo, natura vero Deus Verbum. Quod vero est gratia, non natura est: et quod est natura, non gratia. *Non duo filii.*

In this « son of Mary » who is an « adopted son of God », it is impossible not to recognize a true human person, really distinct from the Divine Person of the Word. This is the ultimate step to which Diodorus has come in his effort to safeguard the divinity of the Word. The incarnation is reduced to a divine inhabitation, an adoption of a man by grace. In rejecting the Apollinarist notion of a composition of the Divine Word with human flesh, Diodorus has also sacrificed the principle whereby the Word is the legitimate subject of predication for the human acts and attributes of Christ. By distinguishing two subjects of predication: the Son of God and the son of Mary, Diodorus has been led, by the force of his own logic, to divide Christ into two persons: one the Son of God by nature, and the other the son of God by grace. The indwelling of God in this man, and his divine adoption, surpass that of all the saints in duration and excellence; but are not essentially different. The son of the Virgin Mary is the greatest of the saints: but still, like them, is an adopted son of God.

This, at least, is the picture which the hostile florilegia give us of the doctrine which Diodorus developed in his controversy with the Apollinarists. This picture is no doubt one-sided, for it shows us only the position which Diodorus took in the pressure of controversy, and of that, only as much as his enemies have transmitted to us. But there is a reason to accept this picture as a substantially correct view of Diodorus' later teaching, and that is its similarity with the doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia. This similarity will be brought out in the further course of our study. Suffice it to say at the present that the general impression one gets of

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[89] Cyril, frag. 5 (*P.G.* 76, 1440 a-b). Cf. Leontius, frag. 2 (*P.G.* 86, 1388 a-b).

Diodorus' teaching on Christ is that it is definitely « Antiochene ». Grillmeier, it is true, has shown that Diodorus was not vitally concerned with the question of the human soul of Christ, and that he still occasionally slipped into the old « Word-flesh » terminology. Nevertheless, it seems clear that in his controversy with the Apollinarists, where his preoccupation is not with their denial of the human soul, but rather with the consequences of their system on the divinity of the Word, Diodorus has come to conceive of Christ as the union of the Word and a man: of the Son of God and the son of Mary. In the following chapter we shall show how Theodore of Mopsuestia further refined this teaching of his master, while filling in its lacunae, and endeavouring to combine the Word and « the man » in the unity of one person.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THEODORE

I. Statement of the problem.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the Arian and Apollinarist heresies both involved a false understanding of that principle whereby the Word is the ultimate subject of predication for the human acts and attributes of Christ. The Arians had used this principle as the basis of one of their arguments against the divinity of the Word, by assuming that whatever is predicated of the Word, must be true of Him in His nature *qua* Word. The Apollinarists, on the other hand, had made the Word out to be not only the ultimate subject of the human operations, but their vital, dynamic principle. Hence their interpretation of the principle of unity also involved a derogation of the divinity of the Word, the inevitable result of such a mixture of Divine Spirit and human flesh.

We have seen that there were two possible replies to the argument against the divinity of the Word which the Arians had drawn from the predication to Him of human limitations. One was to distinguish between what is predicated of the Word in His nature as Word, and what is true of Him as the ultimate subject to whom the humanity and its operations belong by reason of the appropriation of human nature in the Incarnation. This, as we saw, was the solution of Athanasius, whereby he was able to reply to the Arian argument, without sacrificing that concept of the unity of Christ which was based on the idea that there was but one subject of all predication: scil. the Divine Word.

The other reply to the Arian argument involved the admission of the premise that whatever was predicated of the Word must be said of Him *qua* Word, and must, therefore, be true of his nature. On this basis, the only way that

Eustathius saw to save the divinity of the Word was to reject outright the predication to Him of any but strictly divine attributes.

We have seen that the reply of Diodorus to the Apollinarist error likewise meant a rejection of the propriety of predicating any but divine attributes of the Word. Diodorus realized that the Apollinarist concept of the unity of Christ involved an impossible mixture of Word and flesh. But in rejecting this error, it seems clear that he also rejected any use of the communication of idioms whereby human actions or sufferings were predicated of the Word. To safeguard the transcendence of the Word, he insisted on a rigid distinction between what could be said of the Word, and what of the man.

As a result, the defense which Eustathius and Diodorus adopted against the errors of Arius and Apollinaris presented a grave problem regarding the unity of Christ. In each case, the refusal to allow the human attributes to be predicated of the Word, meant the distinction of two subjects of attribution: the Word and the man, or the Son of God and the son of David. From what remains of their writings, there is no evidence that either Eustathius or Diodorus offered a satisfactory solution to this problem of unity. The line of defense which they adopted to safeguard the divinity of the Word, meant sacrificing the position of the Word as the ultimate subject of attribution. Their theology presents a strict division between Word and man, with no apparent solution to the question as to how these two are united.

This was the problem which Theodore of Mopsuestia inherited from his Antiochene predecessors. In order to see the continuity between the two earlier bishops and Theodore, it is important to realize that he found himself in opposition to those same heresies against which Eustathius and Diodorus had fought. Thus he was under the same necessity of defending the divinity of the Word against the Arian dialectic. There is ample evidence to show that Theodore looked upon Arian writers as major adversaries. He himself tells us that his *De Incarnatione* was directed against the errors of Arius and Eunomius; he mentions Apollinaris only in the third place [1].

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1 Quoted by Facundus of Hermiane, in his *Pro defensione trium capitulorum*, (*P.L.* 67, 769 b) from the preface to Theodore's work entitled: *De Apolinario et ejus haeresi.*

Similarly, in the preface to the *Commentary on St. John*, he remarks that he had been planning a work against Eunomius [2]. But he consents to write the commentary on the Gospel of St. John, mentioning the treatise which the Arian Asterius had composed on this same Gospel [3]. In the course of his commentary, Theodore mentions the work of this same Asterius again, adding that he had more fully refuted his arguments in the *De Incarnatione* [4]. Another indication of the importance which Theodore attached to the refutation of Arianism is the number of times he refers to Arius or Eunomius in the course of his *Catechetical Homilies*. Here there are at least seven references to Arius, four to Eunomius, but only one mention of Apollinaris [5]. In one case, he refers to the Arian denial of the human soul of Christ, but in the other instances it is a question of the Arian attack on the divinity of the Word.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in Theodore's exegetical works, we find him time and again refuting that argument whereby the Arians had used the predication of human attributes to reduce the Word to the level of a creature. Thus we find, in Theodore's commentary on Psalm II, that his major concern is to show that the words: « Ego constitutus sum rex ab eo », are said not of the Word, but of the *homo assumptus*. His point in so doing, as he explains it himself, is to refute those who, « taking the occasion from the dispensation of the flesh which was assumed, deceive the simple and ignorant by claiming that it was the Only-begotten Son who received the kingship, and thus take Him to be inferior to the Father in his divinity » [6]. There can be no question but that Theodore is dealing here with an Arian interpretation of the psalm; his reply is to distinguish clearly between what is said of the Word, and what of the man.

Similarly, in the course of the *Commentary on St. John*, there are numerous instances where Theodore refers to those heretics who argue against the divinity of the Word by apply-

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2 Trad. Vosté (*C.S.C.O.*, Scriptores Syri, Ser. IV, tom. 3), p. 1.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.

5 Trad. Tonneau (*Studi e Testi*, vol. 145): Arius is mentioned on pp. 19, 69, 71, 111, 215-6, 237, 381; Eunomius on pp. 19, 71, 111, 381: Apollinaris on p. 381.

6 Ed. Devreesse (*Studi e Testi*, vol. 93), pp. 11-12.

ing to Him those attributes which belong to the human nature. Thus, for example, he refutes those heretics who take the words: « Post me venit et ante me factus est », to apply to « the divine hypostasis » [7]. Again, he refutes those heretics who use the words: « Ego vivo propter Patrem », as an objection to detract from the divinity of the Only-begotten [8]. In these and similar cases, it is clear that Theodore is concerned with the type of exegesis which the Arians had used to reduce the Word to the level of a creature. Theodore's reply consists in the careful distinction between what is true of the Word and what of the man; what belongs to the divinity and what to the humanity. As Vosté points out in his preface, Theodore's *Commentary on St. John* is characterized throughout by his care to distinguish between what is said of the Word, and what of « Christus-in-carne » [9]. It seems clear that the basic reason for this pre-occupation is the need to safeguard the divinity of the Word against the Arian dialectic of such exegetes as Asterius.

Moreover, in his controversy with the Apollinarists, it is clear that Theodore was vitally concerned not only with the question of the mind of Christ, but also with the question of the propriety of predicating human attributes of the Word. As we have seen, Diodorus' chief quarrel with the Apollinarists was not on the question of the human soul, but with their use of the communication of idioms, whereby they had applied human predicates to the Word, and divine attributes to the « Son of David ». In what remains of Theodore's *Contra Apollinarem,* we find that while he is seriously concerned with the question of the human soul of Christ, he also takes exception to the Apollinarist use of the communication of idioms. He cannot accept such statements of theirs as that « God incarnate was born of the Virgin », or that « He who is born of the Virgin is consubstantial with the Father » [10]. For Theodore, as for Diodorus, such statements involve an impossible confusion of the divine and human natures, and inevitably reduce the Word to the level of a creature. Hence, in his controversy with Apollinaris, Theodore continues the polemic

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[7] Vosté, p. 30.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. vii.
[10] Vigilius, fragment 1 (ed. Günther, *C.S.E.L.*, XXXV, 1), pp. 237-8.

of Diodorus against such a confusion of the natures, by insisting on the strict distinction of Word and man.

Theodore, therefore, shows himself to be the continuator of the controversies of Eustathius and Diodorus, and, like them, an ardent champion of the divinity of the Word. Following in the Antiochene tradition, Theodore's method of safeguarding the divinity of the Word is to follow a strict distinction between what is said of the Word, and what of the man. Inevitably this brought him to face the grave problem of unity in Christ. If, in order to defend the transcendence of the Word, one must constantly distinguish between the Word and the man, how can there be « one Lord Jesus Christ »? The great advance of Theodore over his predecessors was that he realized the gravity of this problem, and took great pains to find its solution. As was evident, by the practise of distinguishing between the Word and the man, one had, in a sense, divided Christ into two. Yet Theodore saw that in another sense they must be one. His solution to the problem sounds perfectly simple, and perfectly orthodox: there are two natures, but one person.

The distinction of the two natures in Christ, and their union in one *prosopon,* is the characteristic of Theodore's christology at every period of his career. We find this formula not only in his later, theological works, such as the *Contra Apollinarem,* and in his *Catechetical Homilies,* but also in his earliest exegetical work: the *Commentary on the Psalms.* Moreover, the doctrine of the union in one *prosopon* is by no means a minor element in Theodore's teaching; in the *Catechetical Homilies* it receives a markedly prominent place. There is no question but that Theodore realized that the lack of unity had been a grave weakness in the doctrine of his predecessors, and was determined to remedy it.

In view of Theodore's consistent stress on the union of the two natures in one person, one may ask how it can be that there is still question of his orthodoxy on this question of the unity of Christ. As we have seen in our first chapter, a number of scholars are satisfied that Theodore's doctrine is basically sound on this point. But there are others who are not satisfied, despite the orthodox formula of two natures in one person. Their attitude corresponds with the suggestion which Grillmeier has made, regarding the study of Theodore's christology: namely, that his orthodoxy cannot be

sufficiently proved merely by his use of correct formulae [11]. Grillmeier insists that one must go beyond the formulae, into the ideology which they are meant to express. One must discover, in other words, just what Theodore meant by his « two natures », and by the « one person » in whom they are united. When he speaks of the Word and the *homo assumptus* as two « natures », does he really understand that this man is not a human person, an ultimate subject of attribution in his own right, distinct from the Divine Person of the Word? When he speaks of the union of Word and man, does he mean anything more than the inhabitation of God in a man? When he speaks of the *one prosopon*, is this more than a moral, or dynamic person, constituted by a sharing of activity and prerogatives between the Word and the man assumed?

As we understand it, these are some of the questions which must be answered if one would reach solid conclusions as to the soundness of Theodore's doctrine of the unity of Christ. It must be observed, however, that in asking whether the orthodox formula: « two natures in one person », actually corresponds to sound ideology, we do not mean to question the sincerity of Theodore's intentions. There is no reason to suspect a deliberate attempt to conceal heresy under a cloak of orthodox terminology. One cannot read Theodore's works without being thoroughly convinced of his honest intention to think with the Church. The question remains whether his concept of the union of two natures in one person really solved the problem of unity caused by the Antiochene division of Christ into Word and man. This is the question which we shall study in the succeeding pages. For the sake of reducing the subject-matter to some order, we shall divide it into the following points: 1) Theodore's concept of the « two natures »; 2) His concept of their union: scil. the incarnation; 3) His concept of the « one person » in whom the two natures are united.

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[11] Grillmeier, *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* I, p. 145, note 2.

II. Theodore's concept of the « two natures ».

There is probably no single word which occurs more frequently in the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia than the word « nature » (φύσις). Before discussing his use of this term in its strictly christological applications, it would be well to see what meanings it has for him in more general usage.

We find several instances where Theodore uses *physis* in what is perhaps its most general sense: to signify a substantial reality, as opposed to something which is unreal, such as a vision, or a figment of reason. Thus, for example, when speaking of the dove which descended upon Christ at his baptism, Theodore asserts that this was « a vision, and not a *physis* »[12]. Similarly, in his exegesis of *Heb.* 1: 2, « per quem fecit et saecula », Theodore explains that the sacred author does not literally mean that God created « the ages », since an « age » is a mere interval of time: it is not a *physis*[13]. Where this same exegesis occurs in the *Commentary on St. John*, Vosté translates the Syriac: « non quod saecula *res* quaedam sint »[14]. This seems to hit off perfectly this primary sense of *physis*: something which is *real*, as opposed to *ens rationis*.

The other basic meaning which seems to be involved in the notion of nature for Theodore is that of « kind » or « species ». In at least one instance it is this notion of « kind » which is primarily intended. When describing the miracle at the wedding feast of Cana, Theodore remarks that Christ not merely changed the water into wine, but into a marvellous *physis* of wine[15]. This is a rare usage, but it shows that this notion of « kind of thing » is definitely present in the word *physis*. In the ordinary usage, it is the combination of these two basic meanings: *reality*, and *kind*, which con-

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12 Greek fragment 14, (ed. Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, Appendix, p. 317, line 17).

13 K. Staab, *Pauluskommentare aus der Griechischen Kirche*, p. 201, lines 9-10.

14 Vosté, p. 15, line 25.

15 Greek fragment 18 of the *Commentary on St. John*, Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 320, line 6.

stitute the whole idea; a *physis* is a reality of a particular kind.

As is evident, this notion can be taken in a more individual, or in a more universal sense, depending on whether one emphasizes the element of « reality » or the element of « kind ». In modern usage, we are more accustomed to taking the term « nature » in its more universal sense, where the notion of species predominates. When we speak of « human nature », we usually mean that nature as common to the whole race; we do not ordinarily use the term: « a sin, for no other reason than to take away its sin », it is true that Theodore likewise uses the term *physis* in this universal sense, as, for instance, when referring to human nature as common to all men. Thus, when he says: « The Son of God was in this nature which is subject to death and sin, for no other reason than to take away its sin », it is clear that he refers to human nature in general, and not to the individual human nature which He assumed [16]. Similarly, when he speaks of Christ's community of nature with the rest of men, or when he speaks of the virgin-birth as something « outside of human nature », the term is clearly used in the universal sense [17].

Likewise familiar to our ears is Theodore's use of « divine nature » where he intends the divine nature as it is common to all three Persons of the Trinity. In this sense he also uses the term *ousia* [18], but there are instances where he uses *physis* in this connotation. Thus he speaks of the communion of *physis* between Father and Son [19]. Again, he remarks that Philip surely knew that the « divine physis » is invisible, where it is a question of both Father and Son [20].

The use of the term *physis* in this manner: scil., of the human *physis* as it is common to all men, or of the divine *physis* as it is common to the Three Persons, corresponds to the sense in which we ordinarily use the term « nature ». But it is important to realize that in the great majority of cases, when Theodore uses the term: « the human physis »,

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16 Staab, p. 134, lines 4-5.

17 *Cat. Hom.* VI, 10 (Tonneau, p. 147).

18 *Comm. in Aggaeum Prophetam*, *P.G.* 66, 485 a.

19 Greek fragment 125 of the *Comm. on St. John*, Devreesse, *Essai*, p. 390, lines 8-9.

20 *Comm. in Zachariam Prophetam*, *P.G.* 66, 504 b.

he is not referring to human nature in a universal sense; he intends that concrete, individual human nature which was assumed by the Word in the Incarnation. Similarly, when he speaks of « the divine physis », he generally does not mean the divine nature precisely as common to the Three Persons; he means the « divine nature of the Word », or « the divine nature that was begotten of the Father and dwells in the *homo assumptus* » [21]. The frequency with which this individual sense of the term *nature* occurs in the writings of Theodore, is due to the fact that he has adopted the formula: « the two natures », to express the difference in Christ between the Word and the man assumed. This discernment of the two elements in Christ is certainly the most prominent feature of Theodore's theology, and his New Testament exegesis. As we have seen, Theodore inherited this preoccupation from his Antiochene predecessors. To some extent, he also inherited their vocabulary, in the sense that he followed their practise of distinguishing between God the Word and « the man ». It is worth noting, however, that the formula most commonly used by Diodorus: « Son of God » as distinct from « Son of David » or « Son of Mary », hardly appears in the writings of Theodore. He preferred the formula: God the Word and the *homo assumptus,* which is close to the expression used by Eustathius. But the new formula which Theodore introduced, and which is actually the one most frequently used by him, is the distinction between « the divine *physis* » and « the human *physis* » in Christ.

This use of the term: « the divine nature », to refer to the Word, and of the term: « the human nature », to refer to the *homo assumptus,* is a characteristic of Theodore's teaching which deserves careful attention. In the following pages we shall attempt to determine just what significance the word *physis* had for Theodore in this connection. We shall begin with a study of his use of the term « divine nature », and of its synonym, « the divinity ».

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21 For Theodore's use of the term *nature* in this manner, cf. *Comm. on St. John,* Vosté, p. 173: « Quae enim erga hominem assumptum contigerunt, tum naturam Dei Verbi eum inhabitantis manifestabant, quanta sit dignitas eius qui est causa omnium illorum factorum; tum ipsum Genitorem (revelabant), quippe qui tam excelsam ac miram naturam genuerit ». See also Vosté, p. 193, line 35; *Comm. in Ep. ad Eph.,* Swete, I, p. 167.

There can be little doubt but that Theodore's chief preoccupation in his effort to distinguish the « two natures » in Christ, is to see to it that nothing is predicated of the Divine Word which would in any sense compromise his divinity and equality with the Father. This is especially evident in his *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John*, where Theodore is at great pains to show that whatever predicates imply subordination to the Father are to be understood of the *homo assumptus*. In applying this norm in particular instances, Theodore goes so far as to exclude from the Word even such predicates as « being sent, receiving, hearing, learning » from the Father; notions which are generally interpreted as signifying the divine procession and mission of the Word. However, for Theodore they smacked of created imperfection, and he rigorously insisted that such predicates could not be understood to apply to « the divine nature », or to « the divinity » [22].

In this care to safeguard the divinity of the Word, Theodore is following in the footsteps of his Antiochene forebears. The new element which he adds is his use of the terms: « divine nature », « divinity », where Eustathius and Diodorus had spoken of « God the Word ». The question which must be solved is whether, in using these terms, Theodore intended to draw a distinction between the Divine Word as a Person, and his divine nature, or divinity, as such. It will he recalled that a distinction of this kind had been an important element in the reply of Athanasius to the difficulties proposed by the Arians. By distinguishing between the Word as the subject to whom the humanity and all its operations belonged, and the divine nature as such, Athanasius was able to reply to the Arian argument without sacrificing the position of the Word as the ultimate subject of predication even for the human attributes of Christ. While birth, suffering, etc. could not be said of the divinity, or of the Word in His divine nature, still Athanasius insisted that they could be predicated of the Word as the subject to whom they ultimately belonged.

Now we likewise see Theodore insisting that the human attributes and operations cannot be understood of the « divine nature » or « the divinity ». Does this mean that Theodore intended to establish a distinction similar to the one Atha-

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[22] See *Comm. on St. John*, Vosté, pp. 80-84, for a typical example of such exegesis.

nasius had drawn, between what can be predicated of the Word *qua* subject, and what can be said of the divinity, of the divine nature as such?

We believe that this question must be answered in the negative. In the first place, we have not been able to find a single instance in the extant writings of Theodore, where he explicitly distinguishes between saying something of the Word, and attributing something to the divinity of the Word as such. As we have seen, Athanasius insisted on such a distinction, in order to justify attributing the human acts of Christ to the Word as their ultimate subject. There is no trace in the writings of Theodore, of any such concept of the Divine Word as the subject of the operations or sufferings of his humanity. Nor is there a single instance where Theodore actually predicates a human attribute or operation of the Divine Word *qua* subject. It does not seem likely, therefore, that when Theodore used the terms, « divine nature », and « divinity », he meant to distinguish, as Athanasius had done, between the Word and his divinity as such. If this had been his intention in introducing these terms, it seems incredible that he would not have expressed this distinction, or have made practical application of it by actually predicating the human operations of the Word in some such way as had been done by Athanasius.

There is no positive evidence, therefore, that when Theodore used the terms, « divine nature », and « divinity », he meant to establish a distinction between what could be said of the Word, and what could be said of his divine nature. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that Theodore did not recognize such a distinction. The following examples will illustrate this point. In *Catechetical Homily VI,* where Theodore is discussing *Romans 9*: 5, « ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus », he takes the phrase: « Christus secundum carnem », to indicate the *homo assumptus,* who is born of the Jews [23]. This creates a difficulty as to the meaning of the following phrase: « qui est super omnia Deus ». In explaining this scriptural use of the communication of idioms, Theodore speaks as follows:

> Le bienheureux Paul, en effet, après avoir dit « les Juifs, *de qui est le Christ* » ajouta « *selon la chair* » afin de distin-

[23] *Cat. Hom.* VI, 4 (Tonneau, p. 137).

guer les natures. Et il nous fait savoir que le Christ (issu) des Juifs selon la chair, il ne pense pas que ce soit la nature de la divinité du Monogène, ni que ce soit Dieu le Verbe à qui il donne ce nom, — lui qui *au commencement était en Dieu* et qui de toute éternité *était dans le sein de son Père,* — mais c'est à la forme d'homme qu'il assuma.

In this case it is clear that for Theodore, what cannot be said of « the nature of the divinity of the Only-begotten », cannot be said of God the Word. The longer, abstract phrase seems to be merely another way of speaking of God the Word.

A similar case is seen in the *Commentary on St. John,* where Theodore explains the verse: « Pater neminem iudicat, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio ». (Jo. 5: 22) According to Theodore, it is the *homo assumptus* who is meant here, for he who judges must be visible to those who are to be judged. He goes on to say [24]:

> Itaque hic est scopus huius verbi: neque divinitatem Unigeniti iudicare mundum, quia aeque Deus-Verbum est invisibilis hominibus ac Pater, quamvis non sit remotus ab officio iudicandi sicut nec Pater.

Here again, the abstract « divinitatem Unigeniti » seems to mean no more or less than the concrete « Deus Verbum ».

This impression of the lack of any intention on Theodore's part to draw a distinction between what can be said of the Word and what can be said of the divinity of the Word, is confirmed by several passages where Theodore is explaining the scriptural use of the communication of idioms. For instance, in explaining *Jo* 3: 16: « Sic enim Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret », Theodore sees in the notion « daret », a reference to the suffering of Christ. This leads to the following comment [25]:

> Quomodo ergo dixit: *Filium suum Unigenitum dedit*? Quamvis sit evidens, divinitatem pati non posse; propter coniunctionem tamen unum sunt; quare etsi alius pateretur, attamen totum divinitati tribuitur.

This last clause deserves careful attention: it shows eloquently how far Theodore was from the distinction of

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24 Vosté, p. 119, lines 8-12.
25 *Ibid.*, p. 51, lines 26-30.

Athanasius between what is said of the Word, and what is said of the divinity as such. As far as Theodore is concerned, when the Scripture attributes suffering to the *Filius Unigenitus*, it attributes it to the *divinity*, even though it is another: *alius*, who really suffers. Then obviously Theodore does not see any distinction between predicating something of the « Only-begotten Son » and attributing it to the divinity. Nor does he conceive of the Only-begotten Son as the ultimate subject in any real sense, since it is really *alius qui patitur*. In what sense, then, can he mean that suffering is attributed to the divinity by the scriptural text? It can be nothing more than a way of speaking: of alluding to the divinity with which the *homo assumptus* is united. That this is Theodore's mind here is evident from the sentence which follows:

> Solet enim liber sacer, quotiescumque magnitudinem passionis describit, de divinitate mentionem facere in confirmationem sermonis. Et sicut beatus Paulus, magnitudinem passionis significare intendens, dicit: *Si enim cognovissent, numquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent*, ut ipso hoc titulo indicet magnitudinem passionis; ita Dominus noster, volens significare abundantiam dilectionis suae ex eo quod est passus, egregie dicit: *Unigenitum dedit.*

A similar instance of Theodore's explanation of the scriptural use of the communication of idioms occurs in the *Catechetical Homilies*, where he comments on *Phil.* 2: 6-11. In this text, St. Paul predicates obedience unto death, and consequent glorification, of the same Christ Jesus, who being in the form of God, emptied himself, etc. In accord with his usual exegesis, Theodore distinguishes between what is to be understood of the divine nature, and what of the human nature. But he must still explain how such predicates as « being obedient unto death » can be said of the same one who is « in the form of God ». He explains it thus [26]:

> Etant évident et certain que cela fut dit de la nature humaine, il le dit, cependant, par communication, de la nature divine, afin que cette parole stupéfie et soit perçue des auditeurs.

Here again we find the identification of « divine nature » and the Word as Person or subject. Athanasius would have

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[26] *Cat. Hom.* VI, 6 (Tonneau, p. 141).

said that these latter predicates are rightly said of « Him who is in the form of God », but that they are not said of the *divine nature*. Theodore, on the contrary, apparently sees no distinction between saying something of the Word as Person, and saying it of the divine nature. When he admits, then, that what is true only of the human nature is said here, « by communication », of the divine nature, it seems clear that he understands this not in any literal sense, but as a kind of hyperbole, intended to « amaze the listeners ». In the context which follows, Theodore gives his more usual explanation of the communication of idioms in the scriptures; it is that attributes pertaining to both natures are predicated « comme d'un seul ». We intend to treat this whole question of Theodore's concept of the communication of idioms in a later section; hence we shall not go into it at length here. The point which we wish to make at present is simply that Theodore does not interpret such communication of idioms in terms of a distinction between what can be said of the divine nature, and what can be said of the Word as a Person or subject. As we have seen, there are clear indications that for Theodore, saying something of God the Word meant nothing else than saying it of the divine nature or of the divinity.

Another example of his attitude on this point is his treatment of *John* 16: 28, « Exivi a Patre et veni in mundum; iterum relinquo mundum et vado ad Patrem ». As Theodore understands it, the first two verbs: exivi et veni, can apply only to « the divinity »; the second two: relinquo et vado, can apply only to the *homo assumptus*. He sums up this distinction by saying [27]:

> Itaque utrumque simul nequit de una ex illis naturis accipi; neque Deo Verbo neque homini ambo illa conveniunt.

Here it appears clearly that when Theodore speaks of the « two natures », he means precisely God the Word and the man. In other words, « the divine nature » is taken as perfectly synonymous with « God the Word ». There is no question of a distinction between these two concepts, which would allow one to predicate something of « God the Word » which could not be said of « the divine nature ».

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[27] Vosté, p. 217, lines 26-28.

This conclusion is confirmed by Theodore's usual practise of using such abstract phrases as « the divine nature » and « the divinity of the Only-begotten », where he means nothing else than would be expressed by the concrete term: « God the Word ». For example, while in one passage, he expresses himself in the concrete terms: « Il est Dieu le Verbe, celui qui assuma, mais il est l'homme celui qui fut assumé » [28]; a few pages later on, he uses the term: nature, in the same connection [29]:

> C'est ainsi que les saints Livres nous enseignent la différence des deux natures, ce qu'il nous faut nécessairement apprendre: quel est celui qui assuma et quel est celui qui fut assumé; et que celui-la qui assuma est la nature divine, qui pour nous fit toutes choses; tandis que celui-ci est la nature humaine, qui pour nous tous fut assumé par celui qui est cause de tout, et il est en une conjonction ineffable et éternellement indissoluble.

This identification of « the divine nature » and « God the Word », made it possible for Theodore to pass almost imperceptibly from abstract terms to concrete, personal ones, as, for example, in the following passage [30]:

> Ici encore il rend évidente la distinction des natures et que celle-là est la forme de Dieu et celle-ci est forme d'esclave; que celle-là assuma et que celle-ci fut assumé; et que celui qui assuma devint, en celui qui fut assumé, en la forme d'homme; mais celui qui fut assumé était véritablement forme d'homme, en qui était celui qui l'assuma.

Another feature of Theodore's terminology which shows that the term « divine nature » is merely a synonym for « God the Word », is his way of describing the incarnation as « union with the divine nature », or as the « inhabitation of the divine nature » in the man assumed. It is clear that in so using the term, Theodore does not mean the divine nature as common to the Three Persons, as he certainly holds that only the Word became incarnate. Hence his constant use of the term « the divine nature » in this connection is illustrative of his way of using this term as perfectly synonymous with

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28 *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 1 (Tonneau, p. 187).
29 *Ibid.*, 10 (p. 199).
30 *Ibid.*, VI, 5 (p. 139).

« God the Word ». Typical is the following passage from the *De Incarnatione,* where he speaks of the failure of the Jews to understand the mystery of Christ [31]:

> ... patet iis (Judaeis) non esse cognitionem de Deo Verbo, neque naturam divinam, quae inhabitabat in homine, intelligebant.

Another example of the use of the term « divine nature » as synonymous with « God the Word » is seen in the following passage from the *Commentary on Ephesians,* where he comments on the words: « Quod autem ascendit, quid est, nisi quia descendit primum in inferiores partes terrae? » (Eph. 4: 9). He understands « He who ascended » to be the *homo assumptus,* and comments as follows [32]:

> Vult autem dicere quoniam non ascenderat, nisi primum in illum divina aliqua extitisset natura, quae etiam et super caelos erat; cui et complacuit in illum habitare, qui super terram erat, et super terram morabatur. Non qui descendit ipse est et qui ascendit; quemadmodum enim fieri poterat ut ille qui adsumptus est homo ipse sit et qui de caelo descendit? Simile est autem hoc dictum illo dicto: « nemo ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo descendit »; vult enim dicere quoniam is in quem divina descendit natura, super omnes effectus est caelos, illo ascendens, ita ut et in omnibus idem esse videatur, omnibus ad eum intuentibus propter inhabitantem naturam.

The text just quoted is interesting for a number of reasons, and we shall have occasion to refer to it again. For the present we wish to point out the typical use of the term « divine nature » to refer to God the Word. It would be easy to multiply instances where Theodore uses such expressions as « the divine nature », « the nature of God the Word », « the divinity of the Only-begotten », where there is obviously no intention to distinguish between the Divine Word and his divinity as such. There is no evidence that Theodore was aware of the possibility of drawing a line, as Athanasius had done, between what could be said of the Word, as subject, and what could be said of the divine nature. Theodore's

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[31] *De Incarnatione* VI, *cod. Brit. Mus. add. 14669,* fol. 6 a; trad. Sachau, p. 34.

[32] *Comm. in Ep. ad Eph.,* Swete, I, p. 167.

usage indicates that as far as he is concerned, these are identical concepts.

The logical conclusion is that what cannot be true of the divine nature, cannot be predicated of the Word. This seems, in fact, to be the conclusion which Theodore has drawn. As we have seen, there is no instance in his writings where he actually predicates a human attribute of Christ to the Word as its subject. On the contrary, there are a number of instances where he positively denies the propriety of such predication. Obviously his meaning in doing so is to exclude anything which would compromise the divinity of the Word. But his identification of « divine nature » and « God the Word » excludes the possibility of considering the Word as a subject of predication for these human attributes. The following examples are typical. In commenting on *Phil.* 2: 9, « Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum », Theodore asks [33]:

> Quem autem exaltatum esse dicimus? Deum Verbum? ... Aut quomodo exaltabat Deus eum, qui ei par erat aut majorem seipso eum facit? Quod turpe dictum est. ... Nimirum manifestum est haec eo, qui assumtus est, esse dicta ...

Similarly, on *Heb.* 1: 16, « Et cum iterum introducit primogenitum in orbem terrae, dicit: ' et adorent eum omnes angeli Dei ' », Theodore asks [34]:

> Quis est igitur qui in orbem terrarum introducitur, et dominationem ejus accipit, de qua ei et adorari ab angelis acquiritur? Nec enim insaniens aliquis dicat Deum Verbum esse introductum, qui omnia non exstantia fecit, ineffabili ejus virtute donans eis ut essent.

It is only logical that Theodore must deny that God the Word was born of the Virgin Mary. Without a distinction between what can be said of the divine nature, and what

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[33] *De Incarnatione* XI, trad. Sachau, pp. 46-47. See also the corresponding passage from the commentary on this epistle: Swete, Vol. I, p. 222: « Nescio si aliquis sic stultus inveniri possit, ita ut post passionem exaltatum fuisse Dei Verbum existimet. ... Quoniam autem haec post passionem adquisita sunt illi qui adsumptus est, nemo qui nesciat; Deo autem Verbo aderant a principio, utpote omnium factori, quod neminem aestimo contradicere, nisi forte valde cedat insaniae ».

[34] Fragment quoted by Cyril of Alexandria in his *Contra Theodorum*, Book. II, and cited by the Fifth Council; *P.G.* 76, 1445 d.

can be predicated of the Word as subject, it is sheer nonsense, and blasphemy, in Theodore's eyes, to say that the Word was born of the Virgin Mary. There is no reason whatever to suspect the genuinity of the following passage of the *Contra Apollinarem*, quoted by Justinian, Vigilius and the Fifth Council [35]:

> ... sed non divina natura ex virgine nata est: natus autem est ex virgine, qui ex substantia virginis constat, non deus verbum ex Maria natus est; natus autem est ex Maria, qui ex semine est David, non deus verbum ex muliere natus est, sed natus est ex muliere, qui virtute sancti spiritus plasmatus est in ea; non ex matre natus est consubstantialis Patri (*sine matre* enim iste secundum beati Pauli vocem) sed qui in posterioribus temporibus in materno ventre sancti spiritus virtute plasmatus est utpote *sine patre* propter hoc dictus.

The identification of the divine nature and God the Word in the above citation is perfectly consonant with Theodore's language in all his extant works. The denial that God the Word was born of the Virgin Mary follows inevitably from the failure to recognize a distinction between what is true of divine nature, and what can be predicated of the Word by reason of the incarnation. It seems quite certain that Theodore did not recognize such a distinction.

With this we conclude our study of Theodore's concept of « the divine nature » in Christ. We believe we have established the fact that his use of the abstract expressions: « the divine nature », and « the divinity », does not indicate that he drew such a distinction as Athanasius had made between the Word *qua* subject, and his divinity as such. On the contrary, it seems that Theodore held neither this distinction, nor the principle which Athanasius had thereby protected: namely, that the Word is the ultimate subject of predication even for the human operations and sufferings of his humanity. Theodore must develop his doctrine of the « one person » without the benefit of a concept of the Word as unique subject. The conclusion suggests itself that whatever,

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[35] Fragment 1 of the Council and the *Constitutum Vigilii* (ed. Günther, p. 238, lines 29-36); also quoted, in Greek, by Justinian in his *Epistola adversus Theodorum Mops.*, *P.G.* 86, 1059 a.

or whoever, this « one person » is in Theodore's mind, it is not the Divine Person of the Word, considered as the subject to whom all the predicates, even of the humanity, ultimately belong. We shall return to this point, when we come to examine Theodore's doctrine of the one person. For the present, we must continue our study of the « two natures », by considering his doctrine concerning the human nature assumed by the Word: the *homo assumptus*.

We have already seen that Theodore's use of the terms: « the human nature », and « the humanity » marked a departure from the language of his predecessors, who had spoken more concretely of « the man Jesus » or of « the son of David ». The question arises whether Theodore's use of the abstract terms may have been motivated by the intention to indicate that this « human nature » is not a « man » in the sense of a human person. In modern christological terminology, at least in the Thomistic tradition, the terms: « human nature », « humanity », are employed in preference to the concrete term « the man », precisely for the reason that « the man » implies a human *suppositum*: one who *has* human nature, and is the ultimate subject of the operations of this nature. Whereas, « the humanity » signifies the human nature assumed by the Word, which, though particular and concrete, is not a human person in its own right. As a result of this distinction between the abstract term, « the humanity », and the concrete, personal term, « the man », Thomists are careful to use neuter, rather than masculine forms in referring to this assumed humanity. Only a person is referred to as « he » or « him »; the humanity, therefore, is designated as « it ».

As is understood, in proposing this question we are not setting out to judge Theodore on the basis of Thomistic accuracy in the use of terms. But there seems to be good reason for making such an inquiry, in view of the fact that Theodore did introduce the use of the abstract, or neuter, forms, whereas previously the Antiochenes had used only the concrete and masculine (the man Jesus, the Son of David, etc.). Furthermore, there is at least one text which gives a striking example of the use of the neuter with reference to the humanity assumed by the Word. In a passage of the *De Incarnatione*, quoted by Facundus, Theodore refers to the human nature with such terms as « alterum »; « quod

assumptum est, quidquid illud sit »; « hoc »; « quod assumptum est »; « assumptam naturam, quaecumque illa sit » [36]. At first sight, one might judge that Theodore's reason for using such neuter expressions is the same as a Thomist would have: scil. to indicate that this human nature is not a « man », is not a « he » but an « it ». However, Facundus explains these neuter expressions differently, and his explanation is most likely drawn from the context of the passage which he has quoted. He says [37]:

> Ideo vero dicit: quaecumque illa sit, quoniam haeretici contra quos agit, etiam a se diverso errore de incarnatione dissentiunt. Nam Apollinaristae quidem carnis et animae naturam sine mente assumpsisse Dominum credunt; Ariani vero carnis tantummodo. Idcirco etiam superius ait: alterum Deus Verbum natura, alterum autem quod assumptum est, quidquid illud sit.

In other words, Facundus tells us that Theodore has used the vague, neuter expressions here merely as a way of reducing the *status quaestionis* of his particular argument against the Arians and Apollinarists. He says: « the human nature, whatever that may be », because he wishes for the moment to prescind from the question whether this nature is merely flesh (the Arian position), or body and soul without mind (the Apollinarist position), or a perfect man (Theodore's position). Facundus' explanation of the neuter expressions used here has every chance of being the correct one, both because he had the context to judge from, and because elsewhere, when Theodore is proposing his own doctrine, independently of any such precisions for the sake of a controversy, he does not hesitate to use the concrete, personal expression. His own doctrine, as we have indicated, is that the Word assumed a *perfect man*. To give but one example out of many [38]:

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[36] Facundus, *op. cit.*, *P.L.* 67, 747 c - 748 b. We shall discuss this text more fully when considering Theodore's doctrine of the one person in whom the two natures are united.

[37] *Ibid.*, 749 c.

[38] *Cat. Hom.* V, 17 (Tonneau, 123-125). Cf. *De Incarnatione*, Sachau, p. 38-39, where Theodore argues for the assumption of « a perfect man » against Arians and Apollinarists.

> Mais nos pères bienheureux mirent en garde sur tout cela, en disant: « qui s'est incarné et devint homme », afin que nous croyions qu'il est un homme parfait, celui qui fut assumé et en qui demeura Dieu le Verbe, — lui qui fut parfait en tout selon la nature humaine et dont l'état résultait d'un corps mortel et d'une âme intelligente, car c'est « pour l'homme et pour son salut qu'il descendit du ciel ». A bon droit, ils dirent qu'il prit un homme semblable à ceux d'entre lesquels il fut pris; car l'homme qu'il assuma, étant semblable à Adam qui introduisit le péché dans le monde, il abolirait le péché par ce qui lui était connaturel.

The neuter expressions in the passage quoted by Facundus are quite exceptional, and have an explanation in the particular context. The question remains, however, as to Theodore's mind in using the abstract terms, « human nature », and « humanity » as he frequently does. Did he intend to express, by these terms, anything different from what he meant by the concrete term: the man assumed? Or are the two expression: « the human nature », and « the assumed man », really equivalent in Theodore's language?

There are many indications that the latter is the case. In the first place, Theodore will substitute one expression for the other with no apparent difference of meaning. Typical is the following example, whose context we have explained above [39]:

> Itaque utrumque simul nequit de una ex illis *naturis* accipi; neque Deo Verbo neque *homini* ambo illa conveniunt. ... primum videtur congruere divinitati, alterum vero *homini assumpto*, propter coniunctionem *naturarum*, per quam ambo ad unitatem quamdam pervenerunt.

Thus the « nature » of which Theodore speaks, is equally « the man », or « the man assumed ». Another indication of the equivalence of the abstract « human nature » with the concrete « man », is Theodore's way of passing directly from one form of expression to the other, as in the following passage [40]:

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39 *Comm. in St. John*, Vosté, p. 217. See above, p. 210.

40 *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 13 (Tonneau, 205-207).

> A cause de tout ceci, apprenons donc des Livres Saints la distinction des natures et leur conjonction; attachons-nous fermement à cette doctrine et appliquons notre esprit à la distinction des natures: que celui qui assuma est Dieu et le Fils Unique; mais (que) la forme d'esclave, celui qui fut assumé, est homme; et Dieu assuma les biens de notre race, et celui-ci fut assumé, — qui lui-même demeure dans les « excellences », et sur nous répand la participation à sa grâce.

In the passage just quoted occurs another expression for the human nature: scil., « the form of a servant », which Theodore has adopted from St. Paul (*Phil.* 2: 7). This is another « abstract » term which Theodore uses as perfectly equivalent to the concrete « man », as is seen in the following passage [41]:

> Ensuite, il expose aussi la miséricorde ineffable (répandue) sur nous, à cause de laquelle (Dieu) manifesta l'économie (divine) par le Christ, lui qui étant en la forme de Dieu voulut bien prendre la forme d'esclave, qui assuma un homme parfait et complet pour le salut de toute la race humaine ...

Elsewhere, Theodore says flatly: « ... la forme d'esclave est celui qui par nature est homme, qui pour notre salut fut assumé » [42].

The conclusion to which one comes from a study of Theodore's terminology is that he really draws no appreciable distinction between saying: « The Word assumed human nature, or the form of a servant », and saying: « The Word assumed a man ». There is nothing to indicate that he saw a difference between the use of the abstract and the concrete, the neuter and the masculine forms, when referring to the humanity assumed by the Word. The clearest proof of this is his constant practise of speaking of the assumed humanity as the *homo assumptus*, and using of this man such terms as give a strong impression that he thought of him as a human *suppositum*, as a personal subject distinct from the Word. This is an aspect of Theodore's christology which is one of

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[41] *Ibid.* XVI, 10 (pp. 549-550).
[42] *Ibid.*, VIII, 1 (p. 187).

its most striking characteristics, and undoubtedly has contributed largely to the unfavorable opinion held of Theodore by his critics. It is certainly an aspect that can not be overlooked or minimized in an objective attempt to evaluate Theodore's doctrine of the unity of Christ. One cannot fairly judge his concept of the « one person », without considering the way in which he refers to the *homo assumptus* as if this man were a person distinct from the Word. In the following pages, we shall indicate some of those expressions which have created the impression that Theodore's *homo assumptus* is really a person in his own right.

The first point to be considered is Theodore's way of attributing the human operations and sufferings of Christ to the *homo assumptus* as if he were the ultimate subject of whom these attributes are predicated. This is a result of Theodore's refusal to predicate the human attributes of the Word: « it is not the Word who suffers, but the man assumed ». Thus the distinction between the two natures becomes equivalent to a distinction between the two subjects to whom the operations belong. The following text is illustrative of this manner of speaking [43]:

> Verba autem: ad Patrem meum et Patrem vestrum, et Deum meum et Deum vestrum (Joh. 20: 17), nemo sic demens est, ut alii cuidam convenire diceret, nisi templo Dei Verbi, homini pro nostra salute assumpto, qui et mortuus est, et resurrexit, et ascensurus esset in caelos, et Patrem cum discipulis vocabat Deum, et ipse gratia adoptionem meritus; et Deum etiam (suum appellat), quia ab eo cum ceteris hominibus ut esset accepit.

In this text, the *homo assumptus* is presented as the ultimate subject not only of the statement in question, but of all the other actions mentioned. The reference to « alii cuidam » is certainly a way of saying that this statement does not belong to the Word, but to the *homo assumptus*. One could quote numerous other instances where the *homo assumptus* seems to be conceived as the real subject of the human opera-

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[43] *Comm. in St. John*, Vosté, p. 251. This passage was quoted in the *Constitutum Vigilii* and in the Acts of the Fifth Council; Vig. cap. 14, ed. Günther, p. 249, where one may also read the criticism of Pope Vigilius.

tions; the divinity is present to him, assisting him, etc., but it is the man who really acts or suffers [44].

This manner of distinguishing as between two subjects of attribution leads naturally to the distinction between « him who suffers », and « him who is present to the one who suffers »; it is one who suffers, it is another who raises him up, etc. Hence we find Theodore distinguishing between the Word and the man as *hic-ille*, or *alius-alius*. Thus, for example, when asked the question: « Deus crucifixus est, an homo? », Theodore replies: [45]

> ... quod utrumque quidem, non autem secundum similem rationem. Nam hic quidem crucifixus est, utpote et passionem suscipiens, et ligno affixus, et ab Judaeis detentus: ille autem, quod erat cum ipso secundum praedictam causam [scil. secundum affectum voluntatis].

We find a similar reply to the same sort of question in a section of the *De Incarnatione* preserved in the Syriac version of cod. 14669 [46]:

> Ti autem accedunt et dicunt nobis (placet nobis verbis eorum adversus eos uti) « resuscitatus est aut is qui resuscitari debet? resuscitans eum, qui solubilis est, aut solutionem excipiens? » quae autem inter se contraria sunt neque congruunt. Solubilis enim eget resuscitatore suo, ille autem extra passionem est et potestate eum, qui solvitur, resuscitat. Dixerunt ergo nobis: quid erga hanc quaestionem dicere decet? Facile autem respondemus dicentes: satis cognitionis de hac re ex Sacra Scriptura nobis est. Alius enim est, qui solvitur, alius qui resuscitat. Et ille est templum, quod solutionem excipit; ille autem, qui id resuscitat, Deus Verbum est, qui promittit se resuscitaturum esse templum ejus dissolutum.

We have already seen a similar statement, where Theodore explains: « Filium unigenitum dedit », by saying: « etsi alius pateretur, attamen totum divinitati tribuitur » [47]. One might add a passage where Theodore explains the text: « Non possum ego a meipso facere quidquam », (Jo. 5: 30) by putting into the mouth of the *homo assumptus* the following [48]:

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[44] See, for example, *Cat. Hom.* V, 5-6 (p. 107); VII, 13-14 (p. 179-185); *Comm. in St. John*, Vosté, p. 182 etc.

[45] Fragment quoted by Cyril in his *Contra Theodorum*, P.G. 76, 1445 a.

[46] Cod. 14669, fol. 9 b, Sachau (*trad.*), p. 51.

[47] *Comm. in St. John*, Vosté, p. 51.

[48] Vosté, p. 85.

> « Ab alio habeo potestatem et virtutem iudicii ». Hoc enim meri hominis non est, ut possit omnia secundum iustitiam iudicare. Et quis est a quo accepit potestatem et virtutem iudicandi? Manifeste Deus Verbum, qui unione sua cum eo, largitus est ei virtutem et potestatem iudicandi, quod numquam suapte natura facere potuisset.

From these texts we have additional reason for accepting the genuinity of the Greek citation from the *Commentary on the Psalms* given by Leontius, where he quotes Theodore as distinguishing between the Word and the man as *alium et alium* [49].

An indication of the same concept of the distinction between these « two natures », is Theodore's use of two masculine pronouns when referring to the Word and the *homo assumptus*. Thus he describes the Jews' ignorance of the divinity of Christ by saying: « Illi secreto decreverant occidere eum, nescientes virtutem et sapientiam eius qui erat in eo qui passus est » [50]. To know the mystery of Christ is to know « quisnam in eo sit, quaenam sit coniunctio huius cum illo » [51]. Theodore distinguishes the natures: « eo quod ille assumpsit, hic assumptus est, et hoc quod ille est similitudo Dei, hic similitudo servi » [52]. One could easily multiply instances of such distinction between Word and *homo assumptus* by the use of such personal pronouns. It is a usage which characterizes all of Theodore's works, and contributes to the impression that he looked upon the « man assumed » not only as a « nature », but as a person in his own right.

This impression is not weakened by the way in which Theodore uses the name, Jesus, or Jesus Christ, as the proper name of the *homo assumptus*. Thus he speaks of « Our Lord and saviour Jesus Christ » as « the man assumed by the Word » [53]. Jesus is the name of « the one assumed », of « the one born of Mary » [54]. Likewise, « Jesus Christ is the name of

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49 See above, pp. 112-118.

50 Vosté, p. 186.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

52 *De Incarnatione*, XI (Sachau, p. 48). For similar examples, see Cyril, fragment from *De Incarnatione* X (*P.G.* 76, 1442 c-d); Vigilius, cap. 8 from the *Contra Apollinarem*, Günther, p. 244-245.

53 *Comm. in Ep. ad Heb.*, Staab, p. 204, line 39 ff.

54 Leontius' fragments 15, 16, 19: *P.G.* 66, 985 c-d; 988 b.

the man whom God put on » [55]. Jesus is « this man assumed for our salvation » [56]. For our sakes, God « clothed himself with Our Lord Jesus, a man, and by the resurrection from the dead made him pass to a new life and made him sit at his right hand » [57]. This last passage certainly gives the impression that God the Word and Our Lord Jesus are two distinct persons, with one sitting at the right hand of the other in glory. For surely, God who « clothed himself with the man » can mean only the Son, and not the Father. It is the Son, then, who makes Jesus, the man assumed, sit at his right hand.

Another element in Theodore's writings which contributes to the impression that he conceives « the man Jesus » as a person distinct from the Word, is his manner of paraphrasing the scriptural words of Christ in such wise as to have the *homo assumptus* speak of himself in the first person, and of the Word in the third person. Thus, for example, in his commentary on *John* 12: 35-36, he has the *homo assumptus* speak as follows [58]:

> Non enim ita morior, quasi in morte permansurus sim, cum neque corpus meum corrumpendum sit, sed anima paulisper decedente, mox iterum corpus resurget, et anima in sua incorruptibilitate perseverat. Itaque in gloria sublimi, quam habebo ex unione mea cum Deo Verbo, tempore opportuno ex alto caelo super omnia apparebo, omnibus revelans dignitatem meam.

There are numerous other instances of such language in the *Commentary on St. John* [59]. It also occurs in the other

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[55] *Cat. Hom.* III, 4 (p. 57).

[56] *Ibid.* VIII 8 (p. 199).

[57] *Ibid.* V, 21 (p. 129-131).

[58] Vosté, p. 175-176.

[59] For example: Vosté, p. 86: « Pro institutione mihi est excellentia Dei Verbi me inhabitantis ». *Ibid.*, p. 74: « Deus Verbum, qui me assumpsit, sibique coniunxit, dat mihi cum fiducia victoriam iudicii. Me enim semel pro semper fecit suum, quando assumpsit me; atque evidens est eum me non derelinquere ne temere agam ». *Ibid.*, p. 213: « Mihi enim, inquit, tota gratia Spiritus facta est, quia Deo Verbo coniunctus sum, et filiationem veram accepi ». *Ibid.*, p. 224: « Illi qui tui sunt, etiam mei sunt, propter indivisibilem consensum et propter participationem divinitatis; quapropter et ego in coniunctione mea cum Deo Verbo, accepi eos et glorificatus sum apud omnes ».

works: in the *Catechetical Homilies* [60] and in the *Contra Apollinarem* [61].

Another factor in Theodore's language which suggests that his *homo assumptus* is really a *suppositum humanum* is that he speaks of this man as possessor of his human nature. Thus, for instance, Theodore has the *homo assumptus* say [62]:

> Iam prope est tempus, ut coram omnibus clarificer; prope est tempus, ut ad honores natura mea maiores elever.

In another place, Theodore declares [63]:

> Miracula autem, ab homine facta, manifesto superabant naturam eius qui illa faciebat.

Similarly, he says that the *homo assumptus* has the power to do: « — etiam quae naturam suam superant, propter suam unionem cum Deo Verbo » [64]. Finally, in a passage preserved in Greek, Theodore not only refers to the human nature as belonging to the man Jesus, but distinguishes at the same time between Jesus and the Word as οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος. Theodore is explaining *Hebrews* 2: 10 (Decebat enim eum, propter quem omnia et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummare). His comment is as follows [65]:

> Evidently referring to God the Word, he says that since He had given to many a share in sonship, and brought them to this glory, it was fitting that He should bring to perfection through suffering, the leader of the salvation of all, namely Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the man assumed by Him: ὥστε φαίνεσθαι καὶ τούτου τὴν φύσιν κἀκείνου τὴν χάριν.

So far, then, we have seen a number of aspects of Theodore's language which give the impression that his *homo assumptus* is really a person distinct from the Word. We must now consider those instances where he explicitly uses the word

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60 *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 11 (p. 203).

61 *Contra Apoll.* III (Vig. cap. 10, ed. Günther, p. 246).

62 Vosté, p. 171.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 193.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 148.

65 Staab, p. 204, lines 37 ff. This Greek passage confirms the accuracy of the Syriac and Latin versions where they use the masculine forms: « hic - ille » in distinguishing between the Word and the *homo assumptus*.

« person » with reference to this man. We have already seen that in his exegesis of the New Testament, Theodore is very careful to distinguish between what is said concerning the Word, and what concerning the man. Similarly, when he is interpreting the words of Christ, he understands some statements as said by the Word, and others as said by the man, allowing the man to speak of himself in the first person, and of the Word in the third.

Now in both of these cases, whether it is a question of something said concerning the man, or something understood as said by the man, Theodore will use the phrase: « the *prosopon* of the man ». Thus, for example, he explains that the words of the Creed: « he will come to judge the living and the dead », are said of the *prosopon* of the man assumed [66]; of the same *prosopon* (scil. the humanity) of whom the creed had predicated suffering and resurrection [67]. There are also a number of instances where this formula is used to indicate that something is to be understood as said by the *homo assumptus*. For instance, in Psalm II, the words: « Ego constitutus sum rex ab eo » are taken as said: « ex persona suscepti hominis, qui est crucifixus » [68]. Similarly, the words: « Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu », are spoken « from the *prosopon* of the man assumed » [69]. Again, in the Commentary on St. John, the words: « Ego scio quia semper me audis » (Jo. 11: 41) are said to be « from the *prosopon* of the man »[70].

The first question which arises is whether such use of the term *prosopon* with reference to the *homo assumptus* is, in itself, a proof that Theodore really thought of this « man » as a person in the strict sense of the word. In other words, can such phrases be accepted as *prima facie* evidence of Theodore's Nestorianism? It would seem that this would be unwarranted. A study of Theodore's exegetical works shows that when he uses this phrase: « from the prosopon of », the word *prosopon* is not used in a strict, philosophical sense, but in a much more elastic meaning. The phrase: « from the *prosopon* of », is a technical phrase of Theodore's exegesis, whereby he

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66 *Cat. Hom.* VII, 13 (p. 181).

67 *Ibid.*, p. 183.

68 *Comm. in Psalm*, ed. Devreesse, p. 11, lines 1-2.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 280, lines 25-28.

70 Vosté, p. 163, line 10. Vosté translates « ex *parte* hominis », but the Syriac uses *parsopa* which undoubtedly represents the Greek *prosopon*.

indicates either *who* is speaking, *of whom* one is speaking, or *for whom* one is speaking. But this « who » or « whom » is not necessarily a person in the strict sense; it can be an individual, a group, or even the whole human race. To give a few examples: when Christ said: « I shall be with you all days », (*Mt.* 28, 20) Theodore explains that while this « you » was said « in the *prosopon* of the Apostles », it was meant to include all those who would come to believe [71]. Similarly, when St. Paul begins *Col.* 1: 21 with the words « Et vos », Theodore remarks: (Paulus) « ... convertit verbum ad eorum personam ... transit ad personam Colossensium » [72]. Again, the phrase: « Convenerunt in unum » of *Psalm* 2: 2, is described as: « dictum tam ex persona populi quam principum » [73]. Finally, when St. Paul, in *I Cor.* 15: 52 says: « et nos immutabimur », Theodore remarks that by his use of the form « we », Paul has « taken upon himself the *prosopon* of the living » [74]. In this case it is the whole living human race which is included in this *prosopon.*

It seems evident, then, that the fact that Theodore spoke of « the prosopon of the man assumed » in such phrases as we have seen, does not in itself constitute proof that he considered this man to be a person in the strict sense. But on the other hand, it cannot be denied that this manner of speaking is a further indication of the fact that Theodore seemed to look upon the *homo assumptus* as the real subject of the human predicates. In other words, when Theodore distinguishes between the Word and the man, his attitude seems to be: « *Who* is speaking here? » — « *Of whom* are they speaking here? » This is especially evident in the case we have mentioned above, where he says that the words of the Creed: « to judge the living and the dead », are said « of the *prosopon* of the man assumed ». His whole attitude in this passage responds to the question: « Who is it who will come, the Word or the man assumed? » And he answers [75]:

> Car celui qui vient, manifestement, c'est cet homme en vérité, qui fut assumé de nous; lui qui viendra du ciel, et

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71 *Cat. Hom.* X, 16 (p. 269-270).
72 Swete, *op. cit.* I, 277-278.
73 *Comm. in Psalm.* Devreesse, p. 9, lines 26-28.
74 *Cat. Hom.* VII, 12 (p. 179).
75 *Cat. Hom.* VII, 14 (p. 183).

c'est de lui qu'à bon droit il est dit qu'il se déplace d'un lieu à un autre ...

How, then, can one explain the word « again » in the creed: since this man will come from heaven for the first time at the judgement? Theodore replies:

> Ils ajoutèrent « encore », pour indiquer, comme par un signe, la divinité du (Fils) Unique qui est en lui, de laquelle il lui échoit de recevoir une telle dignité. ... C'est elle qui, « encore » dans le monde à venir, viendra en ce même homme que pour nous elle assuma.

In other words, it is really the man of whom they say « he will come », although the divinity will come too, being in him. This seems to make « the man » the real subject *in recto* of whom this part of the Creed speaks.

So far we have discussed Theodore's use of the term « prosopon » with reference to the *homo assumptus*, in those cases where he intends thereby to distinguish the man from the Word. There is also an instance where he uses this term to distinguish the man assumed from other men. As we have seen previously, Theodore takes the words of Christ: « Ascendo ad Patrem meum et Patrem vestrum », as said by the *homo assumptus*. He further explains this as follows [76]:

> (*Homo assumptus*) ... et Patrem cum discipulis vocabat Deum, et ipse gratia adoptionem meritus; et Deum etiam (suum appellat), quia ab eo cum ceteris hominibus ut esset accepit. Unde propter communitatem quidem naturae *Patrem meum et Patrem vestrum* dicit, et *Deum meum et Deum vestrum;* divisit autem suam personam ab ipsis, indicans excellentiorem gratiam acceptam, propter quam coniunctus Deo Verbo tamquam verus filius ab omnibus honoratur hominibus.

In this case, Theodore distinguishes between the nature of the *homo assumptus* and his person; his nature he has in common with other men, but his person is distinct from theirs. In this instance, by the expression « his person », he seems to mean the individuality of the *homo assumptus*:

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[76] Vosté, p. 251. For the preceding context, see above, p. 219.

that which differentiates this man Jesus from the Apostles with whom he shares human nature. Can it be that this « person » whereby the *homo assumptus* is distinct from other men, is actually to be understood as the Person of the Word? It hardly seems possible that this is Theodore's meaning. This *homo assumptus* is, like other men, an *adoptive* son of God; he distinguishes himself from them because of « a more excellent grace », not because « his person » is, properly speaking, the Divine Person of the Word. Hence it seems that Theodore, speaking of the « person » of the *homo assumptus* here, means that whereby this « man Jesus assumed by the Word » is differentiated from all other men; that whereby he is Jesus, and not Peter or James or John.

This use of the word « person » of the *homo assumptus* may shed some light on the disputed passage of the *De Incarnatione*, where, according to the Greek text cited by Leontius, Theodore speaks of the *prosopon* of the man [77]. In this passage, according to Leontius' version, Theodore says that when the « two natures » are considered as distinct from one another, each has its own *prosopon*, but that when we consider the union, then we speak of one *prosopon*. Now, as we have seen, Theodore speaks of this « human nature » in highly personal, concrete terms; the Word assumed « one man »; this man is « the one born of Mary »; he is « the man Jesus who was assumed by the Word ». In other words, even when considered as distinct from the Word, this « man assumed » has his own individuality; he is « the man Jesus », and not Peter or Paul, etc. It may well be that this is what Theodore had in mind when saying that when considered as distinct from the Word, this nature has a *prosopon*: scil. it has all those individuating notes which distinguish « Jesus » from all other men.

It is still another question as to what Theodore means when he says that « when we consider the union, we say that there is one *prosopon* ». We shall postpone any further discussion of this problem until we come to treat the question of the « one person ». For the time being, it will suffice to point out that Theodore's use of the term *prosopon* seems

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77 See above, p. 64 ff., where we have discussed this text at length, pointing out our reasons for doubting the accuracy of the Syriac version.

elastic enough so that he would see no contradiction in saying that while each of the natures, considered by itself, has its own *prosopon,* still, they constitute one *prosopon* in their union.

It does not seem certain that Theodore's use of the term *prosopon* with reference to the *homo assumptus* would in itself suffice to prove that he considered the man to be a person in the strict sense in which we now use the word. But it cannot be denied that there are many aspects of Theodore's teaching which contribute to the impression that he conceived of « the man Jesus assumed by the Word » as a human *suppositum,* as the ultimate subject of the human predicates, as a person in his own right, distinct from the Divine Person of the Word. We have considered it important to bring out this aspect of Theodore's teaching, in the first place, because it is a distinctive characteristic of his christology, and one that should not be glossed over or minimized. Secondly, if we are going to form a just estimate of what Theodore really meant by his union of the « two natures » in « one person », it is necessary to be cognizant of the concrete, personal sense in which he used the term « nature ». As we have seen, while he uses the abstract terms, « the human nature », and « the humanity », it is evident that this « nature » is really « the man Jesus assumed by the Word », — a man to whom Theodore gives many characteristics which suggest that he is a person distinct from the Word. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Theodore explicitly taught that Christ was not two persons, but one. The question remains, therefore, whether, by his teaching on the union of these two natures in one person, Theodore shows that despite his language with reference to the *homo assumptus,* he really had a sound concept of the incarnation. This is the question to which we must now address ourselves.

III. Theodore's concept of the incarnation

The first question that naturally comes to mind when investigating an author's concept of the incarnation is: how does he understand John 1: 14 — « Et verbum caro factum est »? Fortunately, the *Commentary on St. John* is one of the few works of Theodore that have been preserved in their

entirety; hence we have his authentic exegesis of this crucial text. His development is relatively brief, and its importance warrants quoting it here [78].

> *Et Verbum caro factum est.* Modo valde conspicuo usus est verbo hoc. « Ecce, inquit, dignatum est tamquam caro fieri ». Cum haec revera opinio esset videntium eum, — quia tam demisse in homine erat et hoc solum a multis credebatur prout apparebat — ideo ad explicandum verbum *erat* adiungit: ... *et tabernaculum fixit in nobis;* id est, hoc sensu factus est caro, quatenus habitavit in natura nostra. ... Atque usitatum esse Scripturae, a *carne* totum hominem designare, notum est; v. gr.: *Ad te omnis caro veniet.* Ideo et hic evidenter significans: (*Verbum*) *factum est in homine,* dixit: *caro factum est.* At non acsi mutatus esset, dixit *factum est,* sed quia propter apparentiam ita esse credebatur. ... Aut enim « factum est » contenderunt significare « conversum est »; quod, opinione nostra, nonnisi ab insipientibus dici potest; aut verba illa sicut plerique intellexerunt. De cetero ipse evangelista sufficienter se explicat, verbis *factum est* apponendo haec: *habitavit in nobis.*

The first point to be noted is that Theodore clearly interprets « *caro* factum est » to mean « *homo* factum est »; the word « flesh » is to be understood as « man ». How then is « factum est » to be understood? Here Theodore acknowledges only two possibilities: either « factum est » means « conversum est », implying a real change on the part of the Divine Word — or « factum est » is to be interpreted in the light of the words which follow in St. John's text: « et habitavit in nobis ». As the first of these suggestions is manifestly contrary to the divinity of the Word, Theodore chooses the second. Therefore, « Verbum caro factum est » is to be taken: « Verbum factum est *in homine* ». Or as he also paraphrases it: « Hoc sensu factus est caro, quatenus habitavit in natura nostra ». As we have seen in the preceding section, there is no real difference to be looked for between the expressions: « in homine » and « in natura nostra ». When Theodore speaks of « human nature » in this connection he means precisely « the man », the concrete individual in whom the Word took up his dwelling.

« Factum est *homo* », therefore, means: « factum est *in*

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[78] Vosté, p. 23.

homine ». The basic concept of the incarnation, it would seem, is one of inhabitation, of indwelling in a man. There is a further idea present, however, which evidently is intended to explain how St. John could say: « he became man » when he meant only: « he came to be *in* a man ». One may say that the Word *become* man *in the opinion of men;* « quia tam demisse *in homine* erat, et hoc solum a multis credebatur prout apparebat ». In this sense Theodore paraphrases: « Verbum caro factum est » as « dignatum est tamquam caro fieri ». The second concept therefore is that of *seeming* to become a man. The Word could not really become a man, since this could only be understood as implying real change. Therefore he seems to become a man, by taking up his habitation in a man, and being thought to be a man by those who were not aware who was within.

These same two concepts appear very clearly in Theodore's paraphrase of the words of Christ: « Exivi a Patre et veni in mundum, iterum relinquo mundum et vado ad Patrem ». He understands them as spoken by the Word, and interprets them as follows [79]:

> Quod ergo dicit, sic sonat: In homine fuit; et tamquam homo ab illis, qui non cognoscebant me, reputatus sum; atque per eum omnia pro salute hominum feci; eundemque assumsi, ut in me coniungerem eum Patri.

There is no question but that Theodore understands the words: « Exivi a Patre et veni in mundum » to be a statement of the incarnation. And just as in the exegesis of John 1: 14, here again we find that the incarnation means that the Word came to be *in a man* in such a way as to be *believed to be* a man.

At the end of his treatment of John 1: 14, Theodore referred to a more thorough treatment of this matter to be found in the *De Incarnatione.* Unfortunately we have only fragments from which to piece together a picture of what Theodore had said there. However, there is no reason to believe that the basic ideas would be substantially different from those expressed in the exegesis of John, since he explicitly refers his readers to the *De Incarnatione,* with no suggestion that he would now wish to change anything which

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[79] *Ibid.*, p. 217. The scriptural text is John 16: 28.

he had said in the earlier work. In fact, the evidence of the fragments does indicate that the same basic notions of the incarnation were developed in the *De Incarnatione,* as we have found in the *Commentary on St. John.* Facundus quotes a passage from the ninth book, wherein we find a striking similarity of treatment [80].

> Si utique quod dictum est *Verbum caro factum est,* secundum aliquam conversionem dictum est, quomodo *inhabitavit* suscipiendum est? Palam est enim omnibus, quia quod inhabitat, aliud est quam quod inhabitatur. Inhabitavit enim in nobis, nostram naturam sumens et habitans, et in ea omnia salutis nostrae dispensas. Quomodo ergo inhabitans caro factum est Dei Verbum? Palam est quia non conversus, neque translatus; non enim inhabitare diceretur.

Here again we find the idea that in order to avoid interpreting « factum est » as a real change on the part of the Word, one must interpret it in the light of the following phrase: « et habitavit in nobis ». Unfortunately, Facundus has closed his citation with a question still unanswered: « Quomodo inhabitans caro factum est Dei Verbum? » In other words, if the incarnation is an *indwelling* of the Word in a man, how can he be said to have *become* a man? From the *Commentary on St. John* we surmise that the answer in the text would have been: he becomes a man in the opinion of those who think he is merely a man.

This surmise is confirmed by a fragment from this same ninth book of the *De Incarnatione,* quoted by Leontius; it is almost certainly the reply to the question left unanswered in Facundus' citation. The translation is ours [81]:

> We have found, therefore,that this word ἐγένετο can be taken in no other sense than κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν — a meaning which we have accurately shown above that this word has in other passages of Sacred Scripture, especially when it is used with reference to the Lord. It is in appearance, then, that « The Word became flesh ». In appearance, not in the sense that he did not take real flesh, but in the sense that he did not become flesh. For when the Scripture says: « he took », this is said not in appearance but in reality. But when it says: « he became », then it is said according to ap-

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80 Facundus, *op. cit. P.L.* 67, 762 a.

81 Leontius' fragment 8, *P.G.* 66, 981 c-d.

> pearance. For he was not changed into flesh. One must attend to the mind of the Evangelist; thus one will come to know the meaning of what is said.

There is no question but that Theodore is on solid ground when he insists that « caro factum est » cannot be taken in the sense of a real change on the part of the Word. But it is clear that he sees no alternative between the real change into flesh, and a « becoming man » in mere appearance. This is certainly the same concept which we met in the Commentary on St. John: the Word dwells in a man in such a way as to be *thought* a man. It is not a question of docetism; the man is real enough. But the Word does not become man; it is merely that he is hidden within the man in so humble a way as to be taken for a man by those who do not know who is within.

In the passage which we have quoted from Leontius, he refers to a previous treatment of the meaning of the word ἐγένετο in Holy Scripture. By chance, we possess a confirmation of this reference in one of the fragments of the *De Incarnatione* preserved in the Syriac *cod. 14669*. As we have remarked previously, this manuscript consists of a number of loose folia, preserved at random from what must have been a complete version of the work of Theodore. One of these folia is taken from the section where the point at issue was precisely the meaning of ἐγένετο in Holy Scripture [82]. We have neither the beginning nor the conclusion of the discussion, but there can be no doubt but that this is the section to which Theodore referred, when he spoke (in the citation of Leontius) of having shown that the word ἐγένετο is frequently to be understood « according to appearance ». Two of the texts discussed in the fragment of *cod. 14669* are: *Gal.* 3: 13, « factus pro nobis maledictum », and *Phil.* 2: 7, « in similitudinem hominum factus ». In each case, Theodore takes the word γενόμενος in the sense of κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν. Sachau translates the Syriac version: « in existimatione », and « tamquam in opinione » [83]. This random page of the Syriac version definitely corroborates the citation of Leontius on this point.

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[82] Sachau, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.
[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

If, therefore, we combine the two citations which we have quoted from Book Nine of the *De Incarnatione* (that of Facundus, and that of Leontius), we find the same two notions which formed the basis of Theodore's exegesis of John 1: 14; scil., that the Word became man only in the sense that he came to be *in a man*, and thus came to be *thought to be a man* by those who did not know who was within. We find these same concepts involved in Theodore's exegesis of the most important Pauline text on the incarnation, namely, *Phil.* 2: 7, « semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens in similitudinem hominum factus ». Here is Theodore's paraphrase of this text, in his commentary on this epistle [84]:

> Ad hoc etiam exemplum aptasse visus est, siquidem Christus, ad Patrem secundum divinam naturam aequalitatem vindicans, adquievit in hominem habitare, et sic exiguam apud homines opinionem adquirere, ita ut nec existimarent eum aliud quid tunc esse praeter hominem solum, quod et esse videbatur ...

Here again we find the two concepts of *indwelling* and being *thought to be a man.* There can be no doubt that the notion of the incarnation invoked to explain *John* 1: 14, runs consistently through these exegetical and dogmatic works of Theodore. « Caro factum est », means nothing else than: « Factum est *in* homine, ita ut homo *crederetur* ».

It is not surprising, therefore, that Theodore's most ordinary way of expressing the relation of Word and man in these works is in terms of inhabitation. It is to be found *passim* in the *Commentary on St. John*: a few examples will suffice to show how it is employed. When describing the « economy of salvation », Theodore speaks as follows [85]:

> Quando ergo hanc (mortem) Dominus noster Deus voluit solvere, et homines reddere incorruptibiles, eosque dignos facere magno honore, principium omnium assumpsit unum hominem in quo habitavit Deus Verbum, ac fecit ut operaretur et toleraret omnia quae hominem decent, vitam integerrimam ducendo.

The leaders of the Jews, plotting to put Christ to death, are described as: « nescientes virtutem et sapientiam eius

84 *Comm. in Ep. ad Phil.*, Swete, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 224.

85 Vosté, p. 224.

qui erat in eo qui passus est » [86]. Similarly, the last judgement will be made by the *homo assumptus*: « non quod suapte natura habeat tantam dignitatem, sed quia Deus Verbum habitat in eo, per quem communicat cum Patre » [87]. Not only in the *Commentary on St. John*, but also in the other exegetical works, this notion of inhabitation is frequently to be met. For example, in the *Commentary on the Psalms*, we find such an expression as: « Susceptus itaque homo ius super omnia dominationis accepit ab inhabitatore suo, Verbo suo ... » [88]. Likewise, in the Commentary on *I Timothy*, where Theodore speaks of the heresy of Simon Magus, he does so in the following terms [89]:

> (Simon Magus) ... carnis denegabat factam fuisse adsumptionem; dicebat enim phantasmate solo dominum adparuisse in carne, ita ut non videretur caro tali ratione honore et diligentia videri, siquidem et inhabitatione divina digna fuerit.

Finally, in a passage of the *De Incarnatione* preserved in the Syriac version of *Cod. 14669*, Theodore describes the whole economy of salvation in terms of the inhabitation of the Word in a man [90]:

> Beatus David gratia Spiritus Sancti totam gubernationem quae futura erat praevidit, et Deum creatorem universi propensum futurum et inhabitaturum esse in homine salvationis nostrae causa et eum similitudinem servi esse assumturum et eam secum unam (parem) redditurum et unione cum ea universum recturum esse. Miratus autem est de misericordia eius

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86 *Ibid.*, p. 186.

87 Vosté, p. 119.

88 *Le commentaire ... sur les Psaumes*, (ed. Devreesse), p. 11.

89 Swete, vol. II, p. 136. Cf. also *ibid.* p. 134, where the « dogma de Christo » is described as a mystery: — « eo quod deitas Unigeniti inerat in homine ... ».

90 Sachau, p. 48. Cf. also *ibid.* p. 33, where the ignorance of the Jews is described: « ... patet iis non esse cognitionem de Deo Verbo, neque naturam divinam, quae inhabitabat in homine, intellegebant ». And also p. 40, where Theodore explains the fact that Satan tempted Christ: « Perspicuum est, si hic qui assumptus est non fuisset homo, et si certamen cum calumniatore constituisset, hic cum eo non pugnasset, ut eum tentaret. Hic enim talem eum esse putabat, qualis apparebat, quum naturam divinam quae in eo inhabitavit, non sentiret. Quod si perspectum habuisset, non ausus esset, ut eum tentaret ».

> et stupefactus est de multitudine honoris hominum, quod nos hujus dignitatis dignatus est, ut inhabitaret in natura nostra ...

There seems to be little doubt, therefore, that in these exegetical and dogmatic works, Theodore's basic concept of the incarnation is that of the indwelling of the Word in a man. As we have seen, the reason why he understands « homo factus est » to mean « in homine fuit », is that he cannot see any more profound sense in which the Word could *become* man without suffering a transformation of his nature. The reason for this, we believe, is that Theodore did not recognize any sense in which the term: « man » could be used, except to signify a concrete human nature. He does not seem to have recognized that broader sense in which one could use the term « man » to mean « one possessing human nature; one who has made human nature his own ». As we saw in a previous chapter, it was such a notion of « man » which allowed Athanasius to say that the Word had really *become* man, since he had « made his own » a human body and all its operations. Theodore does not seem to have come in contact with Athanasius' theory of the incarnation.

On the other hand, he certainly did come into contact with the Apollinarist theory, and rejected it without reserve. As we have seen, the Apollinarist idea of man was that of a « spirit having flesh »; hence they insisted that the Word really became man, since the union of the Word with flesh perfectly fulfilled the definition of man. God the Word, as the Spirit, vivifying and directing the activities of his human body, was the *Homo Caelestis*. Theodore decisively rejected this theory: his words in doing so are as follows [91]:

> Omni igitur ratione hi vituperandi sunt, quod stultissime loquuntur, quia cognomine hominis Deus Verbum cum carne non cognoscitur. Notum autem est Scripturam semper, ubi cognomen hominis de Christo commemorat, indicare naturam hominis, quae perfecta ab eo assumpta est ad redemptionem nostram, eam naturam quam Scriptura in consuetudine habet hoc cognomine appellare.

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91 *De Incarnatione*, section 66; Lagarde frag. 18, p. 105; *trad.* Sachau, pp. 67-68.

Now the point to be noticed here is that Theodore flatly declares that the term « man », referring to Christ, in Holy Scripture, is never to be understood to mean anything but « the human nature which was assumed ». It is evidently this rigid application of the meaning of the term « man » which has dictated Theodore's exegesis of John 1: 14. For if « man » can only mean « the human nature », then it is obvious that the Word cannot really become man, he can only come to be in a man. In excluding the Apollinarist error, Theodore seems to have equally excluded any sense in which it could be said that the Word had really become man. The concept « man » for Theodore did not admit that broader sense in which the Word, as a Person having made human nature his own, could be properly called a man. It is clear, then, why Theodore could not see any middle course between taking the incarnation as a real change into a man, and taking it as he does, as the indwelling of the Word in a man. The Word could not become « a human nature », and this is the only sense in which Theodore will admit the use of the term « man ». Hence the Word could not possibly become man; he could only come to be in a man.

We conclude, therefore, that Theodore's use of the concept of « inhabitation in a man » to describe the incarnation, is no mere accident of terminology: it is really his basic idea of the meaning of « Verbum caro factum est » — scil.: « Verbum factum est in homine ». We have seen that this was the substantial point of his exegesis of John 1: 14, and there is good reason to believe that the treatment of the incarnation in his work *De Incarnatione* was a more thorough development of this same idea. We have also seen that the concept of inhabitation in a man is a constant theme, running through the exegetical works. It is Theodore's ordinary way of referring to the relationship between the Word and the man.

The question which now arises is whether the doctrine which Theodore proposed to his catechumens in the *Catechetical Homilies* shows a different concept of the incarnation from the one which we have seen in the exegetical and dogmatic works. In particular, it will be important to see whether the meaning which Theodore sees in the « homo factus est » of the Creed, will be really different from the one which he gave to « caro factum est » of the Gospel of St. John.

Our question will be: how does he really understand the words of the Creed: « he became man »?

Naturally, in explaining the Creed, phrase by phrase, to his catechumens, Theodore has frequent occasion to use the very expression of the symbol, scil. « the Word became man ». The use of this consecrated formula to express the fact of the incarnation gives to certain passages of the *Catechetical Homilies* an undeniable ring of orthodoxy [92]. But here, it seems to us, is the situation where one must « get behind the terminology », in order to see what the formula of the Creed really meant to Theodore. In this respect, the fact that he will employ the words of the Creed: « he became man », really does not solve the question as to how he understood them. We know from his authentic exegesis of John 1: 14 that he understood « caro factum est » to mean « factum est in homine »; that the Word became man only in the opinion of those who did not know who was dwelling within the man. There is good reason to suspend judgement, therefore, when Theodore uses the formula of the Creed; the question remains: does he really see any more profound a meaning here than he saw in « caro factum est »?

The answer to this question must be sought in those passages where Theodore puts the formulae of the Creed into his own words: when he interprets or paraphrases them in the course of his homilies. It is only thus that we can be sure of the real meaning which they had for him. In order to do this we must examine a number of passages of the *Catechetical Homilies* in detail. The first passage to be considered is the one where Theodore is explicitly treating the words of the Creed: « descendit de caelis, incarnatus et homo factus est ». It is a rather long passage, but because of its importance we believe it warrants quotation [93]:

> « Qui à cause de nous hommes, et à cause de notre salut descendit du ciel ». Qu'est-ce donc que sa descente et quel en est le but? et que fit (l'homme) pour que, à cause de lui,

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92 For example, *Hom.* V, 7 (Tonneau p. 109): « En effet, ' forme d'homme ' n'indique rien d'autre si ce n'est qu'il devint homme » ... « A juste titre donc nos pères bienheureux dirent: ' qui s'est incarné et devint homme ', pour indiquer qu'il devint homme selon le témoignage du bienheureux Paul, et que c'est pour le salut de tous, qu'il réalisa cette ' économie ' ».

93 *Cat. Hom.* V, 5-7 (pp. 107-109). Cf. *Vig. cap.* 37 and 41.

(le Fils Unique) s'abaissât à ce point qu'il devint homme et prit la forme d'esclave? Et pour notre salut il accepta de devenir homme et de se manifester à tous. Et tout ce qui (appartient) à la nature de l'homme il le prit sur soi: étant éprouvé en toutes ses facultés, il le perfectionna de sa puissance; — au point que, même quand il reçut la mort selon la loi de sa nature, il ne s'en éloigna pas; mais étant avec lui, par l'opération de la grâce, il l'arracha à la mort et à la corruption du tombeau, le ressuscita d'entre les morts et lui accorda cet honneur sublime qu'il lui avait promis avant de subir la mort, quand il disait: *Détruisez ce temple et en trois jours je le redresserai* (Jo. 2: 19): ce qu'il accomplit. Et ni dans son crucifiement il ne s'en sépara, ni dans la mort il ne s'en éloigna. Mais il demeura jusqu'à ce que, par le secours de sa puissance, il ait rompu les liens de la mort et délivré son âme des liens indissolubles; et il le ressuscita d'entre les morts et le transféra en une vie qui ne meurt pas, le fit immortel, incorruptible et immuable, et le fit monter au ciel ou maintenant *il est assis à la droite de Dieu* ... (Eph. 1: 20-21) selon le témoignage du bienheureux Paul, et continuellement de toute la creation il reçoit l'adoration à cause de sa conjonction exacte avec Dieu le Verbe. C'est donc à bon droit que nos pères bienheureux dirent: « qui s'est incarné et devint homme », (celui) qui pour notre salut réalisa une telle économie d'être cru un homme commun par ceux qui ne connaissaient pas la divinité demeurant en Lui, mais dont toute l'attention était pour ce qui se voyait.

The first few lines of this passage give the impression of a really new and more profound concept of the incarnation: « the Word has become man; he has taken upon himself all that belongs to the nature of man ». Here, it would seem, is a concept of « homo factus est » which is much more substantial than a mere: « factus est in homine ». And yet, without warning, we suddenly find that when this is translated into Theodore's own terms, it is a question of the Word being *with* the man; of being *present* to him, by the operation of his grace; of *not separating himself from this man* even in his crucifixion and death. Are we not back in the same concept of « homo factus est » which we saw in the exegesis of John 1: 14 — whereby the Word has become man only in the sense that he is *in* this man who suffers and dies? Moreover, in the last sentence which we have quoted, do we not find the second of the two notions which we met in the

commentary on St. John: namely, that the Word has become man in the sense that he « realized such an economy as to be *believed* to be a man? » Both elements of the exegesis of John 1: 14 are present: incarnation by inhabitation; incarnation κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν. The significant point is that this passage begins with what sounds like a more profound concept of « homo factus est », and yet, when Theodore puts this formula into his own terms, it is found to mean nothing more than an extraordinary presence of God the Word in a man.

In the section of Homily Five which follows the one which we have just quoted, Theodore develops at length the idea that the Word « assumed both of our natures: a body and a rational soul ». Here again one could get the impression of a more profound concept of the incarnation, whereby the Word, assuming a human body and soul, really could be said to become man. And yet, when Theodore comes to sum up this development, we find that the concept of the incarnation is still basically that of the indwelling of the Word in a man. His summary is as follows [94].

> Mais nos pères bienheureux mirent en garde sur tout cela, en disant: « qui s'est incarné et devint homme », afin que nous croyions qu'il est un homme parfait, celui qui fut assumé et en qui demeura Dieu le Verbe, — lui qui fut parfait en tout selon la nature humaine et dont l'état resultait d'un corps mortel et d'une âme intelligente, car c'est « pour l'homme et pour son salut qu'il descendit du ciel ». A bon droit, ils dirent qu'il prit un homme semblable à ceux d'entre lesquels il fut pris; car l'homme qu'il assuma, étant semblable à Adam qui introduisit le péché dans le monde, il abolirait le péché par ce qui lui était connaturel. Et il se revêtit d'un homme semblable à Adam, qui, après avoir péché, avait reçu une sentence de mort, afin que par un (être) semblable fût extirpé de nous le péché et abolie la mort.

Who is « this man like Adam » with whom the Word « clothed himself »? A few pages further on in the same homily we find the answer [95]:

> ... c'est Dieu qui fut pour nous cause de tout bien et que c'est lui qui donna la victoire sur tout ce qui est contraire, soit la mort, soit le péché ou n'importe quel mal qui en pro-

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[94] *Cat. Hom.* V, 17 (pp. 123-125).
[95] *Cat. Hom.* V, 21 (pp. 129-131).

> vienne; c'est lui qui, pour nous, se revêtit de Notre-Seigneur Jésus, homme, et par la résurrection d'entre les morts le fit passer à la vie nouvelle et le fit asseoir à sa droite; et à nous, par sa grace, il donnera société avec lui ...

This passage makes it perfectly clear that « clothing himself with a man » cannot be taken to mean that the Word in any real sense became man. For if the Word had become man, he could hardly be conceived as « making the man Jesus sit at his right hand ». The metaphor of « clothing » is merely another expression of Theodore's basic concept that « homo factus est » means nothing else than « factus est *in* homine: scil., in homine Jesu ».

The same idea is also fundamental to Theodore's understanding of the Pauline expression of the incarnation: « formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus » (Phil. 2: 7). We have already seen that in the commentary on this Epistle, Theodore explained this text in terms of « dwelling in a man », and « being thought to be a man by those who did not know who was within ». In order to realize how this text is to be understood when Theodore employs it in his *Catechetical Homilies*, one should be aware that he interprets such phrases as: « the form of a servant » and « the likeness, or form, of a man » as synonymous with the concrete term: a man. We have pointed out this fact, where we discussed his use of the term: « human nature ». Hence, in Theodore's usage, to say that the Word came to be *in* the form of a servant, or *in* the likeness of a man, means nothing else than to say: the Word came to be *in a man*. This can be seen in a passage of the *Catechetical Homilies* where Theodore explains *Phil.* 2: 6-7. Having quoted the Pauline text, Theodore comments [96]:

> Ici encore il rend évidente la distinction des natures et que celle-là est la forme de Dieu et celle-ci est forme d'esclave; que celle-là assuma et que celle-ci fut assumée; et que celui qui assuma devint, en celui qui fut assumé, en la forme d'homme, mais celui qui fut assumé était véritablement forme d'homme, en qui était celui qui l'assuma. Et celui qui assuma, — n'étant pas homme mais, de sa nature, incorporel et non composé, — devint en la forme d'esclave, (forme) qui avait naturellement corps et composition; et c'est selon la loi du corps

[96] *Ibid.* VI, 5 (pp. 139-141).

humain qu'il se trouva être homme. Et c'est ainsi qu'il se cacha lui-même au temps où il fut dans le monde: il conversa avec les hommes, en sorte que tous ceux qui le voyaient vivre en homme et ne connaissant rien d'autre, pensaient qu'il fût un homme commun.

Here also we see the notion that by remaining « hidden within the man », the Word was *thought to be* a man by those who did not know the truth. The two concepts which explained John 1: 14 still underly Theodore's thinking in the *Catechetical Homilies.*

In another passage of the homilies we see that while Theodore multiplies his expressions to convey the idea of the incarnation, they are all ultimately reduced to the notion of « indwelling in a man ». Explaining the phrase: « descendit de caelis », Theodore comments [97]:

> Et pour nous apprendre comment il descendit, « Il devint homme », dirent-ils. Et ce ne fut pas par une simple providence qu'il s'abaissa, ni par le don d'un secours puissant comme il fit maintes fois, et encore maintenant; mais c'est notre nature même qu'il assuma et dont il se revêtit et en qui il fut et habita, afin, par la passion, de la rendre parfaite, et c'est à elle qu'il s'unit. (Nos pères dirent cela) pour faire connaître par là le don de sa grâce que l'on voit envers le genre humain, *d'avoir assumé, (issu) de nous, un homme, et qu'en lui il fût et habitât.* Ils nous enseignèrent qu'il souffrit et subit tout selon la loi de la nature humaine, afin que nous comprenions que ce ne fut pas à la façon d'un simulacre qu'il fut homme, mais qu'en vérité il fut homme et, conformément à la nature humaine, subit ce qui est humain.

The last sentence which we have quoted here is an instance of a certain ambiguity which occurs in the *Catechetical Homilies,* and can lead to a false impression of Theodore's meaning if one does not examine the larger context. The question is: to whom does Theodore refer by the pronoun « he » when he says: « *he* suffered and underwent all things according to human nature ... *he* was man in truth, and, in conformity with human nature, underwent what is human ». At first reading, one could assume that it is the same « he » who was the subject of the previous sentence: scil., the Word,

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[97] *Ibid.,* VII, 1 (p. 161). (Emphasis ours).

who assumed the man and dwelt in him. In this case, one would conclude that Theodore is here making striking use of the communication of idioms, and is saying that the Word is truly a man, and suffers according to his human nature. But there is good reason to take the less obvious grammatical construction: the « he » who is truly man and suffers, is not the Word, but the man in whom he dwells. How can this be proved to have been Theodore's real thought here? The fact is that almost immediately after this sentence, he goes into a discussion of that part of the Creed beginning: « who was born of the Virgin Mary », etc. [98]. Our question, therefore, is identical with the question as to the meaning which Theodore gives to the pronoun « who » in the Creed. Who is it who can truly be said to have been born, to have died, etc.? Does this relative pronoun refer back to the *Word* who « became man », or does it refer more immediately to the word: *man*? We believe that the latter is the case: that Theodore really understands the Creed to mean: « The Word came to be *in* a man, who (scil., this man) was born of the Virgin Mary », etc. Hence all the following verbs of the Creed are predicated not of the Word, but of the man in whom the Word came to dwell. It is this man who was born, died, etc.

Now it must be admitted that this is not immediately evident in the passage which follows, since Theodore continues to use the pronoun: « he », or the name: « Christ », as the

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[98] It should be observed that the Creed which Theodore explains in these homilies is slightly different from the ordinary version of the Nicene Creed. He nowhere presents it as a whole, but, piecing together the phrases on which he comments, one arrives at the following form (in Tonneau's version): Je crois en un seul Dieu, le Père tout-puissant, auteur de toutes les choses, visibles et invisibles, et en un seul Seigneur Jésus-Christ, Fils de Dieu unique et premier-né de toutes les créatures, qui a été engendré du Père avant tous les siècles, et n'a pas été fait, vrai Dieu de vrai Dieu, connaturel à son Père, celui par qui furent constitués les mondes et fut créée toute chose. Qui à cause de nous, hommes, et à cause de notre salut, est descendu du ciel et s'est incarné et devint homme, qui est né de la Vierge Marie et a été crucifié au temps de Ponce-Pilate, et il fut enseveli et dans les trois jours il est ressuscité, comme l'avaient dit les Ecritures. Il est monté aux ciex; il est assis à la droite de Dieu, et il reviendra juger les vivants et les morts. Et en un seul Esprit-Saint, celui qui procède du Père, esprit vivificateur, et une église catholique, la remission des péchés, la resurrection du corps, et la vie éternelle.

subject of the sentences wherein he speaks of the passion, death, burial and resurrection. It is not until he comes to speak of the ascent into heaven that we have a certain indication of just who this « he » is of whom all these verbs have been predicated. But here Theodore expresses his thought in unmistakeable terms [99]:

> De même, en effet, que le Livre Saint dit d'Adam que Dieu le fit, et ajouta comment et d'où, et en quel lieu il le plaça pour mener cette vie; ainsi du Christ Notre-Seigneur aussi, — qui de nous fut assumé et fut selon notre nature à nous, —après avoir dit qu'il « ressuscita d'entre les morts », à bon droit ajoutèrent-ils: « Il est monté aux cieux » ...
>
> Puisque nous attendons de jouir de ces biens, dont eut les premices le Christ Notre-Seigneur, — lui dont se revêtit Dieu le Verbe et qui par la conjonction exacte mérita pour soi un tel honneur, et à nous aussi accorda l'espoir de lui être associés, — c'est donc à bon droit que l'Ecriture Sainte aussi nous apprend que non seulement il ressuscita d'entre les morts, mais aussi qu'il monta au ciel ... Mais ils joignirent aussi ceci à leur discours « Il est assis à la droite de Dieu »: premièrement, pour indiquer l'immense honneur que cet homme assumé reçut de sa communion avec Dieu le Verbe, qui s'en revêtit ...

From the sequence of the thought in this homily, it is beyond question that Theodore conceives the « man assumed » as the subject of all the verbs in this part of the Creed. It is this man to whom the pronoun « who » refers when the Creed says: « who was born of the Virgin Mary, etc. ». It is likewise this man who will come to judge the living and the dead; the « divinity » will come *with* him, since it is *in* him; but the real subject of the verb: « he will come » is definitely the « man assumed » [100].

We conclude, therefore, that the concept of the incarnation underlying Theodore's commentary on the Creed is not substantially different from that of his exegesis of John 1: 14. It seems certain that Theodore's genuine interpretation of « homo factus est, qui natus est de Maria Virgine », is really: « factus est in homine, qui (homo) natus est de Maria Virgine, etc. ». The real subject of the phrases: « who was

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[99] *Cat. Hom.* VII, 6 (p. 171); 9-10 (pp. 175-177).
[100] *Ibid.* 13-14 (pp. 181-183).

born, died », etc. is not the Word-made-man, but « the man assumed », the man in whom the Word came to dwell.

We do not mean to ignore the fact that Theodore insists on the idea that attributes referring either to the Word or to the man assumed are predicated « as of one person ». We shall discuss this question in a subsequent section. But before one can understand what he means by this « predication as of one person », it is essential to have a clear idea of what he means by « homo factus est ». We believe that we have shown that Theodore's genuine interpretation of this formula, both in his exegetical and dogmatic works, and in his homilies, is reduced to the idea: « Verbum factus est in homine; habitavit in homine ». As we have seen, the notion of inhabitation in a man is basic to his concept of the incarnation. It is this inhabitation which effects such a « conjunction » of the two natures as to result in « one person ». Hence, these are the notions which we shall examine in the following section, in an attempt to see what this « inhabitation » implies for Theodore, and how he conceives the « conjunction » of the two natures. It is only thus that we can come to know what he really means by the « one person » in whom the two natures are united.

IV. The nature of the union by inhabitation

We have seen that Theodore conceives of the incarnation as the inhabitation of the Word in the man assumed. It should not be imagined, however, that by this he means an ordinary case of divine indwelling: as we see in a passage preserved by Facundus, the inhabitation of the Word in the *homo assumptus* is something extraordinary, for by it the two natures are united in such a way as to effect one person by their union [101].

> Bonum est in hoc loco maxime concludere quid virtutis habeant ea quae dicta sunt, sive conversari, sive baptizari, sive crucifigi, sive mori, sive sepeliri et resurgere. Non puro alicui haec coaptantes homini dicimus: ... sed inhabitato quidem a Deo Verbo ab ipsa in utero matris plasmatione; inhabitato vero, non secundum communem inhabitationem, neque iuxta eam quae in multis intelligitur gratiam, sed juxta quam-

[101] *De Incarnatione* XIII, quoted by Facundus, *op. cit. P.L.* 67, 587 a-b.

dam excellentem, secundum quam etiam adunari dicimus utrasque naturas, et unam juxta adunationem effectam esse personam.

It should be noted that Theodore conceives of this « one person » as being *effected* by the union of the two natures. This is not the only place where this appears; we have had occasion previously to cite texts where the same notion is expressed [102]. From this fact it is clear how essential it is to have an accurate concept of what he understands by this « special kind of inhabitation ». For if the inhabitation brings about the union of the two natures, and the one person is effected by this union, then it follows logically that the nature of this « person » will depend directly on the nature of the inhabitation whereby the union is brought about. If this inhabitation involves a merely moral, or dynamic union of Word and man, then it would seem to follow that Theodore's « one person » will be no more than a moral or dynamic person. Hence the importance of knowing just what he meant by this extraordinary inhabitation.

The longest fragment of the *De Incarnatione* to have been preserved in the original Greek is precisely a discussion of this concept of inhabitation as applied to the relation of the Word to the man assumed [103]. The presupposition of the whole argument is that the union of God and man in the incarnation is to be explained as a kind of inhabitation of the Word in the *homo assumptus*. Accepting this premise, Theodore then proceeds to examine the various senses in which God can be said to dwell in his creatures. Having rejected indwelling by nature, and by operation (since these are common to all creatures), he settles on indwelling by good pleasure (*eudokia*), for in this sense God does not dwell in all men, but only in those with whom he is pleased by reason of their zealous devotion to Him. How does this indwelling by good pleasure manifest itself? In the fact that God willingly cooperates with, works with, and protects, those in whom he is well-pleased; God is near to such men by the attitude or disposition of his will, while in the same sense he is far-removed from those who are unworthy of his good-pleasure [104]. The characteristic note

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102 See above, pp. 75-76.

103 *De Inc.* VII, fragment 1 of Leontius, *P.G.* 66, 972-976.

104 *Ibid.*, 973 b-d.

of this indwelling, therefore, seems to be an attitude on the part of God whereby He is willing to grant special assistance, special cooperation, to those in whom he is pleased.

Having established this generic concept of inhabitation by *eudokia,* Theodore now proceeds to distinguish its species. In fact, he speaks of only two: inhabitation in the just, and inhabitation in the *homo assumptus.* In the case of the Apostles, or of other just men, God is well pleased as in men distinguished for virtue; but in the *homo assumptus* he is well pleased « as in a son ». This is the heart of the matter, as Theodore himself evidently realized, for he goes on:

> But what does this mean: as in a son? It means that in taking up his habitation, He has united the whole of the one assumed to Himself, and has brought it about that he should have a share in all the honor which He, the natural Son, who dwells in him, possesses: so as to be counted as one person, in virtue of His union with him, and to give him a share in all His dominion, and thus to accomplish all things in him, so as also to effect the examination and judgement of the whole world through him and his coming; while it is clear that one must recognize the difference in respect to those things which are proper to each nature.

Now the first question which arises is this: does Theodore conceive of this « dwelling by good pleasure as in a son » as a totally new genus of inhabitation by *eudokia*? In this case, there would seem to have been little point to his previous discussion, wherein he established the general notion of this type of indwelling. It would seem rather that he understands the generic definition of inhabitation by *eudokia* to hold even in this case. If this is true, then he still understands the inhabitation of the Word in the *homo assumptus* to be fundamentally a disposition or attitude on the part of God; essentially it consists of a disposition of God's will with respect to the man assumed [105]. In ordinary inhabitation, as in the just, this disposition of good pleasure shows itself in God's willingness

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[105] In confirmation of this point, one may note other fragments where this indwelling is said to consist in a disposition on the part of the Word: cf. *P.G.* 66, 989 d, and 992 c. We also cite a passage from the *Commentary on Ephesians* (Swete, I, p. 142): « Caput autem nostrum ille est, in quo divina natura *affectu inhabitat eliganti* ».

to protect, to cooperate with certain men, to work with them. Wherein does the difference lie in the case of the *homo assumptus*? In this case, the divine disposition shows itself in three respects:

1) God not only cooperates with the *homo assumptus*, but accomplishes all things in him.

2) The Natural Son of God shares his prerogatives: specifically his honor and his dominion, with the man assumed.

3) In virtue of the union effected between them, the Word and the man are counted as one person.

It will be recalled that in the passage which we have previously cited from Facundus, Theodore insisted that the indwelling of the Word in the man assumed was no ordinary inhabitation, but one such as to effect one person by the union which it established between the two natures. If, therefore, the union in one person is the effect of this special inhabitation, it would seem that the first two elements of the three which we have listed above, are the factors which provide the basis and the *ratio* of the third. Thus the union in one person would stand in relation to the other two factors as the effect to its cause. Is there any other evidence that this is the way Theodore coinceived it? There is another text from the *De Incarnatione* which points strongly in this direction. It is contained in a section of this work which we have discussed at length in a previous chapter [106]. There are two different versions of the passage in question: the Greek as quoted by Leontius, and the Syriac version of *cod. 14669*. It will be recalled that the Greek text speaks of the two natures as united in one *prosopon*, while the Syriac version speaks of union in one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*. We have indicated above our reasons for preferring the Greek text of Leontius. However, for our present purpose, this difference is of no great moment, since the two are in substantial agreement on the point with which we are now concerned. We shall quote Richard's French version of the Syriac text: [107]

> Mais lorsque nous voulons considérer l'union, nous proclamons que les deux natures sont une seule personne et une hypostase, reconnaissant qu'en raison de son union à la divinité

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106 See above, p. 64 ff.

107 *Mél. Sc. Rel.* 1945, p. 24. The corresponding text as given by Leontius is in *P.G.* 66, 981 c.

> la chair reçoit un honneur au dessus de la création et que la divinité accomplit tout en elle.

The Greek text corresponds with this except that it does not have the words « and one hypostasis ». But the point which comes out clearly in both versions is that when Theodore comes to explain what he means by this « union in one person », the two factors which he mentions are: the honor which accrues to the humanity, and the fact that the divinity « accomplishes all things in it ». Here again we find the two elements which came to the fore when Theodore was explaining the indwelling by good pleasure of the Word in the man assumed. These, then, would seem to be the factors on which his concept of the « unity in one person » is ultimately based.

In order to test this theory, we must now examine more carefully those passages where Theodore explains what he means by the inhabitation of the Word in the man, and by the conjunction of the two natures. We believe that this investigation will show that when Theodore indicates the factors on which this union is founded, it will be seen that it is a question of one of these two concepts: either the notion that the Word « works through the man », or the idea of the sharing of divine prerogatives with the man assumed. We shall begin with a study of the idea that the word « accomplishes all things » through the *homo assumptus*. Our point will be to see to what extent Theodore bases his doctrine of the union of the Word and the man on this element of union in activity.

A clear indication of the importance of this element in Theodore's thinking on the unity of person, is seen in a fragment cited by the fifth council from the seventh book of the *De Incarnatione* [108].

> Cognosci autem personae unitatem eo quod omnia per eum perficit; quae unitas facta est ex inhabitatione quae est secundum bonam voluntatem. Unde dicens Filium Dei judicem venturum esse de caelis, simul hominis et Dei Verbi adventum intelligimus; non quod similiter ei Deus Verbum traducitur secundum naturam, sed quod bona voluntate unitus omni modo cum eo erit ubicumque fuerit, eo quod et omnia perficit per eum.

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[108] *Acta Conc. Const. II*, Sess. IV, cap. 30 (Mansi IX, 216).

Here it is clear how essential to Theodore's notion of the unity of person is the idea that the Word « accomplishes all things through the man ». The inhabitation by good pleasure means that the Word is with the man assumed, and works through him.

It is true that this text is found only in the *capitula* of the fifth council. But there are texts in other sources which confirm it as the genuine thought of Theodore. For instance, there is the passage which we have already had occasion to cite from the *Commentary on St. John,* where Theodore paraphrases the words of Christ: « Exivi a Patre et veni in mundum; iterum relinquo mundum et vado ad Patrem » (John 16: 28). Taking the first part of this sentence as a statement of the incarnation, Theodore puts it into his own words as follows [109].

> Quod ergo dicit, sic sonat: In homine fui; et tamquam homo ab illis, qui non cognoscebant me, reputatus sum; atque per eum omnia pro salute hominum feci; eundemque assumpsi, ut in me coniungerem eum Patri.

Here, in order to explain: « veni in mundum », Theodore not only has the Word « in the man », but « working the salvation of men through him ». In other words, the full notion of this presence of God in the world, of his indwelling in the man, postulates the idea of the activity of the Word in and through the *homo assumptus.*

Another text of the same *Commentary on St. John* brings out even more clearly the importance of this notion of the co-activity of the Word and man in Theodore's explanation of the incarnation. Theodore is explaining the text: « Omne judicium dedit Filio », (Jo. 5: 22) and comments as follows [110]:

> Nam quia natura divina invisibilis est omnibus creaturis, iudex vero videatur oportet propter iudicandos, idcirco convenienter assumpsit Deus-Verbum hominem, in eo totam dispensationem complens pro salute nostra, deditque ei iudicare, faciens per ipsum iudicium, ut visibilis sit qui iudicat et praecipit.

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109 Vosté, p. 217.
110 *Ibid.,* pp. 82-83.

Another indication of the important part which this factor of « working through the *homo assumptus* » has in Theodore's idea of the incarnation is seen in a text which we have had occasion to mention above [111]. Here, in explaining the text: « Verbum caro factum est » in terms of « habitavit in nobis », Theodore gives a further detail which indicates wherein this inhabitation consists: « Inhabitavit enim in nobis, nostram naturam sumens et habitans, *et in ea omnia salutis nostrae dispensas* ». Likewise, in the *Catechetical Homilies* we see this notion that the Word accomplished the salvation of men through the *homo assumptus*, where the Word is spoken of in the following terms [112]:

> ... le (Fils) Unique de Dieu, — celui qui assuma celui qui était de la descendance de David et qui en lui demeurait, qui par son moyen exécuta toute l'économie pour notre salut, et lui fut conjoint et le fit s'élever au-dessus de toute la création ...

There is also a passage in the commentary on Epistle II to the Thessalonians, which indicates the importance of this element of « co-activity » in Theodore's idea of the incarnation. Here he is discussing the « man of sin » (II Thess. 2: 3), whom he sees as a kind of incarnation of Satan. He describes him in the following terms [113]:

> « Hominem » equidem eum nominavit iusta ratione, eo quod et homo erit, daemone in eo omnia inoperante, sicut et in illum hominem qui pro nostra salute sumptus est, Deus Verbum omnia perfecisse videtur. Temptat enim ille per omnia illa, quae Christi sunt, imitari, utpote et Christum se esse dicens.

Finally, there is a passage of the *De Incarnatione* found in the Syriac version of cod. 14669 which brings out this same point very clearly. Here Theodore is summing up a discussion of the eighth Psalm, which he sees as messianic [114]:

> Miratus autem est de misericordia eius et stupefactus est de multitudine honoris hominum, quod nos hujus dignitatis

111 See above, p. 231.

112 *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 3 (p. 189). For similar statements in the *Cat. Hom.* see *Hom.* V, 19 (p. 127) and *Hom.* VI, 10 (p. 149).

113 Swete, vol. II, p. 50-51.

114 Sachau, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

dignatus est, ut inhabitaret in natura nostra ... Et de his duobus miratus est, de uno quod eos qui ad malum sese verterunt, ad bonum reducit, de altero quod hanc actionem agit in homine tamquam in vase — eo quem tamquam principium ab omni genere nostro assumsit et omnia in eo paravit ad salvationem vitae nostrae.

From the texts which we have cited, it is clear that the idea that the Word « worked in and through the *homo assumptus* » played an important part in Theodore's concept of the inhabitation of the Word in this man whom He assumed. The « conjunction » which is established between these two natures is, at least in part, a union of operation, whereby the Word accomplished the salvation of mankind in and through the man assumed. Now in order to understand what Theodore means when he says that the Word accomplished the work of salvation through the man assumed, one must be familiar with his idea of the redemption. It is thus that one will see what part in this work of salvation was played by the Word and what by the man, and how Theodore conceives of the union of their activity.

There are a number of passages where Theodore briefly and clearly sets down his concept of the way in which our salvation was accomplished. Typical is the following passage of the Catechetical Homilies [115]:

C'est ainsi que, notre état ayant atteint au désespoir, Notre-Seigneur Dieu voulu dès lors, par sa grâce, en procurer l'amendement; pour cette raison, de nous il prit un homme qui fut observateur exact des lois divines; et, parce qu'il fut trouvé exempt de tout péché, il se montra libre de toute sentence de mort. Mais l'usurpateur, qui dès lors n'avait que faire, amena sur lui une mort injuste par les Juifs, ses serviteurs. Mais lui l'accepta de bon gré et eut devant Dieu, le juste juge, un procès contre (l'usurpateur); et il fut affranchi de la sentence de mort, parce que pris par elle iniquement et sans justice. Il devint absolument étranger à la mort, immortel et incorruptible par nature. Et c'est ainsi qu'il monta au ciel et fut élevé absolument au-dessus de (tout) maléfice et fraude de Satan, parce que celui-ci ne pouvait plus désormais rien faire à l'homme qui est immortel, incorruptible et immuable, habitant le ciel et ayant avec la nature divine une parfaite conjonction. Or, parce qu'il avait une telle assurance, l'hom-

115 *Cat. Hom.* XII, 9 (pp. 335-337).

> me assumé de nous fut fait légat pour la race, afin qu'en cette transformation excellente, le reste des hommes lui fût associé ...

Now from this description of the « work of our salvation », it is clear that the key point is the sinlessness of the *homo assumptus*.. If this is the case, how can it be said that the *Word* accomplishes our salvation? The answer is given in another passage of the *Catechetical Homilies* where a similar thought is developed; it is because it was the grace of God which kept free from sin the man with whom God had clothed himself [116]. Prior to the death of Christ, then, the activity of the Word is to keep the *homo assumptus* free from sin; but it is the man himself who actually must practise virtue and accept the unjust death which Satan brings upon him [117]. At this stage in the work of salvation, the union of activity seems to consist in a special cooperation of the Word with the man: an extraordinary inhabitation by grace.

This special presence of the Word to the man « by the operation of his grace », continues even during the crucifixion and death of the *homo assumptus* [118]. But at this point a new phase of the work of salvation begins: now it is the Word who is the principal actor, for it is He who raises the man assumed from the dead, and makes him ascend into heaven where he enjoys immunity from death and sin [119]. In all this, the man assumed is the « principle and first fruits » of our salvation, inasmuch as what is accomplished in him is to be transmitted to all who will be baptized [120]. Hence here, in a special sense, it can be said that the Word accomplishes our salvation « in the man assumed ». Finally, there is a third stage of cooperation between the Word and the man, when, at the last judgement, it is the man who will come to judge, but the divinity will be with him and in him, and will execute judgement through him [121].

From a study of Theodore's concept of the « work of our salvation », it is clear that one must distinguish in it several

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116 *Hom.* V, 18 (p. 125).
117 *Hom.* VII, 13 (p. 181).
118 *Hom.* V, 5-6 (p. 107). See above, pp. 237-238.
119 *Ibid.*
120 *Hom.* XII, 20 (p. 355), and 21 (p. 357).
121 *Hom.* VII, 14 (p. 183-185).

phases of the cooperation of the Word and the man. Insofar as the union of the Word and the *homo assumptus* is a union of activity in the work of salvation, this union is susceptible of various degrees of perfection. The progressive development of this union between the Word and the *homo assumptus* is the subject treated in the second of the fragments of the *De Incarnatione* preserved in Greek by Leontius [122]. Here we find that while the *homo assumptus* was united to the Word from his formation in the womb, still it was only subsequent to his death and resurrection that he had God the Word accomplishing absolutely everything in him, so that he had no activity apart from Him. Prior to the cross, although the Word accomplished a great part of what was necessary, still He allowed the man to practise virtue of his own free choice, although encouraged and strengthened in this by the Word. The man had an extraordinary tendency toward virtue by reason of his union with the Word, but his steadfastness in virtue was a result both of his own determination and the cooperation of the Word. But after his resurrection and ascension into heaven he gave a perfect proof of the union, since from this moment he had absolutely no activity apart from the Word, having God accomplish everything in him by reason of his union with Him [123].

There is no doubt, therefore, that Theodore conceived of the union of operation between the Word and the man as being more perfect in heaven than it was during the mortal life of Christ on earth. It is only in heaven that this union reached its ultimate perfection, since it was only then that the man began to have no activity apart from the Word. During the mortal life of the *homo assumptus*, the activity of the Word is essentially a cooperation with the man; the man himself must act in order to overcome Satan by his life of virtue, and his free acceptance of the unjust sentence of death [124]. But when the union is perfect (as at the last judge-

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122 *De Inc.* VII, *P.G.* 66, 976 c - 980 a.

123 *Ibid.*

124 Cf. *De Inc.*, section 33 (fragment 2 of Lagarde, *trad.* Sachau, p. 63-64): Quum enim Apostolus dixerit: « Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, ita etiam gratia per unum hominem Jesum Christum in multos redundavit » ... et dicemus: Hominem moribus suis inobedientiam relinquere decebat. Quoniam autem homo simplex, ubi pugnabat cum peccato, tum ejus potestatem vincere non poterat, ... inhabitatio Dei Verbi requisita est, ut dum voluntas mo-

ment), the man has no activity distinct from that of the Word; when the man judges, it is actually the Word who judges through him and in him.

From the fact that Theodore conceives of the union of activity between the Word and the *homo assumptus* as developing in perfection, can one conclude that he admits a corresponding increase in the « conjunction » between man and Word subsequent to the resurrection and ascension? There is reason to believe that this is the case: for there are a number of passages where he speaks of the « conjunction » of the *homo assumptus* with the divine nature as if it were something received only subsequent to the ascension [125]. Such texts can be understood in the sense that it is only subsequent to the resurrection and ascension that the man receives the *perfection* of this union, since it is only then, as we have seen, that he has no activity of his own, apart from the Word. Here, then, we have an indication that Theodore conceived of the conjunction of the two natures as increasing in perfection in proportion to the degree to which their operations are identified.

From all the points which we have considered, we believe we have ample confirmation of the view that one of the basic elements of Theodore's concept of the union of the two natures in Christ is the idea of a unity of operation between the Word and the man assumed. As we have seen, this was one of the factors which Theodore invoked to explain the « inhabitation by good pleasure ». From the study which we have made, we believe this conclusion can be drawn: that as Theodore conceives this union of activity between Word and man, prior to the glorification of Christ, it seems to be a kind of divine cooperation, superior in duration and in degree, but not in essential character, to that cooperation which characterizes the inhabitation of God « by good pleasure » in other saints. It is superior in duration, because the union, in the case of

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rum ab homine (procedens) integra servabatur, auxilio autem Dei Verbi, qui dabat, ut perfecte valeret, a peccato facile sese liberaret atque inobedientiam, quae per principem formationis nostrae exstitit, dimitteret.

[125] Cf. *Cat. Hom.* XII, 9 (p. 337): « Or il montre que sont désormais sans changement ni mutation les biens que nous avons: depuis que pour nous le Christ est mort, est réssuscité d'entre les morts et a reçu une conjonction avec la nature divine, par sa prière pour nous il nous amène à avoir part à la résurrection et aux biens qui en dérivent ». Cf. also: *Hom.* XV, 10 (p. 475); XVI, 2-3, (pp. 537-539).

the *homo assumptus,* begins at the moment of his formation in the womb. Theodore explains this as due to God's foreknowledge of « what kind of a man be would be » [126]. It is likewise superior in degree, for the grace granted to the *homo assumptus* was to redound to the benefit of all men; his victory over sin was to win salvation for all. Hence the Word provided extraordinary assistance to the man whom he assumed; He made the practise of virtue easy for him, and thus aided him to reach a degree of perfection not possible to an ordinary man [127]. But in all this we do not see anything which is essentially superior to that cooperation which God grants to other men in whom he is well pleased. It can be said that the Word « works our salvation through the man assumed », but at this stage of the plan of salvation, the work of the Word seems to be essentially one of cooperation. It is the man who places the actions of overcoming sin and accepting the unjust sentence of death. In the union of Word and man prior to the resurrection, therefore, this factor of « working through the man » does not seem to involve anything essentially superior to a moral, dynamic union: an extraordinary cooperation of God with a man.

We must now examine the other factor of the inhabitation: scil. the sharing of the prerogatives of the Word with the man, to see what contribution this makes to Theodore's concept of the one person. We have seen that when Theodore explained his idea of the « inhabitation by good pleasure as in a son », he mentioned that this involved a sharing of the honor and the dominion of the Word with the man assumed. At this point, therefore, we wish to see how intimately Theodore's concept of the one person is connected with this notion of a communication of honor and dominion.

One indication of the importance of this « sharing of honor » in Theodore's concept of the unity of person, is seen in the fact that in a number of texts, in place of the usual dichotomy between « distinction of natures and union of person », he substitutes the formula: « distinction of natures and union in dignity, in honor, or in glory ». In such instances, it would seem that the « union in honor » is considered a primary element in the concept of « union of

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126 Cf. *P.G.* 66, 980 b; 989 c - 992 a.
127 *P.G.* 66, 980 a-b.

person ». Typical of such usage is the following passage from the *Commentary on the Psalms* [128]:

> Inter susceptum vero hominem et Deum Verbum, quod diximus, tantam esse diversitatem quanta est omnis hominis ad deum, ad naturae distinctionem volumus accipi, non ad honoris diversitatem; nam honoris titulus in suscepto homine omnem creaturam longe transgreditur, quam quidem honoris eminentiam per coniunctionem personae homo Deo unitus accipit.

Another text in the same commentary which balances the distinction of natures against a sharing of honor is the one where Theodore comments on St. Paul's use of the verse: « Quid est homo quod memor es eius », (*Heb.* 1: 6). Theodore's opinion is that the « homo » to whom the psalmist refers here is none other than the *homo assumptus*. But in the passage to which we now refer, he admits for the sake of the argument that David may have referred to « man in general »; in any case, he insists, St. Paul applied this text to Jesus (Heb. 1: 9). This leads to the following comment [129]:

> ..si enim his verbis, quae beatus David de communi homine dixerat, quod dignus habeassit tanti beneficii, beatus Paulus suscepti hominis honorem a Deo impertitum voluit adprobare — sine dubio probavit, quantum ad naturae proprietatem pertinet, magnam esse inter Verbum et hominem diversitatem illam, apud nos fide absque dubio permanente quoniam post ascensionem tantum honoris accepit, ut omnem creaturam longe transcenderet et unitus cum Deo Verbo sit ab omnibus adorandus ...

Another text which clearly brings out the importance of the idea of a union in honor and glory in Theodore's concept of the one person, is the following from the *De Incarnatione*, preserved in the Syriac version of *cod. 14669*. In this passage, Theodore is summing up a discussion of *Phil.* 2: 6-11; his summary is as follows [130]:

> Hoc autem imprimis admiratus sum, diligentiam verborum Apostoli, hoc dico quod primum dixit de eo qui assumsit, (dein) de eo qui assumtus est, et hunc vocat similitudinem

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128 *Comm. in Ps.* VIII (Devreesse, p. 43).

129 *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

130 *De Inc.* XI, fragment of *cod. 14669*, fol. 13, *trad.* Sachau, pp. 47-48.

> Dei, hunc similitudinem servi — et postquam distinctionem naturarum accurate memoravit, tunc corporeitatem ejus quoque dicit et mortem crucis et ea quae post mortem ei contigerunt, dico gloriam quam a tota creatione accepit. Et per haec unionem indicat. Assumtione enim, eo quod ille assumsit, hic assumtus est, et hoc quod ille est similitudo Dei, hic similitudo servi, naturas distinguimus. Gloria autem, quam Deo Verbo in morte et cruce communicat, unionem personae cognoscimus.

A similar stress on the element of the sharing of glory in Theodore's notion of the unity of person, is seen also in the *Catechetical Homilies*. In the following text, the association in honor and glory seems to be the basis of the conjunction of the two natures [131]:

> Certes ce n'est pas la distinction des natures qui anéantit la conjonction exacte, ni cette conjonction exacte qui détruit la distinction des natures; mais ces natures mêmes distinctes demeurent en leur « ousie », et leur conjonction demeure nécessairement, parce que celui qui fut assumé est associé à celui qui assuma, en honneur et en gloire, puisque c'est pour cela que Dieu voulut l'assumer.

In another text it is the unity of adoration which seems to be the capital element in the conjunction of the two natures [132]:

> ... deux par nature, mais un par conjonction; — deux par nature, parce qu'il y a beaucoup de difference entre les natures; un en conjonction, parce que ne se divise pas l'adoration, mais que celui qui fut assumé (la) reçoit avec celui qui l'assuma, parce qu'il est le temple dont il est absolument impossible que s'en aille celui qui y demeure.

Another illustration of the fact that this sharing of honor plays an important part in the union of person as Theodore conceives it, is seen in the frequency with which this factor is introduced as a justification for the scriptural communication of idioms. As we have seen before, Theodore generally understands the communication of idioms as the predication « as of one person » of attributes which belong to both Word and man assumed. But when he comes to explain the

131 *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 13 (p. 205-207).
132 *Ibid.*, 14, p. 207.

grounds on which such predication is based, we frequently find him invoking the sharing of honor and dignity between Word and man. Thus, for example, when explaining *Rom.* 9: 5, « Ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus », he speaks as follows [133]:

> Or il dit ces deux choses à la fois pour indiquer la distinction des natures. Car il n'y a personne qui (parlant) de « ce qui est né d'entre les Juifs selon la chair » reconnaisse que naturellement il soit Dieu, ni que « Dieu au-dessus de tout » soit naturellement (issu) des Juifs. Mais du fait qu'il dise ces deux choses à la fois il nous fait connaître la conjonction exacte qu'eut l'assumé avec celui qui assuma; en sorte que, avec la différence de nature, il indique aussi à tous la dignité et la gloire que l'homme assumé eut de cette conjonction avec Dieu qui l'assuma.

A similar instance occurs when Theodore explains why the creed predicates « as of one » those things which belong both to the divine nature and the man assumed [134]:

> Or ils dirent cela d'un seul, en (plein) accord avec la pensée des Ecritures. Ce n'est pas que ces choses humaines aient été naturellement opérées du côté du Dieu, mais, à cause de la conjonction exacte avec lui, ils dirent ces choses humaines afin qu'on crût aussi les choses glorieuses dites de lui, qui lui advinrent après sa passion, (choses) qui sont au-dessus de la nature humaine, — de sorte que tout le monde en convienne, en apprenant que c'est la nature divine qui se revêtit de cet homme et que c'est par (suite de) sa conjonction avec elle qu'il reçut tant d'honneur et de gloire.

Such an explanation of the communication of idioms certainly highlights the element of a « sharing of honor » in Theodore's doctrine of the one person. The Word and the man are spoken of as one person, it would seem, because they are one in dignity and honor. The fact that attributes of both can be predicated « as of one », is understood as a scriptural way of showing what honor accrued to the man assumed by virtue of his union with the Word.

We conclude this section with the observation that there is ample evidence to show that the union of the Word and

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133 *Hom.* VI, 4 (p. 139).
134 *Ibid.* 7 (pp. 143-145).

the man assumed in activity and in honor are two important factors in Theodore's concept of the « inhabitation by good pleasure as in a son » which results in the unity of person. In themselves, these factors do not seem to postulate anything essentially superior to a moral unity between the Word and the *homo assumptus*. If this unity is merely a question of a special cooperation of the Word with the man, and a sharing with him of divine titles and honor, then the one person effected by this union would be no more than a moral person. The question remains, therefore, whether Theodore had anything more substantial than this in mind when he insisted that the two natures were united in one person. To answer this question, we must now examine more closely those passages where he sets forth his teaching on this one person.

V. The one person

Practically every work of Theodore which has come down to us, either in fragments or in its entirety, testifies to the fact that he taught the union of the two natures: Word and man, in one *prosopon*. Whether he also taught a union in one *hypostasis* seems to us to be highly doubtful. We have discussed the evidence for the use of this formula in a previous chapter, and given our reasons for doubting the reliability of the Syriac version on which it is based [135]. We believe it would to rash to base an exposition of Theodore's christology on the dubious Syriac texts in which the formula: one *hypostasis*, in found. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence for the use of the term: one *prosopon*, and it is this formula which we plan to study in the present investigation.

How did Theodore understand the word *prosopon* when he used it to describe the union of the two natures in Christ? In order to answer this question, it seems well to consider first two other contexts in which he used the term: namely, in his trinitarian doctrine and in his exegesis. There is a good chance that the christological application of *prosopon* may have developed out of one or the other of the first two usages.

In his trinitarian doctrine, Theodore uses the term

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[135] See above, pp. 78-82.

prosopon as equivalent to *hypostasis;* he will speak either of the three *prosopa* or of the three *hypostases* in the Trinity; he will speak of the *hypostasis* or of the *prosopon* of the Father, etc. Now the question is: when he speaks of the two natures being united in one *prosopon,* does Theodore mean that they are united in the one Divine *Prosopon*: in the eternal Person of the Word? Is the trinitarian *prosopon* likewise the *prosopon* in whom Word and man are united?

We have already seen some evidence to indicate that this question should be answered in the negative. In the first place, there are several texts where Theodore speaks of the one person as being *effected* by the union of two natures [136]. If this is to be taken literally, it is clear that he cannot refer to the Person of the Word. Secondly, if he conceived of the two natures as being united in the Person of the Word, then he should have considered the Divine *Prosopon* as the ultimate subject of whom the attributes of both of his natures could be predicated. This would postulate a distinction between what can be said of the Word, and what can be said of the divinity as such. But in our study of the « two natures », we saw that Theodore does not seem to have recognized such a distinction. There are, therefore, several difficulties against the position that Theodore's one *prosopon* is actually to be understood as the *Prosopon* of the Word. In our present study of the « one person », we shall attempt to come to a more definitive answer to this question.

We have had occasion to mention previously the frequent use which Theodore makes of the term: *prosopon* in his exegetical writings. Here, as we have seen, the *prosopon* is the subject of whom, or to whom, or by whom a passage of Scripture is spoken. This *prosopon* is not necessarily an individual: it can be the « *prosopon* of the Apostles », or the « *prosopon* of the Colossensians », or the « *prosopon* of all the living » [137]. The term occurs wth special significance in Theodore's exegesis of the Psalms; for one of the basic principles of his exegesis is that there can be no change of *prosopon* in the course of a single Psalm. In other words, if part of the Psalm is to be understood as spoken « in the *prosopon* of David », or « in the *prosopon* of the people of Israel », then there can be

[136] See above, p. 75-76. Cf. Facundus, *P.L.*, 61, 153 c: « ... una exstante persona, quam adunatio naturarum effecit ».

[137] See above, pp. 224-225.

no exchange whereby another part of the same Psalm is taken as spoken « in the *prosopon* of God ». The subject who speaks, the subject of whom one speaks, must remain the same throughout [138].

Now when Theodore applies this concept to a Psalm which he recognizes as messianic, we see how the exegetical sense of *prosopon* can influence the christological sense. A good example of this is found in his commentary on Psalm 44 [139]. In this psalm, there are two consecutive verses which, according to Theodore's principle, must be addressed to the same *prosopon*. The verses are:

> Thronus tuus, Deus, in saeculum saeculi; sceptrum aequitatis sceptrum regni tui. Diligis justitiam et odisti iniquitatem: propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo laetitiae prae consortibus tuis.

The exegesis, therefore, demands that there be one *prosopon* whom one can address as « God » in verse 6, and yet to whom one can say « Thy God », in verse 7. This one *prosopon* can be none other than Christ. For the divine nature can be addressed as God, and of the human nature can be said: « Thy God »; yet together they are the one *prosopon* of whom both verses are said. In what sense, then, is Christ one *prosopon*? In that he is the « one subject » whom one can address now as God, and now as man. Here we see, then, that the christological sense of the term *prosopon* is allied with the exegetical: the Word and the « man assumed » together constitute one *prosopon* of whom one speaks, whether what is said refers to the divinity or to the humanity.

This concept, we believe, is the essential point in Theodore's explanation of the « communication of idioms » in the Scriptures and in the Creed. It is not that what pertains to the humanity can be predicated of the Word as the subject to whom this human nature belongs. Rather, it is a question of predicating attributes of both Word and man « as of one *prosopon* » — i. e., one subject who includes both. To illustrate this point, we shall show how Theodore conceives of the communication of idioms, and how he explains it.

As we have seen, in keeping with the Antiochene tradition,

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138 Cf. *Comm. in Ps.*, ed. Devreesse, p. 280.

139 *Ibid.*, pp. 287-290.

Theodore was constantly alert in his exegesis to distinguish between the two natures: between what is said of the Word and what of the man assumed. At the same time, however, he was very much aware of the fact that the Scriptures spoke of both of these natures in a unified way. In the same passage, there would be attributes which could pertain only to the divinity, and others which could pertain only to the man. At times this amounted to what Theodore calls: « commixtio et Dei Verbi et hominis quem assumpsit [140]. It is enlightening to see the various formulae which Theodore used to express this phenomenon which he noted in the Scriptures. We shall mention some of the more common expressions, without pretending to give an exhaustive list.

In the first category, we list expressions which do not involve the term *prosopon*. Such are

> ... ambarum naturarum proprietates in unum conducit; et sicut de uno quodam eloquitur [141].
>
> ... quasi de uno eodemque omnia dicens [142].
>
> ... omnia in unum colligens [143].
>
> « Saying what pertains both to the divinity and to the humanity *as of one alone* (comme d'un seul; tamquam de uno) » [144].
>
> ... dire deux choses *à la fois* [145].
>
> ... dire deux choses *d'un seul* [146].
>
> ... dire deux choses *comme d'un seul Fils* [147].
>
> ... dicere duo *secundum coniunctionem* [148].
>
> ... dicere duo *secundum unionem* (κατὰ ἕνωσιν) [149].

In the second category we place those expressions which employ the term *prosopon*:

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[140] Vosté, p. 217, lines 17-18.

[141] *De Inc.* X, Sect. 70, qquoted by Facundus, *P.L.* 67, 751 d.

[142] *Comm. in Ep. ad Col.*, Swete, I, 272-273.

[143] *De Inc.* XI, Sachau, p. 47.

[144] *Cat. Hom.* VI, 6 (p. 141); VIII, 10 (p. 201); VIII, 11-12 (p. 203); cf. Vosté, p. 81, line 3.

[145] *Cat. Hom.* III, 7 (p. 61); VI, 4 (p. 139).

[146] *Hom.* VI, 7 (p. 143).

[147] *Hom.* VI, 3 (p. 135).

[148] *Vig. Const.*, cap. 31, ed. Günther, p. 265.

[149] *Contra Apoll.* IV, quoted by Justinian, *P.G.* 86, 1071 d.

... dire deux choses *comme d'une seule prosopon* [150].
... dire deux choses *de l'unique prosopon* [151].

A comparison of the expressions listed here in the first category, with those of the second, adds weight to the idea that Theodore's use of the term *prosopon* in christology may have developed from his use of the term in exegesis. In the exegetical context, the *prosopon* was the subject of whom, or to whom, a psalm was spoken. The essential note of the term *prosopon* here was not that the subject referred to be a « person » in the philosophical sense of the term. The *prosopon* of a psalm could be an individual, a group or a multitude. But it constituted one *prosopon* if it was the subject of whom the psalm was spoken.

Now when Theodore found the Scriptures speaking of the Word and the man assumed « sicut de uno quodam », or « quasi de uno eodemque omnia dicens », it seems only natural that he would express this in terms of « one *prosopon* ». Thus he would express the fact that there is one subject of whom the Scriptures speak, whether they refer to the Word or to the man assumed. Theodore's use of the term *prosopon* to express such an idea, as we have seen, does not necessarily imply that this « one subject » is an individual, a « person » in the strict, philosophical sense. It seems rather, simply to be a way of saying that the Word and the man together constitute one subject of whom one can say what pertains to either of them. This one *prosopon* could well be conceived as having been *effected* by the union of the two natures. It would, moreover, be a « *common prosopon* », that is, a subject including both the Word and the *homo assumptus* [152].

The further question now arises: what is it that justifies the sacred writers in predicating attributes of both Word and man « as of one person »? In explaining and justifying this scriptural practise, Theodore gives a number of reasons, which can be reduced to three general types. The first reason, and the one which occurs most often, is that the sacred writer wishes thereby to « teach the exact conjunction of the two natures » [153]; to « prove the perfect conjunction which has tak-

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150 *Cat. Hom.* III, 10 (p. 65).
151 *Hom.* III, 7 (p. 61); cf. *Comm. in Ps.*, Devreesse, p. 290.
152 Vosté, pp. 119-120.
153 *Cat. Hom.* III, 10 (p. 67).

en place »[154]. Another way of expressing the idea is: « Lest one imagine that they divided the perfect association which the one assumed had with the one assuming »[155]. In other words, to say what belonged to the Word and what belonged to the *homo assumptus* « as of one *prosopon* », was a striking way to emphasize the conjunction between them.

The second reason assigned to justify this scriptural practise was « to make known the grandeur and dignity had by the man with whom God clothed Himself »[156]. This reason is clear enough: it was certainly indicative of the glory of the man assumed that he should be so associated with God the Word that one could say what was true of both of them « as of one *prosopon* ». We have seen previously the important place which this « union in glory » had in Theodore's concept of the conjunction of the two natures.

The third reason assigned in explaining the predication « as of one *prosopon* », is that thereby one « renders more credible the glorious things said of the man assumed ». This reason is perhaps not so clear at first sight. What Theodore seems to mean is that one would naturally find it difficult to believe that a man would be so glorified by God as to be raised from the dead, assumed into heaven, seated at the right hand of God, and made judge of the world at the end of time. Yet, as Theodore conceives it, it is precisely the *homo assumptus* of whom all these « glorious things » are said. Hence, in order to indicate the source whence all this glory accrued to the man (namely, from his union with the Word), the Scriptures make a point of speaking of them both together, so as to render more credible what was said of the man[157]. Another way of expressing a similar idea is that the use of the communication of idioms is a way of *alluding to the divinity*, even when it is the man of whom the sacred writer is directly speaking. By such an allusion to the divinity, the Scriptures indicate the source of the grandeur and dignity which accrued to the *homo assumptus*[158]. A good example of this is Theodore s interpre-

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154 *Hom.* VIII, 11 (p. 203); cf. *Hom.* III, 7 (p. 61); *Hom.* VI, 4 (p. 139); *Cont. Apoll.* IV (*P.G.* 86, 1071 d).

155 *Hom.* VI, 3 (p. 135).

156 *Hom.* III, 7 (p. 61); cf. VI, 3 (p. 135); VI, 4 (p. 139).

157 *Hom.* VI, 7 (p. 143); VIII, 11 (p. 203); VI, 6 (p. 141).

158 Vosté, pp. 51-52: « Solet enim liber sacer, quotiescumque magnitudinem passionis describit, de divinitate mentionem facere in con-

tation of Heb. 1: 2 — (Deus) « locutus est nobis in Filio, quem constituit heredem universorum, per quem fecit et saecula ». As Theodore understands this, the « Filius in quo Deus locutus est, et quem constituit heredem universorum », is none other than the *homo assumptus*. But the phrase, « per quem fecit et saecula », can only refer to the Divine Word. Here, then, is a typical case of the allusion to the divinity » in order to render credible what is said of the man assumed [159]. This interpretation tends to confirm the idea that as Theodore conceives it, the « one *prosopon* » of whom all is predicated, is not to be understood as the Divine Person of the Word. In this case which we have been considering, the « Son » in whom God has spoken to us, and whom he has made heir, is not the same Divine Son through whom he created the universe. Theodore does not seem to conceive of the Divine Son: the Person of the Word, as the one subject of whom one can say both that God constituted him heir, and that He created the universe through him. This would mean predicating of the Divine Person, what is true of him only by reason of thē humanity which he had assumed. But Theodore does not understand it that way. For him, the « Son » whom God has constituted heir cannot be the Divine Son; he can only be the *homo assumptus*. Hence the phrase: « per quem fecit et saecula » is an « allusion

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firmationem sermonis. Et sicut beatus Paulus, magnitudinem passionis significare intendens, dicit: *Si enim cognovissent, numquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent*, ut ipso hoc titulo indicet magnitudinem passionis; ita et Dominus noster, volens significare abundantiam dilectionis suae ex eo quod est passus, egregie dicit: *Unigenitum dedit* ». Cf. also pp. 105-106, where T. explains: « Ego sum panis vivus qui de caelo descendi » (Jo. 6: 51): Non vult igitur significare corpus inde descendisse; sed (ita loquitur) quia natura sua sublime est donum istius rei. Alludendo ad magnitudinem divinitatis, confirmat verbum suum.

159 Vosté, p. 82: Solet liber (divinus) referens ea quae humanae naturae Domini contigerunt, si quid superat naturam de qua agitur, statim mentionem facere de magnitudine divinitatis, indeque auditoribus indubium facere sermonem. Ita verbi gratia apud beatum Paulum; cum enim dixit: (*Deus*) *locutus est nobis in Filio, quem constituit heredem universorum*, intedens hominem assumptum, et significans eum humano modo esse locutum, ipsumque, quamvis non esset rerum dominus, dominationem in eas recepisse per unionem suam cum Deo-Verbo, quia Verbum tamquam rerum auctor etiam dominatur illis; — intellegens hoc dictum superare naturam eius de quo sermo erat, adiecit dicens: *per quem fecit et saecula*, ut ex attributo naturae divinae demonstret etiam huic visibili (Christo) competere posse dominationem universalem.

to the Word », a way of « mentioning the divinity », from whom the man assumed receives such glory.

There is, however, one formula used by Theodore in describing the communication of idioms, which suggests that he did think of the Divine Son as the « one *prosopon* » of whom all could be predicated. We refer to a passage where he said that terms applying to both natures were said « of the unique *prosopon* of the Son ». This formula occurs when Theodore is commenting on the article of his Creed: « Filium Dei unigenitum, primogenitum omnium creaturarum » [160]. This passage deserves careful attention, as it indicates both Theodore's concept of the communication of idioms, and his concept of the « One Son ».

In the article of the creed immediately preceding this: (et in unum Dominum Jesum Christum, per quem omnia facta sunt), Theodore had seen an indication of the two natures; the divine nature is signified by the « unum Dominum, per quem omnia facta sunt ». whereas the human nature is signified by the name: « Jesum Christum », since Jesus is the name of the man with whom God clothed Himself, and « Christ » signifies the unction of the Holy Spirit, by which the man was made perfect and justified. Then Theodore continues [161]:

> Ayant donc dit ceci et fait connaître la nature divine et la nature humaine, dont Dieu se revêtit, (nos pères) ajoutèrent ceci « Fils Unique, premier-né de toutes les créatures ». En deux mots, ils nous apprirent les deux natures; par la distinction des noms, ils nous enseignèrent la distinction des natures. Ceux qui de l'unique personne (πρόσωπον) du Fils dirent ces deux choses, nous apprirent la conjonction exacte des deux natures.

Here, then, we find the formula: « the unique *prosopon* of the Son ». By this expression, does Theodore mean that it is the Divine Person of the Son, of whom one can say both that He is « unique », and that he is the « first-born of creatures »? If this is his meaning, then he must really conceive of the Divine Person as the subject of the attributes even of the humanity. We must consider more of the context, to see just what he means by this « unique *prosopon* of the Son ».

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160 *Cat. Hom.* III, 6-10 (pp. 59-57); cf. p. 61, line 3.
161 *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

In the explanation which follows, we find that of the two « natures » which are indicated here, the first is the « Unique Son » who was begotten of the Father [162]:

> Tel est donc le sens de ce qui a été dit « le Fils unique »: celui-là qui seul est par génération du Père et est seul Fils, et toujours avec son Père existe et est connu avec lui, parce qu'en vérité c'est lui le Fils (issu) de son Père.

How then is the term « first-born of all creatures » to be understood? Theodore explains it thus [163].

> Mais quant a ce (terme) « premier-né de toutes les créatures », ainsi le comprenons-nous, comme cette parole: *ceux qu'il a connus d'avance il les a élus et les a marqués à la ressemblance de l'image de son Fils, afin qu'il devînt le premier-né parmi nombreux frères* (Rom. 8: 29). Et il a employé ce nom de « premier-né », non pas pour nous apprendre qu'il est seul Fils, mais afin de nous faire comprendre qu'il a de nombreaux frères. Car nombreux, on le sait, sont ceux qui ont avec lui participation à l'adoption filiale; et à cause d'eux il reçoit le nom de premier-né, puisque ce sont ses frères. De même aussi ailleurs, *premier-né de toutes les créatures* (Col. 1: 15); et ceci est dit de l'incarnation du Christ. Ce n'est pas en effet « premier-né » simplement qu'il le dit, mais de *toutes les créatures*; or on ne dit pas (quelqu'un) « premier-né », s'il n'a pas d'autres frères, à cause desquels il est appelé et est premier-né. De même aussi est-il dit *premier-né de toutes les créatures,* parce que, lui d'abord, par la résurrection d'entre les morts, fut renouvelé et transformé en une vie nouvelle merveilleuse; et qu'aussi il a renouvelé toutes les creatures et les a amenées à une autre catastase excellente. ... C'est donc à bon droit qu'il fut appelé *premier-né de toutes les créatures,* parce que lui-même, en premier lieu, a été renouvelé et ensuite renouvela les créatures, étant lui-même plus élévé que toutes en honneur.

Although Theodore does not use the term here, it is clear that the « «first-born of all creatures » is the *homo assumptus*. It is he who was renewed and transformed by the resurrection from the dead. It was he who received this « renewal » when he passed to a new life, and was raised above all creatures.

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162 *Ibid.*, p. 63.
163 *Ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

This is the sense in which he is the « first-born of all creatures »; because they also will share in this new life which he was the first to receive.

But in what sense is the « first-born of creatures » a son of God? The answer is plainly given: it is by an adoptive filiation; a filiation in which his brethren are also to share. Hence the Unique Son is the Son of God by nature; but the « first-born of creatures » is Son by adoption. The Unique Son has no brethren, because he alone is begotten of the Father; the « first-born of creatures » has many brethren who share in his adoptive filiation, in his renewal and elevation to a new life.

Having thus described the two natures, Theodore now explains in what sense they are one:

> La différence donc entre les deux noms, voici comme nous la comprenons: cette différence c'est comme d'une seule personne (πρόσωπον) que l'entendirent nos pères, instruits par les Livres Saints, et ils dirent: « en un seul Fils Unique, premier-né de toutes les créatures », pour nous apprendre, comme je l'ai déjà dit, la conjonction exacte des deux natures. Donc, à bon droit, dirent-ils d'abord, « unique » et ensuite « premier-né », parce qu'il convenait que d'abord ils nous indiquassent qui est celui-là qui est en la forme de Dieu et par sa miséricorde assuma (l'un) de notre nature, et qu'ensuite ils nous parlassent de la forme d'esclave assumée pour notre salut. Ainsi nous firent-ils connaître, par la différence des noms employés, les deux natures et leurs différences, et qu'unique est le Fils à cause de la conjonction exacte des natures opérée par la volonté divine.

From this explanation it seems clear that the « unique *prosopon* of the Son » of whom Theodore had spoken previously, is not to be understood as the Divine Person of the Word. It is not the only-begotten Son, the Son of God by nature, of whom one can say both that He is unique, and that he has many brethren. Rather, it is a question of applying terms referring to both natures, to one *prosopon*: to a Son who is unique *by reason of the conjunction* of the two natures. This is a *prosopon*, a Son, who includes both the Son by nature and the son by adoption; the Son by nature who is unique, and the son by adoption who has many brethren.

But the question remains: if the « Unigenitus » is the Son of God by nature, and the « primogenitus » is the son of God

by adoption, how can these two « natures » be truly one Son, and not two? Theodore addresses himself to this problem in his eighth homily; his answer will shed considerable light on his concept of the One Son. In this section of the homily, after having discussed the two natures and their conjunction, Theodore concludes that this doctrine does not constrain one to speak of « two Sons » [164]:

> Ce n'est pas, en effet, parce que nous disons deux natures que nous sommes contraints de dire deux maîtres ou deux fils, ce qui serait d'une naïveté extrême: car tous ceux qui en quelque chose sont deux et un en quelque chose, leur conjonction, qui les fait un, n'anéantit pas la distinction des natures, ni la distinction des natures ne s'oppose à ce qu'ils soient un. *Moi*, est-il dit, *et mon Père nous sommes un* (Jo. 10: 30); ce n'est pas le « un » qui supprime le « moi et mon Père », qui sont deux. Et ailleurs il est dit de l'homme et de la femme *qu'ils ne seront pas deux, mais un seul corps* (Mt. 19: 5) et ce n'est pas parce qu'ils sont un seul corps que l'homme et la femme ne sont pas deux. Mais ils demeurent deux en ce par quoi ils sont deux, et ils sont aussi un en ce par quoi ils sont un et non pas deux. De cette même manière ici, deux par nature, mais un par conjonction: — deux par nature, parce qu'il y a beaucoup de différence entre les natures; un en conjonction, parce que ne se divise pas l'adoration, mais que celui qui fut assumé (la) reçoit avec celui qui l'assuma, parce qu'il est le temple dont il est absolument impossible que s'en aille celui qui y demeure.

One will have noticed here that in both of the examples cited, it is a question of two persons who are one in conjunction: scil., the Father and the Son who are one in divine nature, and husband and wife, who are « one flesh ». Secondly, the reason assigned for the unity between the one assuming and the one assumed is a good example of that notion of « union by inhabitation » which results in the sharing of prerogatives: in this case, adoration. Both of these points would suggest that Theodore's « one Son » may be only morally one: scil., a « Son » who really includes two persons, a natural Son of God and an adoptive son.

The explanation which follows offers further confirmation of this view. Theodore's argument is that one properly speaks

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164 *Hom.* VIII, 14 (p. 207).

of « two X » only when each of the objects mentioned is « X » *by nature*. Thus, for example, the animals spoken of by Daniel (Dan. 7: 4-7), are four, because each of them is an animal *by nature*. Similarly, one rightly speaks of « two men » (Jo. 8: 17) and of « two masters », (Mt. 6: 24) because each is by nature what he is called. Theodore's conclusion from this principle is as follows [165]:

> De même dans le cas présent. Si chacun d'eux était par nature fils et seigneur, on pourrait dire deux fils et deux seigneurs, selon le nombre des personnes; mais puisque l'un est par nature fils et seigneur, tandis que l'autre n'est naturellement ni fils ni seigneur, — mais que c'est par sa conjonction exacte avec le (Fils) Unique, Dieu le Verbe, que nous croyons qu'il reçut ces (titres), — nous confessons qu'unique est le Fils. Et certes nous considérons en premier lieu Fils et Seigneur celui qui naturellement a ces deux (titres); mais nous y adjoignons dans notre pensée celui-là aussi, le temple qu'il habite en tout temps et dont il ne se sépare pas, (et cela) à cause de la conjonction indissoluble qu'il a avec lui, et à cause de laquelle nous croyons qu'il est Fils et Seigneur.

For Theodore, then, the problem of the « two Sons » is resolved by the fact that the *homo assumptus* is not a natural son of God. If he were Son and Lord by nature, then there would be two Sons; but since he receives these titles only by reason of his conjunction with the Word, there is only one Son.

The doctrine of the « One Son », therefore, is reduced to the same basic notion which we saw in the *De Incarnatione*: namely that the inhabitation of the Word in the man « by good pleasure », means that the Word shares with this man his honor and his dominion. Here we see that specifically, this means sharing his titles as « Son » and « Lord ». Because the inhabitant is Son and Lord, the temple also shares these titles; the one is Son and Lord by nature, and the other is called Son and Lord by reason of the conjunction between them. And therefore there is only one Son, because only one of those called « Son » is really Son by nature.

Does this actually solve the problem of the « two sons »? It does not seem to. For Theodore it is enough that there should not be two natural Sons of God. But the fact remains that his « unique Son » consists of one who is Son of God by

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165 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

nature, and another who is son of God by adoption. The Son who was born of Mary is not the same Son who was begotten of the Father. This becomes evident in the paragraph which follows [166]:

> Mais s'il y a quelqu'autre passage où l'Ecriture appelle Fils celui qui fut assumé, c'est à cause de la conjonction exacte qu'il eut avec celui qui l'assuma, qu'il reçut le nom de Fils. Quand en effet il est dit *Au sujet de son Fils qui fut de la descendance de David, en la chair*, il est certain qu'ici le nom de Fils est donné à celui qui fut de la lignée de David par la chair, et non pas à Dieu le Verbe, mais à la forme d'esclave qui fut assumé. Ce n'est pas en effet que Dieu devint chair, ni non plus que Dieu devint de la lignée de David; mais cet homme qui fut assumé pour nous, c'est lui évidemment que le bienheureux Paul appelle Fils. Or nous le considérons comme Fils et lui en donnons le nom; non pas à lui simplement, mais pour la conjonction qu'il eut avec le Fils véritable.

The first point which is evident from the foregoing citation is that the « prosopon of the Son » of whom Theodore predicates attributes of both natures, is certainly not the Divine Son. If this had been Theodore's meaning when he spoke of the « unique *prosopon* of the Son », then here would be a clear case where he would have applied his principle, by allowing that it can be said of the Divine Son, that He was « of the line of David according to the flesh ».

But there is no evidence that Theodore recognized the propriety of such predication of the Divine Person by reason of the humanity which He had assumed. On the contrary, the explanation which he gives of this text involves an explicit denial of the legitimacy of such predication: it cannot be said of God that he came to be of the line of David: it was the *homo assumptus* of whom St. Paul spoke when he said: « His son who was of the line of David ». It should be observed that this case is perfectly parallel to the question of saying that God the Word was born of the Virgin Mary. The explicit denial of this latter expression in the fragment from the *Contra Apollinarem* cited by Vigilius [167], is only a more obvious formulation of what is said here.

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166 *Ibid.*, pp. 209-211.

167 See above, p. 214.

Therefore, « the son » of whom it is said that he was of the line of David, — since it cannot be the Divine Son — is the *homo assumptus*. This is the second point which we wish to observe: that here, as in a number of other cases where the Scriptures refer to the Son, Theodore interprets them to mean not the Divine Son, but the *homo assumptus*. We have already observed one such text (Heb. 1: 2 — (Deus) locutus est nobis in Filio, quem constituit heredem universorum) — where Theodore remarks that the « son whom God had constituted heir » is the man assumed [168]. In similar fashion, on the text from Psalm II (Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu, Ego hodie genui te), Theodore comments [169]:

> Ad eum sine dubio Filium dictum hoc referendum est, cui potest praesentis temporis generatio convenire ...

« Ad eum Filium » is clearly a reference to the *homo assumptus*, as distinct from God the Word, whose generation is eternal. Another text similarly interpreted is Gal. 4: 4: « Misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere », etc. Of this text Theodore says: « Evidens quidem est quoniam de homine dicit, qui et ex muliere factus est et sub lege conversatus est » [170]. In other words, the « Son whom God has sent » is not the Divine Son, but the man assumed, because only of him can it be said that he was born of a woman, etc. Lastly, in the text, « Hic est Filius meus dilectus in quo mihi complacui », (Mt. 3: 17), the « Son in whom God is pleased » is taken to be the *homo assumptus*. This is put rather strongly: « Insania evidens est de Deo Verbo putare dicere eum » [171].

The third point which we wish to observe is the reason which Theodore gives why the *homo assumptus* is called « son of God ». In the passage of the eighth homily which we have been considering, it was said that « we consider the man assumed as a Son, and we give him this name — not to him simply, but by reason of the conjunction which he has with the true Son ». Here we see the effect of the « inhabitation by

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168 See above, p. 265. Cf. also a fragment on the same text, quoted by Cyril of Alexandria, *P.G.* 76, 1446 d.

169 *Comm. in Ps.*, ed. Devreesse, p. 13. Cf. also p. 280, lines 25-27.

170 *Comm. in Ep. ad Gal.*, Swete, I, p. 62.

171 *Comm. in Matt.*, fragment in *Vigilii Const.*, cap. 40, ed. Günther, p. 270.

good pleasure »: the Word shares his prerogatives and titles with the man in whom he dwells. But if the man assumed enjoys this title by reason of his conjunction with the True Son, obviously he himself is not the true son, but an adoptive son. That this is in fact Theodore's way of conceiving of it, is clear from a number of texts.

We have already seen that as Theodore understands the verse: « Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te », (Ps. 2: 7), the « Son » here is the *homo assumptus*. In what sense then is « genui te » to be understood? In two different texts we find the answer; it means: « participationem filiationis dedi » [172]. We obtain a clearer idea of this « participation in sonship » from Theodore's comment on John 1: 16 — « de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus » [173].

> *De plenitudine eius,* inquit, *nos omnes accepimus,* id est, gratiam Spiritus, qua donamur, ex abundantia eius accipimus. De humana eius natura dicit, omnem gratiam ei inesse; at simul hoc manifestat dignitatem naturae quae in eo est. Per unionem enim cum Deo Verbo, mediante Spiritu, factus est consors filiationis verae. Nos ex eius gratia spirituali partem accipimus, atque per eamdem participes efficimur una cum eo filiationis adoptivae, quamvis multum ab hac dignitate distemus.

Here it will be noticed that while the sonship of the *homo assumptus* is described as « consortium filiationis verae », still we shall be sharers *along with him* of *adoptive* filiation. Does this mean that the *homo assumptus* is likewise an adoptive son, although much higher in dignity than the rest? There can be no doubt that this is Theodore's meaning, since he puts this very clearly elsewhere. For example, after noting that the « Son » of whom it is said: « Misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere », (Gal. 4: 4) is the *homo assumptus,* Theodore goes on to explain [174]:

> Nam quod dixit: « misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere », evidens quidem est, quoniam de homine dicit, qui et ex muliere factus est et sub lege conversatus est. Filium autem eum iure vocat, utpote praeter omnes homines

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172 *De Inc.* XII, fragment quoted by Cyril of Alex., *P.G.* 76, 1447 a; cf. Comm. in Ps. Devreesse, p. 280, lines 25-27.

173 Vosté, p. 26.

174 *Comm. in Ep. ad Gal.,* Swete, I, pp. 62-63.

participatum filii adoptionem, propter copulationem illam qua Deus Verbum qui ex Patre est genitus eum sibi copulare dignatus est.

Again, when commenting on John 20: 17 — « Ascendo ad Patrem meum et Patrem vestrum », Theodore remarks that the *homo assumptus*: « Patrem cum discipulis vocabat Deum, et ipse gratia adoptionem meritus » [175]. Similarly, on the verse: « transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae », (Col. 1: 13) Theodore comments [176]:

> « Transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae ». Unde bene quia non dixit *filii* tantum, sed *filii caritatis suae*. Nec enim participes regni Dei Verbi efficimur — qui enim potest ut universitatis Opificio jungemur? — sed suscepto homini dicit, cui et participabimus honoris propter naturae similitudinem, quando affectum erga eum ipsis operibus ostendere valuerimus. Unde et « filium caritatis » eum vocavit, eo quod non secundum naturam Patris est filius, sed caritate filiorum adoptionem est adsecutus.

Lastly, there is Theodore's interpretation of Mt. 3: 17 — « Hic est filius meus dilectus in quo mihi complacui ». As we have seen, this is taken as addressed to the *homo assumptus*. In his commentary on St. John, Theodore interprets the force of the phrase: « dilectus — in quo mihi complacui », as follows [177]:

> At quia etiam inter eos ordinaria erat haec denominatio « filii »; v. gr. *Filios genui et magnos eduxi;* item: *Ego dixi: dii estis et filii Excelsi vos omnes;* volens ostendere huius aliam esse dignitatem, dicit: *Hic est Filius meus dilectus, in quo mihi complacui.* Non est illis similis, neque familiaritatem mere verbalem recepit, sed excelso amore dignus factus est, siquidem unione sua cum vero Filio revera consors factus est in filiationis honore.

Moreover, Theodore saw a peculiar significance in the fact that these words were spoken by the Heavenly Father at the moment of Christ's baptism, when the Spirit descended upon him. There is a development of this point in one of the homi-

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[175] Vosté, p. 251.
[176] *Comm. in Ep. ad Coloss.*, Swete, I, pp. 259-260.
[177] Vosté, p. 89.

lies on Baptism, which sheds considerable light on his concept of the filiation of the *homo assumptus*, and his union with the true Son [178]:

> Il faut donc savoir que tu es baptisé de ce baptême dont Notre-Seigneur le Christ en la chair fut baptisé: voilà pourquoi tu es baptisé « au nom du Père et du Fils et de l'Esprit-Saint », parce que ce (baptême) aussi fut déjà esquissé dans les faits eux-mêmes, de cette manière, en figures. En effet le Père, de loin dit à haute voix: *Celui-ci est mon Fils bien-aimé, en qui j'ai mis mes complaisances* (Mt. 3: 17). Il indiquait vraiment la grâce de l'adoption filiale, en vue de laquelle a lieu ce baptême-ci. En effet, dire: *Celui-ci est mon Fils bien-aimé en qui j'ai mis mes complaisances*, c'est comme si l'on disait: Voici véritablement l'adoption filiale; celui-ci est le « bien-aimé », et il m'a plu; celui-ci (le baptisé) est le fils, celui qui a reçu cette adoption filiale, — parce que celle-ci est de beaucoup supérieure à celle de chez les Juifs, qui était sujette au changement ... Celle-ci demeure ferme et inébranlable, car celui qui recevra cette adoption filiale demeurera immortel; mais certes, c'est par ces figures qu'il passe à l'adoption filiale, laquelle aura lieu à la résurrection, qui le transformera en une nature immortelle et incorruptible. A coup sur, le Fils était là aussi, en celui qui était baptisé, présent, et conjoint à celui qui fut assumé: il confirmait l'adoption filiale elle-même. Et aussi l'Esprit-Saint: il descendit en forme de colombe et demeura sur lui; et ainsi, lui aussi (le Christ) fut baptisé au nom du Père et du Fils et de l'Esprit-Saint. Quand donc le pontife dit: « Au nom du Père », il rappelle la parole du Père: *Celui-ci est mon Fils bien-aimé en qui j'ai mis mes complaisances*; et toi, entends-le de l'adoption filiale qui par là t'est donnée. Et quand il dit: « Du Fils », toi, entends-le de celui qui était présent à celui qui fut baptisé, et reconnais qu'il a été pour toi cause de l'adoption filiale. Et quand il dit: « De l'Esprit-Saint », souviens-toi de celui qui est descendu en forme de colombe et demeura sur lui; en bref, attends de là, toi aussi, confirmation de l'adoption filiale ...

In this passage we see clear confirmation of all three points which we have made in this study of Theodore's concept of the « One Son ». First: he does not understand the Divine Son, as a Person, to be the « unique prosopon » of whom all the attributes of Christ can be predicated.

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178 Cat. Hom. XIV, 24 (p. 451-453).

The Word is present to the one who is baptized, but the *homo assumptus* is the only subject to whom this predicate can be attributed. Secondly, because the man assumed is the one baptized, it is he whom the Father addresses as « My beloved Son »; hence the man assumed is a son of God, distinct from the Divine Son. Thirdly, since he cannot be a son by nature, he must be a son of God by adoption. As we have seen, he possesses this adoptive filiation in its plenitude, having received it by his union with the true Son; other men will share it with him, receiving it from the fullness of his grace.

From all this, one conclusion at least seems certain: Theodore's « One Son » is not the Divine Person, but a common term including both the natural Son of God and an adoptive son. There is « One Son » because the name « Son » includes both him who is Son by nature, and him who shares in this title by adoption, by conjunction with the true Son. This idea that the unity of Theodore's « One Son » consists really in the sharing of the same title, in the same « appellation of Son », appears rather clearly in a passage of the *De Incarnatione* quoted by Facundus [179]:

> Maneat enim et naturarum ratio inconfusa, et indivisa cognoscatur esse persona. Illud quidem proprietate naturae, diviso quod assumptum est ab assumente; illud autem adunatione personae in una appellatione totius considerata sive assumentis, sive etiam assumpti natura, et veluti sic dicam in Filii appellatione simul et Deum Verbum appellamus, et assumptam naturam, quaecumque illa sit, consignificamus propter adunationem quam ad illum habet.

The unity of the Son, therefore, would seem to consist in the fact that there is one name: « the Son », which signifies both him who is Son by nature, and him who is son by adoption. One can say of this one « *prosopon* » what pertains to either of these natures, because the term includes both of them. Strictly speaking, the name « Son » belongs only to Him who is Son of God by nature, but the « inhabitation by good pleasure » involves the sharing of the honors and titles of the natural Son with the man whom He assumed. Hence, when we say: « the Son of God », our thought includes not only the Divine Son, but also the *homo assumptus* who shares this ti-

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179 *P.L.* 67, 748 b.

tle. Hence, we can say of this « one *prosopon* of the Son » what belongs either to the Word or to the *homo assumptus*.

The relation between Theodore's concept of the one *prosopon*, and the sharing of the titles of the Word with the man assumed, is seen in a passage of the *De Incarnatione* preserved in the Syriac version of *cod. 14669*. In this text, Theodore is arguing with the Apollinarists, who are maintaining that if the Word assumed a perfect man, this man would be a son of God distinct from the Word, and hence there would be two Sons. The Apollinarist contention, on the contrary, is that the Word assumed a body and a soul, but not a mind; and that hence, since this body and soul belonged to the Word, they did not constitute a person or a son distinct from the Word.

Theodore's reply is rather long, but it is important enough to warrant quoting [180].

> ... si Deus Verbum in natura perfectus Dei Filius est, quod attinet ad nativitatem a Patre est. Is ergo, qui extra hanc naturam est, non solum ab essentia (seu *persona*) sua pro se nominatus est, sed propter copulationem exactam cum Deo Verbo, in nomine Filii Dei confitemur. Et quod dicitur de Filio Dei, patet intelligi etiam de eo, qui assumtus est, quamquam perfectus est. Neque urgemur, ut propter hanc causam dicamus « duo filii ». Corpus enim et anima duas naturas esse neque inter se similes, manifestum est et etiam hi confitentur. Nam si duae naturae, quae assumtae sunt, non inter se similes sunt, neque (similes) Deo Verbo, qui assumsit, neque aliam personam pro se constituunt propter copulationem cum Deo Verbo, — notum est, neque naturam tertiam, quae est cognitio, si secundum eorum opinionem addatur, hoc efficere. Si enim, dum ambo anima et corpus ad Deum Verbum pertinent, qui ea assumsit, et dum vere filius est, propter copulationem exactam (haec ambo) una cum eo (filio Dei) nominantur et agnoscuntur, vides, etsi sit natura tertia, hoc non infringere opinionem nostram in hac re. Ut enim hae duae naturae propter copulationem exactam nomine naturae potioris h. e. ejus, qui ea (corpus et animam) assumsit, nominantur et praedicantur, ita, etsi sit natura tertia, « filius Dei » nominatur et vocatur non distinctus a Deo Verbo. Neque concedimus ut aliud quidquam extra naturam divinam, in essentia (seu *persona*) sua pro se intellegatur et apelletur

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180 *De Inc.*, fragment of *cod. 14669*, fol. 7; trad. Sachau, pp. 38-39. Where he says: « essentia (seu *persona*) » he is rendering the Syriac: *qnoma*, which is the equivalent of the Greek *hypostasis*.

« filius Dei »; sed nominatione « filius Dei » nos significamus etiam eum, qui assumtus est, quamvis homo perfectus sit.

There are several expressions here which could suggest that Theodore held a theory of the incarnation by the appropriation of human nature: whereby the humanity is not a person in its own right, because it belongs to the Word. But careful attention to the further explanation which he gives of this terminology will show that, in adapting the Apollinarist argument to his own advantage, Theodore has not presented anything here which is substantially different from what we have already seen. When he comes to explain the reason why these « natures » do not constitute a person distinct from the Word, we see that it is because the lesser natures are called by the name of the greater nature which has assumed them. In other words, the « perfect man » assumed by the Word does not constitute a person distinct from Him, because he is not a son of God in his own right, but rather shares in the title « Son of God » by his conjunction with the true Son. This explanation of the « One Son » is not essentially different from the one which we saw in the *Catechetical Homilies*: namely, that one could speak of « two sons » only if there were two *natural* Sons of God. The reason, therefore, why there are not two sons is because only the Word is Son by nature; the *homo assumptus* shares in this title, being the lesser nature joined to the greater. The unity of person and the unity of Son is due ultimately to the fact that the Word, in joining this man to Himself, shares with him His title of « Son », so that by the name « Son of God », we signify also the perfect man who was assumed.

Thus it appears that Theodore's concept of the communication of idioms is effective in the downward direction only: the man assumed can be called by the titles of the Word; the lesser nature enjoys the names of the greater. But this humanity does not belong to the Word in the sense that one can predicate of the Word as Person, what belongs to the humanity which he has made his own. One may, however, say of the « Son of God », what is true of either nature, because, while « the Word » means only the divine nature, the name « Son of God » includes not only the natural Son, but also the man who shares this title. The one *prosopon*, then, of whom all is predicated, is not the person of the Word, but

this « Son of God » who is both Divine Son and adoptive son.

Again we see why Theodore conceived of the one *prosopon* as something effected by the union. It is the result of the union that the man shares in the honors and titles of the Word; hence it is the result of the union that the one name « son of God » signifies both Word and man. Thus it is also the result of the union that the « Son of God » is one *prosopon,* one subject of whom one can say what is true either of Word or of man.

It should be noted that just as the title « son of God » is shared by the *homo assumptus,* and hence includes both natures, so also the title « Lord » is communicated to the man assumed, and becomes a name inclusive of both natures. To be sure, the title « Lord », and the domination which it signifies, belong by nature only to the one who is truly God [181]. But one effect of the inhabitation by good pleasure is the sharing of dominion; hence the *homo assumptus* receives this power from the one who dwells within him [182]. The result is that the name « Lord » becomes a term signifying both him who is Lord by nature, and the one who receives this power of domination from him. Hence Theodore will use the term « Lord » or « Christ Our Lord » to refer either to the Word, or to the man assumed, or as a common term of whom one may say what pertains to both. We have already seen how Theodore interprets the phrase of the Creed: « the one Lord Jesus Christ ». In this case, the term « Lord » is taken to apply particularly to the Divine Word, while « Jesus » is the name of the *homo assumptus;* hence the full name signifies the union of the two natures in one *prosopon* [183]. In other instan-

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[181] *Cat. Hom.* III, 2 (pp. 55-57).

[182] « Susceptus homo ius dominationis accepit ab inhabitatore suo, Verbo suo ... » (*Comm. in Ps.,* ed. Devreesse, p. 11). Cf. *Comm. in Jo.,* Vosté, p. 213: « Deinde ostendens quanta differentia habeatur inter se et illos, dicit: *Omnia quaecumque habet Pater, mea sunt.* Nam etiam universalem dominationem accepi, inquit. Et nos credimus hoc ita esse. Particeps est enim omnium quae sunt Dei Verbi, propter suam coniunctionem cum eo. Haec autem coniunctio facta est, mediante dono Spiritus. Igitur tribuit ei causam universalis suae dominationis ».

[183] Cf. *Cat. Hom.* III, 4-5 (pp. 57-59). Cf. also Vosté, p. 80: « At cum Dominus noster et Salvator Jesus Christus Deus sit et homo, atque Deo quidem naturaliter omnia insint, homini vero omnia deinceps devenerint per unionem cum Deo Verbo; iure ac merito tamquam homo

ces, the term: « the Lord Christ » is used to describe the *prosopon* which includes both natures. Thus, it is « Christ our Lord » of whom Theodore says [184]:

> ... il ne fut pas Dieu seulement, ni non plus homme seulement; mais vraiment c'est « en les deux » qu'il est par nature; aussi Dieu, aussi homme. Il est Dieu le Verbe, celui qui assuma, mais il est l'homme celui qui fut assumé.
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> ... Et celui qui assuma est ceci par nature: cela même qu'est Dieu le Père, car *il est Dieu auprès de Dieu* et tel est ce qu'est celui auprès de qui il était. Mais celui qui fut assumé est ceci par nature: cela même qu'étaient David et Abraham dont il est le fils et de la descendance de qui il est. Aussi est-il le Seigneur et le fils de David: fils de David à cause de la nature, mais Seigneur à cause de la dignité qu'il eut; mais il fut plus élevé que David son père, à cause de la nature qui l'assuma.

In the last part of this citation we see why the name « Lord » includes not only the Word but the man assumed; it is because the latter shares this dignity with the one who assumed him.

Hence, in the course of his *Commentary on St. John,* Theodore frequently uses the term « Dominus » as a name which signifies both the Word and the man assumed. « The Lord » can speak as God, but he can also speak as man; he can pass from the divinity to the humanity, even in the course of the same statement. « Dominus » is the title of the *common prosopon,* who can speak of both of the natures as « his own ». This is seen in striking fashion in a passage where Theodore comments on the verse: « Non sum solus, sed ego et Pater meus

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de violato sabbato accusatus, ex magnitudine Dei ostendit se sabbatum non violasse, licere autem sibi omnia quaecumque velit facere ».

[184] *Cat. Hom.* VIII, 1 (p. 187). Cf. *Comm. in Matt.*, quoted by Facundus, *P.L.* 67, 742 d: « Dominus enim Christus erat quidem et Deus et homo, utrumque secundum naturam similiter: ex altero quidem apparens, ex altero vero, utpote secundum naturam divinam, invisibilis exstans. Erat autem unum quidem omnibus manifestum, utpote quod apparebat: hominem enim eum omnes tunc temporis aestimabant esse, et amplius nihil. Quod enim in illo latebat, omnibus erat incredibile priore tempore; sed ex magnitudine eorum quae circa illum agebantur, et novitate miraculorum, quaecumque ad doctrinam videntium efficiebat, et ex gratia sancti Spiritus qui super apostolos venit, intellectus est postea et creditus verus Deus, essentialiter exstans Filius verus Dei aeterni ».

qui misit me » (John 8: 16). As Theodore understands this verse, the first « ego » (implied in « non sum solus ») is the *homo assumptus*; but the second « ego » (sed ego et Pater meus) is the Divine Son, who, along with the Father, is with the *homo assumptus*. This is made clear when Theodore paraphrases this second part [185].

> Sed sum ego cum eo, id est natura divina. Est autem cum eo etiam Pater.

This rather complicated interpretation of the two « ego's » in this one verse leads Theodore to a discussion of the way in which « the Lord » can use the pronoun « ego » whether he is referring to his divinity (scil. the Word) or his humanity (scil. the *homo assumptus*). As a comparison, he cites the use by St. Paul of the pronoun « mihi » in Rom. 7: 21, where he says: « Invenio igitur legem volenti mihi facere bonum, quoniam mihi malum adiacet ». This leads to the following conclusion [186]:

> At non de eodem dixit hoc: *Mihi volenti facere bonum,* et illud: *quoniam mihi malum adiacet;* quia ne contradictio quidem terminorum hoc tolerare potest; quamvis in utroque posuerit pronomen: *mihi.* Sed hoc: *Volenti mihi facere bonum,* dixit de anima; illud autem: *quoniam mihi malum adiacet,* dixit de corpore. Cum de duabus naturis dissereret et de duabus rebus diversis, apte iuxta differentiam naturarum, posuit cum utroque membro pronomen *mihi* tamquam de uno; hoc est de sua persona loquitur quoad utrumque propter unionem quae habetur inter corpus et animam. Ita etiam Dominus noster, quando de humanitate sua et de sua divitate loquebatur, pronomen *ego* retulit ad personam communem. Et ut ostenderet se in omnibus istis non de una eademque natura loqui, usus est variis verbis.

This passage illustrates the strength and the weakness of Theodore's concept of the unity of Christ; the strength in his insistence on the one person; the weakness in that this one person is not the Divine Person of the Word, but a « common person », a person who results from the union of the two natures. The use of the comparison of body and soul

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185 Vosté, p. 120, lines 19-20.
186 *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

in man, while it implies an intimate union of the two natures in Christ, really emphasizes the fact that his « one person » is something over and above both Word and man. This is brought out more clearly in a passage of the *Contra Apollinarem*, where Theodore discusses the application of this comparison of the union of body and soul [187].

In this text, Theodore is arguing against the Apollinarist contention that by his union with human flesh, the Word actually became man. Against this, he proposes the comparison of the union of soul and body. When soul and body are united, this does not mean that the soul becomes a body, or becomes mortal; nor does it mean that the body becomes a soul, or becomes immortal. Rather, each remains what it is, but from their union results one man. As Theodore applies this to the union of Word and man, it is clear that the Word and the man assumed stand in the same relation to the common *prosopon*, as do the soul and body to the man who results from their union. One may say of this common *prosopon* what is true of either nature, just as one may say of a man what is true of either his body or his soul. But the union does not warrant saying of the Word what pertains to the man assumed, any more than the union of soul and body warrants saying that the soul becomes a body, or becomes mortal. This comparison brings out unmistakeably the fact that as Theodore conceives the union of Word and man, it is strictly a question of two natures uniting to constitute one person. He simply does not conceive of the Word as the one Person involved; the Word is just one of the two natures, standing in symmetrical relation with the *homo assumptus* to the one person who is the effect of their union. Hence he cannot admit that it is the Word Himself who is the unique Person; that by His assumption of human nature the Word can be said to have become man; that thus one can properly predicate of the Word *qua* person what belongs to Him by reason of the humanity which he has made his own.

This, we believe, is the conclusion which flows from all that we have seen of Theodore's doctrine on the two natures, on their union, and on the one person. The Word and the *homo assumptus* are indeed united in one *prosopon*, but this *prosopon* is not the Divine Person of the Word. « Our Lord

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[187] *Contra Apoll.* IV, quoted by Facundus, *P.L.* 67, 755 c - 756 b.

Jesus Christ » is both God and man, both Word who assumes and man who is assumed — but one cannot say that the Word has really become man, or that the Word was born of Mary according to the flesh. There is one « Son of God », but this is because the one who was born of the Virgin Mary is an adoptive son of God, and shares in the title of the true Son who dwells in him by « good pleasure ».

One further conclusion remains to be drawn: that it is not without reason that Theodore of Mopsuestia has been called the « Father of Nestorianism ». By this we do not mean that Theodore was formally guilty of this heresy. But we mean that his concept of Christ: his basic solution to the problem of the unity of Word and man, is fundamentally akin to that proposed by Nestorius in the letter which was condemned at Ephesus. By the same token, it is fundamentally opposed to the doctrine of the letter of Cyril, which this council declared to be the orthodox interpretation of the Symbol of Nicea [188].

In a recent article, I. Ortiz de Urbina has pointed out the fact that the dogmatic decision of the Council of Ephesus, as expressed in the conciliar judgement on these two letters, meant the condemnation of the doctrine of Nestorius in those basic points wherein it stands in direct contradiction to the doctrine of Cyril [189]. The same author has listed these basic points of contradiction in his article [190]. Without listing them here again, we believe we can express the fundamental opposition between these two letters in the following terms. For Cyril of Alexandria, the incarnation means that God the Word is the subject of whom one rightly predicates not only the attributes of his divinity, but also the actions and passions of that humanity which He has « made His own ». Hence, the Creed really means to say that God the Word, without change or loss of divinity, became man, and was born of the

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188 Letter of Cyril: ed. Schwartz, *A.C.O.* I, 1, 1, pp. 25-28 (also in Migne, *P.G.* 77, 44-49). Letter of Nestorius in reply: *A.C.O.* I, 1, 1, pp. 29-32 (also in Migne, *P.G.* 77, 49-57, and in Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 173-180). Judgement of the Fathers of Ephesus on these letters: *A.C.O.* I, 1, 2, pp. 13-36.

189 I. Ortiz de Urbina, S. J., « Il dogma di Efeso », *Mélanges Martin Jugie, Revue des Etudes Byzantines*, XI (1953), Institut Français d'Etudes Byzantines, Paris, p. 239.

190 *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

Virgin Mary according to the flesh. For Nestorius, on the other hand, there is no distinction between what can be said of God the Word, and what is strictly true of the divinity as such. Therefore the actions and passions of the humanity cannot be predicated of God the Word, but only of « Jesus Christ », or « the Lord », or « the Son », — names which signify the two natures in the one *prosopon*. Hence Mary is « Mother of Christ », but not « Mother of God ».

There can be no doubt on which side Theodore of Mopsuestia stands in this conflict of ideologies. The ultimate point of contradiction comes down to this: is the one subject, of whom all these verbs of the Creed are predicated, really God the Word or not? Theodore certainly would agree with Nestorius that it is not. But the Fathers of Ephesus agreed with Cyril of Alexandria that it is. Nestorius, as well as Theodore, taught that the two natures are united in one *prosopon*. But neither understood that this one *prosopon*, this one subject of whom one can predicate what belongs to both divinity and humanity, is actually the Divine Person of the Word. Here is the basic defect of Nestorianism. It is likewise the basic defect of the christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia. For all the positive and sound elements which are to be found in his thinking, one cannot deny the essential agreement between the doctrine of Theodore and the doctrine of that letter of Nestorius which was condemned at Ephesus. We believe this fact is ample justification for the verdict of the « Doctor of the Incarnation »: that Theodore of Mopsuestia was the Father of Nestorianism.

CONCLUSION

In this conclusion we shall summarize briefly the principal problems which this thesis set out to solve, and the solutions which we have offered for them.

In our study of the literature concerning Theodore which has appeared in the past twenty-five years, since the rediscovery of several of his works awakened new interest in his theology, we found that the opinion of scholars was divided on two fundamental points. The first of these was a question of the sources which could be used and relied upon in a study of Theodore's christology. The second was a question whether this christology is really infected with the « Nestorianism » of which Theodore has stood so long condemned. Now these two questions are intimately related, since the sources whose reliability has been questioned, are precisely those extracts upon which Theodore's reputation for Nestorianism had been based. According to M. Richard and R. Devreesse, a comparison of these extracts with parallel texts in Latin and Syriac versions of his works, shows the extracts in so many cases to have been mutilated and falsified, that one can not put any faith in the compilers of the hostile florilegia. Others, however, were not convinced that this question had been definitively settled. In view of the importance of a number of these extracts, as representing a major portion of what is extant of Theodore's strictly dogmatic works, we proposed to examine the proofs which had been offered to prove that they had been falsified.

Without going into the details of this study, we can say in general that Richard's argument is based on the supposition that an ancient Syriac version of the *De Incarnatione* (of which we possess some pages) is sufficiently faithful to the original, that divergence from it is enough to prove deliberate falsification of our Greek texts. We have tested this supposition in a number of cases where there is no reason to suspect the Greek text, or indeed, where there is positive

proof of its genuinity. In a number of such cases, there is a discrepancy whose only reasonable explanation is that the Syriac translator has departed from the original text. In fact, in the very passages where Richard sees mutilation on doctrinal grounds, there is good reason to accept the Greek version in preference to the Syriac.

We have also examined the evidence of falsification presented by R. Devreesse. Here we have found that in a number of cases a more careful examination of the parallel texts tends rather to confirm the accuracy of the hostile extract, than to impugn it. While it is true that in some instances the compilers can be shown to have omitted necessary context, still, in general, we have not found Devreesse's sweeping charges of falsification to be justified. The conclusion to which our study of this matter led us, was that with the proper caution, one could and should make use of this « hostile » material in a thorough study of Theodore's christology.

The second problem which we set out to solve was precisely the question of this christology. Here we limited ourselves to that aspect of his doctrine which still finds scholars divided: namely his concept of the unity of Christ. In approaching this question, we first considered Theodore's theological milieu, in order to see how the problem of the unity of Christ had presented itself to him. We studied the doctrine of his predecessors and his adversaries, looking especially to their attitude on that principle of unity whereby the Divine Word is taken to be the subject of all predication relating to Christ. We saw that in the face of the Arian argument against the divinity of the Word, Athanasius still maintained this principle of unity, whereas the reply of Eustathius meant its abandonment. We likewise saw that Diodorus, in combatting the errors of Apollinaris, rejected that communication of idioms whereby the actions and passions of the humanity could be predicated of the Word. In order to safeguard the divinity of the Word, the Antiochenes established a rigid distinction between what could be said of the Word, and what of the man. This led to the setting up of two subjects of predication, with the consequent division of Christ into the « Son of God » and the « Son of Mary ».

Finally, we came to the doctrine of Theodore himself. In the first place, we studied his concept of the « two natures »;

the Word and the *homo assumptus*. Here we saw that there are many elements of Theodore's language which would suggest that his *homo assumptus* is really a subject *sui juris* of those actions and passions which cannot be predicated of the « divine nature ». We looked in vain for a distinction between what could be said of the Word and what is true of the divinity as such.

Secondly, we examined Theodore's concept of the incarnation. Here we found that his interpretation of *John* 1: 14 in the sense: Verbum factum est *in homine*, pervaded all his thinking on Christ. The incarnation meant that the Word « took up his dwelling in a man », and thus became man « in the opinion of those who did not realize who was within ». But this was no ordinary inhabitation of God in a man: it was such as to result in one *prosopon*. We examined the texts wherein the nature of this inhabitation was explained, and found it to involve the extraordinary cooperation of the Word with the *homo assumptus*, and the sharing with him of the honors and dominion proper to the natural Son of God. What then is this one *prosopon* which is the effect of this union by inhabitation? It is the one subject of whom the Scriptures and the Creed predicate what refers to both Word and man assumed. It is the « one *prosopon* of the Son », since the term « Son » includes both him who is Son of God by nature, and the man who shares in this title, being an adopted son, the « son in whom the Father is well-pleased ». The one *prosopon* is likewise the « Lord Jesus Christ », since this name signifies both him who is Lord by nature, and Jesus, the man assumed, who is Lord by reason of his conjunction with the Word.

Whatever is true, therefore, of either Word or man can be said of « the one *prosopon* », of « the Son », of « Christ the Lord ». But this communication of idioms is valid in one direction only. It allows one to say, in a certain sense, that the *homo assumptus* is « Son » and « Lord ». But one cannot say of God the Word that he was born of the Virgin Mary in virtue of the humanity which he assumed. The « one *prosopon* » of whom all is predicated is not God the Word, but it is a *prosopon* effected by the union of the two natures; it is a *common prosopon*, including both God the Word and the man in whom he dwells.

Finally, we remarked that this is substantially identical with the doctrine of that letter of Nestorius which was con-

demned at Ephesus. The cardinal point of contradiction between Cyril and Nestorius turned precisely on the question whether or not God the Word is the subject of whom the Creed said: « He was born of the Virgin Mary ». According to Nestorius, this can be said of « Christ », of « the Son », of « the Lord », — but not of God the Word. In this he showed himself a faithful exponent of the principles of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The decision of the Fathers of Ephesus meant that it was not sufficient to unite the two natures in one *prosopon*. One did not do justice to the basic fact of Christianity unless one understood that this « one person », this subject of whom the Creed said both that He was begotten of the Father, and that He was born of the Virgin Mary — is in fact none other than God the Word. If the failure to recognize this fact is the root-error of Nestorius, then it cannot be denied that Theodore of Mopsuestia, despite his orthodox intentions, was indeed what he has so long been called: the « Father of Nestorianism ».

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